Take a moment and write down the most unpopular groups to you in America today. The likely set of answers varies depending on your politics, but it is more than likely that religion is well represented in the set you record. People who challenge religious faith, like Michael Newdow, who sought to remove “In God We Trust” from American currency; people who take religious dictates to extreme positions, like the Westboro Baptist Church, which advocates against tolerance of gays and lesbians by protesting at military funerals; and all the people in between suggest that religion is an important element in the politics of American life and remains a flash point for American politics.

Should these people be allowed to say and do such things? Should atheists be allowed to run for public office? Should Christian fundamentalists who believe in creation be allowed to teach biology? Should any religious believer be allowed to advocate for the imposition of religious law in America? You may not disagree with any of these groups, but the key question confronting us in this volume is what you think when you do disagree with at least one. Do you “put up” with the group you disagree with or not? Putting up with such a group is called political tolerance, which entails the extension of equal rights and liberties regardless of viewpoint. Political tolerance is the bedrock of democracy because, without it, politics would quickly devolve into an endless cycle of violence rather than the peaceful (if not agreeable) resolution of conflict through debate, compromise, and fair and open procedures.

Because religion is implicated in the set of groups that challenge basic notions of what it means to be an American does not mean that religion is necessarily tied to intolerance and therefore poses a challenge to democracy. While some religious (and irreligious) groups do offer challenging positions, religion is
also bound up in how people think about democracy and the extension of equal rights. Further, religion shapes how people respond to intolerance when they experience it themselves. The important point for now is that there is no single variable that we can use to describe the nature of that religion.

There is a reason why this book appears in the series *The Social Logic of Politics*. “Religion” is an incredibly complicated set of ideas and social institutions that structure how people live and interact with others. Religious beliefs concern the divine, but they also offer explicit guidance about whether and how to engage with others. Religious institutions, such as houses of worship, are engaged in shaping the particular beliefs and values individuals hold. But they are also organizations in which more or less diverse sets of people interact to learn and solve collective problems. Thus houses of worship constitute tiny publics whose institutions and interactions may generalize to the broader public. Moreover, these tiny publics exist within larger publics and, of course, have preferences over how those larger publics are governed, preferences that more than likely involve the extension of rights and liberties to all or some.

Political tolerance is, by its nature, a product of social considerations. We build support for this essential democratic norm when our social experiences mimic the conditions democracy was meant to address: Disagreement is experienced over the pursuit of collective ends. Our support for an equal playing field for all to participate is maintained when our attitudes leave space for the rightness of other accounts and the legitimacy of claims for competing interests. Of course, that support is bolstered when we believe that there is some mutual respect for our own position. These are all social considerations, through which people carefully consider other groups in society and make difficult choices about whether they and society can afford to include them in debates and governing processes.

This is an edited volume, and therefore no single argument is advanced. The contributors all have different conceptions of what religion is, how it should be measured, and how it relates to the social considerations of political tolerance. What we all agree on is that political tolerance is a vibrant area in which to understand how religion and politics relate and elaborate the social logic at play. Published after a period of relative dormancy in this literature, this volume represents new and innovative research that should reinvigorate this line of work for a generation. The additional value is that this work allows us to continue to wrestle with perhaps the fundamental question of the place of religion in democratic society.

From the beginning of the United States, there was considerable debate about the necessity of religious faith for the maintenance of limited government. Though there was a diversity of beliefs on this question, we might summarize them using the poles of James Madison and John Adams. Madison, most famously in his *Memorial and Remonstrance* ([1785] 2000), argued that freedom never flowed from a tight connection of religion with the state. Freedom, in his
view, was sustained only by a riot of diversity in intensely held belief so that there could never be a majority view that could be used to oppress a minority. Put simply, for Madison disagreement was the solution to guarantee freedom (see also Jelen and Wilcox 1990; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Adams, on the other hand, viewed too much disagreement as the problem: “It is Religion and Morality alone which can establish the principles upon which Freedom can surely stand” (quoted in Reichley 1985: 104). Democracy breaks down if claims on it are fundamentally at odds such that compromise is not possible.

It is notable that both Madison and Adams presume that religious groups hold tenaciously to convictions that stand at odds with other groups’ values. That is, both Madison and Adams agree, at base, about the nature of religious groups. Instead, they vary in how institutions aggregate and process disagreement—for Madison disagreement maintains stability, while for Adams disagreement courts anarchy. But what if their assumption about religious groups in society does not hold? We can relax parts of their assumption systematically—that (1) groups (or portions of them) may not hold their values tenaciously, (2) their values may not be at odds with other groups (or their minority status is variable), and (3) their deeply held convictions are concerned not (or not only) with the distribution of goods in narrow, particularistic ways but with universal values of how people are treated.

This, in essence, is what the academic literature investigating religious influences on political tolerance has done. Each chapter that follows in this volume builds on this foundation, so you will not find a comprehensive review of the religion and political tolerance literature there. I provide that in this chapter. The nice feature about this literature is that, until recently, it is conceptually quite orderly. It draws on the same definitions of religion and uses many of the same measures (though almost never all at the same time). The challenging feature of this literature is that the specific findings are quite variable, for a variety of reasons that I discuss.

Religion and Political Tolerance in Review: A Proxy War

All modern empirical tolerance work builds from Samuel Stouffer’s monument *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (1955). Working amid the virulently anti-Communist politics of the late 1940s and 1950s, Stouffer finds very limited support for the extension of civil liberties to avowed Communists in the mass public, but more support for their rights among elites. It is from this observation that we have an elitist theory of democracy, in which elites maintain the rules of the game in the face of mass defection from constitutionalism for their political enemies (see also McClosky 1964). Interestingly, he elided the inclusion of clergy from his otherwise comprehensive collection of elites. But Stouffer also briefly investigated the connection of church attendance and civil liberties extensions, finding that higher church attendance was correlated with weaker
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support for civil liberties. This is not surprising, given the common construct of the time of “godless Communism.”

This conclusion is rather unsatisfying from the perspective of modern social science. Just what does this relationship of intolerance with church attendance mean? Does it simply mean that more religion means more intolerance (as Madison might argue)? Since some groups demand or encourage more church attendance from their adherents (evangelical Protestants for instance), the people who attend church often are not the same kinds of religious people who attend less, and the religion experienced among high attenders is generally different from the religion experienced by those who attend less often.

If that is true, then does a church attendance effect mean that the adoption of certain kinds of beliefs and values is linked to intolerance? If so, then we should measure those independently. But church attendance may also signal that people hold particular sets of beliefs and values more fervently, perhaps even dogmatically (holding that they are true and without error). Higher church attendance may also mean that people are interacting with a less diverse set of people than they might if they were pursuing other activities. It may mean that they are attending in an area that is particularly threatening. Or church attendance effects may indicate that people happen to receive information in church that, while not overtly religious, still bears on their tolerance judgments. And the kinds of people who frequently attend church may be different from those who attend less regularly in other ways that bear on tolerance, such as educational attainment and gender.

This discussion is not meant to imply that sorting out church attendance effects is our central goal. Instead, this brief exercise indicates the kinds of questions that could be asked of any simple correlation of a religious attribute (a belief, behavior, value, or experience) and tolerance. You might now understand why I subtitled this section “A Proxy War”—researchers have used general purpose measures intending them to mean something else, and we continue to argue over just what that meaning is (even when our statistical models grow more “complete”).

This discussion is important for a number of reasons, some of them normative. Understanding the particular mechanisms of influence may implicate religion as essentially antidemocratic, as believers see greater threats from those who do not share the faith. It may implicate a particular cognitive style as intolerant, or it may highlight the social organization of the church as problematic for the extension of civil liberties. If intolerance should be corrected, which is debatable, then which mechanism connecting religion to intolerance are we constitutionally able to alter?

But this set of concerns begs a more basic question. In Stouffer’s analysis, we are seeing only that church attenders are more opposed to the equal rights of Communists. This does not mean that others in society are willing to apply equal protection to groups that they might dislike more. Thus, later work, starting
with the General Social Survey in 1972, began to list a selection of unpopular groups—generally including Communists, atheists, homosexuals, racists, and militarists.

Even that may not be enough diversity to capture the full extent of intolerance in America. That is, by the late 1970s, researchers were noting the steady increase in tolerance in comparison to Stouffer’s results (e.g., Davis 1975; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). One reason for that may have been that the groups once considered unpopular were simply not salient threats anymore (Sullivan, Pireson, and Marcus 1979). As a fix, John Sullivan, James Pireson, and George Marcus (1979, 1982) proposed a “content-controlled” (1979: 785–786) method, in which individuals were allowed to select or propose a group they liked the least. Once a group was selected, people were asked whether they would extend civil liberties when the group engaged in hypothetical actions such as running for public office, marching, and teaching. When Sullivan, Pireson, and Marcus implemented this method, they found a “pluralistic intolerance” (1979: 793)—intolerance was higher and more widespread in the population than in earlier accounts using the “Stouffer method” of asking tolerance questions about predetermined groups. This technology may be particularly important for the perceived tolerance levels of religious groups (see Chapter 5), since the General Social Survey list was slightly tilted to groups on the left.

With a baseline selection of groups that is widely seen as unbiased, we can build a firmer foundation of understanding how religion might bear on political tolerance. To begin, I review the literature addressing four essential questions that I alluded to previously.

*Are Religious Effects Actually a Function of Demographic Differences?*

The first pieces of research beginning in the 1970s to pick up where Stouffer left off investigated whether religious groups differed in their tolerance levels. Religious minorities, including Jews, were found to be more tolerant than Catholics and Protestants, implicating the minority experience in America (Beatty and Walter 1984; Filsinger 1976; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Roof and McKinney 1987). This complicates the picture, since Jews also tend to have higher levels of educational attainment than even mainline Protestants (Roof and McKinney 1987), so it has not been clear whether Jewish tolerance is a function of values, experience, or education, though Wald (2015) argues it is a function of interests. Certainly, one of the justifications for the low tolerance scores of evangelicals was their lower level of socioeconomic status (Reimer and Park 2001; Roof and McKinney 1987; Wilcox and Jelen 1990).

In systematic analyses, when demographic differences, such as education, age, and gender, across groups were accounted for, religious group identifications played a somewhat lesser role, though they generally did not disappear (Beatty and Walter 1984; Bobo and Licari 1989; Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005;
Ellison and Musick 1993; Gibson 2010; Reimer and Park 2001; Wilcox and Jelen 1990; but see Burge 2013; Eisenstein 2008). All post-1990 analyses incorporate controls for demographic differences and at least some religious effects persist, especially since differences in socioeconomic status between evangelicals and others have declined (C. Smith 2000). Instead, researchers have concentrated on identifying different religious beliefs and behaviors that may be linked to tolerance judgments.

Are Religious Effects a Result of Holding Particular Religious Beliefs?

The simple answer is yes (e.g., Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Ellison and Musick 1993; Gibson 2010; Green et al. 1994; Tamney and Johnson 1997; Wilcox and Jelen 1990), but there are (at least) two ways to think about religious belief effects. First, people may differ in their political tolerance levels because of the specific content of their beliefs. Second, it may matter more the way in which those beliefs are held—this claim is addressed in the next section. Back to the first claim, some may believe that the specific values or activities of a group are sinful and thus may oppose their operation in society as a result. For instance, evangelicals are more likely than others to believe that homosexuality is a sin (e.g., Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Reimer and Park 2001; C. Smith 2000). Similarly, there is no mystery why religious believers of almost all varieties view atheists with some disdain, especially when they are described (as in the General Social Survey) as “against all religion and churches” (Djupe, Calfano, and Back 2013; Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Filsinger 1976). It is clearly difficult to explicitly grant rights to those seen working against divine dictates and the practices and beliefs of your group.

In a generally overlooked chapter, Clyde Nunn, Harry Crockett, and J. Allen Williams (1978: chap. 8) pitch the idea that belief in the devil and religious certainty are ways that people ill-equipped to handle a complex world full of injustice adopt to preserve a sense of the social order (see also Durkheim [1912] 1961). In their fascinating account, only those with less than a high school education increased their belief in the devil from 1953 to 1973 in response to social unrest, and the least tolerant were much more likely to believe in the devil. While some of this relationship was because of status anxiety, not all of it was, and belief in the devil independently contributed to intolerance (see also Gibson 2010; Gibson and Tedin 1988). It seems readily apparent that acknowledging the embodied presence of evil in the world would entail higher stakes for allowing it to act unchecked by government.

On the flip side is the argument about how beliefs about God bear on tolerance judgments. Following Greeley (1995), views of the nature of God analogize to how others should be treated. For instance, Paul Froese, Christopher Bader, and Buster Smith (2008: 33) find that “individuals with harsher and more wrathful images of God will be less forgiving and tolerant of others.” In a sense, individuals holding this belief become self-perceived agents of God on earth.
Far and away the most commonly discussed relationship between beliefs and tolerance is that the particular belief may be less important than the way it is held. Believing there is an absolute, unconditional truth leaves precious little room for disagreement, let alone fundamental disagreement. Moreover, such dogmatism raises the stakes for error, as even slight deviations may entail great peril—from either another group pursuing an errant view or straying from the path oneself. While this dogmatic way of holding beliefs is thought to be distinct from other religious attributes, note the similarity with beliefs in the devil or a vengeful god. As I note below, studies of fundamentalism tend to incorporate all of these dimensions.

Quantifying dogmatism has its roots in the 1950s investigations of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950). Its conceptualization was an attempt to strip out an ideological overlay of the authoritarian “F-scale” that limited its application to conservatives and therefore weakened its analytic value. Interestingly, another attempt to achieve this moved the measurement of authoritarianism into the family by asking about child-rearing practices (Kohn 1977); that approach has been used widely in political science (e.g., Barker and Tinnick 2006; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Mockabee 2007).

The effect of religious dogmatism is thoroughly documented. Most often, a relationship between a belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible and tolerance is used as evidence for religious dogmatism effects. This relationship holds in national samples (Jelen and Wilcox 1991; Tuntiya 2005; Wilcox and Jelen 1990), among activists (Green et al. 1994; Wilcox and Larson 2006), and over time (Reimer and Park 2001). Literalism is not always pulled out as a distinct item, but it is sometimes used as part of a measure of fundamentalism, which is also closely linked to intolerance (e.g., Ellison and Musick 1993; Tamney and Johnson 1997; but see Wilcox 1987: 287). When these attributes are pulled apart, Nana Tuntiya (2005) finds that literalism is driving intolerance and not a fundamentalist identity. But there are other measures for religious dogmatism; for instance, Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox (1991: 35) use an index composed of the existence and importance of clear rights and wrongs.

The battle over the understanding of dogmatism is pitched, however. Dennis Owen, Kenneth Wald, and Samuel Hill (1991) push back against the definition of authoritarianism as a personality trait. Instead, they argue, some religious people are “authority-minded,” adopting the teachings of a particular religious tradition as an act of choice—a temporary “state” versus a dispositional “trait.” The difference is profound. If religion and politics work has been using religious measures as a proxy for items psychologists claim as predispositions, at least somewhat rooted in biology, then religion is derivative of hard-wired, perhaps genetic traits. The rejection of the trait argument is an attempt to reclaim religion as an independent force in the world. It is a plea for the survival of the subfield itself in some ways.
The problem is that measures of both religious and secular (no religious content) dogmatism have been included in only a few studies. In Marie Eisenstein’s (2008: 51–54) analysis, biblical literalism is related to religious commitment, which in turn is related to a less secure personality (dogmatism and self-esteem; see also Eisenstein and Clark 2014). It is more common to find a link between religiosity and dogmatism or a related construct, such as authoritarianism or personality security (Canetti-Nisim 2004; Canetti-Nisim and Beit-Hallahmi 2007; Jelen and Wilcox 1991; Peffley and Sigelman 1990). And some research has assessed how the “big five” personality traits correlate with religious variables (e.g., Francis 2010; Hills et al. 2004). That is, we do not have an answer yet, and no one has deliberately tried to parse out the degree to which authoritarianism differs from authority-mindedness.

What Role Does Social Cloistering by Way of Church Involvement Have?

The third pillar of classic investigations of religious effects on tolerance relates to the first variable investigated—church attendance (Stouffer 1955). By itself, church attendance is a relatively good proxy for more general senses of religiosity (e.g., Layman 2001). Those who attend church more frequently hold more conservative beliefs and attend churches with traditions that encourage more involvement. But once those variables are accounted for, attendance might account for only a few other effects. First, it may entail exposure to a set of information, such as from clergy, that may bear on tolerance. Because researchers rarely have access to this kind of information, they generally ignore that possibility (see Chapters 2 and 3). Instead, attendance has been thought to capture the social structure and the degree to which it is closed to the marketplace of ideas (Green et al. 1994; Smidt and Penning 1982; Sullivan, Pierses, and Marcus 1982). It is assumed that people attending church more regularly therefore socialize with a more homogeneous set of people. Church attendance is thought to indicate a choice in a near zero-sum situation, so that it precludes participation in other social organizations and hence signals a degree of cloistering. Social closure feeds a dogmatic worldview, in which truth is set a priori and deviation is punishable, since individuals do not have to continually wrestle with the value of dissonant arguments. On the other hand, social openness breeds a give-and-take of views that undermines bright boundaries between good and evil (see, e.g., Mill [1869] 1975; Mutz 2006).

While the logic is consistent, it ignores the widely noted link between religion and civic voluntarism and broader political participation (e.g., Musick, Wilson, and Bynum 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Moreover, religious groups that differ in their levels of church attendance do not differ substantially in the attributes of members’ social networks, including disagreement and political discussion (Djupe and Calfano 2012a). Moreover, churches vary considerably in the amount of diversity within them (Djupe and Gilbert 2009),
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perhaps outside of race (see, e.g., Scheitle and Dougherty 2010). This does not mean that church attendance is not related to cloistering but instead that it is likely a poor proxy for it when other, better measures may be available.

Criticisms of the Existing Literature

This is not the only criticism of this literature, as Eisenstein (2008) details (see also Gibson 2010). The earliest studies drew on data that had rather weak and idiosyncratic religion batteries about which researchers often expressed regrets. Given the preceding discussion, it is clear that the meaning of each religious variable changes depending on what else is controlled for in the model. Since the model specifications shift around considerably across studies, it becomes almost impossible to compare the effects of church attendance, for instance.

The controls are also important from another perspective. The broader tolerance literature has settled on at least three core features that explain tolerance: the threat posed by a target group, support for democratic norms, and a secure personality (dogmatism, self-esteem, and trust). (For a more complex model, see Marcus et al. 1995.) Until very recently, most studies of religious effects on tolerance have not included these forces. To make matters more complicated, most of those studies have used religious variables as proxies for those forces (especially dogmatism). Again, this is why this section of the chapter is subtitled “A Proxy War.” This leaves open the possibility that (1) once those forces are controlled for, religion ceases to matter in tolerance judgments, and we are put out of business; (2) religion works through those forces, which pushes our analyses back to understanding threat, democratic norms, and insecurity (see Eisenstein and Clark 2014; Chapters 5 and 10); or (3) if standard measures of religion no longer matter at the primary or secondary levels, other conceptions of religion do. All three cases are made in this volume, but it is to the last possibility that I now turn by way of concluding this review of the literature.

New Directions in Religious Effects on Tolerance

Until recently, one particular conception of religion has dominated this literature. As Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge (1985) defined it, “religion is a set of beliefs about the divine, humankind’s relationship to it, and the consequences of that relationship” (quoted in Kellstedt et al. 1996: 175). This is the logic for capturing religious belief items as they describe the content of divine dictate and presence, while religious behaviors indicate the degree to which individuals are committed to those beliefs. Peter Benson and Dorothy Williams (1982) describe this definition of religion as “vertical” and provide the same definition as Stark and Bainbridge and Lyman Kellstedt and colleagues: “the degree to which religion is understood as a relationship between the individual person and God” (Benson and Williams 1982: 108). However, “vertical” is just one religious theme
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among eight that Benson and Williams identify. They also name agentic, communal, restricting, releasing, comforting, challenging, and horizontal dimensions. For now, I focus on the last theme: the horizontal.

While Benson and Williams define the horizontal theme as “the degree to which religion presses a person to adopt compassionate, caring attitudes and actions” (1982: 108), I would extend and generalize this theme. A better conceptualization would avoid attitudinal content—religion could press people to hold stingy, uncaring attitudes, and that would also be different from a vertical conception. Therefore, I define the horizontal religious theme as the ways that religion helps individuals structure their social relations.

Religion might bear on the structure of social relations in a number of ways, one of which has been discussed in the literature through the (negative) effect of church attendance on tolerance. That is, attending church frequently is an immersion in an assumed homogeneous society of believers. But other conceptions are broader, more flexible, and thus more analytically useful. Religious groups are constantly conveying norms of inclusion and exclusion to their members, sometimes at the same time. Inclusion entails reaching out to people who are different from you and accepting them for who they are. This can apply to diversity within the church, community, state, or world. One obvious place to find inclusion is in evangelism outreach, but it is also in mainline “welcoming” churches, which announce their support for gay and lesbian members.

Religious groups are also continually conveying norms of exclusion in multiple senses. Any information that elevates the salience of the ingroup highlights boundaries with the outside world. Therefore, the simple act of gathering sends a message of exclusion, though perhaps not a powerful one. The message “We are different,” the encouragement to adopt restrictive dress or diet (Finke and Wittberg 2000), and the call to avoid contamination from the outside world all serve the cause of fostering exclusion. The importance of exclusion is that it raises the stakes for interactions with people outside the ingroup. Such interactions may be dangerous, introducing impurities of thought, values, or disease (see Chapter 6). But exclusion also simply reduces the chances for interactions with outsiders (see Djupe and Calfano 2013b), thus limiting the participation in the marketplace of ideas that breeds tolerance.

Both inclusion and exclusion are elements of the religious economy in which religious firms compete for members. The central force that divides the inclusive from the exclusive is tension with the world. As Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000) argue, low-tension groups (historically called “churches”) exist consonantly with the world (see also Finke and Stark 2005); they emphasize not distinction but rather integration with the community. On the opposite end of the spectrum lie high-tension groups (often called “sects”) that exist embattled in a fallen world filled with peril to one’s eternal soul (typically described as fundamentalists). Most, of course, fall in between, but the forces of the religious economy predict a distribution of tension that meets the demand in the marketplace (Stark and Finke 2000).
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Brian Calfano and I (Djupe and Calfano 2013a, 2013b) provide a measure of the commitment to inclusion and exclusion conceptualized in terms of values among American Protestant clergy. We use four statements to capture the two value concepts.

**Inclusive values**

- To be true to your faith, it is important to “love the stranger as yourself.”
- To be true to your faith, it is important to invite others to church even if the church begins to change as a result.

**Exclusive values**

- To be true to my faith, it is important to shop as much as possible at stores owned by other people of my faith.
- To be true to my faith, it is important to keep company with other people of my faith.

Using data from a rather large survey of diverse Protestant clergy, we show that they almost universally present inclusive values and display only a slight variability in exclusive values presentation, with evangelicals more likely to display any commitment to exclusive values. While this version assessed the frequency of clergy presentation of these values, work in this volume assesses the degree to which clergy agree or disagree with these values (see Chapters 1 and 2). Measuring frequency is more appropriate for assessing clergy effects on members of congregations (Djupe and Calfano 2013a), while measuring agreement is more apropos for studying the relationship between values and tolerance among clergy. Chapter 9 assesses the degree to which commitment to inclusive and exclusive values affects threat and tolerance among average citizens.

Another set of religious themes that Benson and Williams (1982) promote is the agentic/communal set of dimensions. In the full discussion in Chapter 7, Stephen Mockabee and I draw on work he did with Kenneth Wald and David Leege (2007) to capture measures of individualism (the agentic dimension) and communitarianism (the communal dimension). As they summarize it, individualism captures the idea that religion demands the perfection of the self through, in part, the avoidance of sin. On the other hand, communitarianism promotes the idea that individuals express their faith best through helping others. Though they appear conceptually related to the inclusive and exclusive values Brian Calfano and I developed, it turns out that they are not especially closely related (and thus surely constitute distinct dimensions of religious values).

I close this section of the chapter with four larger points. First, it is surprising that the religion and politics literature has not, until the past decade, developed measures suitable for framing religious worldviews (for one of the early calls for such measures, see Leege and Kellstedt 1993). Therefore, the classic...
studies on religion and tolerance have evaded most any measure of the values religious people hold. These values are essential to building a richer vision for religion’s influence in the world, as values are specifications of how the world should work rather than beliefs about how it actually works. That is, values presumably compel particular action; in fact, the classic models of public opinion place values in the driver’s seat for dictating a destination. Beliefs interact with values in the sense of directing traffic, suggesting which routes to the destination may work or whether the destination is reachable at all. It is too strong to say that the religion and politics literature has been missing the driver, but the importance of including values should readily present itself.

The second main point is that values (as well as beliefs) are not just dispositions; they are more or less constantly in motion in religious organizations. Conceptualizing religion as simply a vertical relationship between an individual and God misses the organizational setting in which that relationship is shaped and reshaped through time by clergy, fellow congregants, and other sources. Indeed, this is a well-developed thread in the sociology of religion (Bibby 1997; Cavendish, Welch, and Leege 1998; Cornwall 1987; Hadaway and Marler 1993; Welch 1981), but it has also seen development in political science (see, e.g., Djupe and Hunt 2009; Gilbert 1993; Jelen 1992; G. Smith 2008; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988).

Now, this could be a superfluous step—if congregations help develop and solidify religious beliefs and values, then simply capturing those beliefs and values would be sufficient, and we can ignore the antecedent effects of the congregation. However, there is good reason and some evidence to suggest that the content of the information varies across time, and thus religious organizations are not simply reinforcing beliefs and values. The kind of information conveyed, too, stretches beyond religious beliefs and values to include political and other information that bears on political decisions (Djupe and Gilbert 2009); this is the third major point. Clergy convey arguments on gun control and threats to the nation, members have bumper stickers on their cars, and congregations hold political discussion groups on various topics (see also Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). None of this is captured in the traditional religious belief or behavior measures, it has not been included in previous tolerance work, and it may bear on the least-liked group that people pick, the threat people may perceive, the democratic norms they hold, and the tolerance they are willing to extend.

There is only one direct piece of evidence for this line of argument thus far. Brian Calfano and I (2013a) variously primed respondents with inclusive or exclusive values before asking them about their political tolerance. Priming is the act of making a consideration (cognition or emotion) salient before the respondents make a decision. Priming exclusion drove up the threat they perceived from their least-liked group and thereby reduced their tolerance for the group’s activities. This is important because it moves us away from thinking of religious effects as stable and long-term and highlights again the importance of the social environment in which religious values and beliefs may be communicated and
therefore primed—a dynamic that has been found effectual in more and more situations (see also Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012).

Fourth, while the kind of information presented is important, the way in which it is presented can help develop or undermine tolerance. For instance, clergy can essentially deliberate over policy options, and the more fair the presentation of conflicting sides, the more respect for difference congregants may develop (Djupe and Calfano 2012b; Djupe and Neiheisel 2008; Djupe and Olson 2013). Congregations are surprisingly diverse places, and to deal with this diversity without driving away members, congregations are likely to adopt deliberative norms including mutual respect, diversity of views, and full participation (Neiheisel, Djupe, and Sokhey 2009; see also Chapter 1). The fact of implementing good democratic procedures (for clergy) and experiencing them (for congregants) may help nurture a democratic bent that extends beyond the church walls.

Conclusion

It is an exciting time to be working on religious effects on political tolerance. After a generation of work adopting a vertical definition of religion, a sudden burst of energy has diversified the conceptualizations of religion to come much closer to measuring the list Benson and Williams generated in 1982. Many of the first looks at them are present in this volume. As I reviewed the literature and extended its reach, I made note of where much of this new research falls and organized it into three parts. We begin at the elite level, where I collaborate with Ryan Burge and Brian Calfano in Chapter 1, with Brian Calfano in Chapter 2, and with Jeffrey Kurtz in Chapter 3 to examine for the first time the political tolerance levels of clergy and then clergy effects on congregants’ tolerance levels. In Chapter 4, Clyde Wilcox and Christine Kim examine whether and under what conditions political activists extend tolerance to Christian fundamentalists.

Then the floodgates open in the second part, where a variety of social-psychological approaches and methods are employed to study the religion-tolerance connection among average citizens. Marie Eisenstein (Chapters 5 and 10) and April Clark (Chapter 5) back up the causal process and assess how religion affects the antecedents of tolerance. Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Marie Courtemanche develop the role of disgust in tolerance judgments (Chapter 6), while Stephen Mockabee and I (Chapter 7) and Joby Schaffer, Anand Sokhey, and I (Chapter 9) further test the role of different conceptions of religious values. In Chapter 8, Dan Cox, Robert Jones, and Juhem Navarro-Rivera draw on new survey data from the Public Religion Research Institute to assess tolerance of atheists, with commentary on the conceptualization of the meaning of “least liked.”

The last part turns this formulation around to ask how religious groups respond to intolerance and prejudice. In Chapter 11, Jacob Neiheisel, Laura Olson, and I ask how pleas for tolerance affect associated attempts to persuade, while
in Chapter 12, Brian Calfano and I ask how people are responsive to arguments that incorporate calls to restrict the rights of a controversial group. In Chapters 13 and 14, respectively, Christopher Garneau assesses how atheists respond to intolerance and prejudice, and Patrick Schoettmer covers how Muslims respond. In the Conclusion, Ted Jelen achieves the difficult task of pulling these strands together.

Notes

1. The General Social Survey, administered through the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago since 1972, is an omnibus survey of several thousand adults gathered every year or so. It is designed to capture in some detail the social life of Americans. More information about the GSS is available at http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website.

2. Quite a bit of research has subsequently been done to see whether the mode of capturing tolerance bears on our conclusions about its determinants. Essentially all of this work by Jim Gibson (e.g., Gibson 1992; Gibson and Bingham 1985) has found little difference. However, in Chapter 5 of this book, Marie Eisenstein and April Clark suggest that mode does matter for our understanding of religious connections to tolerance.

3. There is some debate in the literature about whether there is a difference between measures of beliefs in biblical literalism and the inerrancy of the Bible. There is little difference in using either one according to Ted Jelen (1989), but Jelen, Clyde Wilcox, and Corwin Smidt (1991) find that respondents distinguish the two items.

4. Secure personality is generally a combination of dogmatism, interpersonal trust, and self-esteem (see Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982).

5. One good example of exclusive values comes from a hymn commonly sung in church when I was growing up: “They’ll Know We Are Christians.” While it says, “They will know we are Christians by our love,” it is clear that that love is directed toward the ingroup. Each stanza begins with an exclusive message that is repeated several times: “We are one in the spirit; we are one in the Lord,” “We will walk with each other; we will walk hand in hand,” and “We will work with each other; we will work side by side.”

References

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