INTRODUCTION
Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America
David Stoll

One of the more surprising phenomena of recent years is the success of born-again Protestantism in Latin America. Perhaps its success is not so surprising if we think of Latin America as a Catholic continent trapped in an increasingly Protestant world.¹ Still, it was not expected by any but the truest believers. Evangelical Protestantism seemed so anomalous and so escapist. Its doctrines and passions seemed so peripheral to the issues that really mattered—land reform and popular organization, national debts and stabilization programs, the power of the military and drug traffickers, human rights and elections. But Pope John Paul II raises the subject with increasing urgency on his trips to this most Catholic part of the world. He warns Catholics to close ranks against an “invasion of the sects,” and no wonder. His visits no longer draw the multitudes they used to, perhaps not even as large as the crowds at the Protestant rallies competing with his. At the quincentennial of the European colonization of the Americas, as the Catholic Church celebrated five hundred years of missionization, the majority of active churchgoers were becoming evangelicals.²

Only recently have scholars paid much attention to born-again religion in Latin America. In the 1970s and 1980s, the main topics of interest were liberation theology and the Catholic Church. The first was presumed to be revitalizing the second and, even more important, mobilizing the popular classes
for a wave of social change. As for research on evangelicals, it
often went unpublished, and conferences on the Latin Ameri-
can church included the subject only as an afterthought. Two
circumstances are forcing scholars to attend to evangelicals. One
is the Catholic hierarchy’s repression of its progressive wing,
together with growing evidence that liberation theology does not
express popular aspirations as effectively as it was presumed to. The other reason scholars are attending to evangelicals is, of
course, their rapid growth.

Ten percent or more of the Latin American population iden-
tifies itself as *evangelico*, with the percentage substantially higher
in Brazil, Chile, and most of Central America. It is true that
a majority of Latin Americans still call themselves Catholics,
but of these relatively few participate in church life. Because a
much higher percentage of evangelicals do, they have become
the movers and shakers on the religious scene. In the 1980s,
evangelical strategists grew so bold as to project growth rates
and predict when their converts would become the majority of
the population. Such a prognostication, as this volume will make
clear, cannot be taken very literally. But if the growth of the last
several decades continues, Latin Americans claiming to be *evan-
gelicos* could still become a quarter to a third of the population
early in the twenty-first century.

Because of the parenting role played by North American
missions, Latin American Protestantism is usually understood
in terms of the North American genealogy of the mainline or
“historical” denominations, followed by a sometimes confusing
succession of fundamentalists, evangelicals, and Pentecostals.
First we hear about the fundamentalist revolt of the early 1900s,
against modernist views of the Bible in the mainline denomina-
tions. As the fundamentalists lost these battles, they withdrew
from established churches to organize their own independent
congregations, Bible institutes, and missions, a number of which
directed their activities to Latin America. Following bitter doc-
trinal quarrels between fundamentalists, in the 1940s the more
moderate groups renamed themselves “evangelicals,” to express
their wish to rise above sectarianism and get on with the task of evangelizing the world.5

In Latin America, this pedigree is translated into various "waves" of missionary activity that are held to have shaped the contemporary evangelical movement. Immigrant churches from Europe (such as the German Lutherans of Brazil) and mainline denominations from the United States made up the first two waves, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While both created enduring churches, neither converted large numbers of people. Strangely, neither did the third wave, the fundamentalist "faith missions," despite their manifest zeal and determination to evangelize beyond their predecessors. More successful is a fourth wave of evangelists, the Pentecostals, who until recently have been considered outcasts in the North American pedigree. This is because of their claim to receive special gifts from the Holy Spirit—speaking in tongues, faith healing, and prophecy—that non-Pentecostal fundamentalists and evangelicals eschew. Even though the majority of missionaries have come from non-Pentecostal backgrounds, more Latin Americans have been attracted to Pentecostal churches than to any other kind: two-thirds to three-quarters of all Protestants. Pentecostal churches have so outgrown others that perhaps, Donald Dayton suggests, evangelicals should be regarded as a subset of Pentecostals rather than the other way around.6

Regardless of denominational affiliations, Latin American Protestants most often refer to themselves as evangélicos; hence "evangelical" is often used as an umbrella term. But mission pedigrees have to be recognized for what they are. They beg the question of what was there before the missionaries came. According to Jean-Pierre Bastian, the first Protestant churches in Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico in the 1850s grew out of Liberal lodges rebaptizing themselves in the name of the new religion.7 In the Guatemalan town where I did fieldwork in the 1980s, local men took credit for founding the churches over which they presided; but to find a larger body with which to affiliate, some had to go to the capital to find a misión.
Not only can "Protestant" organization exist on the landscape before Protestantism, so can "Protestant" standards of behavior, which evangelical churches only make more visible and assertive. When David Dixon probed conversion stories in Santiago, Chile, evangelicals reported changing their lives of sin to lives of righteousness before they started going to church. Evidently there is a "Protestant" ideal of self-discipline available within popular culture, an alternative that becomes more attractive as economic crisis forces Latin Americans to tighten their household economies. Dixon goes on to suggest that evangelical churches may serve not so much as sources of moral innovation than as points of congregation for like-minded individuals. At the very least, evangelical churches need to be viewed in terms of local predispositions and initiatives as well as of "planting" a mission.

Why Protestantism Instead of Liberation Theology?

To date, the main question about evangelical growth in Latin America has been, Why? Why are so many Latin Americans abandoning the established church? In pastoral letters, Catholic bishops blame North American evangelists and their generous budgets. It is true that missionaries continue to have an impact, but most churches now are led by Latin Americans. This has forced the Catholic hierarchy to recognize its own pastoral failings. Most often cited is the perennial shortage of personnel, especially ordained priests. But heated debates over clerical prerogatives show that the dilemmas go deeper than that. At issue is the Catholic structure of authority—the oldest bureaucracy in the world, dating to the Roman empire—and whether it can respond to far-reaching changes in what Latin Americans want from church life.

For two decades, progressive Catholics thought they were successfully reforming their church, and simultaneously responding to the needs of the Latin American poor, with liberation theology. At a time when the Catholic Church seemed out of touch with the masses, pastoral agents would reconnect it
with its popular roots through their “option for the poor.” Meanwhile, ecclesial base communities would encourage participation and make church life more democratic by training lay leaders. Empowered by the pedagogical technique of “consciousness-raising,” a newly popular church would work for the Kingdom of God here on earth. The vision was a bold one, of a still-hegemonic established church leading a defense of community against the combined forces of military dictatorships and world capitalism.

What has to be asked is whether liberation theology responded to the needs of ordinary Latin Americans. Perhaps the key issue is the traditional role of Roman Catholicism as a mystifier of social inequality and the implications of demystifying that function. In practice, liberation theology usually meant spurning the Catholic Church’s mystique as an intermediary with higher spiritual and political powers. Unfortunately, what might seem a welcome advance in social consciousness could strip the church of its ability to manage social conflict, in ways that were disturbing to the poor as well as the wealthy. While activists deployed Catholic authority for new objectives, sometimes very effectively, in the process they alienated Catholics from the lower as well as the upper classes, who continued to expect traditional forms of patronage. Another implication of rejecting the church’s historical function as an intermediary between social classes was to expose Catholics to reprisals from the state.

Worse, if the Catholic Church simply attended to its traditional constituency, it would fail to address new spiritual arenas in which evangelicals seemed to have competitive advantages. In societies whose economies are being globalized, whose traditional social structures have heaved apart, where people must fend for themselves in hostile new environments, how can a single, centralized religious hierarchy satisfy a newly individuated population whose members need to chart their own courses? For those same individuals, afflicted by new forms of personal insecurity, how can sprawling, territorially based Catholic parishes satisfy the desire for closer-knit congregational experiences? How can a religious system organized around sacraments satisfy the hunger for personal transformation? In each of these
respects, the decentralized structures of Latin American Protestants, their multiple leaders competing for followers through charisma, and their emphasis on conversion proved to be distinct advantages.

Perhaps inevitably, the Catholic hierarchy turned against efforts to democratize church authority. Owing to the steady replacement of sympathetic bishops with conservatives appointed by Rome, progressives who regarded themselves as the future of the Catholic Church are now clearly an oppositional network, mainly at the middle and lower levels of the pastoral hierarchy. It is also clear that the popular constituency for liberation theology was overestimated, owing to the hopes and fears it aroused.9 Many of the people reporting on liberation theology were activists who started their research through contacts in the Catholic pastoral structure, worked down to model projects at the grass roots, then presumed their findings to be more representative or influential than was the case. In a forthcoming book, *Looking for God in Brazil* (1993), our contributor John Burdick explains the lesson to be learned. Instead of focusing on a single institution like the Catholic Church and its representatives, or "message carriers," researchers must look at the social clusters receiving the message. We have to ask how ordinary people choose between the religious discourses available to them, bend these to their own purposes, and wend their way in and out of particular groups.

Distrust of ideological imports from the United States is widespread in Latin America, and so is the wish to protect local traditions from capitalism. Hence, many intellectuals find themselves in agreement with Catholic bishops on at least one point: Evangelicals are captive to a foreign ideology and alienated from national culture.10 A less reductive, yet compatible, explanation for evangelical growth is what Daniel Levine calls the "crisis/solace" model, which presents born-again religion as a form of escapism.11 The classic work is Christian Lalive d'Epinay's *Haven of the Masses* (1969), a study of Chilean Pentecostals. According to Lalive, Pentecostals re-create the traditional society of the hacienda by replacing the figure of the *patrón* with that of their
pastor. Imbued with the power and glory of the Holy Spirit, the pastor re-creates a tributary structure of authority—that is, one in which members render tribute to a patronal figure—in the guise of a church.

When Laliv studied Chilean Pentecostals in the 1960s, their pastors rejected participation in trade unions and other reform movements. The believers seemed engaged in a “social strike” that expressed their protest against the Chilean social order but failed to direct it constructively against their oppressors. Liberation theologians and the Latin American left have found such an interpretation congenial to their own critique of evangelicals—for being too sectarian, for becoming absorbed in spirituality or personal advancement, and for turning their backs on class peers.

Generally, researchers from North America and Protestant Europe have shown only limited interest in the crisis/solace model. Instead, they tend to explain the new religion as a creative response to capitalist development and its uprooting of traditional society. The resulting “crisis/adaptation” model, in Daniel Levine’s terms, is exemplified by Emilio Willems’s study of Protestants in Chile and Brazil, Followers of the New Faith (1967). This school of thought emphasizes the ability of evangelicals to transcend social dislocation by establishing new forms of community, learning new forms of discipline, and stabilizing their family situations, with the result that at least some climb higher in the class structure.

Rethinking Who Latin American Protestants Are

Explaining why so many Latin Americans join Protestant churches is not the object of this collection. Nor will we dwell upon the mission apparatuses, the North American religious right, and the North American political connections that I explored at length in Is Latin America Turning Protestant? Instead, our contributors—a historian, two sociologists, five anthropologists, and a team of four political scientists—address two main issues: How are evangelicals responding to social crisis in Latin
America, and how are they affecting the societies around them?

Dealing with such questions requires, first of all, rethinking who Latin American evangelicals are, especially in terms of gender. Pointing out the central position of women in Latin American Protestantism is Elizabeth Brusco, author of a groundbreaking (1986) dissertation on the evangelical reformation of machismo. Because scholars tend to focus on leaders and most evangelical structures are run by men, women can easily appear to be of secondary importance. Yet the majority of evangelicals are women, church life is especially responsive to their needs, and they play a critical role in the diffusion of Protestantism. Even though male pastors and evangelists attract most of the attention, their main function is reinforcing converts who originally came to church because they were recruited person-to-person by family members and neighbors who are predominantly female. Based on research with Colombian evangelicals, Brusco argues that born-again religion helps Latin American women resocialize their men away from the destructive patterns of machismo, in ways that may be far more effective than secular feminism. Evangelicals have succeeded in this difficult endeavor, Brusco suggests, precisely because they maintain the pretense of male control.

Lesley Gill and Linda Green describe how indigenous women use evangelical social organization as a survival vehicle. Understanding how they do so requires a deeper appreciation of the shifts and overlaps in how Latin Americans identify themselves religiously, a neglected issue that both authors explore under the heading of “religious mobility.” Identifying oneself in terms of religion is, as Gill points out, a process that takes place over an entire lifetime. The typical reversals and ambiguities require a crucial distinction, introduced in this volume by Green, between “conversion” and “affiliation.” If conversion implies a significant transformation, affiliation (or adherence) is the fact of how one identifies oneself. It can be quite tentative, and it encompasses a wider range of participants. Despite the teleological thinking surrounding the term “conversion,” a missionary premise that has often been accepted unconsciously by scholars, it would be a mistake to assume that most people who attend evangeli-
cal churches are converts and that becoming an evangelical is a one-way, irreversible process.

Evangelical leaders usually downplay ambiguities in the loyalties of their followers, to avoid disrupting the dichotomies that maintain church boundaries. This is especially true of the Catholic/Protestant contrast that most observers take for granted, including the church growth experts who calculate the expansion of the evangelical movement. Generally speaking, evangelicals acknowledge the ambiguities of religious identification only in terms of "backsliding," which places the onus on individual moral failure. However, the tactics responsible for the rapid growth of the evangelical movement are also responsible for a rapid increase in the number of "post-Protestants." For several decades, evangelical strategists have tried to make their churches as open as possible to newcomers. But the more people who join evangelical churches, the more people become available for "backsliding." In a 1989 survey of Costa Ricans, nearly as many said they used to be evangelicals as currently identified themselves as such. Evangelicals have long boasted of their ability to convert Catholics, but we have yet to hear much about evangelicals who go back to being Catholics.

Classifying the population into Protestants and Catholics is not meaningless, but Green and Gill show that it is equally important to see how Latin Americans juggle such identities. With a majority of the population not active in church structures, there is a huge potential for straddling ecclesiastical categories. One increasingly visible phenomenon disrupting the Catholic-Protestant distinction is the Catholic charismatic movement. It comes out of a Pentecostal revival that, unlike earlier outbreaks of the Holy Spirit, spread into ecumenical Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church. Like their Pentecostal mentors, Catholic charismatics seek special gifts (charisma in Greek) from the Holy Spirit. Because the charismatics worship as Pentecostals do, emotionally and loudly, skeptical Catholics view the movement as a one-way street into Protestant churches. Many charismatics have indeed made the journey, typically after colliding with unsympathetic Catholic clergy.

Yet the charismatic renewal may also be "capturing" disillu-
sioned evangelicals. And Catholic charismatics have taken over at least one influential Protestant organization, the Guatemalan branch of the Full Gospel Businessmen’s Fellowship. According to charismatics, they are the Catholic Church’s best chance to hold onto parishioners attracted to the evangelical experience of personal transformation. The most prominent charismatics are from the upper classes and belong to tight-knit “covenant” communities with ties to the North American religious right. But judging from unpublished field research by Jacob Bernstein, the movement is growing rapidly among the poor, where charismatics have practically taken over certain rural parishes and account for a growing majority of the movement in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. To date, charismatics have shown little interest in social issues and political activism, so they are usually pictured as being at loggerheads with Catholic progressives. Judging from my acquaintance with Mayan charismatics in Guatemala, the class position of poorer, parish-based followers could change this.

Interpreting Pentecostalism

The transitions between all these manifestations—Pentecostal churches, charismatic fellowships, folk Catholicism, and Afro-American spiritism—suggest what Rowan Ireland has called “a common folk religion cutting across religious boundaries.” According to Jean-Pierre Bastian, “The heterodox religious effervescence that we are witnessing in Latin America is none other than a renewal of the ‘popular religion,’ of rural Catholicism without priests.” Questioning whether even “Protestantism” is an appropriate term for the phenomenon, Bastian refers to it in the plural, as “protestantismos.” He denies the parallels that others have claimed between the Protestant Reformation in Europe and the evangelical boom in Latin America. Instead, according to Bastian, there is little continuity between the “historical” Protestants of the mainline denominations—Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Lutherans—and Latin American Pentecostals.

The first Latin American Protestants, Bastian argues, were
associated with radical liberal minorities who questioned the region's corporatist social order. Pentecostals, in contrast, come out of a popular, Catholic, and shamanistic religious culture that, instead of rejecting corporatism, reinforces it. This has implications for the social contribution to be made, according to Bastian. So while historical Protestantism was "a religion of literacy and education characterized as civil and rational"—hence a vehicle for "liberal democratic values"—Pentecostalism represents "religions of oral tradition, illiteracy and effervescence" that reinforce "caudillist models of religious and social control." Consequently, sectarian Protestantism in Latin America has "no relation whatsoever to religious reform and . . . even less to do with political and social reform."  

It is true that the ecumenical incarnation of historical Protestantism, influenced recently by liberation theology, has fared poorly against more conservative evangelicals, and possibly these defeats have influenced Bastian's argument. Indeed, he denies that any contemporary religious movement has the potential to promote reform, even liberation theology, which he dismisses (following Jean Meyer) as another manifestation of intransigent Catholicism setting itself against secularization and modernity. What Bastian does emphasize is the autonomy displayed by Pentecostals, what some North American scholars would call "resistance," and he firmly rejects conspiracy theories, which reduce them to a North American plot. But he denies that their congregational life is constructing any alternative to the status quo.

A low church man from Britain disputes the latter point. David Martin, a sociologist of religion known for his work on secularization, sees powerful continuities between the Protestant experiences in Europe, the United States, and Latin America. Just as Puritanism and Methodism were associated with democratizing trends in Britain and the United States, Martin argues that Latin American Pentecostalism is a "third wave" of Protestant revivalism that could have broadly similar implications. Not only is this the latest stage of a centuries-old struggle between Anglo Protestantism and Hispanic Catholicism, it is also a struggle for modernity against the Catholic spiritual monopolies that, accord-
ing to Martin, have discouraged the kind of pluralism necessary for a democratic society. This is where the seemingly divisive sectarianism of congregational religious life has performed a historical duty, Martin argues, by opening up social space for new forms of association, authority, and dissent.

Depending on your point of view, this may sound like a hopeful sign for the future or the latest neocolonial thinking. But both Martin and Bastian address the question of whether Protestantism, specifically Pentecostalism, could transform entire national societies. Martin’s argument recalls the long-standing Protestant dream of reforming Latin America along Anglo-American lines—that is, with a broader distribution of rewards and more respect for civil liberties. Unfortunately such hopes may underestimate Latin America’s disadvantageous position in the world market and the devastating pressures on its resource base, not to mention the brutal exigencies of international debt that continue to pauperize the majority of Latin Americans. But Martin’s argument does have the virtue of breaking with common assumptions used to evaluate the impact of Protestantism, particularly those associated with liberation theology.

One such assumption is that the conservative politics of North American missionaries and national leaders is a reliable guide to how evangelicals actually behave. That is, it has been presumed that evangelicals will be bulwarks against the left. With this presumption in mind, two of this volume’s chapters present new evidence that not as much separates Latin American evangelicals from their class peers as is often assumed. For El Salvador, Kenneth Coleman, Edwin Eloy Aguilar, José Miguel Sandoval, and Timothy Steigenga obtained fascinating data on religious affiliation and political attitudes from the surveys carried out by Ignacio Martín-Baró, one of the six Jesuit priests murdered by the Salvadoran army in 1989. In Brazil, specifically the group of industrial suburbs of Rio de Janeiro known as Duque de Caxias, John Burdick observed lower-class Pentecostals taking an active part in local neighborhood, labor union, and political party structures that evangelicals are usually thought to shun.

Brazil looms so large in our subject, representing almost 40
percent of the Latin American population and possibly half its evangelicals, that we made a special effort to recruit Brazilianists who could use their field experience to project wider trends. Hence Paul Freston’s account of the major Protestant denominations and their political trajectories during Brazil’s democratic opening, an analysis that is unprecedented in distinguishing the various tendencies in a movement usually subject to glib generalization. As the movement becomes larger and penetrates higher in the class structure, Pentecostals are being forced to respond to the debt crisis in new ways. Even as Freston explains how Brazilian Pentecostals have arrived at their conservative reputation, he suggests why their leadership is not as conservative as it might appear. The opportunism and desperation he describes point to a varied political performance that could include increasing involvement with populist movements and the left.

Brazilian Protestantism is situated in the wider field of Brazilian religious options by Rowan Ireland. By sketching the lives of two crentes (believers) in a town near Recife, in the Northeast, Ireland suggests how evangelicals can draw on their repertoire of doctrine, myth, and practice to construct (or, alternatively, struggle against) various “political economies” that compete for the loyalty of Brazilians. These include traditional patronage networks, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, populism, and the communitarian structures of liberation theology; hence “the religious construction of politics.” Ireland’s evocative work, published at greater length in his book Kingdoms Come, suggests how, if we can understand the religious foundations of competing political styles in Latin American life, religious trends can help us understand political ones.

In 1990–91 alone, twenty-two evangelical congressmen took office in Guatemala along with Jorge Serrano Elías, that country’s first Protestant to be elected president; seventeen evangelical congressmen did the same in Peru along with President Alberto Fujimori, a Catholic whose vote was mobilized largely by evangelical churches; and thirty-three evangelicals were elected to the congress of Brazil. But as Latin America’s “return to democracy” disappoints expectations, especially for economic recovery, there
is little sign that evangelical politicians will avoid being tarred with the same brush as the rest of the political class.

What remains is the distinction made by Donald Dayton between direct social action, the impact of which seems slight at present, and the possible longer-range social impact of Protestantism. It is far easier to see how Protestantism has led to upward mobility for particular individuals, families, and social groups than how it will change relations of authority and the distribution of rewards in society as a whole. But various questions remain. Is Latin American Pentecostalism a step on the road to demystifying, secularizing, and rationalizing Latin American society, as predicted by David Martin, or is it inevitably thaumaturgical—that is, magical and mystifying—as argued by Jean-Pierre Bastian? And what are the implications for patterns of authority? Is Latin American Protestantism basically caudillistic, or do its tendencies to fragmentation give it more democratic implications?

Evangelical groups have often been criticized in Latin America for separating their members from the larger society. Presumably there is something bad about this. Yet numerous local studies suggest that evangelical congregations have at least become a way for significant minorities of Latin Americans to reform themselves, their relations to each other, and perhaps their relations to the larger society. Hence David Martin refers to these groups as a "free social space" or "protective social capsule," like a cocoon, for generating new kinds of social relations. Through the door of religious conversion, individuals and families join small, tight-knit groups that reinforce new patterns of behavior, encourage the transmission of these patterns to future generations, and generate new kinds of social cohesion which empower members (or perpetuate relations of domination, depending on your point of view). Like conversionist religion in general, evangelical Protestantism can therefore be regarded as a way for believers to alter their cultural inheritance. It is a popular new orientation to being Latin American that could, conceivably, open up the sadly diminished panoramas of the 1990s.
NOTES


2. This is an observation most often made of the countries with the greatest percentage of Protestant population: Brazil, Chile, and Central America. Hard figures are lacking, but evangelical chapels can be observed outdrawing Catholic churches in many localities, as corroborated by Catholic sources such as the June 29, 1989, special issue of Latinamerica Press, a newsletter published in Lima.


Published dissertation research includes Sheldon Annis, God and Production in a Guatemalan Town (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Elizabeth Brusco, The Reformation of Machismo (Austin: University of Texas Press, forthcoming 1994); John Burdick, Looking for God in Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Cornelia Butler Flora, Protestantism in Colombia: Baptism by Fire and Spirit (London: Associated University Presses, 1976). Other Ph.D. dissertations that, because of new interest in Protestantism, are being revised for publication, in-
clude Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "A History of Protestantism in Guatemala" (Tulane University, 1986); Timothy Edward Evans, "Religious Conversion in Quezaltenango, Guatemala" (University of Pittsburgh, 1990); and Cecilia Loreto Mariz, "Religion and Coping with Poverty in Brazil" (Boston University, 1989).


5. "Fundamentalist" and "evangelical" should not be regarded as mutually exclusive categories. Instead, the terms often refer to two different faces of the same interpretive community, that is, the wish to defend the fundamentals (or sectarian principles) of the faith versus the wish to expand its boundaries or evangelize, after the Greek root for spreading the good news. Hence, when a self-defined fundamentalist appeals to new constituencies, s/he behaves like an evangelical. When an evangelical is placed on the defensive, s/he may behave like a fundamentalist. Christians who refer to themselves as fundamentalists, evangelicals, Pentecostals, or simply "believers" continue to have strong traditional beliefs in God, the afterlife, sin, and redemption, including the need for personal transformation through Jesus Christ, often experienced in terms of being "born again." They believe that salvation can be achieved only through Jesus Christ, that the Bible is inerrant, and that the most important duty of a Christian is to spread the faith.

9. In 1987, Phillip Berryman (Liberation Theology, p. 72) estimated that there were “several times as many active Protestants and evangelicals as there are members of Catholic base communities.”
10. See Rafael Mondragón, De indios y cristianos en Guatemala (México, D.F.: COPEC/CECOPE, 1983); María Albán Estrada and Juan Pablo Muñoz, Con Dios todo se puede: La invasión de las sectas al Ecuador (Quito: Editorial Planeta, 1987); and Alfredo Silletta, Las sectas invaden la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Contrapunto, 1987).
11. Levine, “Protestants and Catholics in Latin America.”
14. A church-planting guide from the Assemblies of God, the largest Protestant denomination in Latin America, advises evangelists against erecting a church building until the new congregants insist on one. The idea is to avoid setting up walls and boundaries that could discourage further converts. David E. Godwin, Church Planting Methods (De Soto, Tex.: Lifeshare Communications, 1984), pp. 37, 119.
15. The survey was designed by church growth researcher Jean Kessler. See his “A Summary of the Costa Rican Evangelical Crisis: August, 1989,” unpublished paper (Pasadena, Calif.: IDEA/Church Growth Studies Program, 1989, p. 5). Costa Ricans who identified themselves as Catholics were asked, “Have you been an evangelical at any previous time in your life?” In a representative sample of 1,276 adults, 8.9 percent said they were evangelicals, another 1.6 percent said they were Mormons or Jehovah’s Witnesses, and another 8 percent said they had been evangelicals at some previous time in their lives. This suggests a desertion factor of 47 percent. Two-thirds of the evangelical defection went back to identifying themselves as Catholics, while another third said they had no religious affiliation. Given how recent the evangelical
boom is and how rapidly the category of ex-evangelicals is growing, the ultimate dropout rate could go significantly higher. But Kessler's survey also suggests that the experience of being an evangelical could spread far beyond the percentage of the population that presently attends or claims to attend a church.

16. Because of the recruiting strategies of the Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship, including quasi-ecumenical relations with the Catholic Church despite the founder's background in the Assemblies of God, Catholic leadership of the Guatemalan chapter is probably compatible with the Houston-based organization's aims. But Catholic leadership of the Guatemalan chapter has motivated defections by Guatemalan evangelicals who are unwilling to accept it. David Stoll, "Jesus Is Lord of Guatemala: The Prospects for Evangelical Reform in a Death Squad State," in Emmanuel Sivan and Gabriel Almond, eds., Accounting for Fundamentalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).


18. Ireland, Kingdoms Come, p. 239.


20. Ibid., pp. 332, 344.


23. This is most evident in mass media treatments that reach a far larger audience than does scholarship. "Onward, Christian Soldiers," a video by Gaston Ancelovici and Jaime Barrios (First Run/Icarus, 1989), summarizes the left's conventional wisdom about evangelicals in the


