deeply appreciate the decision of Temple University Press to publish this third edition, nearly fifty years after the publication of the first edition of *The Phenomenology of Dance*. I am deeply honored as well by the value and near classic status that reviewers have placed on the book. The decision by the press together with the value and esteem given the book by reviewers are a tribute to phenomenology and its rigorous and challenging methodology, for it is that methodology that has guided the descriptive analyses in the book and that has allowed it to stand the test of time.

In the intervening years, ongoing experiences in movement and dance have deepened and broadened my reflections on dance, movement, and bodies, and of course the art of dance itself has evolved. As I noted in the Preface to the Second Edition, symbolic forms of dance were the mainstay of modern dance in America prior to the revolutionary shifts in focus in the 1960s, and it was the dynamic structure of these symbolically expressive forms that was the focus of the original book. To acknowledge and celebrate the creative explorations and energies that fuel the changing art of dance, I would restate what I later wrote in that Preface, namely, that there are revisions I would make with respect to “some absolute statements . . . which presume...”
an unchanging world of dance.” I would add now too that in addition to the changing art of dance itself, academic programs in dance have grown as have academic writings on dance, movement, and bodies. Scholarship on these topics has indeed grown. In effect, what this present Preface affords is the opportunity not only to reflect and critically examine once again what I originally wrote in the pages that follow, but to cite advances in my ongoing research and writings on dance, movement, and bodies, particularly in the context of questioning the experiential validity of contemporary writings by philosophers on the sense modality that is kinesthesia or its outright neglect. Kinesthesia is, after all, at the very heart of dance as a formed and performed art.

What this Preface furthermore affords is the opportunity to spell out in finer detail the value of a phenomenological methodology and just what is involved in carrying out the methodology. Accordingly, in addition to questioning and answering to contemporary writings by philosophers—both phenomenologists and analytic philosophers—this Preface presents a prolegomenon of sorts to phenomenological methodology as a discipline in its own right, one warranting both respect and distinction from post-structuralist and, in general, cultural relativist studies. Before engaging readers in these introductory matters, I turn attention to the text itself, specifically to possible lexical emendations I thought of making and to straightforward phenomenological emendations I would definitely make were I to rewrite several paragraphs of Chapter 2 having to do with a “bodily schema” and a consequent neglect of kinesthetic experience and kinesthetic memory.

The possible lexical emendations concern several sentences in Chapter 2 that contain dated if not politically incorrect language. Deep reflections of my own along with discussions with others have led me to leave the text as it originally appeared—thus, for example, I have retained the term “man,” as in “Man comprises temporality within himself” (p. 12). At the time I was studying dance and when I was writing *The Phenomenology of Dance*, a popular and unquestioned adage was “Man has always danced.” As noted in the opening sentence of an article titled “‘Man Has Always Danced’: Forays into an Art Largely Forgotten by Philosophers,” “If the statement ‘man has always danced’ were true, philosophers ought to have found a good deal more to say about dance than the little they have said.” My critical remark was and
surely remains warranted, but as I also stated in that article, “However interesting it might be to concentrate attention on the former term [‘man’] and critically assay its use as a sexually- or gender-biased term, more elemental or foundational matters concern us.” The more elemental or foundational matters in the article concern the word “always,” hence an investigation into the socio-historical evidence that would sustain the claim that humans have always danced. In short, though I initially opted to change “man” to “human” and to make other such changes in this third edition, I subsequently chose to let the past be, in light of both my faith in an enlightened present-day world and my essential concern with the nature of dance as a formed and performed art. I would hope that readers find that superseding focal concern of similar overriding significance as they take up the phenomenological analyses set forth in the original text that follows.

As to straightforward phenomenological emendations, I would now correct what I attribute to a “bodily schema” in Chapter 2 and Chapter 9, namely, a pre-reflective awareness of the body’s spatiality. I would properly and energetically highlight and elucidate kinesthesia in its place—which I do here and now in the several paragraphs that follow.

In general terms, phenomenologists—and more broadly, present-day philosophers as well as neuroscientists—can come closer phenomenologically to the body than do Merleau-Ponty and those following his lead, specifically with what they offer in terms of a hypothetical “body schema” and a consequent blindness to kinesthesia. In turn, present-day philosophers and neuroscientists can delve deeper into first-person experiential truths of what I term in the text that follows “corporeal consciousness”; in particular, they can delve deeper into first-person experiential realities of movement and thus experiential truths of kinesthetic consciousness. Several articles and essays of mine since the original publication of *The Phenomenology of Dance* attest to the validity of this claim. The claim is in fact succinctly supported in an endnote in the final chapter of the expanded second edition of *The Primacy of Movement*, published in 2011 (the first edition was published in 1999). I paraphrase it in part as follows:

Contrary to the claim of Shaun Gallagher, Merleau-Ponty does not “treat kinesthesia”, i.e., he does not examine phenomen-
nologically the experience of self-movement. If he had done so, could he possibly have written of the body “[a]s a mass of tactile, labyrinthine and kinaesthetic data,” for example, and of the “massive sentiment I have of the sack in which I am enclosed”? Most tellingly, could he have failed to follow up his own query about movement, instead declaring, “[I]n thinking clearly about movement, I do not understand how it can ever begin for me, and be given to me as a phenomenon”? Clearly, one can hardly claim that Merleau-Ponty “treats kinesthesia.” Merleau-Ponty in fact wrote of dancing as a “motor habit” and declared that “forming the habit of dancing is discovering, by analysis, the formula of the movement in question.”

The sidelining of kinesthesia by phenomenologists is in fact remarkable in a basic everyday sense. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, for example, affirm that “the sense of agency is not reducible to awareness of bodily movement or to sensory feedback from bodily movement. Consistent with the phenomenology of embodiment, in everyday engaged action afferent or sensory-feedback signals are attenuated, implying a recessive consciousness of our body.” They not only cite Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception) as a reference but also conclude, “I do not attend to my bodily movements in most actions. I do not stare at my hands as I decide to use them; I do not look at my feet as I walk.” Their apparent unwitting appeal to vision and neglect of kinesthesia are both telling and puzzling. Why would one stare at his or her hands in deciding “to use them” any more than one would look at one’s feet as one walks unless there was a pathological condition of some kind? One might indeed be inclined to think that Shaun Gallagher’s and neuroscientist Jonathan Cole’s study of Ian Waterman, a person who “does not know, without visual perception, where his limbs are or what posture he maintains,” and who indeed is written about in terms of “an impaired body schema,” has unwittingly influenced genuine phenomenological practice and in this instance compromised it by hewing not to direct and immediate first-person experiential realities of movement “in deciding to use one’s hands” or in “walking,” for example, but to pathological studies.

A further problem with “bodily schema” actually stems from its
close alignment with pathology and the not uncommon practice of using pathology to explain the normal. Particularly with respect to movement, one may properly ask what justifies starting with pathology in order to understand the normal, the normal being what neuropsychologist Aleksandr Romanovich Luria lucidly described as *kinesthetic and kinetic melodies*.\textsuperscript{14} In addition to critical remarks in *The Roots of Thinking* in answer to the question,\textsuperscript{15} I follow up constructively on the question in an essay on kinesthetic memory, asking, “If the purpose is to understand everyday self-movement, why not start with a magnification of such movement rather than with its diminishment? Why, for example, not begin with dance, and ask whether motor theories, body schemas, and body images are up to the task of explaining how such intricate and complicated ongoing movement is learned and remembered?”\textsuperscript{16} To back up my questioning, I turn in the essay to what Merce Cunningham wrote of his dance *Untitled Solo*:

A large gamut of movements, separate for each of the three dances, was devised, movements for the arms, the legs, the head and the torso which were separate and essentially tensile in character, and off the normal or tranquil body-balance. The separate movements were arranged in continuity by random means, allowing for the superimposition (addition) of one or more, each having its own rhythm and time-length. But each succeeded in becoming continuous if I could wear it long enough, like a suit of clothes.\textsuperscript{17}

I go on to point out that

*Untitled Solo* is hardly a motor habit and learning it was hardly learning “by analysis, the formula of the movement.” Through practice, the dance became a kinesthetically crystallized whole, etched in kinesthetic memory and articulated by way of kinesthetic memory. Were one to take Cunningham’s description as a transcendental clue to coordinated movement, one might say that if one “wears movement long enough,” it can become a kinesthetically articulated dynamic that spins continuously from one’s body like the web of a web-spinning spider.\textsuperscript{18}