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The Dream Deferred

The Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Holy Week Uprisings of 1968

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If riots come, ask the question: Who is responsible—those who have been drawn to desperation or those who drive them to desperation?

—REV. HENRY J. OFFER
(qtd. in Paul Fairfax Evans, City Life)

As the sun began to set on Saturday, April 6, 1968, Robert Bradby, a twenty-one-year-old black steelworker, was relaxing at his girlfriend’s house when a crowd of black men and women began to congregate about a mile away on Gay Street in East Baltimore. Two days earlier, Martin Luther King, Jr., had been assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, and the black communities in Washington, D.C., and Chicago had erupted, but Baltimore, in the words of government officials, remained calm.

Concerned about the safety of his girlfriend’s children, Bradby set out to find them. After learning that the children were safe, Bradby stopped for a beer at Club Federal, a local hangout at the corner of Federal and Gay. From the bar he could see a raucous crowd, which, when he left the bar, he did his best to avert. To his surprise, gunshots rang out, nearly hitting him. Presumably, the shots were fired by either the owner of Gabriel’s Spaghetti House, John Novak, or by Clarence Baker, a forty-seven-year-old bartender, each white and each fearing the crowd was about to ransack his business.

Bradby responded by concocting an improvised Molotov cocktail and throwing it into the restaurant. A small fire erupted. It was about to go out when another man threw a bigger firebomb into the building. As a result, the fire spread. By the time firemen arrived, much of the building had been destroyed. Unbeknownst to Bradby, Louis Albrecht, a fifty-eight-year-old white resident of Baltimore who had sought refuge
in the restaurant, died in the blaze. ² Around the corner another body, James Harrison, an eighteen-year-old black man, was later found. Albrecht and Harrison were two of Baltimore’s six fatalities during the Holy Week uprisings of 1968.³ 

At about the same time that Bradby left to search for his girlfriend’s children, Joe DiBlasi, a student at the University of Baltimore, was returning home from a National Guard drill session in Parkville, Maryland, one of the nearby suburbs. Though he witnessed a few kids throwing rocks at cars, he did not expect such juvenile pranks to escalate into a riot. However, he received a call from the National Guard ordering him to report to the federal armory as quickly as possible.⁴ 

Subsequently, DiBlasi was placed in charge of a squad of twelve men and given orders to take up a position at the corner of North and Pennsylvania avenues, near the historic center of the African American community in Baltimore. From his post, DiBlasi witnessed looting, burning buildings, and defiant crowds. By the time he returned to civilian life, five days later, Baltimore had suffered more than $12 million in damage and over ten thousand troops (Maryland National Guardsmen and federal forces) were encamped in the city. Looking back, DiBlasi emphasized the surreal nature of the event. “You would just look around and say, ‘How can this be happening?’”⁵ 

The Pats sisters, Sharon and Betty, in their teens in 1968, together with their parents Sid and Ida, had gone to bed on the night of Saturday, April 6, just about the time that looting broke out on the corner of North and Pennsylvania avenues. Earlier in the day, a black woman from the neighborhood had warned their family that they “better get out.” And Sharon Pats Singer later recalled that things had been tense in the neighborhood ever since King’s assassination. Nonetheless, when the Pats girls awoke on Sunday morning, they felt secure enough to drive to Hebrew school and to go shopping. Not until Sharon steered her family’s car down North Avenue did she realize that much of her neighborhood was in smoke. Winding her way around crowds of people, Sharon quickly picked up the rest of her family and drove away.⁶ 

Shortly afterward, the Patses’ home and business were looted. A day later the building was burned to the ground. It was “the end of [our] life as [we] knew it.” Her sister, Betty Pats Katzenelson elaborated: “My mom was out of her job and what she did. My dad was out of his job and what he did. . . . Nothing was right.” Ironically, Sharon added, before the riots there had been a great deal of excitement about the prospect of renewing the neighborhood, with funds raised by the Mid-City Development Corporation. But, as Ida Pats put it, the redevelopment “never materialized.”⁷ 

Louis Randall, one of the first African Americans to graduate from the University of Maryland Medical School, three years after the Brown decision, was delivering a baby at Provident Hospital, in West Baltimore,
when he heard the sounds of windows being broken. From the hospital he could smell the acrid smoke from burning stores. As soon as he could, Randall rushed home and then dashed off to his office building, which he had recently opened with several other black doctors. Like many other African American business owners, Randall placed a “Soul brother” sign on his door to make clear to would-be looters that his was a black-owned business. Still, not trusting the sign alone, Randall vigilantly stood guard, shotgun in hand, hoping he would not have to shoot anyone to preserve what he had worked so hard to achieve.8

These four stories provide a glimpse at the riots or uprisings that erupted across America in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Each one hints at the challenges historians face in trying to reconstruct the past. Whose story do we tell and which ones do we leave on the cutting board? How do these stories fit into established understanding of the time period? And what do these stories tell us about the causes and consequences of the urban or racial disorders of the 1960s?

While this chapter focuses on Baltimore, it is important to remember that the uprising was widespread. Between the evening of April 4, when James Earl Ray shot Martin Luther King, Jr., and Easter Sunday, April 14, 1968, cities in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia experienced looting, arson, or sniper fire.9 Fifty-four cities suffered at least $100,000 in
property damage, with the nation’s capital and Baltimore topping the list at approximately $15 million and $12 million, respectively. Thousands of small shopkeepers saw their life savings go up in smoke. Combined, 43 men and women were killed, approximately 3,500 were injured, and 27,000 were arrested. Not until over 58,000 National Guardsmen and army troops joined local state and police forces did the uprisings cease. Put somewhat differently, during Holy Week 1968, the United States experienced its greatest wave of social unrest since the Civil War.

In spite of the magnitude of the Holy Week uprisings, historians have virtually ignored them. With the exception of Ten Blocks from the White House, collectively written by Washington Post reporters in the immediate wake of King’s assassination, no comprehensive study of the events that followed King’s death exists. A survey of twenty texts on postwar America or the 1960s reveals scant discussion of the King-assassination uprising. In contrast, most of these same works spend a considerable amount of time and space on student-centered disturbances, such as those that took place at Columbia University and in Chicago during the Democratic Party’s convention, in the spring and summer of 1968, respectively.

Even before the spring of 1968, scholars and laypersons already had developed detailed analysis and theories as to why “rioting” or “disorders” were taking place. A large cluster of them concluded that the riots were rooted in the conditions of the ghetto. As the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission report) declared, the nation’s failure “to make good the promises of American democracy to all citizens” stood as the central cause of the disorders. Another cluster of scholars and laypersons strongly disagreed. They contended that the riots were the by-product of radical agitators, or “riot makers,” to borrow the words of Eugene Methvin. In some cases, this school of analysis also blamed liberals for molly-coddling the militants, either directly or by promoting permissive values that allowed individuals to shirk their responsibilities. Put somewhat differently, one school cast the disorders as rational political events, as a form of protest against unjust circumstances, while the other school contended that the riots represented the irrational actions of individuals who were “seeking the thrill and excitement occasioned by looting and burning.” In addition to providing a broad overview of the Baltimore uprising, the following analysis allows us to test both schools of thought.

On the basis of multiple sources, including police logs and the U.S. Army’s “After Action Report,” the “initial disturbance” took place in the 400 and 500 blocks of North Gay Street, in the heart of East Baltimore, between 5:15 and 5:20 p.m. on Saturday, April 6, two days after King’s assassination. As orders were being issued for all off-duty police to report to their respective districts, crowds grew in size and a fire bomb was thrown into
a vacant house. According to one source, policemen on the scene were commanded to withdraw rather than confront the crowd, but this claim cannot be confirmed. There is no question, however, that about an hour later two new fires broke out at the Ideal and Lewis furniture stores in the 700 block of North Gay Street and that crowds continued to gather in East Baltimore.¹⁷

By some reports, the crowd quickly grew to over one thousand men and women. Like a slow-moving wave, it rode its way up Gay Street and spilled over to Harford Road and Greenmount Avenue. Quickly, Police Commissioner Pomerleau ordered K-9 units to deploy downtown, and state police set up posts around the state office building. Just before 8:00 P.M. Governor Spiro Agnew declared a state of emergency. A couple of hours later he signed executive orders that established an 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 A.M. curfew and banned the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. In the same time period, Maryland National Guardsmen began to report for duty and to deploy around the city.¹⁸

Situation reports that flowed into the White House provided a keen sense of the speed with which circumstances changed in Baltimore. Whereas one report issued on the afternoon of April 6 reported that a peace rally had taken place in Baltimore “without incident,” a separate report, issued about
six hours later, stated that twenty fires had erupted, that “firemen [were being] pelted with bricks and stones,” and that stores were being “ransacked.”19 By 4:00 A.M. on April 7, situation reports noted that Baltimore had recorded five deaths, 300 fires, and 404 arrests.20

Just as importantly, the uprising, which began in East Baltimore, began to spread to the Pennsylvania Avenue corridor in West Baltimore. Eventually, thirteen distinct neighborhoods and at least a half-dozen commercial districts experienced at least twenty incidences of looting, vandalism, or arson. Every major black section of the city, with the exception of Cherry Hill in southwest Baltimore, was affected. Areas that were predominantly white and the downtown business section remained relatively unaffected. Faced with this escalating situation, President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized the use of federal forces. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert York, the federal forces joined Maryland National Guard units that had already deployed. All told, 10,956 troops deployed in Baltimore.21

One tense moment occurred on the afternoon of April 9 due to miscommunications between federal, state, and local authorities. At midnight about two hundred men and women began to assemble at Lafayette Square, in West Baltimore, for a peace rally. Unknown to federal officers, Maryland National Guard commander General George Gelston had given his approval for the rally. When General York instructed commanders that no permit to assemble had been issued, federal forces began to disperse the crowd. Local commanders requested the right to unsheathe their bayonets should the crowd resist. As the crowd proceeded to march down Pennsylvania Avenue, tensions and the chance for a confrontation peaked. Fortunately for all involved, Major William “Box” Harris, the top black police officer in the city, appeared. After fielding a barrage of jeers, Harris announced to cheers that the rally would be allowed to take place after all.22

One other tense situation involved a white mob that assembled near Patterson Park. Vowing to have it out with blacks, it dispersed only after federal troops and National Guard units made clear they would not allow the whites to cross into the black section of town.

Some looting may have been augmented by organized crime. Intelligence sources reported that seasoned criminals paid children to help them steal valuable items. Young looters did this by creating diversions, serving as lookouts, and quickly fencing larger goods to adults who parked pickup trucks in back alleys behind appliance, furniture, and other stores. At the same time, one of Baltimore’s best-known criminals, “Little Melvin” Williams, helped quell the uprising. With the permission of General Gelston, on April 8, Melvin, along with Clarence Mitchell III, called on people in the community to “cool it.” As he recalled, “I . . . stood on a . . . car hood or roof and said that: You have taken all there is to take out of this black community. You’ve taken the heart out of your own area. But more importantly, I’ve been told by this General [Gelston] that in the event that
you cross Howard and Franklin Streets . . . they are going to kill you all.”23
Ironically, Melvin was arrested two weeks after helping to cool things down for allegedly pointing a machine gun at a police officer.24
The number of incidents dropped on April 9, allowing the Baltimore Orioles to play their opening game on April 10, one day later than originally scheduled. One final casualty of the uprising was a concert by the King of Soul, James Brown. Scheduled to perform at the Civic Center on Friday, April 12, Brown had to cancel his appearance in part because the venue was still being used to house an overflow crowd of riot-related arrestees. The decision to allow Brown to go ahead with his scheduled appearance in Boston on April 6 helped avert significant turmoil there.25
Even though the media called these events “race riots,” there were only a couple of confirmed acts of violence between blacks and whites. Baltimore experienced few fatalities, especially in comparison to the “riots” of 1967 or to those earlier in the century. Six individuals were killed, five blacks and one white. In contrast, thirty-four and forty-three men and women were killed in Watts and Detroit, respectively. Somewhat along the same lines, even though they had to face large and unruly crowds, most often with unloaded weapons, few National Guardsmen or federal troops suffered serious injuries.26 And while close to one thousand businesses were affected and hundreds were ransacked or torched, public and community buildings,
including symbols of the establishment such as schools, government buildings, and churches, were largely spared.27

Indeed, the greatest difference between the riots that took place during Holy Week 1968 and those that took place between 1965 and 1967 was the substantial decrease in fatalities. This was not due to luck. Rather, the decrease in fatalities grew out of decisions that federal authorities made following their study of the disorders of the summer of 1967. More specifically, from recommendations put forth by Cyrus Vance, the federal government developed detailed procedures for responding to urban disorders and, building on these procedures, conducted intensive riot-training programs for law enforcement officials from across the nation. Branches of the military, including the National Guard and the army, did the same. The most significant change was to deploy troops with orders that they were not to load their weapons and that they were to refrain from shooting looters. This decision garnered much public wrath and, as we shall see, galvanized conservative attacks on liberalism. Conversely, it also saved hundreds of American lives.28

This analysis should not divert us from recalling the pain suffered by merchants, many of whom in Baltimore’s case were Jewish. Close to 80 percent of all establishments that suffered damages were owned by whites, a disproportionate number by Jews. Some of these Jewish merchants were Holocaust survivors. Others had fled Russian pogroms earlier in the century or were descended from those who had. A number of commentators explicitly compared what had happened to Jewish merchants during the riots to what had happened during the Russian pogroms.29 Still, those who vandalized, looted, and torched buildings did not, with rare exception, attack white men and women. Reports of sniper fire were vastly exaggerated, and no one was killed by the sniper fire that did take place.30

Over the course of the week, 5,512 men and women were arrested. Ninety-two percent of the arrestees were black; 85 percent were males. The plurality of arrestees were over the age of thirty. Sixty-three percent of all of the arrestees were charged with curfew violations and an additional 7 percent with disorderly conduct. Although 910 men and women were charged with larceny, many charges were later dropped because of the difficulty of proving them in a court of law. Only thirteen men (no women) were charged with arson, few of whom were convicted. Given its space constraints, this chapter will not survey the strains that the uprising put on the criminal justice system. Suffice it to say that authorities resorted to extraordinary measures, ranging from holding many of the arrestees in the city’s main indoor arena to getting defendants to accept pleas to lesser charges in exchange for light sentences, during the crisis.31

Unlike riots in the early decades of the twentieth century, when whites attacked blacks in black neighborhoods, the Holy Week uprisings remained a very local affair. Surveys showed that the vast majority of those imprisoned
were arrested within ten blocks of where they lived. Incidents of looting, arson, and vandalism took place almost exclusively in black neighborhoods. One reason this was the case, as suggested in the preceding by Little Melvin, was because state troopers quickly cordoned off downtown and blacks had reasons to believe that they would be shot if they ventured outside their own communities.32

If Martin Luther King, Jr., could come back to life, there is little doubt how he would answer the question, What caused the uprising? A year and half before his assassination, King appeared in Baltimore to receive the Baltimore Community Relations Commission’s Man of the Decade prize. Upon receiving the award, King delivered a prescient speech, “The other America,” in which he reflected on the social forces that had given rise to the riots that had already taken place. “One America,” King explained, “is invested with enrapturing beauty. In it we can find many things that we can think about in noble terms. . . . This America is inhabited by millions of the fortunate whose dreams of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are poured out in glorious fulfillment. . . . In this America,” he continued, “little boys and little girls grow up in the sunlight of opportunity.”33
In contrast, in the other America, “we see something that drains away the beauty that exists. . . .” In this [other] America,” King continued, “thousands of work-starved men walk the streets every day in search for jobs that do not exist. . . . In this America,” King said, “people find themselves feeling that life is a long and desolate corridor with no exit signs. In this America, hopes unborn have died and radiant dreams of freedom have been deferred.”

As King easily could have gleaned from his visits to Baltimore, in housing, employment, education, and health care, the dreams of scores of Baltimore’s black residents, like those in many of America’s cities, had been deferred. Many of the city’s black residents felt trapped in a “long and desolate corridor with no exit signs.” Moreover, they felt trapped at a time of heightened expectations, and these heightened yet unfulfilled expectations amplified a widely held view that the American dream remained out of reach.

One of the outstanding characteristics of Baltimore was the prevalence of residential segregation on which so many of the city’s inequities were built. Between World War II and 1968, Baltimore’s overall population remained fairly stable, yet its racial makeup changed dramatically. In 1950 over 700,000 whites lived in the city. Less than a generation later, fewer than 500,000 did. During the same time frame, the number of blacks rose from fewer than 220,000 to over 400,000. When viewed from a metropolitan perspective, the magnitude of this demographic shift is even more apparent. In 1950 the entire population of Baltimore County, which surrounds Baltimore City in a horseshoe shape, stood at less than 250,000, approximately 20,000 of whom were black. Twenty years later the county’s population had risen to over 600,000, all but 20,000 of whom were white. Even within city limits, as documented by Edward Orser’s fine study on blockbusting, Baltimore witnessed a racial sea change, as entire sections of the city went from being virtually all white to all black in a very short time. About the only change that did not take place was that whites did not move into predominantly black neighborhoods.

Blacks and whites not only lived in separate neighborhoods but inhabited qualitatively unequal homes. Nearly 50 percent of homes in inner-city neighborhoods were rated as “very poor” quality. Nor did the postwar building boom alleviate the housing shortage faced by blacks. While housing construction skyrocketed in the largely white suburban Baltimore County during the 1960s, it came to a standstill in the city of Baltimore. Without new construction, older housing, especially older rental units in communities disproportionately inhabited by blacks, fell into increasing disrepair.

Citywide, the infant mortality rate stood at 28.4 out of 1,000 live births in 1965. Yet in census tracts targeted by the Model Cities Program, which were largely black and poor, infant mortality rates often exceeded 50 per
The same areas had twice the crime rate as the city as a whole, which was at least twice as high as the surrounding suburban communities. While skyrocketing crime rates alarmed whites, leading conservatives to adopt “law and order” as one of their main demands and campaign slogans, we need to remember that blacks were victimized by crime at a far greater rate than whites, making it harder and harder for them to experience the American dream.

Concomitantly, the city began to experience considerable economic pains. Long a blue-collar town, synonymous with work on the docks, garment shops, and steel mills, an increasing percentage of Baltimore’s workforce found employment in the service sector, such as in the health care industry or the public sector. Since blacks in Baltimore were disproportionately represented in the manufacturing sector, this economic shift
had a greater impact on them than it did on whites. During the 1960s, the number of men and women employed in manufacturing in Baltimore City declined by over 25 percent, in spite of heavy demand for defense-related goods due to the escalation of the Vietnam War. Looked at from a regional perspective, the transformation of the labor market took on even greater significance. Between 1945 and 1968 the total number of jobs in Baltimore City increased 11 percent, the vast majority in sectors of the economy with the lowest rates of black employment. During the same period, in Baltimore County, where few blacks lived, the number of jobs grew by a whopping 245 percent.

Unemployment statistics illustrated the disparate worlds that blacks and whites of the Baltimore region occupied. Nationally, the unemployment rate in 1968 was less than 4 percent, suggesting a booming economy. Yet in Baltimore the rate for blacks was more than double this and in some inner-city census tracts unemployment hovered just below 30 percent, or at Great Depression rates. Even in segments of the labor market where things looked bright for blacks on the surface, such as at Bethlehem Steel Corporation, they appeared gloomy beneath it. As a report by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission observed, blacks were “virtually unseen” in office work but were found abundantly in the most dangerous and worst-paying jobs.

Although headline stories catalogued breakthroughs that blacks made in the public sector, from the first black police sergeant in 1947 and the first black housing inspector in 1951 to the “assignments” of 78 black firemen in 1954 and appointment of the first black judge in 1957, overall, blacks remained underrepresented in government jobs and even more underrepresented on construction sites paid for with federal, state, and city funds. Whereas blacks made up over 40 percent of the city’s population, less than 18 percent of the entire Baltimore government’s workforce was black in 1966.

Given that Baltimore’s political leaders, unlike those throughout much of the nation south of the Mason-Dixon Line, chose to comply with rather than fight Brown v. Board of Education, one might expect that education stood out as a bright spot. Yet, even though de jure segregation died in Baltimore, de facto segregation and, perhaps just as importantly, unequal education remained the rule. In addition, achievement gaps between white and black schools remained large; even within racially balanced schools, significant gaps between blacks and whites existed. And glaring gaps between inner-city and suburban schools persisted. (For a detailed examination of school desegregation in Baltimore, see Chapter 10.)

This said, it needs to be remembered that in contrast to political leaders in the Deep South, where whites formed citizens councils to resist challenges to their way of life and rallied behind calls for “segregation forever,” Baltimore’s elite sought to address the racial divide. As I have noted,
Baltimore complied with the *Brown* decision. A decade later, it actively pursued various War on Poverty funds. (Indeed, the city’s grant applications provide some of the best documentation on the distress of its inner-city neighborhoods.) One such program that won funding was Baltimore’s Community Action Commission (CAC). Headed by Parren Mitchell, who went on to become Baltimore’s first black congressman, CAC established job training and Head Start programs that sought to revive the dream of a better life.47

Moreover, there was some evidence that Baltimore’s police department, unlike those in nearly all other cities, was making strides toward overcoming the racial divide. In March 1968 *Reader’s Digest* specifically contrasted Baltimore’s police to those in many of the nation’s cities. The department had developed a “novel” form of policing, *Reader’s Digest* reported. This included the “expansion of a biracial Community Relations Department” that had orders to “penetrate the Negro community, not with a gun and nightstick but with service.” Baltimore’s top black police officer, Major William “Box” Harris, the article continued, had become a folk hero in the black community. Under Harris’s direction, the police even sought to open...
lines of communication with advocates of Black Power. “We’re going to have to deal with them, one way or another—either over the barricades with fire bombs falling about us,” Harris explained, “or over a glass of beer in some gin mill. My department is trying the latter.”

Is it possible that these efforts along with Baltimore’s willingness to comply with Brown further raised expectations that the racial divide would decline? Perhaps it was a pure coincidence that rioting first erupted in the Gay Street corridor of East Baltimore, a section of the city that was not simply poor but one that had been slated for urban renewal since 1963. Community members participated in over forty conferences on the plan to revive the neighborhood. “Militant civil rights leaders” and ordinary residents had “crowded into the City Council’s chambers,” in the fall of 1967, to get it to approve phase 1 of the plan. Yet as of April 1968, residents still awaited final approval of the plan by bureaucrats in Washington, D.C.

For Baltimore’s blacks, their expectations had been raised but left unfulfilled by everything from LBJ’s promise of a Great Society to advertisements and television shows that consistently displayed Americans enjoying the “good life.” That they earned more than their parents had or had more years of education mattered less to them than that, compared with whites, they earned less and had less access to quality education and good housing. The election of Thomas D’Alesandro as mayor, who won 93 percent of the black vote and quickly appointed blacks to top positions, including making George Russell the first black city solicitor, certainly reinforced the sense that things were getting better.

Of course, critics of the Kerner Commission, such as Spiro Agnew and William Buckley, claimed that the riots were not caused by “poverty or frustration” but rather by radicals, who incited the riots, and by individual men and women who of their own volition chose to violate the law. “It was no mere coincidence,” Agnew proclaimed in the immediate wake of the uprising, “that a national disciple of violence, Mr. Stokely Carmichael, was observed meeting with local black power advocates and known criminals in Baltimore on April 3, 1968, three days before the Baltimore riots began.” The leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and other black militant groups, Agnew continued, were “riot-inciting, burn-America-down” types who never did anything constructive. And Agnew was hardly the only Baltimore official to accuse black militants of inciting the riot. Mayor D’Alesandro proclaimed that he was “an apostle of the view that this thing was planned and well-organized.” Similarly, Judge Liss, who oversaw the murder trial of Robert Bradby, blamed agitators for planning the riots and getting Bradby to do their dirty work. These people, Liss declared, made individuals such as Bradby “do things that [they] would never have done under normal circumstances.” These people “planned” the riot; they
“inflamed the community and got . . . damn fools like Bradby and others to do their dirty work for them”; and they, Liss indignantly concluded, “are walking away scot-free.” (Nonetheless, lamenting that the law tied his hands, Liss sentenced Bradby to life in prison.)

But if the “riots” were planned, why were authorities so unsuccessful in identifying and prosecuting a single instigator? Certainly not for lack of trying. Believing that militants hoped to cause riots, authorities carefully monitored their movements from the moment King was shot and quickly placed them under arrest whenever the slightest suspicion about their actions arose. For instance, Stuart Weschler and Danny Grant of CORE, Union for Jobs and Income Now (U-JOIN) leader Walter Lively, and SNCC activist Robert Moore were monitored or arrested during the uprising. All charges against them were subsequently dropped.

Nor can those who contend that the uprising was planned explain how radicals knew King was going to be assassinated on April 4. Rather than acknowledge this flaw, some Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials, including J. Edgar Hoover, even followed up on a lead from an anonymous source that black radicals themselves had assassinated King so that they could foment a rebellion. Moreover, the FBI and other government agencies had information that contradicted their own claims. Rather than organizing a riot, an FBI memorandum showed that Carmichael had
come to Baltimore the day before King’s assassination to help plan for his pending wedding.\textsuperscript{55} Not surprisingly, authorities chose not to release such exculpatory evidence to the public.

But if the uprising was not instigated by radicals, what else explains it? One way to answer this question is to look at the one black community in Baltimore, namely, Cherry Hill, that did not experience looting or arson. Cherry Hill suffered only one isolated incident of vandalism and arson, none during the main wave of rioting that swept across the city from April 6 to April 9. None of the traditional variables highlighted by social scientists to explain the disorders of the era help us understand why this was the case. Put somewhat simply, Cherry Hill suffered from essentially all the same socioeconomic woes as did East and West Baltimore. It did not stand out in terms of educational achievement, family income, poverty rates, or homeownership.

While I cannot prove a counterfactual, in other words, why something did not take place, three key factors appear to explain why Cherry Hill did not, as Langston Hughes put it, “explode.” First and foremost, the residents of Cherry Hill still felt that the American dream was in reach. Cherry Hill was established in the wake of World War II as a new enclave for blacks in Baltimore. Rather than build desegregated public housing in white communities, the government developed the previously largely uninhabited section known as Cherry Hill into an all-black neighborhood. It built public housing and nurtured the construction of private homes. As a result, by the mid-1950s, over twenty thousand African Americans lived there, in a mixture of public and private housing. In a short time a library, a shopping center, a movie theater, and recreational associations, all of which served to reinforce a sense of community or common destiny and helped keep alive the dream of a better life, arose. This common history, as well as a high level of community activism, led one resident to describe Cherry Hill as “the closest neighborhood I have ever lived in.” This sense of pride, reinforced by a strong tradition of civil activism, persisted up to King’s assassination.\textsuperscript{56}

Second, Cherry Hill was cut off, isolated, from the rest of the city. This isolation acted as a buffer. Whereas looting and vandalism tended to spill over from one black neighborhood in the inner city to another, it could not spread to Cherry Hill because of its spatial isolation. To do so, it would have had to jump over the inner harbor or through adjacent white neighborhoods and physical barriers.\textsuperscript{57}

Third, Cherry Hill’s commercial establishments were spatially different from those in other sections of the city. In most of Baltimore’s neighborhoods, merchants lined specific shopping ways or roads, such as Pennsylvania Avenue or Gay Street. In contrast, Cherry Hill’s clothing stores, small supermarket, pool hall, and so on, were clustered in a shopping center. Up through at least the mid-1960s, Cherry Hill’s residents
gathered at this shopping center on Friday nights and perceived it as their village square. This perception of their shopping center as a sort of modern-day commons mitigated against vandalism and looting as well.\textsuperscript{58}

Cherry Hill’s actions or lack thereof during the uprising smash another parcel of conventional wisdom, that a firmer hand by the state, ranging from a stronger show of force to shooting looters, would have averted the turmoil. In the aftermath of the King uprisings a major debate erupted over whether authorities had responded properly to the rioting. Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley’s order to shoot to maim looters and kill arsonists had a good deal of support. In contrast, Attorney General Ramsay Clark’s criticism of Daley and support for limited use of force earned him the venom of a large segment of the population.\textsuperscript{59} Spiro Agnew’s metamorphosis from a relatively unknown Rockefeller Republican to the second-highest public official in the land rested in large part on his get-tough persona. In a speech critical of the Kerner Commission report, Agnew proclaimed that it was not white racism but permissiveness that caused the riots. One example of this permissive climate, Agnew claimed, was the order to prohibit police officers from shooting looters. Agnew added that the federal government, not he, issued the command that limited the use of force.\textsuperscript{60}

Yet as the case of Cherry Hill suggests, the use of force did not directly correlate to a lack of rioting. No federal troops or National Guardsmen were rushed into the neighborhood. Nor did police or state troopers increase their presence. On the contrary, off the beaten path, Cherry Hill remained out of sight and out of mind during the uprising. Community activism and engagement, not shotguns and bayonets, appear to have been the best defense against lawlessness.

What were the consequences of the uprising? According to conventional wisdom, the “riot” marked a turning point in Baltimore’s history. One oral history after another, as well as most retrospective newspaper articles on the event, declares that the city was never the same again. Yet careful analysis suggests that the Holy Week uprisings had a much more nuanced impact on the local scene than often presumed.

For instance, in a comprehensive study of the Jewish business district on Lombard Street, Deb Weiner shows that merchants did not desert the area in the wake of the uprising, even though many suffered considerable damage at the time. Rather, Lombard Street’s Jewish business district, known as Corned Beef Row, died a slower death. The district’s demise was due in part to white suburban perceptions that the neighborhood was not safe; in part to the gradual rise of shopping malls and chain stores, which began before the uprising; and in part to a reconfiguration of Lombard Street that commenced in the early 1970s—its widening made the neighborhood less accessible because it was difficult to find parking, especially while road construction was taking place.\textsuperscript{61}
Put somewhat differently, the Baltimore uprising was an extremely significant event in the city’s history but more for what it symbolized than for what it did. It was both cause and effect, or perhaps more precisely effect and cause. Much of the social distress that we assume was the outcome of the uprising was well entrenched before April 1968, and its causes ranged from white flight to weaknesses in the traditional urban economy. The uprising consolidated these trends but it did not cause them. Or to borrow Howell Baum’s words, the uprisings produced a “gestalt shift,” whereby developments that had been in the background now appeared in the foreground. In turn, these changed perceptions reinforced shifts already taking place.\textsuperscript{62}

But if the impact of the Holy Week uprisings on the local level has been exaggerated in the community’s collective psyche, its effect on the national scene has been underappreciated—in part, as I suggested earlier, because historians have disproportionately focused on other major events of the year, such as student rebellions, suggesting that they were the most pivotal events in the watershed year of 1968. Yet there can be little doubt that the Holy Week uprisings shattered one of Lyndon Johnson’s primary goals, namely, making American cities great; reinforced the dissipation of the liberal coalition; and boosted the fortunes of the New Right, particularly with respect to its “law and order” campaign.\textsuperscript{63}

One way Baltimore effected this shift was through the rise of Spiro T. Agnew as a national spokesperson for the New Right. Agnew both symbolized the rightward shift of many moderate Republicans and urban ethnics away from liberalism and articulated the conservative attack on those who sought to keep alive the view that a great society depended on great cities. Agnew’s metamorphosis from unknown moderate Republican to Richard Nixon’s running mate rested on his reaction to the disorders of 1967 and 1968 and to the liberal response to them. On April 11, 1968, he gave a dressing-down to black moderates in Baltimore, accusing them of not having done enough to stop the riots and of having helped precipitate them by refusing to break with black militants and their incendiary rhetoric and demands. Agnew was well aware that his speech would alienate urban black voters, who had helped elect him to office in 1966 and whose votes still played a key role in electing other moderate Republicans.

As the 1968 campaign got under way, Republican leaders pondered how they could retake the White House. One option, long forgotten, was the idea of reaching out to black voters, to bring them back to the party of Lincoln. When Richard Nixon ran as Dwight Eisenhower’s running mate, in fact, Republicans won about half the black vote. And one could interpret Johnson’s landslide victory over Goldwater as proof that the Republicans could not win without regaining black support. Instead of trying to revive the party of Lincoln, Nixon chose to pursue the Southern Strategy. Rather than reaching out to blacks, he decided to try to convince Southern whites that their natural home was in the Grand Old Party. His nomination of
Agnew signaled this decision. That Agnew had been a moderate Republican and was from a border state legitimized the Republicans’ turn away from blacks, the Great Society, and its commitment to urban America.64

Even if the Democrats had won the 1968 presidential election, the United States probably would have turned away from the ideals of the Great Society. Even before King’s assassination, LBJ had refused to publicly endorse the findings of the Kerner Commission. Neither Jimmy Carter nor Bill Clinton placed urban affairs at the center of their agenda. Rather, Carter pledged to bring integrity back to the political arena, and Bill Clinton, empowerment zones notwithstanding, focused his agenda on the largely suburban middle class, represented by the so-called soccer moms. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that King’s assassination played a pivotal role in these developments, by ending the life of one of the most, if not the most, prominent progressive spokesmen of the era and by sparking a nationwide uprising, which in turn gave a shot in the arm to the New Right. It is equally important to recognize that the Holy Week uprisings grew out of long-term urban ills and that our reexamination of them is an opportunity to refocus our attention on addressing them.

NOTES


5. Ibid.; “Federal Troops Leaving the City, Order Restored, York Says.”


7. Ibid.

8. Interview with Louis D. Randall, November 30, 2006, Baltimore ’68: Riot and Rebirth project.

9. Contemporary accounts employed various terms, from “riots” and “civil disorders” to “rebellions” and “revolts.” I favor the term “uprising” because of the magnitude and widespread nature of the incidents.

Austin, TX; “Attachment A,” Lyndon Johnson Papers, Aides: James Gaither, box 37, Riots 1968: Dr King, folder 2. Among other hard-hit cities were Washington, DC ($15 million in estimated damage); Chicago ($8.5 million); Pittsburgh, PA ($2 million); Kansas City, MO ($500,000); Trenton, NJ ($560,000); Wilmington, DE ($500,000); Newark, NJ ($500,000); Memphis, TN ($400,000); New Orleans ($400,000); Richmond, VA ($400,000); Nashville, TN ($300,000); Savannah, GA ($300,000); Cincinnati, OH ($200,000); Durham, NC ($100,000); Dallas, TX ($100,000); Raleigh, NC ($100,000); and High Point, NC ($100,000). Additional cities are listed in Warren Christopher Papers, Civil Disturbances, 1968 folder 3. Another way to measure the severity of the Holy Week uprisings is by the number of National Guardsmen called to duty. From 1945 to 1960, 33,539 troops were called into service to help restore order; from 1960 to 1965, 65,867 troops; in 1967, 43,300 troops; in 1968 a record 150,000 troops. See National Guard Association of the United States, “Use of National Guard during Civil Disorders in 1968,” January 1, 1969, National Guard Files, Civil Disturbances, 1968 July/December.

11. One example of the limited nature of the coverage of the Holy Week uprisings can be found in the “comprehensive” two-volume *Encyclopedia of American Race Riots*. Though the encyclopedia contains a separate entry on King’s assassination, this entry provides little detail on the riots and vastly underestimates the number of incidents. Only the riot in Washington, D.C., rated a separate entry, even though other riots at other times that were much less severe received far more coverage. This lack of coverage reflects the prevailing knowledge, or lack thereof, on the uprisings. See Walter Rucker and James Nathaniel Upton, eds., *Encyclopedia of American Race Riots* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007). After I had written this chapter, a book devoted to the post-King riots was finally published. See Clay Risen, *A Nation on Fire: America in the Wake of the King Assassination* (Hoboken: NJ: Wiley, 2009).


13. For instance, in his popular text *The Sixties* (3rd ed. [New York: Pearson, 2007], 107), Terry Anderson writes that following King’s murder “rioting swept the nation. Blacks poured out into the streets of over a hundred cities, venting their frustration. Sections of Boston, Detroit, and Harlem sank into chaos, but the worst was Washington, D.C. Over 700 fires turned the sky dark; smoke obscured the Capitol. Nationwide, officials called out more than 75,000 troops to patrol the streets, to keep the peace. . . . This because one violent white man slaughtered a nonviolent black man who called on America to live up to its promise.” That’s it. In contrast, Anderson spends four pages on Columbia, and five on the demonstrations in Chicago.


15. Eugene Methvin, *The Riot Makers: The Technology of Social Demolition* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1970). Methvin’s view that “riot makers” caused the riots was published in *Reader’s Digest* and the *National Review*, and a film with the same title was widely distributed by the FBI to police departments across the nation.


20. “Situation Reports.”


28. Papers of Warren Christopher, box 11, Civil Disturbances 1968, folders 1 and 2, LBJ Library.

29. See Baltimore Jewish Times, April 12 and 19, 1968.

30. “Situation Reports.”


34. Ibid.


37. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “Staff Report.”


40. City of Baltimore, “Baltimore Model Cities Neighborhoods.”


43. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “Staff Report.”


52. “Stenographic Transcript in the Case of *State of Maryland vs. Robert Bradby.*”


58. John R. Breihan, “Why Was There No Rioting in Cherry Hill?” (Chapter 3 in this collection).

59. On the Daley-Clark dispute, see Ramsey Clark Papers, especially boxes 50 and 60, LBJ Library.


61. See Chapter 11 in this volume.

