CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Migration, Transnationalization, and Ethnic and Racial Dynamics in a Changing New York

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This is a book about the meaning and experience of contemporary immigration to the United States, focusing specifically on New York City. The chapters provide insights into both the particular historical juncture in which New York finds itself and the current state of studies of immigration. We seek to understand the complex processes of assimilation, incorporation, transnationalization, and ethnic and racial formation in the context of the city's changing political economy. And we focus on the social dynamics of New York City's racial, ethnic, and national diversities as these three elements interact with a changing political economy to place groups in particular positions in economic and social hierarchies and structures.

Following the Introduction, the book is divided into two parts, with the first focusing on transnational processes and the second on immigrant incorporation. Part I has six chapters. Its main analytical work is to add a historical dimension to the study of transnational life and processes among immigrants in New York, and to contextualize these processes through case studies that examine the local effects of global, national, and local policies and stratification patterns (see also Morales and Bonilla 1993; Sassen 1988, 1991). Part II also has six chapters and focuses on immigrant incorporation, examining such issues as racialization, ethnicity, and economic structures.
Three Social Facts About Transnationalization, Immigrant Incorporation, and the Changing Ethnic Structure and Political Economy of New York City

Three social facts related to New York and immigration frame this book. First, New York continues to be a major center of immigration with changing racial and ethnic dynamics. Second, racial, ethnic, and gender processes are interrelated with change in the local and global economies. Third, New York is an important site of transnational action and a node in the global economy. Our discussion includes new analyses of some established research topics, such as poverty among Puerto Ricans, as well as among new groups, such as Peruvians, and new themes, such as the creation of social capital in the context of interminority relations. This approach underlines the importance of specifying the structural and historical context of the analysis, no matter what its theoretical stripe (Tilly 1981). We discuss each of these themes briefly, before moving onto a critical engagement with the literature on migration.

Compositional Change

New York has undergone profound changes in its political economy and its ethnic and racial composition over the past half century and especially in the past twenty-five years. The first change has been from an economy based in manufacturing and related industries to one based in services and related industries, and it has been ably analyzed (see, e.g., Mollenkopf and Castells 1991; Sassen 1988, 1991; Waldinger 1996;). One statistic suffices to illustrate the change. In 1950 manufacturing accounted for 42.8 percent of the city's 3.47 million jobs; in 1997 it accounted for only 15.8 percent of the city's 3.41 million jobs (Mollenkopf 1999, 414). The major sectors of growth have been in services, producing both high and low income jobs. The end result has been an "hourglass economy," with many good jobs at the top for those in highly skilled "information jobs" requiring high levels of education and many jobs at the bottom in the non-union, unstable labor markets populated by the city's poor, including increasing numbers of immigrants. Middle-class jobs offering stable employment and a ladder out of poverty—especially those not requiring college educations—are declining relative to the growth in high and low skilled, and paid, jobs. Many analysts, Saskia Sassen (1988,1991) in particular, link this hourglass economy with larger processes of globalization and New York's growing importance in this global economy. Profound transformations in economics, social relations, and relations of governance have accompanied New York's engagement with such global systems (see also Cordero Guzmán and Grosfoguel 2000; Mollenkopf 1999; Sassen 1996; Waldinger 1996). Alex Julca's analysis in Chapter 11 of Peruvian immigrants' incorporation into and adaptation to New York's unsteady labor markets offers one case of such dynamics.

Simultaneously, the city has undergone tremendous demographic change. In 1950 New York was a largely white, native-born, working-class city whose main jobs were in manufacturing. Now whites are a numerical minority (though still the largest
minority, and a much larger proportion of voters), 85 percent of jobs are not in manufacturing, and interethnic and interracial dynamics have become even more complicated by the influx of many new, nonwhite immigrants. In 1997, non-Hispanic whites constituted 36 percent of the city's population, while non-Hispanic blacks were 29 percent, non-Hispanic Asians were 8 percent, and Hispanics were 26 percent. Moreover, immigrants and their children—"foreign stock"—constitute significant percentages of the population in all these groups: 55 percent of the black population, 59 percent of Latinos (excluding Puerto Ricans), 98 percent of Asians, and, surprisingly, 52 percent of whites in the city (Mollenkopf 1999). New York received more than 1.5 million immigrants between 1980 and 1996 (Rivera-Batiz 1996), the largest number since the beginning of this century. Also, New York receives the most diverse immigrant population of any city in the country, and perhaps the world. The New York City Emergency Immigrant Education Census of 1996 indicates that there were children from 204 countries in its schools, and 23 different countries had more than 7,000 new immigrant children enter within the previous three years (Rivera-Batiz 1996). Moreover, this immigrant influx has changed the greater New York region; Reynolds Farley (1998) estimates that 48 percent of the region's population is of foreign stock.

These two large-scale changes are affecting other major cities with large immigrant populations, such as Los Angeles (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996), and doing so in broadly similar ways that include a cutback in public services and fiscal retrenchment that can be traced to the dynamics of globalization and global cities (Sassen 1988, 1991, 1998). But several characteristics make New York different from Los Angeles. New York is the oldest immigrant city in the United States and one of the country's original and certainly historically its most important port of entry for the immigrants during previous waves of immigration. As a result, New York's politics are much more pro-immigrant than those of Los Angeles and other cities, not because New Yorkers are more enlightened on the topic of immigration, but because the city's political institutions and population dynamics have evolved in ways that require greater collaboration among ethnic groups. John Mollenkopf (1999) cites three factors that make New York's politics more pro-immigrant than Los Angeles's. Whites in New York, he points out, must form majority voting coalitions to govern, while whites in Los Angeles do not. Also, the population of New York is more evenly balanced between blacks, whites, and Latinos than is the population in Los Angeles, and there are more immigrants and their children in each group in New York than in Los Angeles, thus constraining anti-immigrant sentiment. Furthermore, New York's political institutions are more broadly representative than are those of Los Angeles in the sense that New York's power is more decentralized and provides more outlets for representation and the negotiation of conflict. Cordero-Guzmán and Navarro (2000; see also Cordero-Guzmán 2001) analyze another factor that makes New York different from most other cities—its large number of long-term community-based organizations (CBOs) serving immigrants. These CBOs and other service institutions are politically well connected, have been in existence for many years, and can advocate on behalf of their clients in ways that similar organizations in Los Angeles have not and cannot.
These differences manifest themselves in the pro-immigrant stances of the current mayor, Rudy Giuliani, a moderate-to-conservative Republican. While New York's multicultural history has not inured it to the dangers of anti-immigrant sentiments or racism, New York's current immigration politics reflect its historical multiculturalism and the conflicts inherent in it. The comparison with Los Angeles is ironic and telling. The irony lies in the fact that whereas much of the population boom in California since 1900 has been whites fleeing the East Coast and Midwest when immigrants and minorities entered, seeking greener pastures, less crowded cities, and whiter neighborhoods, their descendants now live in a state with a huge influx of immigrants (Mollenkopf 1999). The effects of the historical differences in political culture and institutions between New York and California can be seen by contrasting political leadership on immigration issues in the two states. California governor Pete Wilson led the political fight to pass the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 in his state in 1994—which denied all but emergency aid to undocumented immigrants and placed an affirmative obligation on public employees, such as doctors and teachers, to report those they suspected of being undocumented—and Propositions 209 and 227 later, and Los Angeles Mayor Riordan adopted largely neutral positions toward such anti-immigrant legislation (Mollenkopf 1999). In New York, Giuliani sued the federal government to stop enforcement of municipal regulations that forbid city employees from sharing information on a person's legal status except in the context of a criminal investigation, and to challenge the legality of stopping food stamp distribution to elderly and disabled legal immigrants. There are two points. First, in New York, even a Republican mayor whose support comes strongly from white, U.S.-born citizens in the outer boroughs, must support immigrants, even if he deviates from his party's line. This difference marks one way that New York is particularly interesting, and perhaps distinct. There are some signs that things are changing. Governor Wilson's anti-immigrant policies actually helped make more Latino immigrants into U.S. citizens in California by pushing them to defend themselves with citizenship and the vote, and Latinos have entered California politics as never before. For example, in 1999-2000, both the Speaker of the California House and the Minority leader were minorities, and both Democrats and Republicans have actively been courting the Latino vote (see Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross 1998). The second point is that Giuliani's pro-immigrant stance did not stop him from adopting a variety of positions that hurt these same immigrants, including cutting spending on, and restricting access to, social services (Cordero-Guzmán and Navarro 2000).

Ethnic and Racial Dynamics

Having more enlightened racial and ethnic politics than Los Angeles, however, is a standard to which few should be content to aspire, and New York has plenty of room for improvement in its racial and ethnic dynamics. In particular, New York's relative success in the sphere of formal politics, in which blacks and Puerto Ricans are somewhat included in the liberal establishment, does not negate its particular history with racialization processes in other aspects of life. This leads us to a larger analytical point,
that racialization processes can proceed differently at different levels of social life. In politics, they can work in one way and in the labor market in another and in schools, or social arenas, in another. New York and its environs also have the distinction of being the primary initial destination for Puerto Ricans, West Indians, and other black and Latino immigrants, and a main destination for African Americans migrating from the south. While this diversity has increased awareness of the presence and experiences of other groups, it has also made New York the site for the development of a sophisticated stratification system where racial phenotype, immigrant status, and ethnicity and nationality all figured into creating racializing hierarchies, which evolved as the definitions of whiteness and blackness, and other categories, have changed. These categories matter because once they are established, they influence life chances and future trajectories. Immigrants identified as black experienced a segregation and discrimination that stratified their incorporation and subsequent economic, geographical, and social mobility (Massey and Denton 1993; Torres 1995).

Understanding racializing dynamics helps put the "immigrant analogy" and related processes in context (see Omi and Winant 1986). In its standard form, the immigrant analogy compares the socioeconomic fates of African Americans and non-black immigrants and uses the greater historical success of the latter group to infer the moral culpability of native minorities and exonerate the larger society of any responsibility for structuring those different trajectories (Lieberson 1980; Model 1990; Roediger 1991; Waldinger 1996). This analogy traces its intellectual roots back to W.E.B. Du Bois’s argument that poor whites received a "public psychological wage" by being "not black" in the United States, which proved their fitness for membership in a free community (Roediger 1991, 25; see also Du Bois 1977, 700-701; Ignatiev 1995). While Du Bois attempted to explain why poor whites in the postbellum South ignored their common class interests to ally with the white aristocracy in exploiting and demonizing blacks, David Roediger (1991) insightfully applies this analysis to the white working class, including immigrants, during the last wave of migration. Italian and Irish immigrants of the last wave were not seen as being white when they came into the United States. They demonstrated their whiteness, however, in large part by embracing anti-black racism and thus received advantages in the labor market, in housing, and in other spheres of life. This reasoning is still used to explain the different outcomes among descendants of African Americans and white immigrants: My ancestors endured discrimination when they came to this country, but they prospered through hard work. If other groups—such as African Americans—do not prosper, then it must be their fault.

This logic both absolves the larger society of any responsibility and upholds the image of a level playing field. It also provides what seems to many descendants of these immigrants a plausible narrative to explain the fate of these two groups. The problem, though, lies in the failure to consider the effects of racial segregation in housing and the devastating and persistent effects such segregation and differences in resources can have, as convincingly shown in the work of Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993). Furthermore, this logic does not consider racial and ethnic dynamics in the allocation of oppor-
tunities in jobs (Model 1990), or in the structuring of political power. In fact, it denies what could be argued is a foundational social premise of the U.S. republic, which immigrants learn quickly when they come to the United States: Only whites are fit for citizenship, for full membership in the polity and society, so make sure that when your group’s ethnicity and race are defined, they fall on the "white ethnic" and not "native minority" side of the color line (Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 1991). What then occurs among many of these groups is a process of "whitening." The Irish, Jews, Italians, and before them the Bohemians, Magyars, Slavs, and other "races" were seen in the twentieth century—and for some in the postwar period—as non-white, as a different race from the white Protestants who defined the "mainstream" ideals for many years—witness Milton Gordon’s account, published in 1964—and the white Roman Catholics who came to the fore later (see also Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). In particular, as groups have improved their position in politics, in the economy, and in the neighborhoods they lived in, and they have become "whiter"; hence, the Jews, Irish, and Italians are now considered white. Groups that did not have "success in" all three of these categories did not become "white."

These racializing dynamics are repeating themselves in New York and throughout the United States today under somewhat new and different conditions. First, most newcomers are immigrants "of color," meaning non-white, and come from continents other than Europe. We put "of color" in quotation marks because the Italians, Jews, and Irish, among others, were also considered non-white when they arrived, and it is not certain what category some of these new immigrants will ultimately fall into. Moreover, the experience of racialization will likely also vary not just by the four main racial categories of Asian, Latino, black, and white but also by particular ethnic and national groups, and according to levels of socioeconomic success, and even by gender. Second, the racialization process in New York City includes also Puerto Ricans in the most stigmatized minority category with native-born blacks because of their colonial status, cultural differences, and experience of discrimination. Third, the immigrant status of the first generation and the ethnic identity of much of the second and subsequent generations can partially (but will not necessarily) insulate some of them from the vagaries of American racism, as discussed by Virna Bashi Bobb (Chapter 10, this volume), and others (e.g., M. Waters 1994, 1996, 1999). Many immigrants and their descendants, especially Latinos (but also Asians), have an "in-between" status, in which they are "not Black but not White" (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997, 905) or "native born, and not black" (Smith 1995, 1996). In this state, the meaning of their Latino identity, and its relationship to the U.S. color line, is not clear and is still being determined.

Taken together, these three conditions have made for interesting distinctions in social identities and outcomes for many new immigrants and their children. For example, some West Indian youth who are seen by mainstream U.S. society as "black" might end up identifying themselves, depending on factors such as education, family social class, and parents’ affiliation with ethnic organizations, as "ethnics" and hence not black in the same ways native-born blacks are black and not affected by U.S.
racism in the same way native blacks are. Other such West Indian youth might end up as (racialized) native minorities whose lives are much like native blacks and whose life chances are similarly limited, or as immigrants who are outside the U.S. racial dichotomy altogether (M. Waters 1994, 1999), and who perceive but are not much affected by racist limits. In an explicit statement of the immigrant analogy, Mexican gang and religious youth group leaders told Robert Smith (1995, 1996) that Mexicans, and all members of the "Hispanic race"—which they said includes Mexicans, Central Americans, South Americans, and Puerto Ricans born on the island—were better than native-born minorities, which include blacks and Puerto Ricans born in New York. The difference, they argued, lay in the positive effect of their immigrant culture as against the deleterious effect of the cultures of native minorities, thus explicitly elaborating a racialized schema to explain their own difference and success (Smith 1995, 1996, 2001). These same people, however, lament the turn that young Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans in New York have taken since those statements were made in the early 1990s. National studies demonstrate that, with important exceptions, Mexicans with lighter skins, especially those growing up in Spanish-speaking neighborhoods, do better in school and have higher self-esteem than do Mexicans with darker skins (Murgia and Telles 1996). One could argue that in certain arenas, New York City is becoming more of what the notable Caribbeanist Gordon Lewis calls a "multilayered pigmentocracy" (1983; see also Grosfoguel 1996) where pigmented hierarchy greatly affects life chances. Analyzing how this pigmentocracy emerges and is reproduced is an important analytical task.

The interplay between racializing processes, the immigrant analogy, and economic changes and social hierarchies is playing out in interesting and different ways for Asians and Latinos. Puerto Ricans represent perhaps the paradigmatic case of how these racializing dynamics can combine with economic change and discrimination to create enduring poverty. Moreover, the version of the immigrant analogy aimed at Puerto Ricans has a twist because they are both migrants and citizens. There is a perception that citizenship has advantages; but second-class citizenship does not. As discussed, Puerto Ricans were subjected to racial segregation and discrimination in schools and neighborhoods that concentrated the negative effects of poverty (Massey and Denton 1993; Torres 1995). They migrated in large numbers to New York during the 1940s through the 1970s when other immigration was at historic lows, but vacancies for entrepreneurship were also low. Furthermore, they were discriminated against in the labor market and their employment was concentrated in the declining manufacturing and garment industry. This meant that better employment and economic mobility were limited (Waldinger 1996). In addition, when the previous generation of Jews and Italians left the industry and vacancies in entrepreneurial activities did open up, Puerto Ricans faced new competition in the form of better financed and more experienced immigrants from Asia and Latin America. At the same time, "second-generation" Puerto Ricans—those born in New York—were not entering this industry but pursuing employment in other sectors instead, with some, especially women, emphasizing education and professional employment as a route to upward mobility. Here the problem was that as this
mainland-raised and -educated second generation came of age in the 1970s through 1990s, they faced an hourglass economy. Many found employment in the professional sector, but others found that their educational attainment was too high to allow them to compete effectively for the lower- and middle-income jobs but considered too low for the better jobs (Rodriguez 1989; Torres 1995). The Puerto Rican experience in New York City illustrates the development and maintenance of a sophisticated stratification system based on social-class background, but where the allocation and distribution of material resources is also driven by the dynamics of race, ethnicity, and national origin.

The experience of Dominicans provides another example of how race and political economy combine to produce particular outcomes. Dominican entrepreneurs have shown an impressive capacity to mobilize social capital and circumvent their exclusion from mainstream institutions in trying to achieve upward mobility, and some have used this dynamism to make a case that immigrant success is due to an abundance of, and native minority distress due to a lack of, work ethic (Chavez 1991). Others argue that we can deepen our understanding of these differences through a focus on community-level variables, which articulate a community's economic and social energies and are often neglected for purely structural or cultural explanations (Portes and Zhou 1992, 1993). Yet the larger Dominican population is coming to look more and more like the larger Puerto Rican population in terms of its low income and educational levels, its use of public assistance, and its rate of single-headed households, as well as other indicators of social inequality (Hernandez, Rivera-Batiz, and Agodini. 1995; Lobo, Salvo, and Virgin 1996, 1998). These similarities push the analysis toward structural causation, especially racial segregation and the resulting concentration in poverty (Massey and Denton 1993), as key in determining Dominican life chances in New York.

Asians as a group have a very different relationship to racialization than do many Latinos, particularly those with more "African" features and darker skin. One way this relationship manifests itself is in differential access to entrepreneurial training and resources, as analyzed by Jennifer Lee in Chapter 12. Lee asks why African Americans have much lower rates of self-employment than Koreans and Jews, and what are the consequences. She starts by noting the importance of entrepreneurship for upward mobility among some immigrant groups and its clear importance in our thinking about such matters. She then explicates the reasons for lower rates of entrepreneurship she gleaned from fieldwork and interviews with Korean, Jewish, and African American entrepreneurs. In contrast to the Koreans and Jews, who were able to secure capital for their businesses through family and friends even when they had little credit, almost all African Americans had to use formal institutions, such as banks, to get credit to start their businesses. Moreover, when problems emerged, African Americans had less help in overcoming obstacles, such as fires and robberies, than did Koreans and Jews. She shows clear racial patterns in social processes supporting entrepreneurship, which is one important avenue to upward mobility.

Another way these racializing dynamics manifest themselves is in the decreasing "social distance" between Asians and whites; Asians have become less "socially dis-
tant" from whites than Latinos and blacks (Alba and Nee 1999,144-45). On the whole and over several generations, Asians and their children tend to achieve parity with or surpass their white non-Hispanic counterparts in terms of income and, especially, education. As with Jews in the past, the limited mobility available in the ethnic niche helps push the second and subsequent generations toward education and mainstream employment, a tendency made stronger by the greater rewards of education in an hourglass economy (Alba and Nee 1999; Nee, Sanders, and Sernau 1994). Moreover, Asians, especially women, increasingly marry "out," most often with whites. David Lopez (1999) compares rates of endogamy among two cohorts of Asian women in Los Angeles aged 55-64 years and aged 25-34 years. The younger women married out at higher rates than the older ones, with endogamy rates of 86 percent for the older ones and 44 percent for the younger ones. The Japanese endogamy rate for older women was 89 percent, compared with 32 percent for the younger women, a rate that approached the 24 percent among Jews. The disproportionate representation of Asians at America's elite universities also signals a decrease in the social distance and a possible whitening of Asians in certain spheres of social life.

Another example involves the dynamics of the 1991 redistricting on the Lower East Side of New York City (Woo 1997). In the redistricting process, one intent was to increase the chances of electing an Asian to the city council from Chinatown. The question was raised whether to draw the district to include the Lower East Side, which would put Asians in a district with more blacks and Latinos, or whether, to go west toward Greenwich Village so that it would include more whites. The latter course was chosen, apparently on the belief that Asians would be more likely to be elected in a "white" district than in a black and Latino one. In the black and Latino district, many Asian leaders feared either that they would be treated as the newest minorities who would not be given a chance to get power or that Asians' middle-class status would be held against them were the district drawn to include more lower income people on the east side. The "in-between" status of Asians seems to be tipping toward a whitening process that is very reminiscent of the course taken by Jews—from high levels of niche concentration in self-employment, through universities and into more mainstream employment, and out to suburbs to increasingly intermarry with whites.

A final example is analyzed in Johanna Lessinger's discussion in Chapter 8 of Indian immigrants and their children as they "confront the American Dream." Lessinger insightfully analyzes how Indian immigrants have constructed their social location and self-identification as members of the professional middle class, who, despite their dark skin, are not racial but rather neutrally ethnic—"honorary whites" in her phrase. Part of this neutrality has been a cultivated absence, as a group, from politics, broadly defined. This homogenized picture of an upwardly mobile group incorporating to the right side of America's racial divide and the immigrant analogy is complicated by the internal stratification within the Indian population, and the resulting contradictions. Many Indians are not professionals but shopkeepers or small entrepreneurs, whose success depends, like that of other immigrants, on their being able to exploit their worse-off coethnics as cheap labor. Moreover, the Indians'
embrace of a kind of racial neutrality leaning toward whiteness is not completely accepted by many, including U.S. natives, some of whom have violently attacked Indians. Among the U.S.-born second generation, it is harder to maintain their race-neutral position as other natives try to fit them into black, white, or Latino categories or reject them for not being able to fit.

As these examples show, the relationship to the racialization process will differ for various nationality groups listed under the label "Asian" and will depend on their place in the economy, what neighborhoods they live in, and their reception by institutions—corporate, governmental, and social—now dominated by whites, especially in the suburbs, or by earlier minorities. Moreover, while Asians have certainly achieved significant upward mobility, through ethnic solidarity and through education and geographical mobility and decreased social distance with whites, Asian ethnicity can also function as a screen, hiding coethnic exploitation from scrutiny (see Chin 1996; Kwong 1987, 1997).

This brief discussion has generated more questions than answers about the current racialization process. Will Asians become "ethnics" as the Jews, Irish, Italians, and Eastern Europeans did and hence "whiter," or at least "ethnic, but not black"? Will we continue to have four racial categories—whites, Asians, blacks, Latinos—with the former two seen as falling on the "right" side of America's color line, and the latter two on the "wrong" side? Will or have light-skinned Latinos—such as Colombians—become "whiter," particularly if they are economically more successful? How will educational, geographical, and work mobility affect each group's relationship to racialization? How will different kinds of Latino groups negotiate their "in-between" status as being not black and not white? How will the fact of different kinds of pigmentation and physical appearance among Caribbean Latinos—who are more likely to have African ancestry, appearance, and cultural traits—differ from those of meso-American and South American Latinos—who are more likely to have Spanish and indigenous ancestry, appearance, and cultural traits? (See Smith forthcoming b, for speculation on this question with Mexicans, and Cordero-Guzmán and Navarro 2000 on immigrant youth service providers.) What is clear is that these Latino immigrants and their descendants will have to negotiate their in-between status, and that the outcome of their engagement with these racialized structures in not certain. These are important areas for future research.

New York as a Site of Transnational Action and Processes

As a center of transnational migrant activity, New York is a site for practices and discourses that link sending communities and countries with emigrants and migrants abroad. As a central node in the global economy, New York also manifests in particularly virulent forms the contradictions and exigencies of global capitalist development (Torres 1995; Torres and Bonilla 1993). Hence, New York City has adjacent postal ZIP codes in the Upper East Side and East Harlem that have among the highest and lowest per capita incomes in the country. Many of the former's inhabitants are
linked by their investments and other activities into global markets while the latter may barely have links outside their immediate neighborhood. Sassen has written (1988) with particular eloquence about how global cities like New York have experienced further social and economic polarization because of globalization. Polarization helps explain, for example, why so many immigrants would come to a place with such high rates of unemployment in the 1980s. It also examines how the lives of such globally engaged elite become so disengaged from the rest of the city, with their fates having very little to do with one another (Sassen 1998).

New York has also been a historically important site of home country and diasporic politics. Transnational life is not new among immigrants, who have waged many nationalist and other struggles in New York as well as on their native turf. As Michael Hanagan (1998) points out, struggles for the formation of an Irish nation and state were carried out the United States, especially in New York and Boston. Indeed, Eamon de Valera, Ireland's first president, was a U.S. citizen whose life was spared after his participation in the 1916 Easter Rising because of his American citizenship. De Valera used the United States as a place to organize support free from the coercion of the British state and also to raise funds for the revolt. Similarly, New York and the United States became important in helping to forge Italian nationalism. Many migrants from villages learned that they were "Italian" only upon arriving in the United States and being treated as such and then were enlisted in the nationalist cause (Gabaccia 2000; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Wyman 1993). Intense, simultaneous debate over remittances and exploitation by the *banchisti* (brokers and money remitters, like Sarah Mahler's "viajeros" in Chapter 5) raged in New York and Italy, resulting in transnational mobilization by immigrants, the *banchisti*, and their respective advocates in both places (Cinel 1991; Smith 1998b).

Today, history repeats itself: Leonel Fernandez, former president of the Dominican Republic, holds a U.S. green card and is a product of the New York City public schools. New York is also the site of extraterritorial domestic and transnational politics by Colombians, Dominicans, Mexicans, Israelis, Central Americans, West Indians, Indians and Pakistanis, Poles, and others (Glick Schiller and Fouron, Chapter 3; Guarnizo, Sanchez, and Roach 1999; Lessinger 1998; Pienkos 1991; Smith 1998b). Some of these mobilizations, such as those by Colombians, began as grass-roots efforts later engineered by the sending state for its own foreign policy objectives, while others, such as those by extreme nationalists among Indian immigrants, involved organizing outside the home state's coercive capacity. Moreover, as Pamela Graham documents in Chapter 4, these processes of political incorporation in New York and the Dominican Republic are not disjointed but take place simultaneously and reinforce each other.

While much transnational activity is a form of extraterritorially conducted national politics, most of it is quotidian. Sarah Mahler, in Chapter 5, and Nancy Foner, in Chapter 2, analyze some of the everyday activities that go into the emergence of transnational life, or limiting its ability to emerge. Mahler analyzes how the daily routine of life is and is not transnational, and how it differs at the sites of origin and des-
tination. Foner analyzes the ways in which transnational life during the last great wave of migration and today are similar and different, comparing the effects of technology, social and political environment, and other factors.

The Literature

This volume reflects the editors' belief that contemporary studies of immigrant incorporation and transnationalization must demonstrate cognizance of the pervasive influence of gender, ethnicity and, especially, race in determining life chances, as well as cognizance of the emergence of transnational forms of migrant life and how these change social and political forms and create new forms, including forms of political community and membership. Such studies must ground these analyses within the political economy that shapes other processes, on the local and the global level, and must acknowledge the importance of considering the geo-strategic linkages and (neo)colonial relations in analyzing the development of contemporary social processes. The authors in this volume arrive at these conclusions from different perspectives but agree broadly on the importance of including these elements in contemporary analyses of migration. The authors also illustrate the diversity and complexity of current work on immigration to New York City.

We identify four schools of thought, which have evolved around the concepts of assimilation, social capital, transnationalization, and world systems. In this section, we examine each perspective's theoretical utility and explore its limitations in helping us understand contemporary migration and related processes.

Assimilation

Assimilationism was the dominant approach in the study of immigration for many decades, from the 1920s to the late 1960s, but has become a favorite theoretical "other" against which many scholars working on ethnicity and related topics today define their own work. This is both understandable and lamentable. It is understandable because there are many weaknesses in the assimilationist paradigm. First, its proponents were unaware of their "domain assumptions." They posited that the progress of immigrants in their new societies would stem from the inherent characteristics of the immigrant groups themselves and their ability to conform to mainstream values, norms, and expectations. The problem was not so much that their schemes did not describe social reality—they often did—but that they did so uncritically. Hence, W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole's (1945) now infamous descriptions of the slower assimilation and upward mobility of blacks, non-English speakers, and non-Christians did accurately reflect much of the social reality that existed in America in the mid-1940s. But to simply describe this reality without offering a normative critique, and without imputing causal responsibility to the larger structures that shaped these different rates and paths of assimilation, was to collude with this oppression. The presumption
that assimilation to the mainstream was desirable, that such a white mainstream existed, and that adherence to its norms would automatically benefit newcomers plagued research in the assimilation paradigm. Like most social scientists of the day, these early assimilationists believed that joining the mainstream and surrendering one's own past were prerequisites to success in the United States.

Yet despite its weaknesses, the assimilationist theoretical paradigm and especially its normative political project, still informs much current scholarship because it deals with the fundamental question of how immigrants become part of the larger U.S. society. Moreover, early scholars studying assimilation made theoretical contributions that remain useful today, such as Milton Gordon's (1964) distinction between cultural and structural assimilation, the former referring to such changes as immigrants and their descendants learning English or adopting American cultural norms (or an "overly homogenized and reified conception of it" [Gans 1999, 162]) and the latter referring to their integration into social institutions with the dominant (white) population, including such measures as rates of intermarriage or entry into universities, corporate power centers, or neighborhood integration, which imply leaving their own ethnic institutions (see Gans 1999). Richard Alba and Victor Nee's (1999) interesting and in some ways successful attempt to rehabilitate assimilation redefines the concept by recontextualizing it (Morawska 1994). While defining assimilation as "the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic and racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it" (Alba and Nee 1999, 159), they purposefully omit comment on whether the changes will be one-sided or mutual on the part of the majority or minority, and whether the assimilation will be to a majority (e.g., white) or minority (e.g., African American) group. Theirs is a useful effort to retool a concept that is often dismissed out of hand. For example, assimilationist approaches identify different arenas—social, economic, institutional—in which processes of assimilation may or may not take place, and thus they help us understand the dynamics of intergroup relations in the United States. Moreover, immigrants today confront many of the same problems earlier generations of immigrants confronted, such as identity, opportunity, and generational change. And there is evidence that assimilation, as defined above, is proceeding apace for many immigrant groups, even low-income ones. For example, by the third generation most grandchildren of immigrants, including Mexicans, are monolingual English speakers who hold political and cultural beliefs (and even experience forms of bad health) much like those of most other Americans (de la Garza and DeSipio 1998; Rumbaut 1998, forthcoming). Moreover, suburbanization tends to speed assimilation in that it usually accompanies increasing socioeconomic status, the decreasing importance of ethnic institutions, and the retention of a symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979).

Part of the problem with this concept in general is that by focusing on whether or not a group ends up conforming to native norms, be they white or black, it fails to fully identify and sufficiently critique what we consider to be a central process in immigrant incorporation, the racialization process. Even in Alba and Nee's cogently argued resuscitation of the concept (1999), there is strong evidence that some engagement with racialization is a central part of the experience of immigrants and their chil-
children in the United States. For example, they argue that the most "impassable racist barriers" for immigrants and their children in the United States are not just dark skin—witness the mobility of dark-skinned Indians—but rather a "connection to the African American group" (149). They also note that the disadvantages of low educational level last through generations, especially for Hispanics. Finally, they speculate that Asians and some light-skinned Latinos may jump the racial divide and become "whiter," following Jews and Italians and others before them. We think that given this kind of pervasive racial dynamic in the processes of incorporation, racialization merits inclusion as an important theory in social science tool kit for studying immigration today.

Social Capital

An important and valuable line of inquiry has emerged around the concept of "social capital." Growing out of the work of Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., 1977), James Coleman (1988), and others, the concept has often been used to explain different outcomes between groups, focusing on the relations between the group members—including such factors as group expectations and norms—as an important cause of these different outcomes. The concept of social capital produced a boom of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s in studies of immigration. These studies examine such questions as why and how immigrants that appear to have characteristics similar to those of native minorities (such as low educational levels, low incomes, and residence in poor neighborhoods) seem to do better in school and at work (see Gibson 1988; Kao and Tienda 1995; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston 1998; and Lee, Chapter 12, and Chin, Chapter 13, this volume). Many, including those who have skillfully developed the concept, have lamented that "social capital" as a concept has been too quickly and too randomly applied (Portes 1998).

The work of Portes and Zhou, writing together (1993) and apart (Portes 1998), has set the parameters for much of the debate with the concept of "segmented assimilation." Portes and Zhou (1993:82) argue against a single model of assimilation to the mainstream, instead positing three different possibilities: "[The first] replicates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class; a second leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation to the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity." This last choice is segmented assimilation and represents a kind of delayed, "ethnic" assimilation: immigrants take the road to upward mobility by maintaining their culture during the transition. The other two choices recall John Ogbu's (1978, 1987) concepts of voluntary and involuntary immigrants. The former are immigrant groups who have come to the United States of their own volition, and the latter have come through slavery (African Americans), conquest (e.g., American Indians or Mexican Americans in the southwest), or colonialism (e.g., Puerto Ricans). The "choice" presented to the children of immigrants is a stark and forbidding dilemma: one leads to self-perpetuat-
ing upward mobility but requires surrendering one's own identity; the other enables one to retain one's identity in opposition but in so doing takes a path of "doomed resistance" (Willis 1977) and self-perpetuating poverty. Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick (1993) portray the contest between assimilation to the mainstream, largely white, middle-class and minority underclass as a "race": immigrant parents try desperately to help their children succeed and get them on the ethnic upward path before they "Americanize" to a dangerous and oppositional inner-city minority model in a sort of contagion effect.

This formulation is backed up by some empirical research (Fordham 1996; Gibson 1988; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Stepick 1993; Rumbaut 1996; Zhou and Bankston 1998) and provides a picture of reality quite similar to that perceived by and acted upon by many immigrant parents and their children. It also describes an important racial and cultural dynamic in the processes of immigrant incorporation in contemporary America, laying out a template for other analyses. Moreover, ethnic effects on academic achievement persist even when controlling for parents' education, socioeconomic status, length of residency in the United States, and child's hours spent on homework. Moreover, the "negative effect of disadvantaged group membership among immigrant children was reinforced rather than reduced in suburban schools, but that the positive effect of advantaged group membership remained significant even in inner-city schools" (Zhou 1999, 206; see also Kao and Tienda 1995; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Rumbaut 1996, forthcoming). Recent research on education makes good use of the concept of social capital to argue the importance of generational difference within the same ethnic group (Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995; see the excellent ethnography in Valenzuela 1999). Zhou (1999) usefully emphasizes ways that the segmented assimilation framework should focus on the interaction of macro- and micro-level factors, thus contextualizing community-level analysis.

Yet in its initial incarnation the concept of segmented assimilation also overlooked important variations and incorporation processes that affect both the perceptions that lead immigrants to frame their options in particular ways and concrete models that may point to alternative paths. The concept would have benefited from a stronger appreciation of the racialization process with which immigrants must engage in the United States. Immigrants choose and are forced to define themselves in juxtaposition to negative images of African Americans, usually with the result that the juxtaposition affirms explanations of differential progress positing different work ethics among immigrants and African Americans. The second generation has a more complex relationship to the immigrant analogy, with some in the second generation accepting it and seeing themselves as different from native minorities, and others seeing their futures as more similar to those of same natives. An appreciation of the racialization process is not inconsistent with the concepts of social capital and segmented assimilation, but we attempt to more explicitly analyze the relationship between these processes and the effects of the transmission of behaviors, of being subject to similar discriminatory processes, and of interaction between different levels of analysis.
Also, segmented assimilation curiously leaves out the possibility of what Kathryn Neckerman, Prudence Carter, and Jennifer Lee (1999) call a "minority culture of mobility." According to Neckerman and colleagues, a minority culture of mobility describes, not an "entire culture, but a set of cultural 'tools' relevant to problems of economic mobility." Moreover, this culture orients group-specific beliefs and habits and "emerges in response to distinctive problems that middle class and upwardly mobile minorities face" (947). A minority culture of mobility can also co-exist with an oppositional minority culture (posited in segmented assimilation), both being responses to the conditions within which different segments of a minority population find themselves. Finally, a minority culture of opposition is not a newcomer culture but rather one that emerges through a group's continual experiences with exclusion and discrimination. Neckerman and colleagues' analysis (1999) is consistent with the attention to racialization processes we call for.

Gender is another important factor not initially given an important role in the literature on segmented assimilation or in most theories of immigrant incorporation (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Experiences in school, at home, and in the labor market are very different for minority men than for minority women. For example, minority women are more likely to experience upward mobility and employment in the "pink-collar" labor market than are their male counterparts because employers feel that minority women, and not men, possess the interpersonal, "soft skills" necessary to get work in these sectors (Myers and Cranford 1998; Moss and Tilly 1996). Moreover, gender roles at home, gendered involvement with representing parents to U.S. institutions, and differential gender roles in school and among peers all lead to different kinds of ethnic identity and oppositional and incorporational stances among men and women (see Fordham 1996; Smith forthcoming e; Valenzuela 1998; M. Waters 1999). This creates a very different reality for minority men and women to confront and tends to have important consequences for the kind of incorporation and ethnic and racial identity that each will experience.

Recent work by Smith (forthcoming d, e) uses and critiques the segmented assimilation model. Smith finds that second-generation Mexican Americans in New York experience their ethnicity in at least three ways, with corresponding effects on academics and work. First, as segmented assimilation predicts, a plurality of Smith's sample understands their ethnicity as being an important resource that helps increase ethnic pride and emphasize difference from native minorities, which in turn provides ethnically understood practices fostering school and work success. Second, and partly consistent with segmented assimilation, alarmingly increasing numbers adopt an oppositional stance that defines "Mexicanness," especially for men, with cutting school, making money, and joining gangs, in a repetition of classic working-class rebellion (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Willis 1977). This process is related to both different gender roles for Mexican American men and women in school, at home, in the street, and in the labor market and to larger changes caused by the great influx of large numbers of teen immigrants, especially men who are not with their parents, in the early 1990s (T. Waters 1999). The emerging youth culture includes large numbers
of early adolescent immigrants (what one might call "1.3 generation" immigrants), young men who come to the United States at a younger age than did their predecessors and with little supervision, go to U.S. schools, and experience a partial second socialization here (see also Rumbaut 1998). Fascinatingly, these teen immigrants and their second-generation friends reject both mainstream white assimilation and native minority assimilation (black, Puerto Rican, Dominican). They see themselves as better than natives by virtue of being immigrants and Mexican, though most do so without the academic or work success segmented assimilation posits. The result is a kind of downwardly mobile segmented (or ethnic) assimilation, especially for men. The empirical question remains whether this ethnic downward mobility will be racialized in the future, moving it closer to what both segmented assimilation and a racialization argument predict. Third, a small but growing and very academically successful group is adopting upwardly mobile identities that are black, "neutral," or "multicultural geekish" in school and in public (see also Fordham 1996; M. Waters 1999), while remaining Mexican at home, in private. The common theme here is a conscious attempt to dissociate themselves from the pervasive educational failure of their Mexican peers, and to actively integrate themselves into the orbit of what Neckerman, Carter and Lee (1999) call "minority culture of mobility." This research uses the segmented assimilation framework to map out the possibilities of current incorporation, including explaining ethnically understood, Mexican American upward mobility, while attempting to integrate gender more fully into the framework, and envisioning possibilities for native minority youth culture other than racialized downward mobility. These include an upwardly mobile native minority youth subculture as well as a downwardly mobile Mexican ethnic subculture.

Like Lee (Chapter 12), Vilna Bashi, Philip Kasinitz and Milton Vickerman, and Margaret Chin make important contributions in their chapters to the use and development of social capital analyses. A key finding in Bashi's study (Chapter 10) is that membership in an immigrant social network can provide "insulation" from the effects of racism. It may limit one's interactions with whites because of the sector of the economy one works in; it may offer financial rewards and a style of living higher than that of comparable people in the native black population, hence offering "socio-economic separation" from them; and it may thus provide one with status and accomplishments that belie racial stereotypes about blacks. In contrast, those in Bashi's sample outside such a network did not have such insulation and suffered and experienced the effects of racial discrimination more severely. The networks, then, help determine the meaning of race and its circumstantial relationship to social conditions (see Kasinitz 1992).

Kasinitz and Vickerman (Chapter 9) also take up these themes of racialization and social capital among West Indians. Their message, in sum, is: not all ethnic niches are equal, and not across generations. Engaging the literature on ethnic enclaves and niches as modes of upward mobility, Kasinitz and Vickerman sound a cautionary note about the West Indian niches for the first and second generations, a point consistent with Waldinger's insight (1996) that niches can shrink as well as grow, affecting future opportunity in them accordingly. They argue that while West Indians have done bet-
ter on average than Latino immigrants—in large part because of higher education and English language ability—holding them up as a model of ethnic upward mobility is premature. Indeed, they argue that the West Indians niches are low paying and, because they are public, do not lend themselves as readily to the kind of mutual support the private sector makes possible. Moreover, they argue that the realities of racialization and discrimination for the second generation, including their segregation into very poor neighborhoods and schools, makes it even harder for many West Indians to help their children get ahead. They experience racial discrimination in the same way native black youth do and adopt similarly negative attitudes toward the larger society, as posited by oppositional theories and segmented assimilation. Kasinitz and Vickers fear that the niches of the parents—poor as they may be—may be better than what is in store for their racialized and excluded U.S.-born children.

Chin (Chapter 13) treads new and exciting intellectual and empirical ground by examining how social capital does or does not get generated in the garment industry. A main point in her analysis is that Chinese immigrants who work on piece-rate, whole-garment production bring in coethnics, while Latino immigrant workers who work on sections of garments at an hourly rate for Korean employers do not. Why the difference? Work in the Chinese factories is organized differently than in the Korean factories. The Chinese factories have a union, long training that is eased by having a coethnic sponsor, and longer-term employment, whereas the Korean factories have a large turnover, little training, and no union and non-coethnic employees. What is particularly impressive in Chin’s work is not only that she identifies that ethnic social capital is generated in one case and not the other but she traces it to different organizations of the workplace and their coincidence with different ethnicities of the employers.

Transnationalization and Globalization

Transnationalization

Two related but distinct approaches to contemporary immigration are the transnationalization and globalization or world systems approaches. For the purposes of this chapter, we can consider transnational those works that tend to focus on social processes relating to particular migrant populations and nation-states, while globalization tends to analyze how economic, institutional, cultural, and other changes at a global level reconfigure power, including the places of states, in our world (see Glick Schiller 1999; Mato 1997; Sassen 1998; Smith forthcoming b). In this section we draw on and critique both perspectives.

The transnational perspective on migration issues has gone through at least two stages of theoretical and empirical development. The first widely recognized work to layout a transnational perspective on migration was that of Nina Glick Schiller and colleagues (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992; see also Massey et al. 1987; Sutton 1987). In what came to be its standard form, this perspective argues that the practices and discourses among “transmigrants” and their states are new or fundamentally different than in the past;
the nation-state has been transcended as the main structure organizing political, social, and economic life; and global capitalism is the main force driving transnationalism (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). Linda Basch and colleagues (1994) posit that migrants create a "transnational social field" between their countries of origin and destination that results in a "detrimentalized nation-state" in which "the nation's people may live anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state" (269; see also Baubock 1994; Kearney 1991, 1995).

This formulation has three major problems. The first involves its treatment of the state. The use of "global capitalism" as the theoretical prime mover leads its proponents to overlook the role of an active state in creating transnational public life (see Goldring 1998; Guarnizo 1998; Levitt forthcoming a, b; Smith 1997, 1998; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Moreover, the concept of "detrimentalized nation-state" fails to appreciate that territoriality is a defining dimension of the nation-state, in part because it holds a monopoly on the use of violence and also on the use of resources extracted from the collectivity in that territory (Smith 1996, 1998b; see Smith forthcoming a; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Zolberg and Smith 1996; also see Ruggie 1993, on territoriality). Finally, issues of citizenship and membership are not explicitly discussed, and the concept of community is rejected. These elisions are puzzling given the prevalence of these concepts in migrant and sending-state discourse and action, and the proliferation of sending states' attempts to cultivate and institutionalize relations with their diasporas. The second problem is that the implicit or explicit claims by early proponents of transnationalism about the newness or larger impact of transnational life were not properly contextualized in history, were not comparative, and did not take account of how gender and class, for example, structured transnational life. (Notable exceptions on gender include Goldring 1995 and Levitt 1995; Hondogneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997.) Gender was neglected in part because these early studies focused mainly on the conduct of public life between the sending and receiving states and communities, which are in practice still mainly men's worlds. The third problem is that the focus on how migrants create social fields that transcend nation-states has obscured the focus on cases showing transnational activity that are occurring at a different level of social reality from that engaged so fully with the nation-state, particularly those with past or present colonial relations with a global center, as seen for example, in the concepts of metropoles (Grosfoguel 1997a, b; Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzmán 1998; Grosfoguel and Georas 1996) and world cities (Sassen 1991, 1998).

Many of these problems have been identified and there is much good work being done on them (Glick Schiller 1999; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Kyle 2001; Perez Godoy 1998; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Vertovec 1999). A spate of work has been excavating the past, showing how a transnational perspective can help us gain insight into past migrant experiences, and delineating more precisely what is and is not new about this phenomenon and why it matters. As Nancy Foner details in Chapter 2 (and Foner 1997), the short answers to these questions are that transnational life among migrants is not new but has been significantly changed in its pace and potential impact by the possibilities for collapsing time and space and creating simultaneity.
raised by current technology and other factors, such as the U.S. encouragement of eth-
nic identity (Foner 1999 and Chapter 2; Glick Schiller 1999; Morawska 1989; Portes,
Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Smith 1998b, forthcoming a, f; Vertovec 1999; Wyman
1993). Recent work on gender has helped illuminate the ways that gender structures
transnational life and has brought a focus onto new arenas of life beyond those more
public ones initially considered, including work on the changing dynamics within
transnational families (Foner 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997 see also
Mahler, Chapter 5, this volume; Levitt forthcoming a, b). The term "community,"
which has been both too broadly applied and too narrowly rejected, has undergone
more critical scrutiny and development (Anderson 1991; Goldring 1996a; Hagan 1994;
Smith 1995, 1998c). Finally, more systematic comparisons across cases have enabled
scholars to identify broader similarities and differences in the processes of transna-
tional life, to identify how networks help create transnational communities, and how
transnational life relates to larger processes of racialization, nationalism, community,
and nation building, and others (Foner 1999 and Chapter 2, this volume; Glick Schiller
1999; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Smith and Guarnizo 1998).

Further research is needed to establish the existence of the phenomenon of transna-
tionalization in a migrant context, both empirically and in terms of its being accepted as
theoretically important to the mainstream disciplines (Portes 1999). This will involve
demonstrating important effects of transnational life in the sending and receiving soci-
eties, and perhaps in other arenas too, such as international relations or global politics.
Another area that requires further research is the sending-states’ increasingly deep and
complex relationships with their diasporas in the United States and elsewhere, and the
ultimate importance of their diasporas for both home and host-state politics and related
processes of incorporation and mobility (Guarnizo 1998; Goldring 1999; Guarnizo,
Sanchez, and Roach 1999; Portes 1999; Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Ascencio 1999; Smith

A third area that needs further research is the nature and extent of participation by
the second generation in transnational life. If the children of immigrants do not par-
ticipate at all in transnational activity or are not significantly affected by it, then it is
mainly a first-generation issue. This would mean that transnational life did not really
affect second-generation assimilation and incorporation in the United States, or that
the second generation did not really affect the continued relationship with the send-
ing country—two key dimensions of transnational life (see Rumbaut 1994, 1997). Cur-
rent research on this issue shows interesting variation in the degree and nature of
transnational activities, both contemporarily and historically (Foner 1999 and Chap-
ter 2, this volume; Glick Schiller and Fouron, Chapter 3, this volume; Pienkos 1991;
Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Smith 1998b, forthcoming a, f). Peggy Levitt and
Mary Waters’ edited book (forthcoming) comparing transnational life in the second
generation across cases from different continents should make an important contribu-
tion to this literature.

Glick Schiller and Fouron stake out a new position on transnationalism. They
define second-generation transnationals as those youth whose lives or identities have