In 430 B.C.E. Pericles rallied his fellow Athenians against Sparta by appealing to their civic pride as a generous, creative, and wealthy people. In the nineteenth century, political leaders and intellectuals throughout Europe invented shared histories and characters for their nations—even or especially those nations that did not yet have their own states. Ethnic-racial, caste, and other “structural” identities have been used in many settings throughout the ages to oppress—or to inspire—stigmatized categories of people. Professions such as law and medicine have grabbed power and prestige by portraying their members as special, different, and more knowledgeable than other people. Identities have also been crafted on the basis of shared allegiances—to ecology or a certain God, for instance—but also to particular political tactics, like nonviolence or participatory democracy (Jasper 1997: 85). Collective identities have been used for an infinite variety of goals in a staggering number of settings in most of human history.

Today a popular concept across the social sciences, collective identity is a banner under which people can be mobilized for political, military, or other collective action. It depends on individuals’ subjective identification with some broader group, although that identification can follow from collective action as well as contribute to it. A collective identity is an act of the imagination, a trope that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with their fellows and by defining moral boundaries against other categories. It involves both cognition and emotions and can ultimately be traced to the universal human need for attachments to others. It may be based on shared structural positions, especially class, nation, age, race-ethnicity, gender, and
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sexual orientation, but these never automatically construct identities. There is always a great deal of “identity work” that creates, sustains, and transforms identities. Structural positions are never as structural as they seem.

In the last quarter century scholarly treatment of collective identities has shifted, especially in the study of politics and protest. Once seen as a great advantage to a group, allowing inspiration and mobilization of members for political action, identities are now viewed by many scholars as straitjackets that distort and repress more than they help individuals. Identities can be imagined by others and imposed on a group from the outside to oppress or position it in a social hierarchy. They are not only banners to inspire mobilization; they are cultural stereotypes that damage and distort.

The Identity Dilemma examines both sides of collective identities, both the advantages and the disadvantages. Collective identities enable groups to do certain things but not others. An identity offers individuals some options but not others. It is a focus of tension, trade-offs, and contestation. Each side in the great identity debate proceeds by embracing one horn of the dilemma and ignoring the other. In an oft-used term, collective identities are “necessary fictions”: necessary for political mobilization but always a distortion as well. Inspired by Gayatri Spivak’s similar concept of “operational essentialism,” Caroline Evans and Lorraine Gamman neatly lay out the paradox: “The necessary fiction of a cohesive identity must be spoken in order for political communities to maintain any sort of presence. But there are obviously problems with the articulation of any sort of fixed identity” (1995: 38). This book is meant to explore those trade-offs.

Benefits of Collective Identity

Most scholars of social movements have viewed collective identities as helpful or necessary resources, without which movements cannot mobilize supporters. In the 1990s, researchers such as Verta Taylor and Alberto Melucci portrayed identities as the primary tool with which groups can understand themselves and the world around them and from which they gain the energy necessary for trying to change things. Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier (1992, 1995) described them as the magic that makes a structural category into a self-conscious political player, on Marx’s model of a class-in-itself that needs to become a class-for-itself.

Collective identities also send messages to those outside the group. They present a group to authorities, bystanders, and opponents as morally Worthy, Unified, Numerous, and Committed: what Charles Tilly (2008) dubbed “WUNC displays.” The most successful identities suggest a social movement powerful enough that others must take it seriously: It becomes a significant player. Table I.1 presents some of these internal and external effects of collective identities.
Although almost all scholars view collective identities as socially constructed and contested rather than biological or primordial, those who hold the identities often prefer to see them as fairly fixed, implying a homogeneity and hence coherence for a group that give it power. Individuals can gain pride from a sense that their identities are fixed, even biological. In the face of religious attacks on “the gay lifestyle” as a sinful choice, many gay men in the United States and Europe embraced the idea of a “gay gene” that gave their identities a biological basis rather than a preference that could be deprogrammed. Similarly, trans individuals often insist that the gender identity trapped in their bodies is biological, not socially constructed. A claim of biological fixity can reassure those whose identities are not acknowledged by others.

“Identity” was already being used in the 1980s to characterize themes found in European scholarship on social movements that highlighted cultural processes. In an effort to introduce this work to American audiences, Jean Cohen (1985) contrasted European identity theory and American strategy theory. She thereby implied that identity is an end in itself, in contrast to more instrumental goals. For many readers, this meant that identity, satisfying to members of social movements, turned attention inward, toward expressive action, and away from external issues of power, leadership, opportunities, and networks. Until the mid-1990s, identity was largely seen as a carrier of internal cultural meanings.

In the mid-1990s scholars like Mary Bernstein (1997) reversed this emphasis. Bernstein showed that gay and lesbian identities could be deployed strategically for different audiences—emphasizing either sameness or difference from heterosexual populations—without taking account of the cultural understanding of movement participants. Many scholars now saw the rhetorical flexibility of identities as a strategic advantage for movements but paid

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**TABLE I.1: EXEMPLARY EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity with others</td>
<td>Projection of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride in oneself</td>
<td>Ability to demand rights in name of group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened networks and organizations</td>
<td>Aura of inevitability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfect fit with personal identities</td>
<td>Difficulty incorporating new identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity restricted to one’s group</td>
<td>Risk of highlighting stigma, especially for individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased difficulty assimilating for individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased power for certain leaders to be “representative” of the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial co-optation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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less attention to the trade-offs between different formulations of identity or between internal and external impacts of identity choices.

Even as its external strategic impact was recognized more and more often, collective identity remained a favorite concept for acknowledging the role of cultural meanings in social movements, perhaps even edging out frames for a while. As Scott Hunt and Robert Benford observed, “Collective identity seems to be either a central concept or a residual category for nearly every theoretical perspective and empirical question associated with contemporary studies of social movements” (1994: 433). Today collective identities remain a central concept in explanations of mobilization, largely for the supposed advantages that identities provide (Klandermans 2014).

Risks of Collective Identity

Other scholars downplay these benefits, viewing collective identities as traps that distort complex realities, “naturalize” labels, and deceive individuals about their own goals and desires. Thinkers in the humanities such as Michel Foucault and Judith Butler believe that all identities are subject positions created by systems of power in ways that control and constrain us; we must always be suspicious of them. Fixed identities not only prevent adaptations and reinterpretations but never fit lived experience very well. The essence of "queer" politics is to resist any collective label that could be put on a banner. By deconstructing the political and cultural processes that create identities, this tradition emphasizes the fictional nature of our language and labels for all groups. We should set aside debates over identities, insists Judith Butler (1990: xxxii) in a key text, and inquire into the political possibilities foreclosed by categories of identity.

Susan Hekman warns that identity formation leads to the creation of a new political truth that becomes fixed and associated with the movement: “The identity that has been constructed as a site of resistance is reified and fixed, stripped of ambiguity, fluidity and individuality” (2000: 297). Hekman views public recognition as a trap. Public bodies and state institutions fetishize “the collective” and demand to know who legitimately constitutes the group and speaks on their behalf so that appropriate policy can be formulated and implemented. In this way external players help fix the content of identities.

These critics point to a truth about identities: Individuals hold them in a variety of ways and to varying degrees. Some true believers in a group feel comfortable with an identity, “owning” it and taking enormous pride in it. But others are cynical or ironic about an identity, preserving considerable distance from it. Some recognize the label as necessary for various political ends but otherwise reject it. Some are at the center of the identity, we could say; others are at the periphery. We might expect those at the center to devote more time to organizing events that proclaim, display, and reinforce the identity; they
“patrol the boundaries” (Gamson 1997). Scholar-activists, who make a living deconstructing others’ truths, have been especially prone to point out the fictional character of collective identities instead of their political necessity. They have had a corrosive effect on many movements by focusing so much on the risks of identities and little on the benefits. Deconstructive tactics, critics say, open up endless possibilities for academic articles and books but few for political mobilization outside the academy.

A feeling of groupness also varies over time. “The group in fusion,” as Jean-Paul Sartre (2010) called it, appears especially at certain moments. Émile Durkheim (1995) saw these moments in rituals, when the entire group comes together and participates in activities meant to erase each individual’s sense of a separate identity. Processes of singing, dancing, and marching together are well-known tools for producing these strong emotions of solidarity with the group. But without these moments, identities fade.

The normative critiques parallel more academic criticism of collective identity as too conceptually confused and diverse to be useful. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper find five distinct ways that the term is used: They complain that two of the usages highlight a fundamental sameness, across persons and over time, whereas two “reject notions of fundamental or abiding sameness” (2000: 8). The former are too essentialist for their taste; the latter, too malleable and fluid to be used in analytic work. They have arrived at the paradox of identity: It can be useful as a strong, unquestioned label for a group, but it is also a fiction that, in other circumstances, can be deconstructed. We prefer to analyze these trade-offs than to dismiss a term so widely used in politics and research.

Many protest movements—such as the autonomous movements discussed in Chapter 3—have taken these suspicions to heart, refusing to create names for themselves, constantly questioning who can speak for whom, declining to articulate clear goals, and refusing to group individuals into larger categories. However, inside these movements, groups and individuals have often spoken in the name of some category, if only “the 99 percent.”

The Identity Dilemma

Collective identities carry both benefits and risks. The potentially powerful advantages can also take on a life of their own and elude their creators’ control. This is a common situation: Anything we can use to advance our cause, others can use against us, whether an identity, symbols, social networks, or resources such as guns or Facebook accounts. Collective identities are politically necessary, or at least useful, as symbols for recruiting others and engaging opponents and the state but fictional in that not every member fits or accepts the label in the same way or to the same degree. They continually impose dilemmas on protest groups. Highlighting the many trade-offs and dilemmas
underlying political action is part of an emerging strategic perspective on social movements (Jasper 2004; Duyvendak and Jasper 2015; Jasper and Duyvendak 2015), and more generally an agonistic view of politics (Mouffe 1996, 2005).^2^ Collective identities do some things for us and other things to us. The construction of a label that commands some affective commitments from others is a great accomplishment that allows organizers to persuade others to engage in action. Love, trust, and respect ease social interactions, including recruitment and protest (Putnam 2000). Once formulated, however, the label is not so easy to manage, and different factions may have different interpretations of it. Even opponents may work to define the identity in terms favorable to them, demonizing a group or ridiculing it. One way to think of the central dilemma is that the process of identity work creates products—public statements, names, placards, symbols, and so on—that take on a life of their own in creating expectations about identities (Flesher Fominaya 2010).

Joshua Gamson argues that “fixed identity categories are both the basis for oppression and the basis for political power” (1995: 391). Groups face discrimination on the basis of their identity, but they harness that very distinctiveness to generate internal solidarity and external visibility (Spivak 1987). Gamson asks whether sociopolitical struggles articulated through identity must eventually undermine themselves as their supposed homogeneity fractures. All collective identities have that potential.

Although all collective identities impose trade-offs, perhaps the most common is that between crafting an identity that makes a group look like the rest of society or one that highlights their distinct attributes (Bernstein 1997). With stigmatized identities, protest groups form around the same categories that they are trying to eliminate. At best they can transform negative stereotypes into positive ones; James Jasper (2010) calls this the stigmatized identity dilemma. Research on those labeled “mentally ill” shows the dilemma in stark form, as acceptance of the stigmatized label is typically the price paid to receive needed services (Rosenfield 1997; Pescosolido 2013; see also Chapter 6).

The fictional aspect of identity raises a paradox: It appears to be stable and permanent, yet its content changes. Collective identity “ensures the continuity and permanence of the movement over time; it establishes the limits of the actor with respect to its social environment” (Melucci 1995: 49). Movement actors attempt to articulate a coherent vision of themselves in order to build solidarity and command attention, and this necessarily involves some degree of reification. Reification is a necessary evil of identities, implying that social movement activists share the same goals and interests. By demanding equality, for example, LGBTQ activists present a united front, particularly against those who oppose their equal standing and seek to retain the status quo. Yet the interests of gay men and of lesbians are not identical. Moreover, if gay men
and gay women can coalesce because of the discrimination endured on the basis of sexual orientation, then where do those fighting transphobia fit? For them the core issue is gender, not sexual orientation. The LGBTQ movement attempts to address issues of sexual orientation as well as gender because, standing alone, the trans community can be ignored. Activists come together in sometimes uneasy alliances, presenting a united front, knowing that they are more likely to be listened to or at least less likely to be ignored. But they also have titanic battles with each other. Every strategic player is also an arena (Jasper and Duyvendak 2015).

Related Dilemmas

Recent theoretical approaches that foreground strategy rather than structure or psychology suggest that strategic players always face a series of trade-offs, some of which they consciously recognize as dilemmas and “choice points” (Jasper 2012). They try to make the best judgments in the face of these dilemmas, knowing that each decision has costs and risks as well as potential benefits. Even when they are not acknowledged, most trade-offs are still there. They often appear in research as unanticipated consequences, ironies, catch-22s, contradictions, paradoxes (see Chapter 3), or “double-edged swords” (Saunders 2008). We can often detect trade-offs by the conflicts they create within groups and movements.

The identity dilemma is closely related to the extension dilemma. Building a larger player—a movement or group in this case—has many benefits: more resources, more publicity, more know-how, and more contacts through social networks. But extension also brings risks because the members are less likely to agree on goals or on tactics; members become harder to coordinate as they become more numerous (Jasper 2006: 127). Collective identities can be selected that define the group too broadly or restrict it too severely. Certain actions are possible with a large group; others, with a small one. Extensive definitions may include more members but with less affective commitment. A collective identity is itself an extension that makes some potential recruits uncomfortable.

One variation on the extension dilemma is the dilemma of powerful allies (Jasper 2014: 128). Just as you are tempted to build a large team, you are tempted to bring powerful players on board. They may be allies in the media, they may be other protest groups or political parties, they may be strong leaders with their own resources or prestige, or they may consist of celebrities. These can all be useful to a protest movement. But there is always a risk that—being powerful—they will use your group for their purposes rather than help you attain your own goals. The American New Left of the 1960s was torn apart partly because it attracted media attention, but not the right kind of attention; it created famous leaders, but they developed their own agendas.
They became more powerful than their groups (Gitlin 1980). Battles unfold over a movement’s identity. Because collective identities depend on affective commitments of love and trust, they run up against the band of brothers dilemma (Jasper 2014: 116). A large strategic player depends on emotional loyalties from its members, and leaders take constant measures to encourage those loyalties. But there is a chance that these emotional commitments will settle on a subunit of the larger player. The eponymous example is the combat platoon: Its members are fiercely loyal to each other, even sometimes at the expense of commitment to the army as a whole. In social movements, participants may feel a stronger attachment to their own organization or their own tiny affinity group than to the movement as a whole (Saunders 2008). These smaller groups may defect if they are dissatisfied with the goals or tactics of the full movement. Subidentities can crowd out the broader identities.

Collective identities also impose dilemmas on individuals (Wimmer 2013). In what we might call the assimilation dilemma, they must decide if they will gain more from being a part of the group and helping advance the group’s goals or by advancing as an individual, often by hiding or renouncing a group identity (Lamont and Mizrachi 2012). The classic version is the assimilation of immigrants from ethnic-racial minorities. If an identity proves hard to destigmatize, then hiding it or at least blurring it—for instance, with new labels—is a more attractive option (Jasper 2010; see also Chapter 6).

Strategic choices are not all about rational calculations; they are driven just as strongly by emotions. Far from simple cognitive grids or distinctions, collective identities are based on positive feelings toward one’s group and, often, by negative feelings toward out-groups (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Michèle Lamont (2009) has shown how ethnic groups can use collective identity as a cultural repertory to challenge stigmas and stereotypes and to weaken symbolic boundaries between groups. For those groups who suffer from stigma, one of the main goals of mobilization is to transform shame into pride in the identity, an emotional transformation that often requires moral shock, anger, and indignation along the way (Britt and Heise 2000). Although this particular “emotional battery” (a combination of positive and negative emotions; Jasper 2012) has been most studied for LGBTQ movements (Gould 2009), it is also central to the identity work of groups such as nationalists (see Chapter 9) and users of mental health services (see Chapter 6).

Contesting Identities

Conflicts over identities are constant. Broadly speaking, there are two types, external and internal (see Table I.2). Many movements arise to challenge demeaning identities imposed by outsiders, although sometimes also internalized by members. Even after a movement forms, external players, either
opponents or the state, attempt to challenge the purpose, legitimacy, and authority of its identity. Their motivations are usually clear: The external actor is threatened in some way and needs to (re)establish its authority. In reaction to this external interference, a movement may coalesce around a particular collective identity that is perceived as being, unjustly, “under attack.” The civil rights movement in the southern United States grew stronger, not weaker, in response to white resistance, which further stoked black indignation (Luders 2010: chap. 2). External attacks galvanize solidarity in ways that internal identity building by protesters sometimes cannot (Coser 1956). In the end, however, many external challengers (states in particular) are too powerful to resist and can fragment or destroy the movement.

One benefit from external contestation is that opponents and elites acknowledge protesters as a threat to be taken seriously. For instance, Irish Republicans during the “Troubles” viewed themselves as freedom fighters attempting to liberate their people, while the British state branded them as “terrorists.” The terrorist label attacked the Republicans’ moral legitimacy—they were criminals—but acknowledged their strength; this gained them both admiration and recruits among Catholics, who rejected the moral claim of criminality but celebrated the imputation of strength.

The fluidity of identities opens them to internal contestation as well. Me-lucci captures the fluidity of identity as a process, maintaining that collective identity is “an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place” (1995: 44). There is “a continual process of recomposition rather than a given,” in which identity is “a dynamic, emergent aspect of collective action” (Schlesinger 1987: 237, cited in Gamson 1995).

Every strategic dilemma opens the way for differences of opinion and contestation inside a group (Shriver and Adams 2013). Factions emerge, each favoring a different option and each with good arguments on its side.
ERS IN ECOLOGY MOVEMENTS SHARE MANY VIEWS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMANS AND THE EARTH BUT OFTEN DISAGREE ABOUT THE BEST WAY TO ADDRESS LOOMING ECOLOGICAL DISASTER, RANGING FROM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE TO PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION TO PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY. THEY DISAGREE OVER WHAT A “REAL” ECOLOGIST IS. IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING COLLECTIVE IDENTITY, PROTESTERS CONTEST THE PURPOSE, ACTIVITIES, AND SUBSTANCE OF THE MOVEMENT, SO DILEMMAS CAN AND WILL PRESENT THEMSELVES.

THE RISKS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT ARE OBVIOUS, BECAUSE THEY CAN UNCOVER OR CREATE IRRECONCILABLE DISAGREEMENTS OVER GOALS, TACTICS, AND IDENTITIES, LEADING TO FISSION OR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GROUP ALTOGETHER. MOVEMENTS ARE OFTEN SPLIT BY FACTIONS, SOMETIMES DRIVEN BY INDIVIDUAL AMBITION AND EGO, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DUALIZATION OF EFFORT AND THE EXHAUSTION OF SCARCE RESOURCES. MOREOVER, IF A KEY GOAL OF ANY SOCIAL MOVEMENT IS TO GALVANIZE SUPPORT, THE PUBLIC MAY BE CONFUSED BY MINUTE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN, FOR INSTANCE, THE JUDEAN PEOPLE’S FRONT AND THE PEOPLE’S FRONT OF JUDEA. SUCH INTERNAL CONTESTATION CAN WEAKEN A MOVEMENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG COLLECTIVE IDENTITY, MOVEMENTS WILL STRUGGLE TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC OF WHO THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY STAND FOR.


ONE FORM OF INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT, EVEN WITHIN RELATIVELY ACCEPTED COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES, REVOLVES AROUND TASTES IN TACTICS (JASPER 1997). RATHER THAN NEUTRARLY SELECTING WHATEVER TACTICS SEEM MOST LIKELY TO ATTAIN STATED GOALS, PROTESTERS FEEL MORAL AND EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENTS TO CERTAIN TACTICS AND ARE REPELSED BY OTHERS. THESE COMMITMENTS GO BEYOND FAMILIARITY AND KNOW-HOW, SO THE USE OF CERTAIN TACTICS PARTLY BECOMES AN END IN ITSELF, AS IS OBVIOUSLY THE CASE WITH NONVIOLENCE AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY. CONFLICTING TASTES IN TACTICS OFTEN REFLECT GENERATIONAL DIVIDES WITHIN MOVEMENTS AND MOVEMENT GROUPS (WHITTIER 1995). OPEN DISCUSSIONS OF DIVERSE TACTICS AND STRATEGIES, DURING WHICH THOSE INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT FEEL THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE AND THEIR VOICE WILL BE HEARD, WILL ENSURE MORE SUPPORT FOR ANY DECISION MADE. THIS HAS THE POTENTIAL TO REDUCE FUTURE BLAME IF TACTICS DO NOT HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT.
Scholars and activists today—influenced by queer studies—may feel that they are the first to be uncomfortable with strong collective identities, probably because scholars who write about past identities so often exaggerate the homogeneity of groups and identities. Too often we focus on the product or a successful label and have trouble seeing the disagreements that went into it and continue to do so, including different ways of holding an identity that has always existed. This idealism may result from the dominant model we have for culture: We see people as thinking machines, crunching through codes much as computers make calculations. Instead, people feel their way through the world, via a number of feeling-thinking processes that allow a variety of repugnances, thrills, and desires to operate under the same group labels. Individuals’ allegiances are almost never exhausted by a single collective identity (although there are people who do get absorbed into single identities, becoming almost caricatures). People feel different ways about their identities.

**Types of Identities**

Identity dilemmas differ, naturally, depending on the type of identity. Many different kinds of strategic players have used, or tried to use, collective identities to win different types of political battles. We would like to understand the differences among the identities (felt or expressed) of groups as diverse as nations, ethno-racial groups, professions, women, LGBTQ communities, political factions, religions, and protest movements. We can make a few general observations that might fit all these, but even more interesting are the differences. How do identities form, and how are they lived, rejected, or used in strategic arenas in all these different situations? Here are some preliminary distinctions.

First, does an identity exist independently of the political mobilization around it? At one extreme are ethno-racial groups that are widely acknowledged by both group members and others in a society. The civil rights movement in the United States did not have to persuade black people in the South that they were a distinct group in order to recruit them. There were plentiful cultural resources, including frames, slogans, stories, songs, and historical facts, on which activists could draw for their identity work (Morris 1984). In many cases, the identity exists because outsiders treat the group differently, whether through cultural stereotypes, legal constraints, or outright conflict. Not all special treatment is oppressive, however, leading to a second factor.

Is the group oppressed by, or in conflict with, other groups? The group may be actively persecuted or face legal discrimination, or it may instead simply lack sufficient resources for its members to attain their goals in life. Just as an identity is open to cultural construction, its perception of itself as threatened is too. One of the most effective ways to create a collective identity is to make a group feel persecuted (Coser 1956). However, group identities
can form without this sense of persecution or oppression, as in the case of many movement identities. A sense of difference from others may, almost by definition, be necessary to a collective identity, but this need not come from persecution.

Third, what is the group’s relationship to the state, which affects both these other factors? Some groups are excluded from political participation and are fighting to be included: The state is both opponent and arena of conflict. Roma communities, for instance, are persecuted and marginalized across Europe, and they have come to understand themselves as outsiders who are not full citizens of the states in which they reside (McGarry 2010, 2011). This perception is the basis for mobilization and activism in both domestic and transnational political contexts (see Chapter 7). In other cases, a group has some special legal standing, whether bad or good. Among the latter are professions with exclusive rights to perform certain kinds of work. Some groups are official wards of the state, such as criminals or users of mental health services (see Chapter 6). States encourage some identities and discourage others, but their capacities to do so vary from weak to strong, leading Deborah Yashar to conclude that “the politicization of ethnic identities is likely to occur where state policies challenge the material and political foundations necessary for local community autonomy” (2005: 283).

Fourth, does the group have strong or weak internal networks? Can its members communicate easily, especially through face-to-face interactions, or do they interact with each other through the media? Do they control their own communications technologies, especially group-centered newspapers or websites? A group’s being segregated residentially, either from discrimination (African Americans) or partly voluntarily (gay enclaves), contributes to closer network ties. Formal organizations that have a legal and material basis for carrying out identity work also contribute to strong networks, as well as serve as symbols of the group.

We would expect differences like these to affect how easily a movement can mobilize around a collective identity. Having to create its own identity might be more difficult than reinterpreting an existing identity. But if it claims to represent a category of people with tight networks that faces some threat, activists might be able to mobilize around a new identity. Such differences should also influence the strategic purposes to which a group puts its identity claims. They may have legal standing in some strategic arenas but not others, or they may hold advantaged positions in some arenas. Their available resources may give them greater strength in one arena than another. They may also have to appeal to different allies and deal with different opponents in different arenas. Strong social networks can often compensate for a lack of monetary resources, for instance.

No matter where a group is situated along these four continua, it will face internal struggles over the definition of its collective identity. If nothing
else, activists will try to persuade potential recruits that protest is an essential part of the identity: their own favored form of protest, no doubt. For all these groups, collective identities remain a necessary fiction: “necessary” because of the strategic advantages of identities and “fictional” because of the complex cultural meanings it unavoidably elides.

Summary of the Book

This book contains contributions from a variety of disciplines and draws on the empirical expertise of a range of scholars interested in the identity dilemmas negotiated by social movement protesters. While they retain a clear focus on “the identity dilemma,” the various chapters help develop our understanding of collective identity in a number of empirical contexts.

We begin with an overview of the vast literature on collective identity, a concept that has provoked much interest across many disciplines. James Jasper, Marisa Tramontano, and Aidan McGarry address some of the most significant and enduring collective identities in the modern age—class, nation, race, and gender—highlighting the development of the LGBTQ movement, which has generated some of the most interesting debates concerning the tensions, paradoxes, and trade-offs of identity. Across many disciplines, identity is presented as a positive attribute in order to foster solidarity, but it is also attacked for its darker side.

The remainder of the book is organized in two sections. The first explores strategic identities in protest movements. John Nagle compares social movements in two postconflict contexts characterized by sectarianism and consociational political structures: Lebanon and Northern Ireland. He lays out a fascinating form of the identity dilemma in which nonsectarian groups (workers, LGBTQ) attempt to stimulate new political identities that contest existing forms of ethnic mobilization without being co-opted by sectarian interests. He highlights the transformative potential of these movements, which have the ability to foster peace as their identities transcend traditional ethno-nationalist cleavages that segregate society.

Cristina Flesher Fominaya explores autonomous movements in Spain. Distinguishing between identity as a process and as a product, she traces the paradox of anti-identitarian collective identity from the global justice movement to the indignados, arguing that one of its central characteristics is its refusal to have a common central defining characteristic. In their refusal to produce identifiable representative labels, which most movements work hard to create, autonomous activists run the risk of being invisible in a world that demands auto- and ascribed categorization.

Clare Saunders discusses the challenges of using surveys to measure the identities of ecological protesters. Drawing on research conducted with environmental protesters, she draws attention to the difficulty in conceptualizing
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collective identity in the first place but outlines four elements of identity that can be measured: worldviews, shared goals, relational aspects, and behaviors and norms.

Neil Stammers demonstrates how mobilizing identity can persist and sustain its potential across hundreds of years in apparently very different historical circumstances. Drawing on the construction of the “freeborn Englishman,” he highlights the dilemmas of institutionalizing human rights and the organizational and strategic dimensions of movement activism.

The second section focuses on how stigmatized groups negotiate identity dilemmas. Marian Barnes reflects on the mental health user movement in England and the dilemma of deploying a stigmatized identity to claim authority and knowledge over established psychiatric institutions. By sustaining a collective identity based on the distinctiveness of the “mad experience,” she elaborates on the diversity and contested nature of the different identities among movement participants and offers insights into partnership work and the significance of recognition.

Huub van Baar outlines the importance of the historical construction of identity and the significance of memory in his examination of how the Romani movement has interpreted its history, particularly concerning remembrance and memorials of the Holocaust. Several identity dilemmas are presented that relate to acts of memory and the stigmatization and exclusion of Roma communities from society over time, to varying devastating effects.

Elżbieta Korolczuk addresses the theme of science and health in her exploration of how collective identity is constructed and contested by protesters concerning infertility and assisted reproductive technologies in Poland. She reveals how “infertility” is imagined, negotiated, and understood in online digital spaces and points out the trade-offs involved in maintaining a collective identity while promoting social change.

Finally, Umut Korkut examines memory, collective identity, and nationalism among the far right in Hungary. Today the far right actively constructs the past and imagines a better future for Hungary by mythologizing nationalist authors, who serve as ideal types for Hungarian society, premised on exclusion. Hungary’s sad recent history shows just how central collective identities remain in politics today.

NOTES

We thank Neil Stammers and Marisa Tramontano for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

1. Some social movements aim for an even more inclusive identity than the 99 percent. Revolutionary movements are based on the solidarity of the nation, minus the old ruler and his corrupt minions. Human-rights and environmental movements claim a solidarity for all humanity.
2. Chantal Mouffe comments, “The mistake of liberal rationalism is to ignore the affective dimension mobilized by collective identifications and to imagine that those supposedly archaic ‘passions’ are bound to disappear with the advance of individualism and the progress of rationality” (2005: 6). She recognizes the ubiquity of collective identities without claiming that they are innate (“supposedly archaic”).

3. Activist Jonathan Smucker calls this the political-identity paradox: “Our situation requires a strong internal identity in order to foster the level of commitment needed for protracted struggle; but this same cohesion tends over time to isolate the group, and isolated groups are hard-pressed to build the kind of broad-based power needed to achieve the big changes they imagine. . . . We have to perform an extraordinary balancing act between the conflicting imperatives of building a strong sense of identity within our core and connecting with allies and potential allies beyond the core” (2012: 252).

REFERENCES


Duyvendak, Jan Willem, and James M. Jasper, eds. 2015. *Breaking Down the State*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


Excerpt * Temple University Press


