I

Constructing Modernism
Introduction

*Planners, Policy Makers, and the Grass Roots*

The architect and planner Teddy Cruz was sitting in his San Diego studio in 2006 when he looked out the window and saw an entire house being moved down the block on a flatbed truck. The Guatemalan-born American-trained architect followed this castoff of a consumer society as it crept across the U.S. border into Mexico and through the hilly streets of Tijuana on the other side. It eventually made its way into a huge, Levittown-like subdivision that looked like cornrows of two-car garages. He watched as a crane lifted the house onto a frame that had been jerry-built above and between two of these closely packed, tiny tract homes.

Cruz found himself standing in the midst of a jungle of “guerrilla architecture.” The residents had appropriated and transformed their space with do-it-yourself ingenuity. They had built additions that filled the yards and converted their munchkin-sized dwellings into shops serving their neighbors’ basic needs. “These tract [houses],” Cruz realized, “are perceived as open systems, their inherent uniformity giving way to occupants’ collective desire for functionality and flexibility, for the freedom to activate improvisational, higher-density, and mixed uses—the very DNA of urbanism itself.”

This book is about the hybrid spaces like this barrio that grew out of processes of contestation among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots. In this case, the developers of the subdivision planned to maximize their profits by constructing as many minimum-sized houses as they could pack on their patch of real estate. Somehow conforming to the zoning and building codes, they were permitted to cover the land with houses, setting none aside.
for either public spaces, such as schools and parks, or commercial services, such as grocery stores and Laundromats. In response, the new homeowners rebuilt their environment, turning it from a sheet of cookie-cutter spaces into their own unique place of community, self-support, and urban life.

By including the guerrilla architects of the grass roots, this book is not about urban planning in the narrow, academic sense of formal architecture and design. In contrast to this kind of study of the ideas of great men flowing from the top down, the history of urban change after World War II requires inclusion of the conflicting visions of all three: planners, policy makers, and the grass roots. Or as the British scholar Alison Ravetz explains, “Once the focus is shifted from conscious [formal] planning to the urban environment, it is necessary and inevitable to consider technology, property, people, and mechanisms of control, as well as ideas.”

Consequently, this is a book about seeing all these agents of change interacting in the building of the urban environment. It is about seeing the city as both material space and symbolic place in peoples’ imaginations. It is about “seeing like a state,” looking down from architectural studios, planning offices, city halls, and other centers of power. But it is also about seeing from the bottom up, looking out at the city from bedroom windows, neighborhood street corners, and downtown plazas. Urban space is not just a neutral container—a physical thing. It is also a non-Euclidean place of human activity. Looking at the Tijuana neighborhood, Cruz could visualize the social relationships embedded in the physical alteration of this subdivision into a community.

Giving agency to the grass roots requires an inclusive view of civil society. Marshall Berman supplies just this kind of perspective in *All That Is Solid Melts into Air*. In this seminal work in cultural studies, he examines the historical movement called modernism. Arising out of the industrial city, it was a revolt against tradition that blurred the lines between actor and spectator, fact and fiction. Berman proposes that modernism is “any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it.”

From this point of view, the migrants who moved from farm to factory and self-built their houses and shops on illegal plots of land were also modernists. Their informal planning of shantytowns was literally an attempt to “make themselves at home” in the city of the present moment. In sheer scale alone, their efforts represent a major part of the transformation of the urban environment in the postwar era.

The product of this kind of city building process is what I call “hybrid space,” one of several terms employed in this book that need unpacking because they have several layers of meaning. Drawing on my own observations, contestation over Chicago’s neighborhood parks exposes how the elasticity
of this concept in terms of scale and symbolism is a useful way to describe the multifaceted complexity of the urban environment. One block from my home is Warren Park, a ninety-acre green space. A private golf club from 1896 until 1968, it was redesigned by the Chicago Park District to include a more diverse range of recreational activities. Besides retaining a nine-hole golf course, the park planners added a field house, tennis courts, sledding hill, and several baseball diamonds. Only a little room was left along the borders for picnicking, social gatherings, and other more leisurely pursuits.

Despite lots of community input and political wrangling over the fate of the park for over a decade, the plan was a complete mismatch of design and use. By the time work finally got under way in the late seventies, immigrants from South Asia and Latin America had become the dominant groups living around the park. Most of them do not play baseball, tennis, or golf; they are devoted to soccer and an occasional cricket match.

As I walk through the park, I see baseball fields transformed into soccer pitches with markers ranging from official-looking iridescent cones along the sidelines to makeshift goalposts built out of backpacks and jackets. And while the tennis courts stand empty, families and other groups crowd the fringe areas with their barbeques, turning them into picnic grounds. As with the Tijuana subdivision, the contestation between the planners and the grassroots over the recreational use of Warren Park has produced a patch of hybrid space.

In another way, Warren Park is an exemplar of the interaction of two or more different, even paradoxical environments coming together to create an unplanned mixed-use space. In this case, gaggles of geese have turned the golf course into a place of urban nature during the off-season. With humans barred by a chain-link fence circling the course, its fairways and ponds have become the winter quarters for large flocks of them, numbering in the hundreds. Other birds and wild animals have found a safe haven there too, including raccoons and possums that forage for food on my back porch during the midnight hours.

The creation of hybrid space can result from contestation or adaptation, as in the examples above, or from conscious planning. While the geese have turned a golf course into a blend of the human made and the natural, landscape architects have also composed formal designs of urban nature. Consider “starchitect” Jeanne Gang’s proposal to devolve Northerly Island—a former airstrip on the lakefront in the city center—back to its natural topography as a marshy sand dune. She wants to restore a presettlement landscape to turn it into a refuge for birds migrating along the shoreline of Lake Michigan. She believes a wetland thriving with wildlife will attract people and promote a greater appreciation of the civic value of greening the city. In broader perspective, the American Dream of homeownership in a suburban
nature harkens back to deep-seated, cultural imaginaries of utopia as a pastoral landscape.9

The examples of hybrid space in Chicago parks highlight the importance of putting this complex, multidimensional term within a specific context of an actual place. In addition to the spatial dimensions of contestation over the urban environment, crosscurrents of people and culture contribute to its transformation from a physical shape on the ground into a place alive with the “DNA of urbanism.” Cruz, for instance, was struck by the stark contrast between the skylines of his American city and its Mexican neighbor just across an increasingly militarized border.10

“Two completely different urbanisms,” he observes, “expressing two different attitudes toward the city have grown up in reaction to the phenomenon of the border. If San Diego is emblematic of the segregation and control epitomized by the master-planned communities that define its sprawl, Tijuana’s urbanism evolved [organically] as a collection of informal, nomadic settlements or barrios that encroach on San Diego’s periphery. . . . Unavoidably, both cities seem to contain something of one another: In every ‘first world’ city, a ‘third world’ city exists, and every third world city replicates the first.”11

Transnational urbanism moves back and forth across the United States–Mexican border, part of the globalization of the local, and the other way around. This book is about that globalization, but equally important here is not losing sight of the nation-state as a powerful filter, or lens, mediating between the global and the local. An ecological perspective on the environment can add another vital spectrum of views on the city as a hybrid space. At one end of the scale, it supplies microscopic images of disease organisms in drinking water supplies. At the other are satellite pictures of the air pollution rising above sprawling metropolitan regions. And in between are the struggles over the design and use of public parks and open spaces among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots.12

Of course, people themselves as well as material culture began flowing around the world at an ever-faster pace after World War II. As a Guatemalan American, Cruz personifies the success story of immigrants, who take on multiple identities. He is a member of an elite, albeit swelling, corps of globetrotting professionals, technocrats, and managers. After 1945, they began climbing the rungs of the corporate ladder of success by moving around the world from one foreign subsidiary to the next. Indispensable to bringing about the interconnectivity of markets and information, these nomads could demand oases of safety as they trekked with their families in tow from one strange land to the next. As Cruz observes, his own transplanted hometown has become a fortified landscape of gated communities and spatial segregation by class and race/ethnicity.
In contrast, Guatemala City has become home for more than ten thousand gang members deported from Southern California. They are the antipodes of the globetrotting elite; they are no-where men, trapped in a transnational space-time trajectory without a place to call home, except prison. Almost all of them had come to the San Diego–Los Angeles area as small children with their parents, making them undocumented permanent residents, not illegal immigrants. Most of them grew up in Mexican American or Mexican “cities-within-the-city,” and they joined their neighborhood street gangs.13 They all began as young people in search of place-based identities and self-defense in a hostile environment of social disorder and police brutality.

But they ended up being deported. In 1996, the U.S. Congress changed their status from local residents to global exiles in the aptly named Immigration Reform and Personal Responsibility Act. Even those convicted of a nonviolent offense could be summarily expelled. Treated like pariahs in Guatemala, they were tattoo-covered strangers in a strange land. Nonetheless, their membership in a U.S. street gang followed them, transporting their place-based identities into their new neighborhoods in Guatemala City.14

Like the top-to-bottom contestation over different visions of the ideal city, the global migration of people also included a full range of society, from elite starchitects to outcast gangsters. They all became agents of change who contributed to the building of urban environments. In the case of Southern California and Latin America, this flow of people back and forth represents what Elana Zilberg calls a “politics of simultaneity.” “In the North–South relations under consideration here,” she posits, “deported immigrant gang youth oscillate between ‘home’ and ‘abroad,’ where both home and abroad are themselves unstable locations. At the same time, gang youth who have never been to the United States construct their identities around imagined urban geographies of cities like Los Angeles.”15

From simultaneous different points of view, then, the city itself takes on multiple shapes and layers of meaning. All these visions need to be included because studies of formal plans and official policies provide only a partial picture of the remaking of the urban environment after World War II. In the capitalist countries under review here, the real estate industry and the city’s inhabitants often acted independently of, if not in opposition to, official blueprints of the future. As Ravetz shows in her brilliant analysis of the rebuilding of Great Britain’s cities, even the most enthusiastic embrace of comprehensive planning resulted in only patches of change in the much larger quilt of the urban fabric.16

Conscious planning also generated unintended consequences, constructing urban landscapes unlike anything originally envisioned. Policy
makers saw roadbuilding programs in terms of the planners’ promise to speed up traffic; they predicted neither the resulting smog and congestion nor the populist highway revolts that shut them down. In the subdivision observed by Teddy Cruz, the plan to provide no public spaces or basic services led its residents to jerry-build their own places of community life literally on top of and inside their houses. And in some cities, the official plan was having no plan at all. Consider that in two of the world’s biggest, Mexico City and São Paulo, self-built shantytowns on illegally occupied land cover more than half their metropolitan areas.

Struggles over whose vision of the urban environment would prevail among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots became caught up in much broader questions of political power and social justice. Who has rights to the city, who owns it, and who rules? The makeover under way in the Tijuana subdivision and countless other patches of land represents a largely untold, albeit crucial, part of the history of the city in the postwar era. With a few exceptions, planning historians have turned a blind eye to the grass roots as agents of change in the city building process.17

One of the rebels is Leonie Sandercock, who was trained in the fine arts but now holds a distinguished academic position as an urban planning theorist. She advocates including “insurgent planning histories” from the bottom up to balance accounts of conscious, formal planning from the top down. “Stories of resistance to ‘planning by the state,’” she contends, “are as important a part of the historical narrative as are the more familiar heroic stories of master plans and master planners, of planning legislation and state planning agencies. There is a tradition of community resistance . . . and of community planning, which needs to be incorporated as a counterpoint to the modernist narrative.”18 This book aims to heed her call for a fuller account of city building as a contested terrain of social conflict that results in patches of hybrid space.

I now introduce the three main groups of actors in the building of the urban environment. First come the policy makers, because cities have always needed some form of government to provide for the health, safety, and order of their inhabitants. With the growth of large urban centers in the ancient world, moreover, rulers were needed to organize the provision of essential infrastructure such as waterworks and flood control, roads and bridges, and markets and wharfs. This group plays a central role in both the decision-making process and its enforcement. The power of the policy makers can range from absolute rulers to hamstrung administrators, who can be constrained further by democratic mechanisms of control such as frequent elections and mandatory referendums.19

Similarly, the everyday lives of the people have always been an intrinsic part of the city building process. For our purposes, the “grass roots” are
defined as city people engaged in collective acts of informal planning and resistance against public policy. In the cases of the Tijuana homeowners and Warren Park soccer players, autonomous individuals acted spontaneously to fulfill a shared vision of community life. In other places, local residents mobilized around place-based issues to become organizational forms such as neighborhood associations, faith-based groups, and protest movements. And in some cases, their acts of resistance empowered them to play a role in the official planning and development of patches of urban space. In the extreme, albeit all-to-common experience of the shantytowns, informal planning from the bottom up was the only means available to provide the essential necessities of group survival.  

As we see in the insurgent planning histories in this book, they extended from staking out the boundaries of home lots and roadways to building schools and utility networks. The planners come last because they entered the stage of urban history relatively late as a self-conscious group of professional experts. To be sure, visions of utopia as a kingdom of heaven are as old as pastoral images of a Garden of Eden. But only during the opening decades of the twentieth century were comprehensive plans drawn from a self-proclaimed, scientific point of view. Even the most revered figure of the nineteenth century in town-planning histories, Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann, was actually a civil engineer. Although some of his public works projects to renew Paris were on an unprecedented scale in the modern world, he never proposed an all-inclusive vision or systematic plan of the city of the future. As we discover in Chapter 1, the emergence of planning as a separate field of theory and practice by trained experts took another generation of urban reformers, technological revolutions, and scientific discoveries.  

Our story begins with the architects, engineers, and utopians who called themselves Progressives and redefined themselves as scientists of urban life and space. Drawing on age-old metaphors of the city as a living thing, they reenvisioned it in contemporary, biological terms, what they called the “Organic City.” Since each planner used this term in his or her own way, its meaning can become problematic. Adding to the shape-shifting nature of this term, its conceptual framework as a natural system evolved over time in step with paradigm shifts in the life sciences, especially the new field of ecology.  

Nonetheless, an interrogation of the use of the Organic City metaphor by succeeding generations of planners is crucial in gaining an understanding of their call for a “clean sweep” of the existing built environment. Each planner had a vision to replace the industrial city with a complete, finished blueprint of the modern city of tomorrow. For Frank Lloyd Wright, on the one hand, “organic architecture” meant nature-based designs like his ground-hugging, prairie-style houses. Le Corbusier (Charles-Édouard Jeanneret), on
the other hand, used the same language to describe a Radiant City of soaring skyscrapers and zooming motorways.

Yet the reformers of the Progressive Era shared a much more important set of underlying normative assumptions about nature, society, and the city. At heart, they were all environmental determinists; they believed that changes in physical space could produce changes in social behavior. And nature, however defined, remained their environmental ideal. At the same time, the planners demanded total control. In exchange, they promised that a metamorphosis of urban space would bring about social harmony and a rising standard of living for all.23

 Called modernists after World War I, they shared an optimistic faith in the ability of science and technology to underwrite a sustained economic expansion. Furthermore, they did not question the necessity to segregate land use into hierarchies of residential, commercial, and industrial zones connected by high-speed transport. Nor did they examine how an almost totally male membership injected patriarchal values into their designs of the Organic City. They took for granted that the nuclear middle-class family represented the ideal household, whether living in a high-rise flat in a city center or a one-family bungalow in a garden suburb. Another unspoken assumption about the urban environment among professional planners was that women should be restricted from public space as much as possible.24

What made the adoption of the Organic City metaphor so universal among them was its facility in enabling people to envision all the infinite complexities of urban life in simpler, holistic terms, as a self-sustaining system of interconnected parts. Analogous to human metabolism, the city could be pictured as an open system of energy flows: food or fuel supplies in and waste by-products out. The morphology of this imagined organism turned real estate markets and land development into something natural: urban growth and decay.

For the nascent profession, moreover, adopting theoretical models of biology with their critical practical applications for medicine and public health helped establish the authority of its practitioners as scientific experts. And given the Progressives’ sense of the impending doom of the industrial city, they portrayed its problems as medical pathologies of life cycles, bodily cancers, and mental breakdowns. They cast themselves as the doctors of the city. Only they had the special training and insight to restore its health to a state of physical growth, social order, and moral uplift.

Despite the undeniable utility of metaphors of the city as a natural system, a main contention of this book is that their costs far outweigh their benefits. Over the course of the twentieth century, the planners’ vision of the Organic City resulted in three unintended, dire consequences for urban life in Europe and the Americas. The fatal flaw undermining this model of
urbanism was the illusion of the city having a life of its own, independent from human agency. On the contrary, nothing is natural about the urban environment. Although there is nature in the city, the urban environment requires constant human control to keep essential services working and maintain public order.

As a theory of urbanism, the Organic City also obscured the primary question of political life: Who rules? Like the economists’ “invisible hand” of the marketplace, this model of urban life hid the official planners and the policy makers behind a false facade of a self-regulating, natural system of growth and decay. In part, the massive uprisings of the urban grass roots in Europe and the Americas represented a protest against the Organic City idea. They rebelled against its denial of democratic participation in the formation of plans for the future of the community.

In the post–World War II period, the insulation of the planners from the grass roots provided by the Organic City metaphor contributed to its third disastrous consequence for everyday life in the urban centers of the Western world. Shielded in central bureaucracies from seeing the neighborhoods from a street corner point of view, they suffered a self-delusion of false belief. Their academic training taught them that the scientific foundation of the model enabled them to make value-free decisions. In effect, their theory of urbanism kept them from taking seriously outside criticism of it while inhibiting internal debate over the implications of its underlying assumptions. Their blind faith in the Organic City left them unprepared to meet the challenge from the bottom up on grounds of environmental, political, and social injustice. The urban crisis of the sixties would result in the downfall of the planners in the formation of public policy and the implosion of their model of the urban environment. Like a house of cards, a faulty foundation at the base of this conceptual framework would suddenly bring it crashing down.

The scope and scale of these populist uprisings in European and American cities suggests that comparative perspectives will help expose the roots of these struggles over the production of urban space. This method of seeing the city, sorting out the unique from the common conditions of the urban experience, is perhaps the best way to define the specific context of each place. The need to contrast differences between cities became crucial after 1945, a period of increasing globalization. The resumption of international trade and economic interdependence was intensified by the bipolar competition of Cold War politics. Decolonialization also spurred the participation of the so-called third world in the ensuing race among nations for technological modernization. 25

In the United States and Western Europe, moreover, ideological consensus behind the International Style of architecture and urban design promoted advocacy of a single model of an Organic City. An East–West
transatlantic comparison of these highly industrialized and urbanized countries goes a long way in identifying how this universal utopian image was refracted through the lens of national political cultures and institutions to project different outcomes in city skylines.

At the same time, a North–South contrast between developed and developing nations is also required to illuminate all the various ways cities were built in the postwar period. The exporting and importing of the professional planners’ vision of the city of tomorrow became one of the most visible signs of globalization itself. Today, cities everywhere continue to hire starchitects like Frank Gehery, Renzo Piano, and Santiago Caladrava to make iconic postmodernist symbols of their world-class status. 26

For our purposes, seven case studies illuminate the ways national institutions and cultures played a configurative role in the creation of hybrid space during the postwar period. Each city highlights a different matrix of influence among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots in the contestation over the urban environment. While all the countries of Western Europe shared the dual task of restarting their war-torn economies and rebuilding their urban centers, each followed its unique political tradition to reach this goal. The United States faced a different set of urban problems ranging from the physical deterioration of neighborhoods at the center to the geographic sprawl of suburbia at the periphery. Latin American cities faced similar problems in addition to having to cope with exploding populations of rural migrants (see Figure 1).

For Europe, the Netherlands represents the nation with the strongest tradition of democratic cooperation among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots. And Rotterdam was the place where the professional experts

![Figure 1](image-url)
were given a virtual clean slate to rebuild a city center. It had been blanket bombed early in the war, giving its civic leaders plenty of time to draw blueprints of an Organic City that they could start erecting immediately after liberation. During the blitz of Great Britain, Parliament also kept the planners busy. And like the Dutch, British planners too envisioned comprehensive, clean-sweep plans for London’s reconstruction on a regional scale.

Paris, in contrast, was spared from not only German bombs but also the modernist planners by local traditions of preservationism. Nevertheless, it would be swept up in national plans for breakneck economic modernization that would set loose unsettling “runaway technologies” and equally disruptive social movements against them. “Runaway technologies” Ravetz defines as “characterized not only by the magnitude of its possible disasters, but by the ultimate impossibility of locating responsibility and source of decisions, and so getting it back into control.”

For the United States, Los Angeles and Chicago offer a study of divergence, at least during the first twenty years following war’s end. In Los Angeles, the focus of public attention was on growth and expansion at the periphery. In Chicago, civic discourse put a spotlight on problems of decay at the center, including the need to update the business district and to renew the surrounding ring of “blighted” African American neighborhoods. Although the same underlying forces of national policy and global integration were changing the two cities, they seemed to be headed in completely opposite directions on the surface of local politics and planning.

For Latin America, Brazil and Mexico were the two countries after 1945 with large enough populations to generate self-sustaining consumer, or Fordist, economies. Both countries, moreover, are blessed with rich natural resources. They enjoyed boom times during the war, kick-starting the growth of their industrial cities and a great internal migration of their rural populations in search of a better life. In São Paulo, on the one hand, an elitist and racist regime turned technocratic planning and international capital to advantage in making their city into the prime engine driving the national economy. In Mexico City, on the other hand, an inclusive, corporatist regime considered technical experts to be a threat to their complete hegemony of power. The politicians ignored the planners in the formation of public policy, which promoted the construction of illegal shantytowns to house the tsunami of newcomers pouring in from the countryside.

Taken together, these seven case studies provide a way to measure different visions of the postwar city against actual results in terms of the built environment. Telling their stories reveals the contestation among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots in the production of hybrid space. And contrasting how each city created unique places of urban life helps identify and separate out global agents of change from local ones.
The ultimate goals of this comparative approach are twofold. It seeks to gain a better understanding of how cities were built during the postwar era, and it hopes to shed light on the constellations of social and political relationships among the three groups that have the best prospects of creating hybrid spaces that are alive with “the very DNA of urbanism itself.”

To achieve these goals, the book’s chapters alternate between visionary theories of urbanism and actual practices of city building in the case studies. The chapters examining the history of ideas cover a broad spectrum of voices engaged in transnational discourse about the city, not just those of the planners and politicians. To be sure, the advocates of conscious, formal planning were far better at articulating their viewpoints than the mass of ordinary people. However, the case study chapters provide a counterweight by giving expression to their ideas in the form of material culture. Their guerrilla architecture and informal community planning tell their stories.

The shifting balance of power among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots divides the chronological order of the book into two parts. From 1945 to 1960, a consensus among planning experts behind a single vision of an Organic City helped them gain extraordinary influence in the formation of public policy. Chapter 1 looks back at the history of this model of the modern city from its origins in the 1890s to its widespread adoption after World War II. In large part, the shared class and cultural perspectives of the first generation of professional planners explains the emergence of the Organic City as a utopian ideal. This extraordinary unity not only established a powerful picture of the future but also led its advocates to dismiss alternative visions of the relationship between nature, place, and society. Further insulated from the grass roots after the war, the planners would lose sight of the point of view from the neighborhood street corner.

Chapters 2 and 3 trace the triumph of the planners’ vision of the Organic City during the spread of the Cold War across the globe. The ensuing bipolar struggle between communist and capitalist blocs of countries marked a major turning point in the history of the city. Although the influence of the planners’ urban ideal on policy makers and the general public had grown steadily before 1945, its consolidation into the International Style had been confined to an elite circle of intellectuals, led by Le Corbusier. After, the Cold War cast the city and the conditions of everyday life inside it into the larger race of technological modernization. Portraits of city skylines became a litmus test of which side was winning. In the Western bloc, policy makers gave the planners a remarkably free hand to turn their blueprints for comprehensive, clean-sweep reconstruction of the urban environment into actual shapes on the ground.
But beginning in the mid-1960s, cities around the world exploded in rebellion. Part II takes up the urban crisis with a pair of chapters on the critics of official visions of the Organic City. Both the political right and the left rose up in protest against conscious, formal planning by the state. The insurgency of people in the streets and in the voting booth grew into a global reform movement for political, social, and environmental justice.

Terrifying images on TV of people in Los Angeles crying, “Burn, baby, burn!” finally forced the planners and the policy makers to see what they had done from the point of view of those displaced by their runaway technologies of modernization. Their consensus behind a single vision of the Organic City collapsed just as quickly as the torched buildings going up in flames. Fractured and demoralized, the planning profession would become partisans in the ever more contested and crowded battleground over the future of the city.

During the next twenty-year period of the Cold War, the rising tide of insurgency from the grass roots against top-down planning would change not only the city’s skyline but also the people’s rights of citizenship to participate in decision making about the quality of their everyday lives. Chapters 6 and 7 survey the results from the shifting matrix of influence among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots. They explore both new visions of the Organic City and novel types of hybrid space.

Covering the time of the worldwide economic crisis following the oil embargo of 1973–1974, these chapters also look at the larger role of the globalization of markets and information in how cities were built. Coming on the heels of the urban crisis, the resulting global energy shortage and economic depression marked a second major watershed in the history of the city. As the implosion of urban theory had, the stagflation of the seventies undermined the academic foundations of postwar models of the economy. In the restructuring of capitalism that followed, the recovery produced rising levels of social inequality, led by the United States. After 1979, the growing significance of class would be expressed in spatial terms of increases in the segregation and the militarization of urban space. A psychological state of fear of violent crime in the urban jungle spread across the globe.

Like this infectious case of mass paranoia, the importing and exporting of ideas and people around the world continued to speed up the pace of urban change. Entire minicities of high-security gated communities were being stamped out everywhere at the same time as third world ghettos of exclusion were emerging in the urban centers of the first world. Postmodernist designs and building materials, worldwide webs and organizational networks, and national political realignments and global social movements helped inspire a new generation of urban theorists of the Organic City. Some
would foresee the erection of computer-driven, cyborg cities of flows; others would envision a future of nature-designed eco-cities of citizens.

The conclusion, drawing from a half century of contestation among planners, policy makers, and the grass roots over the urban environment, suggests that we scrap organic metaphors of the city and use a multifaceted lens to envision it from many points of view. Literally like the Tijuana barrio observed by Teddy Cruz, patches of urban space are places of human activity that have several layers of meaning at the same time. Cruz has embedded this insight in plans for the development of patches of hybrid space in San Diego. As an architectural critic put it in 2006, Cruz recast the Mexican “shanty-town as a new suburban ideal.”28 The planner’s project models reflected the shifts in the balance of power among the three groups. First, of course, he had to convince the city council to reform the zoning and building codes to permit higher densities and guerrilla architecture. He proposed to build a closely packed array of one-story concrete frames equipped with hookups for all the infrastructure systems of contemporary life. But the buyers are put in charge of turning these foundation platforms into homes, shops, offices, and ultimately, a community “alive with the DNA of urbanism.”29