INTRODUCTION

The Past as Racial Prologue?

ANDREW GRANT-THOMAS

_The past is never dead. It’s not even past._
—WILLIAM FAULKNER, _REQUIEM FOR A NUN_

The routine and explicit appearances of race and ethnicity in our national discourse tend to be either celebratory (for example, the recognition of national heritage or history months, acclamations of “multiculturalism” and “diversity”) or sensationalistic (for example, the O. J. Simpson and Wen Ho Lee cases or, more recently, the Jena 6).¹ Serious and thoughtful engagements with issues of race and ethnicity are rare.

The 1992 Los Angeles riots riveted the country’s attention on issues of race and poverty only briefly. President Clinton’s Initiative on Race, the most recent deliberate attempt to promote a broad national dialogue on race, left scarcely a ripple on the national consciousness as the furor over the president’s impeachment consumed any possible attention to the Initiative advisory board’s final report (Kim 2000). The dialogue prompted by the University of Michigan affirmative action cases decided by the Supreme Court in 2003 largely skirted the old, but still deeply relevant questions of racial equity in favor of newer questions about the contribution of campus diversity to students’ cultural competence. Partisans of the current immigration debate variously insist that the real issue is undocumented immigration, or economic competition, or national security. We have yet to collectively engage with the profound ways in which racial considerations condition public attitudes and opinions in each of these three important arenas.

Many observers hoped that the disastrous aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita throughout the Gulf Coast would finally force a probing evaluation of the continuing centrality of race, and of the intertwining of race and class,
in American life. That hope goes unfulfilled at the time of this writing. That the congruence of blackness, poverty, and vulnerability, particularly in New Orleans, was greeted as a revelation by the media and much of the U.S. public speaks loudly to our national ignorance of, or indifference to, these issues.

A range of factors helps account for our generally patchy knowledge and superficial explorations of race in the United States. For one, many Americans believe that racial identity now has only marginal effects on a person’s social interactions or access to social opportunities, and therefore conclude that “race talk” and racial inquiry are superfluous (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Schuman et al. 1997). Some advocates for a “colorblind” discourse go further. More than superfluous, they say, race talk of any kind is inherently divisive. It is clear that race talk and progressive racial advocacy often trigger deep anxieties and resentments—especially among whites, but among many non-whites as well. As a result, even people who know that race remains a powerful shaper of social opportunity sometimes complain of “race fatigue.”

Then, too, maybe the problem extends beyond denial or lack of interest to the need for new conceptual tools to make sense of our changing conditions. What does “integration” look like in a society where Latinos now outnumber African Americans, where Asian Americans are a faster-growing population, proportionately, than either, and where people with multiracial identities comprise an ever larger part? What is “unity” in a multicultural nation of 300 million, and what are its foundations? Over the last three or four decades the United States (and the world) has changed in ways that not only shape how we experience race at the national level, but also create dramatic variations in the experience of race at the level of schools, neighborhoods, metropolitan areas, states, and national regions. Much of the cross-talk around race in the United States may be due to the speed, scope and variability of racial change on the ground, to the fact that we have many stories to tell, rather than only one.

With Twenty-First Century Color Lines we hope to help meet the need for fresh information and insight in a society marked by racial transformation. We want to engage skeptical, skittish, fatigued, and confounded readers and contribute to more nuanced and incisive scholarly and public debates on race and ethnicity in the United States. From a range of disciplinary and methodological perspectives, the contributors to this volume provide compelling, if necessarily contingent, answers to fundamental questions about the present and future of multiracialism in the United States: How can we understand the production and reproduction of racial and ethnic inequality in the twenty-first century? How are racial and ethnic identities promoted and defended across a range of social, geopolitical and cultural contexts, and what stakes are implicated in the process? What do two generations of demographic and social shifts around race look like on the ground? And what do the answers to these questions portend for our inescapably multiracial future?

Engagements with multiracialism, including the present volume, usually take as their primary point of departure two generations of dramatic change—
in demography, racial ideology and opportunity structures, the rules of ethno-racial identity formation, intra-group diversity, and more—that have destabilized a racial landscape many thought more or less settled after the civil rights reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. The centrality of change to present racial realities and discourses makes it easy to miss or discount the ways in which patterns and structures rooted in the past combine with more recent developments to shape our ongoing possibilities. In the remainder of this introduction I elaborate this argument with reference to the critical case of racial inequality, still the nation’s most vexing “changing same.” I close with a brief summary of each chapter.

Contemporary Racial Inequality and the Sediment of History

Racial hierarchy endures. Whites still predominate in terms of population and influence, comprising huge majorities of the nation’s homeowners, business and political elites, and opinion leaders (for an overview, see McArdle, this volume). In 2004, black, Latino, and Native American poverty rates all exceeded the non-Hispanic white rate by a factor of three (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2005, table 4). Half a century after Brown v. Board of Education, many black and Latino students remain consigned to separate and unequal schools. In the resurgence of white supremacist groups, ambivalence about racial integration, and bitter disputes about immigration, affirmative action, bilingual education, racial profiling, Indian casinos, and anti-Muslim detentions we see signs of continuing racial fracture. Many of the largest gaps in U.S. public opinion pertain to race, form along racial lines, or both.

Americans often draw a sharp line between the nation’s past and its racial present. For many, the civil rights era marks the critical transition point, our moment of racial paradigmatic shift. According to this narrative, before the 1950s we had slavery, Native American genocide and land seizure, Jim Crow, Plessy v. Ferguson, anti-Asian immigration reform, the eugenics movement, Japanese American internment, and Bull Connor. Since then, and here the narrative turns celebratory, we have had Brown, the Civil Rights, Voting Rights and Fair Housing acts of the 1960s, affirmative action, “fourth wave” immigration, and the enlightenment of white racial attitudes. Racism posed a major obstacle to the upward social mobility of people of color until the civil rights era, especially in the South, but then widespread policy and attitudinal change leveled the social and economic playing field. If anything, affirmative action policies and liberal white guilt have tilted the field in favor of racial minorities. Racial inequality may persist in the twenty-first century, the narrative concludes, but not for reasons rooted in the past (Gilliam 2006, 8).

I argue that, in fact, historically inscribed patterns and structures can and do imprint on current social and institutional practices, though their apparent naturalness may mask their continuing impact. The analytical eye is not readily drawn to “sameness” or to temporally remote causes. And yet, with respect to present-day
inequalities, disregarding the past can lead to sins of explanatory omission; restricting the scope of our inquiry encourages sins of explanatory commission as well. With reference to wealth, education, and political empowerment, in the pages that follow I offer a few examples of decisions made and practices entrenched—before we moved to “level the playing field”—that remain powerfully implicated in producing inequality today. In much of what follows, the long history of black Americans as the country’s predominant racial minority group, and the paucity of historical data on other groups, leads me to focus at times on black-white dynamics. While this emphasis does not fully reflect the reality of racial inequality demographically, it does capture the imbalance of privilege between whites and non-whites.

Wealth Inequality

According to Amartya Sen, we “generally have excellent reasons for wanting more income or wealth. This is not because income and wealth are desirable for their own sake, but because they are admirable general-purpose means for having more freedom to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value” (Sen 1999, 14). Wealthier people can buy rather than rent their homes; live in safer neighborhoods with better schools, public services, and richer social networks; weather unexpected financial strain due to joblessness, prolonged family illness, or other factors; create new business and other opportunities; save for and enjoy retirement (without worrying about the future of Social Security); and, generally, create more attractive options for themselves. The road to security, prosperity, and influence—even to health and a longer life (Bond Huie et al. 2003)—is paved largely by wealth.

Importantly, more affluent people pass these advantages on to their children in the form of a quality high school education, college tuition help, a first car, down payment assistance for a home, a job in the family business, cash gifts, bequests, or other unearned advantages. Financial or other material transfers from relatives account for as much as 80 percent of lifetime wealth accumulation (Conley 1999; Shapiro 2004). Racial gaps in wealth transfers are enormous: four times as many white (28 percent) as black families (7.7 percent) inherit money, with black beneficiaries receiving about 40 cents per dollar inherited by whites (Shapiro 2004, 63). In addition, about half of white families provide substantial in vivo financial assistance to young adult members, roughly twice the proportion of black families able to do so.

As a partial consequence of this discrepancy in intergenerational giving, non-Hispanic white households enjoyed a median net worth of $88,700 in 2002, eleven times the net worth of Latino households and fourteen times the net worth of African American households (Kochhar 2004, 2). Thirty-two percent of black households had zero or negative net worth in 2002, as did 26 percent of Latino households and 13 percent of white households. (Unfortunately, we have little data about the financial assets of Asian Americans and still less about those of
Native Americans, especially the roughly half who live in Indian country. White households at every income level enjoyed much more wealth than did African American and Latino households at similar incomes (Orzechowski and Sepielli 2003, 13).

The roots of current wealth inequalities lie substantially in historical public sector policies and practices that created wealth for many whites while denying it to non-whites. The value of land, labor and other resources expropriated from or unfairly denied non-white peoples over the centuries is incalculable, but some of the key plot lines are clear, if not widely familiar. In the case of Native Americans they include hundreds of treaties and laws that sanctioned the forcible removal of hundreds of thousands of Indians from their homelands and made their land available to white settlers or the U.S. government. By 1900, white settlers had filed claims for 80 million acres of “unappropriated public lands” under the Homestead Act, displacing many tribes in Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska and Wyoming. In 1891 alone, the “Indian Commissioner sold off one-seventh of all Indian lands in the United States to white settlers, over 17.4 million acres” (Anderson et al. 2006, 44, 46).

With respect to Latinos, the wealth transfer story includes the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, under which the interim government of an occupied Mexico transferred roughly half of its land mass—the present-day states of California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as parts of Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico—for $15 million (Anderson et al. 2006). The 1853 Gadsden Purchase secured the rest of Arizona and New Mexico for the United States. The story also highlights the Bracero program, which brought millions of laborers from Mexico, Latin America, and the Caribbean into the United States during and after World War II to work for paltry wages. Chinese immigrants attracted to the California Gold Rush paid the Foreign Miners Tax, but the services the tax paid for went exclusively to whites. The 1924 Alien Land Act excluded non-citizens from land ownership. Facing imminent internment by the federal government in World War II, Japanese Americans, many of them citizens, “sold” their properties to whites at exploitative prices.

The African American story begins with two hundred fifty years of chattel slavery, during which slaves were legally forbidden from owning anything, including their labor, and includes anti-miscegenation laws and the “one drop rule” of African American descent, which made most children of white men and black women both black-identified and ineligible to inherit any part of their father’s wealth. It extends through the broken promise of “40 acres and a mule” made at the end of the Civil War, and on to a viciously exploitative sharecropping system that doomed blacks to perpetual debt. The story also must refer to the terrorism visited on the few blacks who managed to prosper, such as the burning of the “Black Wall Street” in Tulsa, Oklahoma by whites on June 21, 1921. Hundreds of black businesses and homes, and many lives, were lost (Tulsa Race Riot 2001).

The political scientist Ira Katznelson traces much of the current wealth gap, especially between whites and African Americans, to the starkly different treatment
afforded whites and non-whites under the major social welfare programs of the 1930s and 1940s (Katznelson 2005). For example, the initial exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers from the Social Security, Fair Labor Standards, and Wagner Acts meant that most African Americans and many Latinos were denied pensions, minimum wage protections, unemployment insurance and access to labor unions. Sixty-five percent of African Americans, including three in four black Southerners, fell into those two occupational categories, as did roughly 40 percent of whites nationwide (Katznelson 2005, 43).

The GI Bill, which invested $95 billion between 1944 and 1971 in young veterans returning from World War II, deserves special mention. GI Bill provisions helped millions of young Americans to attend college, find jobs, buy homes, and start businesses. “Through these opportunities, and by advancing the momentum toward suburban living, mass consumption, and the creation of wealth and economic security, this legislation created middle-class America. No other instrument was nearly as important” (Katznelson 2005, 113). However, the discriminatory administration of the bill’s key programs meant that benefits accrued mainly to whites. Two of 3,200 loans for homes, businesses and farms guaranteed by the GI Bill in Mississippi in 1947 went to black veterans; in New York and northern New Jersey, fewer than 100 of 67,000 home mortgages insured by the GI Bill went to non-whites (Katznelson 2005, 140). All but shut out of “white” colleges and universities by formal and informal segregationist policies, thousands of black veterans armed with GI Bill vouchers in turn were also denied entry to historically black colleges and universities too small and too poor to accommodate them. The middle class made possible by this unprecedented government largesse was essentially all white.

Homeownership is the main source of wealth accumulation in the United States today. In 2000, home equity comprised three-fourths of the median net worth of U.S. households, and more than 80 percent of the median wealth of Latino and black households (Orzechowski and Sepielli 2003, 14). However, whereas three in four white families owned their homes in 2006, only half of black and Latino families did (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007, 8), and those homes held much less value than homes owned by whites. These racial differences in home values and ownership rates account for much of the racial wealth gap (Charles 2003; Oliver and Shapiro 1995). Accordingly, no story is more instructive about the historically racialized acquisition and transfer of wealth than that of homeownership.

The federal government first opened up the suburbs to whites under the National Housing Act of 1934 (Cashin 2004). The law created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, later renamed the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which subsidized home mortgages for whites in the suburbs. Until then, few families could afford homes because of the requirement that the down payment comprise a third or more of the purchase price. FHA subsidies enabled millions of families to buy homes and build equity. Again, whites benefited from this generosity almost exclusively. The FHA-funded sales in racially homogeneous
white neighborhoods and favored the purchase of homes in the suburbs. The underwriting manual for home mortgage insurance disseminated by the federal government was forthrightly racist. The federal government also pushed home buyers to adopt covenants that precluded the sale of subsidized homes to non-whites (Massey and Denton 1993). While both racial covenants and racist mortgage insurance policies were declared unconstitutional in 1948, their legacy prompted private companies to engage in redlining practices that continue to shape housing market outcomes (Cashin 2004, 112).

The implications of the foregoing observations for the reproduction of racial inequality deserve underlining. It is not simply that blacks, Native Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans have lost or been refused their fair share of the nation’s wealth and therefore had relatively little to pass on to their children. It is also that white Americans sometimes have gained in direct proportion to the deliberate and race-conscious deprivation of non-whites (slavery, under which whites had exclusive extractive rights to black bodies and labor, being the quintessential case). As a result, even if racial discrimination ended today, inequalities grounded in historically rooted disparities in wealth accumulation and intergenerational transfers would persist.

**Educational Inequality**

The structure of educational opportunity offers another instructive example of how historical legacies continue to benefit whites disproportionately. Education not only generates knowledge, skills, and other kinds of social capital, but also powerfully shapes outcomes in other key arenas as well, including employment, occupation and job satisfaction, income, wealth, health, and criminal justice (Children’s Defense Fund 2005; The Condition of Education 2006 2006; Wolfe and Haveman 2001). Chief Justice Earl Warren’s observation on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* rings even more true today: “in these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education” (Children’s Defense Fund 2005, 88). Racial gaps in educational attainment have narrowed in the half century since *Brown*. However, whether with respect to standardized test scores, high school dropout rates, college graduation rates, and many other important measures, wide gaps remain (McArdle, this volume; Mickelson 2003).

Trend data on educational attainment by race highlight immediate instances in which the pre-civil rights past casts its shadow on the racial present. For example, constrained to separate and unequal schools, in 1960 only 39 percent of African Americans ages 25–29 had completed high school or more (Digest of Education Statistics 2005 2006, table 8). Sixty-four percent of same-age whites had done so. By 2005, that twenty-five–point gap had closed to six. However, the human capital shortfalls imposed on older generations of African Americans, of which that twenty-five–point high school completion gap is but one indicator, continue to exert a drag on the fortunes of the African American community today.
Among today’s school-age children, educational achievement owes to a range of factors, many of them, like family background and neighborhood characteristics, widely considered outside the purview of schools. But school resources—teachers, facilities, curricular materials, and much more—also matter a great deal, as does the funding required to secure them (Mickelson 2003). Black, Latino, and poor students suffer by comparison to their white and affluent counterparts on all of these dimensions. Bearing in mind the strong link between school poverty rates and the quantity and quality of school resources (Orfield and Lee 2005), consider that half of black and Latino public school students, but only 5 percent of white students, attend schools where at least 75 percent of the student body is poor (Children’s Defense Fund 2005, 94).

The funding field tilts against poor and minority students at the interstate, inter-district and intra-district levels. African Americans and Latinos together were 40 percent or more of public school students in eight states in the 2003–2004 school year. All but one of those states (Maryland) ranked below the national average in per pupil funding, and five (Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Arizona and New Mexico) ranked in the bottom third of states (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006, table 11). Within states, affluent districts with strong tax bases can lend more support to their neighborhood schools than can poorer districts, which tend to have more black and Latino students. As a result, in twenty-eight states “high-minority districts receive less state and local money for each child than low-minority districts. . . . Across the country, $908 less per student is spent on students in the districts educating the most students of color, as compared to the districts educating the fewest” (Education Trust 2006, 6).

Finally, we see racially inequitable funding even across schools in the same districts, largely the result of “intradistrict funding formulas that allocate positions, rather than dollars, to schools, and teacher sorting patterns that allow higher paid [and more qualified] teachers to systematically opt into lower-need schools” (Rubenstein et al. 2006, 11; see also Thomas B. Fordham Institute 2006, 15). These absolute comparisons actually understate the inequity of current funding patterns. Minority students typically enter schools with greater needs than white students: 35 percent of black, 28 percent of Latino, and 29 percent of American Indian children, but only 10 percent of white children, lived in poor families in 2005 (Fass and Cauthen 2006). Under these circumstances, the equal distribution of monies and resources across schools often segregated by race and class would not signify their equitable distribution, a point recognized and reflected in the educational equity movement. In practice, most schools and districts serving large racial minority student populations would be pleased to achieve resource parity with their more well-to-do peers.

The historical narrative of inequitable public school funding builds on the twin pillars of federalism and segregated schooling. The primacy of state and local governments in public education has its roots in the early nineteenth century outside the South and late in the century in the South, after the post–Reconstruction disenfranchisement of black Americans made it politically feasible for
whites to channel the bulk of education dollars toward their own children (Walters 2001, 40). More than one hundred years later, the historical trend is away from state and local control: between 1920 and 2004, the federal share of public school funding crept from less than 1 percent to 9 percent, and most federal monies come with directives attached (Howell 2005, 4; The Condition of Education 2007, Table 37-1). That said, as William Howell observes of local school boards, “once a political entity has been granted certain powers, it is extremely difficult to reclaim them” (Howell 2005, 7). When those entities also have the political and financial clout to underwrite their historical prerogatives, as local and state governments do in the education arena, we might suspect that rumors of their demise have been exaggerated.

The record of recent court decisions around funding equalization is instructive in this regard. Citing the work of Sean Corcoran and colleagues on “The Changing Distribution of Education Finance: 1972–1997,” Pamela Barnhouse Walters concludes that, although “the Supreme Courts in almost twenty states have issued decisions ordering school finance reform, in no state has the degree of resource equalization ordered by the Courts been realized, and levels of resource inequality between affluent and poor districts remain high” (Walters 2007, 24). By the end of 2005, when plaintiffs had filed cases in forty-five of fifty states and won about half the judgments, the verdict remained roughly the same. In many of those “wins,” legislatures and state officials have resisted implementing remedies or have reallocated funds in ways that reflect “the balance of political power, usually heavily weighted in favor of suburban school districts” (Hunter 2005). In the end, a federal government that spends less than one in ten education dollars is no match for politically savvy schools and districts, mostly affluent and white, able to use their superior political access and clout to secure favorable judgments from key decision makers.

Of course, the different abilities of rich and poor districts to channel resources to “their” schools would have less racial significance if not for the persistence of segregated housing patterns. School and residential segregation are deeply linked, both because parents with housing options typically weigh school quality heavily in making their decisions and because most children attend neighborhood schools. (About 10 percent of K–12 students attended private schools in 2000.) The racial makeup of neighborhoods thus becomes the main determinant of the racial makeup of the schools within them. “In the absence of effective school desegregation policies, location is destiny, and segregated housing for families, reinforced by differential use of private schools, produces education that is starkly polarized” (Orfield and McArdle 2006, 4–5). Like local and state control over education, housing segregation today is partly rooted in history.

Between 1860 and 1940, African American segregation from whites increased dramatically (Massey and Denton 1993, 21, 47). The rise of hyper-segregated “ghettos,” especially in the large metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest, was facilitated by the “Great Migration” of blacks to the North during the first half of the twentieth century but caused by decades of discriminatory policies
such as the mortgage practices noted above; violence directed against blacks; “urban renewal” projects that moved many blacks to marginal neighborhoods; federal public housing programs that isolated black residents in high-poverty neighborhoods; and the growth of the interstate highway system, which fuelled “white flight” and suburbanization (Cashin 2004; Massey and Denton 1993; Powell 2000). These developments inscribed a housing landscape defined by racial isolation, economic polarization, and considerable overlap between the two. Such a landscape will tend to perpetuate itself in the absence of remedies as forceful as those that created it in the first place. But “America has never undertaken any serious effort to reverse its nefarious role in creating such residential misery” (Cashin 2004, 242).

Residential segregation concentrates socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage and, through processes of wealth accumulation, differentially allows more and less affluent groups to expand the residential choices of future generations. Especially in the context of virulent employment discrimination, blacks confined to the large urban ghettos of the mid-twentieth century were hard-pressed to accumulate the human, material and social capital required for social mobility—their own or their children’s (Massey and Denton 1993). Conversely, segregation created well-defined “white neighborhoods” that sustained considerable advantages in terms of incomes, property values, education, employment and social networks (Roithmayr 2004). The twenty-five–point gap in high school completion rates between young blacks and whites in 1960, noted earlier, was one outcome of this divergence in opportunity. The legacy of unequal wealth accumulation produced by several generations of enforced social and economic isolation explains some part of blacks’ residential outcomes today (Charles 2003).

By constraining economic opportunities for African Americans, segregation also regenerates itself by “producing interracial economic disparities that incite further discrimination and more segregation” (Massey 2001, 419). The fundamental attribution error is at work here. Many Americans attribute the “pathological” behaviors associated with urban blackness to biological or cultural predisposition rather than to the structural impacts of institutional discrimination, concentrated poverty, and social isolation (Loury 2002). The error reinforces prejudice, negative stereotypes, and anti-black stigma, which prompt further discrimination in and beyond housing markets. A large body of research finds that many white Americans express a low tolerance for black neighbors and that housing market discrimination remains a major cause of residential segregation today (Charles 2003). 

Political Inequality

Formal politics is yet another arena in which current racial inequalities can be traced in part to historical sources. Racial minorities lag far behind whites with respect to their descriptive and substantive representation in the country’s politi-
cal life. In 2000, much more was said about the fact that Latinos had become the nation’s largest minority group than about the reality that, comprising one quarter of the country’s population, blacks and Latinos also comprised less than 10 percent of our elected officials and held no governorships or U.S. Senate seats (Amy et al. 2000). By 2003, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans were a mere 15 percent of the membership of the U.S. House of Representatives and 2 percent of Senate members (Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006 2005, table 395). This pattern of minority under-representation repeats itself at the state and local levels.

It is also true that the candidates supported by blacks and Latinos are elected less often than those endorsed by whites. In seven of nine presidential elections held since 1972, for example, large majorities of African Americans and Latinos voted for the Democratic candidate while smaller majorities of whites supported the Republican candidate. The candidate favored by white voters won six of those seven elections (Jimmy Carter’s 1976 victory over Gerald Ford being the exception; 47 percent of whites supported Carter while 52 percent supported Ford).

The research on whose substantive preferences are realized in the policy arena suggests that people of color do not enjoy the level of political representation that whites do. For example, in their analysis of the correspondence between the policy preferences of African Americans and whites, and the roll call votes of their U.S. Senators from 1989 to 2002, Griffin and Newman found that “African Americans are severely underrepresented across the broad range of Senators’ voting behavior” (Griffin and Newman 2004, 28). Similarly, using two thousand survey questions on policies proposed between 1981 and 2002, Martin Gilens found that “when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the more affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor or middle-income Americans” (Gilens 2005, 778). Given that blacks and Latinos are much more likely than whites to have low or moderate incomes, Gilens’s finding suggests that they also are less likely to prevail when group preferences clash.

The disparities in political representation captured in these and similar outcomes have many sources, several of which have received considerable attention in the wake of the contested 2000 presidential election results. I focus on just two here: the dominance of non-Hispanic “whites” among the U.S. resident population and the fact that whites vote at much higher rates than non-whites do. Both factors have deep historical roots, none of them “natural” or inevitable.

It is impossible to understand the emergence of the United State as a predominately “white” nation without appreciating the political and historical contexts for contested decisions about how to classify people racially in the first place. From 1850 to 1910, census enumerators used categories like Mulatto, Quadroon and Octoroon to distinguish among blacks. By 1920, however, the “principle of hypodescent as practiced in Jim Crow legislation made such distinctions superfluous”
and they were dropped altogether (Snipp 2003, 567). The move from racial designation by the census enumerator to racial self-identification by the respondent in the 1960 census led to a 48 percent “increase” of the American Indian population between 1950 and 1960 (Snipp 2003, 569–570). The strategic assimilation of various European immigrant groups into “whiteness” in the United State during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was similarly episodic and contingent (Ignatiev 1995; Jacobson 1998; Roediger 1991).

Put differently, the very existence of “non-Hispanic whites” as a politically salient category composed of German, Irish, Italian Americans, and so on, owes largely to historical circumstance. What if these large ethnic subdivisions of whiteness instead were racialized, as they once were to varying degrees, and as “African Americans” and “Asian Americans” are today? What if pollsters regularly reported public support for policies and candidates in terms of ethnic rather than racial categories? What if national politicians vied not for the black, white, or Latino vote, but for the German, African, Italian, Irish and Mexican American votes? When we add to the fact of historically contingent racial classification a record of public policy decisions about war, annexation, birth control, medical care, and the flow of peoples across national borders—many of those decisions expressly intended to promote white racial dominance and supremacy—it becomes clear that the topography of our current racial landscape and the present political dominance of “whites” are as socially and historically constructed as race itself.

In the case of African Americans, felony disfranchisement is the major legal obstacle to voting. Roughly 5.3 million U.S. citizens in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia cannot vote because they have felony convictions. Two million African Americans, most of them former prisoners, are temporarily or permanently denied the vote. Felony convictions disenfranchise 13 percent of black men nationwide; one in four is permanently disenfranchised in the five states that deny the vote to former offenders. Had current imprisonment rates held in 1960, John F. Kennedy might not have been elected president (Uggen and Manza 2002). Conversely, had voting rights been granted to any category of disenfranchised felons in 2000, Al Gore would surely have won the presidency. To put U.S. disenfranchisement practices in international perspective, no country in the European Union bars former convicts from voting and many allow some (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway) or all (Australia, South Africa, Greece, Poland Spain, and Sweden) current prisoners to vote (Uggen and Manza 2002).

The majority of disfranchisement laws, including the most stringent ones, can be traced directly to post–Civil War statutes aimed at diluting the voting strength of newly empowered black Americans (Behrens et al. 2003). To whet the racial edge of the legislation, lawmakers in the South linked “the loss of voting rights to crimes alleged to be committed primarily by blacks while excluding offenses held to be committed by whites” (Mauer 2004, 16). In 1850, roughly one in three states disenfranchised ex-felons; by 1920, three in four did, at which time
literacy tests, poll taxes, white-only primaries and other pointedly discriminatory measures had also been enacted. Many states restored voting rights to some categories of former felons in the 1960s and 1970s and recent years have seen further liberalization across the country (Behrens et al. 2003). Still, with the explosion of the prison population during the last three decades of the twentieth century, the impact of century-old disenfranchisement laws on the voting strength of people of color, especially African Americans, has never been more devastating.

For many Asians and Latinos in the United States, non-citizenship represents the most serious legal obstacle to voting. Six in ten Latinos and Asians, compared with 35 percent of blacks and 25 percent of whites, could not register to vote in 2000 because they were not U.S. citizens or were too young (Passel 2004). The Constitution does not prelude non-citizens from voting and, for the first century of the country’s history, eligibility to vote depended more on race, gender, and property ownership holdings than on citizenship status (Harper-Ho 2000). Indeed, until the War of 1812, voting by white male immigrant property owners was common. By 1875, twenty-two states and federal territories had extended the suffrage to non-citizens, first on the basis of “no taxation without representation,” and later in the hope of attracting settlers to the South and West after the Civil War.

The subsequent sharp retrenchment of “alien suffrage” shadowed a marked shift in the geographic origins and racial/ethnic makeup of the U.S. immigrant population. Where once the franchise had been offered as a carrot for immigrants hailing primarily from Northern Europe, its rapid withdrawal around the turn of the century was a stick meant to moderate the new wave of racially and politically suspect immigrants from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean (Harper-Ho 2000; Hayduk 2004). By 1900, only eleven states granted non-citizens the franchise at any level; by 1928, none did. As with ex-felon disfranchisement, recent years have seen more and more insistent calls for extending voting rights to non-citizens, as well as some marginal gains. Six towns in Maryland now permit non-citizen voting in local elections, and non-citizens vote in school board elections in Chicago, as they did for thirty years in New York City until the dissolution of school boards in 2002.

Would U.S. legislatures have imposed non-citizen and felon disfranchisement laws in the post-civil rights period were they not already in place? We cannot know. We can say that these laws have now assumed a taken-for-granted quality that makes it difficult to bring the serious questions of racial impact and democratic fairness they raise to the national policy debate, much less to change policy and practice on a meaningful scale. Commanding few votes, non-citizens, prisoners and former felons lack the social and political capital needed to organize themselves, forge strong political coalitions, or attract influential policy champions. As a result, even in the case of ex-felon disfranchisement, which four in five Americans oppose, progressive reformers continue to push against the heavy weight of our historical inheritance.
Why Deny History?

The study of history offers more than a baseline against which to celebrate the nation’s egalitarian racial turn or source material for “specious” minority claims to victimization, as some would have us believe. The general failure to recognize the causal links between historically grounded arrangements and present inequalities is due to several factors. For one, many people, especially white Americans, mistakenly believe that racial equality has already been achieved not only in terms of the law and popular sensibilities, but in terms of group outcomes as well. If equality of outcomes is the reality then there is no need to search for the roots of inequality in the past or anywhere else. Even among people aware that deep inequalities persist, the growth of the black, brown, and Asian American middle classes, and the many examples of prominent non-whites, is often taken as evidence of the irrelevance of past practices.

Another reason to deny the links between past and present in this context is strategic: to agree that historical legacies help shape present-day outcomes plausibly shifts the burden of responsibility for remedial action onto society as a whole, and perhaps onto whites in particular. White racial resentment has been well documented (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Swain 2002). Many whites believe that affirmative action policies already serve as sufficient, even excessive, compensation for historical racial wrongs. As one white man put it in response to a question about slavery reparations, “I think they’ve gotten enough” (Bonilla-Silva 2003, 159). When the belief that racial minorities have “gotten enough” is wedded to the belief that group welfare is inherently a competitive, zero-sum game—“My [white] friend did not get a job because a black man got it” (Bonilla-Silva 2003, 159)—whites’ incentive to delineate between past and present becomes stronger still.

Perhaps the biggest reason for past-present myopia in this context is the one highlighted by the structural racism framework: the overly narrow construction of racism that sets the terms of the debate about inequality in the United States (Grant-Thomas and Powell, this volume). If we insist that racism attaches only to people, policies and practices that discriminate intentionally on the basis of race, then, indeed, with the passing of Jim Crow laws the links between the pre-civil rights era past and current inequality are few and largely symbolic. If instead we recognize racial inequality as the result of cultural and institutional dynamics unfolding over time and across domains, the notion of intentionality itself loses meaning, and we are compelled to consider racism, and history, in new ways.

Plan of the Book

We can understand that the past is “not even past” without resigning ourselves to a future that recapitulates its most dreadful racialist features. James Baldwin nicely captured the insight: “I am what time, circumstance, and history have made of me, certainly. But I am so much more than that. We all are.” Beyond
the certainty of its multiracial character, few among us believe that the future of race in America is preordained. The future we shape for ourselves and generations to come will largely depend on our ability to recognize the nature and enormity of our racial challenges and opportunities, and on the insights, intention and creativity we bring to them. The essays in this book are presented in the spirit of that conviction.

The fact of our nation’s rapidly increasing racial and ethnic diversity is widely known, hailed by newspaper headlines, political and civic leaders, and researchers alike. What that diversity looks like on the ground and the challenges and opportunities it entails are less widely appreciated. In her chapter “Color Lines in a Multiracial Nation,” Nancy McArduck begins to answer those questions with a detailed demographic and institutional overview that provides the backdrop for the theoretical and empirical analyses that make up the remainder of the volume. McArduck begins by documenting “the changing face of the nation” at the national, regional, city, and suburban levels, with attention to the dynamics that propel the differential growth of racial and ethnic populations. She then examines how these large-scale transformations manifest in the institutional spaces where our lives unfold, from families, schools and places of worship to workplaces and the political arena. Her analysis affirms that fifty years of transformation have moderated racial inequality and “blurred” the color line in America but hardly erased it.

While the view that racial inequality in the twenty-first-century United States owes largely to old-fashioned “racism” has its adherents, the stance is one that increasingly prompts eye-rolling both within and outside racially liberal circles. In our post–civil rights era, many whites, in particular, assign primary responsibility for persistent inequality to the cultural and personal failings of those at the lower rungs of the social hierarchy, with poor and working-class African Americans bearing the brunt of criticism (Brown et al. 2005). In Part I, “Foundations of Multiracial Inequality,” Nilanjana Dasgupta, Andrew Grant-Thomas, and John powell present emerging critiques of racial inequality that bridge this interpretive disconnect by recognizing the subordinate status of non-whites as more than the product of self-inflicted injuries or due only to expressly prejudicial attitudes and behaviors.

Dasgupta draws on two decades of psychological research showing that even people who consciously and sincerely hold tolerant racial attitudes nonetheless often harbor implicit or unconscious biases. Moreover, Dasgupta documents how unconscious biases inform behavior, with implications for a wide range of racial outcomes. Her chapter closes with practical suggestions for undermining implicit bias.

Grant-Thomas and powell similarly argue that explicitly racist attitudes and behaviors are just part of the process that allows the privileges attaching to whiteness and the disadvantages associated with color to endure and adapt over time. Working at a level of analysis complementary to Dasgupta’s, they articulate the ways that social institutions interact to organize or “structure” critical opportunities
and outcomes in racially distinctive ways. In particular, they emphasize how interactions across social institutions and patterns of resource distribution can racialize the distribution of opportunity with or without the involvement of “racist” individuals.

If race is socially constructed, a foundational assertion of contemporary race theory, then racial inequality is as well. In this respect, engagements with the nature and meanings of racial identity logically supersede disputes about the causes and severity of racial inequality even as questions of inequality and identity rival each other as the main flashpoints of our racial politics. Many observers already regard Latinos, the nation’s largest racial or ethnic minority community and predicted to comprise one in four U.S. residents by midcentury, as the country’s key electoral swing group. As Christina Gómez notes in her chapter, the first in Part II, “Ambiguities of Racial and Ethnic Identity,” how members of this diverse population choose to exercise the identity options afforded them in the decades to come will have enormous social, economic, and cultural, as well as political, ramifications for the country as a whole. Gomez outlines the factors likely to inform those judgments, not least among them the distinct understandings of race that Latino immigrants bring with them.

Like Gómez, co-authors Anayra O. Santory-Jorge, Luis A. Avilés, Juan Carlos Martínez-Cruzado, and Doris Ramírez see identity choices as politically strategic moves with both practical and symbolic consequences. In their study of racial self-identification among Puerto Ricans on the island, Santory-Jorge and her colleagues take as their point of departure the huge gaps between how Puerto Ricans identified themselves racially in the 2000 U.S. Census and in a representative, island-wide survey conducted just three years later. The authors argue that the variability of Puerto Rican identity claims are comprehensible in light of respondents’ very different political and ideological relationships with their interlocutors in each case—the federal government, on one hand, and the University of Puerto Rico, on the other.

As the incorporation of Latinos arguably now substitutes for that of African Americans as the critical test of the inclusiveness of U.S. racial democracy, the relative success of Asian Americans, as a group, is often promoted as its primary defense. Among the mostly educational and economic indicia of the group’s status, for some, as the nation’s “model minority,” the significant number of Asian children adopted into white Americans families in recent decades has been heralded as an especially poignant sign of the liberalization of white racial attitudes and the nation’s fading color line. Jiannbin Lee Shiao and Mia H. Tuan draw on the experiences of a generation of Korean children adopted by white parents to probe the terms of their integration into these families. While recognizing the variety of approaches the parents used to manage adoptive, cultural and racial differences, the authors find that, for many, practicing “colorblindness” actually meant integrating their children into whiteness.

Moving our research and analyses “beyond the black-white paradigm” requires more than expanding the corpus of group-specific work to include more
attention to Asian Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, or extending race relations work to examine dyads other than the familiar blacks and whites. Our research efforts will remain of limited application until they more often reflect the fact that local racial politics are now often triadic or still more complex, and that interactions between communities of color now often assume a higher priority than those between minorities and whites. The contributors to Part III, “Negotiating Change: Group Interaction on the Ground,” engage such irreducibly multiracial dynamics in a range of arenas and places.

Anthony Kwame Harrison’s work examines the tension between the colorblindness that professedly marks the politically progressive, racially diverse San Francisco Bay Area hip hop scene and the pervasive inclination toward strong ethnic identification he sees among hip hop participants. He argues that this tendency to toggle between the assumption of racial sameness and assertions of racial distinction, all within a normative black–white hierarchical framework, increasingly characterizes a range of urban sociocultural spaces in the United States. Similarly presenting arts and cultural practice as a crucial site for multiracial community building, Maria Rosario Jackson contends that multiracial and separatist spaces are both necessary conditions for realizing a cultural commons that supports genuine racial and ethnic diversity. Jackson closes her survey of arts and cultural practices with several suggestions for urban planners and policymakers concerned with fostering healthy diversity in U.S. communities.

Convinced that the kind of cosmopolitan, multidirectional vision of integration flagged by Harrison and Jackson must increasingly accompany our growing diversity, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, John Matlock, and Katrina Wade-Golden ask whether and how young adults’ perceptions of common “core values” with other groups shape their orientation toward this more dynamic vision of integration. They find that, on the whole, perceptions of commonality have powerful implications for the degree to which young white, black, Latino and Asian American adults move in integrated settings, seek to bridge racial differences, and adopt a structural or individualistic view of racial inequality. In these results the authors see the seeds for multiracial political coalitions that are both more and less progressive.

With reference to electoral politics in New York City and Los Angeles, John Mollenkopf examines how demographic change at the neighborhood level is generating new political coalitions as well as new kinds of competition. Where activists once fought to wrest from whites a measure of political power for native-born minorities, Mollenkopf notes that the growth of immigrant populations has transformed the contest into one that often find immigrants challenging both whites and native minorities, especially in our large urban centers.

Finally, in his brief piece in Part IV, “The Road Ahead?” David Roediger tries to divine the future course of the Du Boisian “color line” in the twenty-first-century United States. Taking the public, media, and governmental responses to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the devastation punctuated by Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast in 2005
as his points of departure, Roediger anticipates that color lines are very likely to persist, but in ever more globalized forms. In particular, he argues, these two signature national events of the young century “point to a world in which racial positions are multiple and show that global and local realities mix promiscuously in determining where color-lines will be drawn.” Gary Orfield concludes the volume with reflections on the role of scholars in the project of racial transformation.

Notes

1. The Jena 6 refers to six black students charged with assaulting a white classmate at Jena High School in Jena, Louisiana, on December 4, 2006. The six were initially charged with attempted second degree murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder. Supporters of the Jena 6 contend that the charges were excessive and racially discriminatory. Moreover, they note that three white students who hung nooses from a tree on school grounds, after several black students expressed their intention to sit under the tree, had been merely suspended, rather than expelled, from school. The case has sparked protests in Jena and across the country: See “Thousands ‘March for Justice’ in Jena, Court Orders Hearing on Teen,” available online at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/09/20/jena.six/index.html.

2. Vincent Hutchings and Nick Valentino note that significant black–white preference gaps emerge with respect to race-targeted policies (e.g., affirmative action and school segregation), nonracial policies (e.g., levels of government spending on education and poverty relief), and “values” issues (e.g., egalitarianism, the fairness of the U.S. political system), and that “these disparities have persisted over time and easily exceed differences across gender, class, and religion” (Hutchings and Valentino 2004, 389).

3. To be sure, even on the question of race the pre–civil-rights-era narrative also includes some powerful, mitigating strands—the enduring belief that Lincoln waged the Civil War “to free the slaves,” for example, or the perception of the United States as a “nation of immigrants” that has enabled many generations of multihued newcomers to advance as far as their hard work could take them. But even for those who would defend the country’s racial history on the (contested) grounds that the United States has treated its minorities better than many other countries have, or that its march toward racial justice has been steady, Indian genocide, slavery, and Jim Crow are undeniable stains on that pre-1960s history.

4. For example, many Americans understand racial inequality as a function of bad choices impelled by pathological group cultures (Brown et al. 2005). In my view, this inordinate attention to putative “cultural pathologies” constitutes such a sin of commission.

5. One study of Asian American wealth using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation estimated that in 2000 Asian American households had a median net worth of $73,600, $28,100 less than the median net worth of non-Hispanic white families. This was true even though Asian American families enjoyed slightly higher median incomes than did white families (Ong and Patraporn 2006).

6. The 1988 Civil Liberties Act authorized a payment of $20,000 to the victims of internment, an important gesture of recognition but one that hardly fairly compensated most victims for their actual property loss (Hollinger 2003).

7. The median value for white homeowners in 2002 was $81,200, compared with $49,800 and $40,700 for Latino and black owners, respectively (Kochhar 2004, 17).

8. “Areas surrounding a location are [to be] investigated to determine whether incompatible racial and social groups are present, for the purpose of making a prediction regard-
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ing the probability of the location being invaded by such groups. If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values” (McKenzie 1994, 65).

9. At the same time, in those forty-five years, during which labor market success has increasingly required a college degree rather than a high school diploma, the gap favoring whites age twenty-five to twenty-nine in the attainment of a bachelor’s degree (or higher) has grown from 6 to 16 points (Digest of Educational Statistics 2005 2006, table 8). The corresponding gap favoring whites over Hispanics grew from 15 points in 1975, the first year for which the Digest of Educational Statistics presented data on Hispanic achievement, to 23 points in 2005.

10. It was not until 1968 that blacks in the South were provided universal secondary schooling (Walters 2001).


12. In the 2003–2004 school year, 44 percent of the $462 billion dollars allocated to U.S. public schools had local sources, most of it in the form of property tax revenue (The Condition of Education 2007 2007, table 37-1). Another 47 percent came from the states. Note that federal funds are intended only to supplement, not to replace, state and local funds. “Unfortunately, some states and districts game the system, perhaps unknowingly, by lowering their own allocations to schools catering to needy children because they know these schools will receive federal funds” (Thomas B. Fordham Institute 2006, 19). Perversely, federal Title I monies, meant to supplement state and local funds in states with large numbers of poor children, instead disproportionally go to wealthier states (Education Trust 2006, 2–3).

13. William Howell reports that when a recent Gallup poll asked, “Who should have the greatest influence in deciding what is taught in the public schools?” 61 percent of respondents “selected the local school board, while 22 percent chose the state government and just 15 percent chose the federal government” (Howell 2005, 8–9). Howell also quotes findings from a 2002 poll commissioned by Education Week to the effect that “the public not only trusts school boards, it also believes that school boards are the single most important institution in determining the quality of public schools—more important than parents, governors, state assemblies, or the U.S. president.”


15. Because the power to zone is the power to exclude, the land use authority of local governments is one discriminatory tool worth mentioning. Many municipalities employ restrictive land use regulations (e.g., low-density zoning, limits on new residential permits), costly infrastructure requirements, and difficult approval processes that make it difficult to build affordable homes (Robinson and Grant-Thomas 2004, 38). The scarcity of affordable housing effectively locks many blacks and Latinos out of high-opportunity suburban neighborhoods (Ihlanfeldt 2004; Pendall 2000). Local authority to regulate land use and zoning is not constitutionally mandated, but instead derives from the Supreme Court’s 1926 decision in Euclid v. Ambler and the fact that almost all states have granted home rule to localities (“Democracy or Distrust?” 1998). Richard Thompson Ford notes that exclusionary zoning has a “self-perpetuating quality”: by excluding a class of people from the community, “a locality constructs a political space in which it is unlikely that an
electoral challenge to the [exclusionary] ordinance will ever succeed . . . in many cases, the only significant vote that will be taken in the exclusionary ordinance is the first vote” (Ford 1994, 1871).


17. The authors do go on to note that “on some votes more salient for them, African Americans are actually marginally better represented than whites” (Griffin and Newman 2004, 28).

18. In the 2000 Census, 15 percent of the U.S. population identified themselves as having German ancestry; 11 percent, Irish ancestry; 9 percent, English ancestry; and 6 percent, Italian ancestry (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2004, 2).


21. For example, Shelby Steele argues that the popularity of anti-black conspiracy theories in black communities reveals nothing as much as the presence and power of the “enemy memory,” itself a form of false consciousness, within individual African Americans and the community as a whole (Steele 1990).

22. Six in ten white respondents to a 2001 national survey by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University believed that blacks had equal or better access to health care than whites do (Kane 2001). Half thought blacks and whites had similar levels of education, and half thought blacks enjoyed comparable job status. Similarly, the findings of a recent study of white Americans’ attitudes toward reparations for African Americans suggest that “white resistance to reparations for Black Americans stems from fundamental biases in estimating the true cost of being Black” (Mazzocco et al. 2006).

23. The white Alabaman man interviewed as part of the FrameWorks Institute’s research on how people think and talk about race speaks for many: “How long ago was [slavery]? A hundred years? . . . Black people are mayors, congressmen, doctors, lawyers. What have they got to complain about? They’ve got the same opportunities I have. I think their only handicap is if they think, you know, “I’m being crapped on because I’m Black” (Gilliam 2006, 8). Similarly, in opposing reparations for black slavery, conservative commentator David Horowitz asks: does the existence of a substantial black middle class “not suggest that economic adversity is the result of failures of individual character rather than the lingering after-effects of racial discrimination and a slave system that ceased to exist well over a century ago?” Horowitz’s brief against reparations for African Americans, “Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks—and Racist Too,” is available at the Free Republic’s website at http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3a54b37c6b16.htm.

24. For example, a few years ago the Jim Crow Study Group of the Rogers School of Law at the University of Arizona found that at least eight Southern states still had laws designed to prevent public school integration or support segregated private schools. Attention also has been paid recently to the continuing existence of racial restrictive covenants in property deeds and the governing documents of homeowners associations across the country.

25. The line appears at the end of the documentary film Race is a Four Letter Word: see http://www.lumiere.net.nz/reader/item/1058.
References


