Practical solutions for the reform of national security operations
U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War
A Project of the Center for International Policy
edited by Craig Eisendrath, foreword by Tom Harkin
paper EAN: 978-1-56639-848-0 (ISBN: 1-56639-848-7)
"The distinguished contributors to this book present a wide range of perspectives from which to assess our intelligence system. Their decades of public service command tremendous respect. Their views break new ground and demand the attention of the White House and of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. This book should be required reading by all congressional committees concerned with intelligence policy, surveillance, and appropriations, and by all Americans."
Senator Tom Harkin, from the Foreword
The Cold War has been over for ten years and no country threatens this nation's existence, yet, we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. Even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information (leading, among other things, to a grossly inflated military budget) as it supported corrupt regimes around the world, promoted the drug trade, and repeatedly violated foreign and domestic laws. And worse, protected by a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes. Instead, it grew larger and more insulated every year.
In National Insecurity ten prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what needs to be done to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and the foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can protect U.S. Security while upholding the values of our democratic system.
The contributors include Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, advisor to President Kennedy, and author of The Cuban Missile Crisis; Melvin A. Goodman, former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs; Robert E. White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay and president of the Center for International Policy; Robert V. Keeley, former ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius; Jack A. Blum, chief investigator for Senator Church's Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for the Senate investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal; Kate Doyle, analyst at the National Security Archive; Alfred W. McCoy, author of The Politics of Heroin; Robert Dreyfuss, a journalist who publishes regularly on intelligence matters; Richard A. Stubbing, who for twenty years handled the intelligence budget for the Office of Management and Budget; Pat M. Holt, former chief of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and author of Secret Intelligence and Public Policy; and the editor.
Excerpt available at www.temple.edu/tempress
"The United States intelligence system is badly in need of reform. Its budget$29 billion in 1998and its mode of operation still reflect the life-or-death view of international relations of the Cold War. Between 1949 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, no cost was deemed too high and no deed to brutal when survival seemed at stake. In no area was this truer than in the areas of U.S. intelligence responsible for espionage and covert action. Paramilitary operations, election rigging, disinformation, massive electronic eavesdropping, and common cause with a host of the world's most undesirable characters all seemed justified, despite the fact that these actions systematically eroded our reputation around the world and our credibility at home.
" In October 1998, almost ten years after the end of the Cold War, the United States intelligence community received what Tim Weiner of the New York Times called "the largest spending increase for intelligence in 15 years." The increase came despite a long string of intelligence failures, including the intelligence community's inability "to foresee India's nuclear tests, to quickly and accurately assess a North Korean missile launch, to come up with a workable plan to undermine the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and to provide sharp analysis of global financial crises." ¹
" The book argues that today we have the strongest reasons for change and that change can take place only through an analysis of the intelligence system from the ground up. What went wrong? How can it be fixed? What is the proper mission of intelligence? How should it be implemented?"
From the Introduction
¹New York Times, October 21, 1998.
"[A] comprehensive sweep of the disputes and principles that underlie the struggle for an ethics-grounded U.S. intelligence commitment."
"[The book] was published in 2000 but unfortunately, its relevance and importance have increased exponentially since the turn of the century.... This book is a must read." The review is available on the EU Policy Network website: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 43-46.
The Journal of European Affairs
"National Insecurity is only the latest in a long line of volumes that make you think about the good and the bad all over again."
"Veteran diplomats, former congressional staff members and journalists who specialize in intelligence coverage join forces in this collection of essays to call for a total overhaul of U.S. intelligence strategy."
Foreword Senator Tom Harkin
Introduction Craig Eisendrath
1. After the Cold War: The Need for Intelligence Roger Hilsman
2. Espionage and Covert Action Melvin A. Goodman
3. Too Many Spies, Too Little Intelligence Robert E. White
4. CIA-Foreign Service Relations Robert V. Keeley
5. Covert Operations: The Blowback Problem Jack A. Blum
6. The End of Secrecy: U.S. National Security and the New Openness Movement Kate Doyle
7. Mission Myopia: Narcotics as Fallout From the CIA's covert Wars Alfred W. McCoy
8. TECHINT: The NSA, the NRO, and NIMA Robert Dreyfuss
9. Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding Richard A. Stubbing
10. Who's Watching the Store? Executive-Branch and Congressional Surveillance Pat M. Holt
Conclusions Crag Eisendrath
About the Center for International Policy
About the Contributors
Craig Eisendrath is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. He served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.
Contributors: Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, advisor to President Kennedy, and author of The Cuban Missle Crisis; Melvin A. Goodman, former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs; Robert E. White, former U.S. ambassador to El Salavador and Paraguay and president of the Center for International Policy; Robert V. Keeley, former ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius; Jack A. Blum, chief investigator for Senator Church's Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for the Senate investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal; Kate Doyle, analyst at the National Security Archive; Alfred W. McCoy, author of The Politics of Heroin; Robert Dreyfuss, a journalist who publishes regulary on intelligence matters; Richard A. Stubbing, who for twenty years handled the intelligence buget for the Office of Management and Budget; Pat M. Holt, former chief of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and author of Secrt Intelligence and Public Policy; and the editor.
Political Science and Public Policy
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