

# 1 Introduction

## *Neo/Liberal Disjunctures*

FROM THE VANTAGE POINT of the stars in 1989, the transformation toward a newly forming “global liberalism” on planet earth seemed ubiquitous and triumphal. From the fall of the Berlin Wall, to regime changes in Poland and Romania, to glasnost, to the end of the Cold War, neoliberalism and the market appeared inevitable and unstoppable, a smug and self-sufficient duo with no barriers in sight, global coverage the ultimate goal, and victory the annihilation of all alternate forms of social and economic organization. An unflagging belief in the economic logic of laissez-faire capitalism seemed to be the new global hegemony, and it was a logic that appeared perfect, infallible. Corinil captured this perspective well:

As an expression of this millennial fantasy, corporate discourses of globalization evoke with particular force the advent of a new epoch free from the limitations of the past. Their image of globalization offers the promise of a unified humanity no longer divided by East and West, North and South, Europe and its Others, the rich and the poor. As if they were underwritten by the desire to erase the scars of a conflictual past or to bring it to a harmonious end, these discourses set in motion the belief that the separate histories, geographies, and cultures that have divided humanity are now being brought together by the warm embrace of globalization, understood as a progressive process of planetary integration.<sup>1</sup>

It is this global village image of harmonious integration that was harnessed and put to work for corporations from AT&T to Benetton, from Global Crossing to IBM. Different histories and bodies were fused into a perfect oneness, and then difference itself was banished from future discussion. This remains the ultimate fantasy of disembodied, ahistorical spacelessness, where there are no material or discursive frictions to hinder the space of flows. It is the fantasy of neoliberalism, a world without historical and spatial

closure, without fissures and alienation; it is the transcendent moment for capitalism as well, for in a world without “the scars of a conflictual past” or “the separate histories, geographies, and cultures that have divided humanity,” there also exist no barriers to the free circulation of capital and laboring bodies across space.

For the corporate world and for neoliberal thinkers like Francis Fukuyama, human society is poised for a great evolutionary leap—the leap into total obeisance to the laws of capitalist motion. For Fukuyama, the “end of history” means the end of the twentieth-century experiments of different doctrines of government; it means the victory of capitalism and modern, liberal freedoms over socialism, communism, fascism, and dictatorship.<sup>2</sup> For him, the current apocalypse of “the end” is also the current utopia—the moment where the limits of so-called social engineering are made manifest, and a *neoliberal*, market-based order grounded in human nature emerges triumphant. Fukuyama’s “new” liberalism exists in profound contrast to a social, democratic, and interventionist liberalism of the mid-twentieth-century era. It is a philosophy of noninterference and of the triumphant individual, incorporating notions of freedom and autonomy across scales, from the individual human body to global corporations. The imagined neoliberal world is one of purity and flow, a world of perfect individuals and markets engaging and contracting with each other, unobstructed by the depredations of the state. The end of history for Fukuyama and his numerous neoliberal compadres means the final moment of evolution in the Hegelian sense of a progressive development of political and economic institutions. In this contemporary picture, the “liberal” national state of the Keynesian moment will be transcended and surpassed by the “neoliberal” postnational state of the global era. Economic globalization, finally made possible through the perseverance of *laissez-faire* capitalism’s dynamic and inexorable motion, will mean the end of old, static, and socially proscribed traditions and practices, and the beginning of a new world order.

But wait. If for a moment we remove ourselves to a less lofty vantage point, that of a small city on one edge of the former British Empire, this assumed neoliberal future becomes a little more dubious. In 1989 this city was transforming almost before

our eyes from a provincial backwater, an achingly beautiful yet placid city, into a global metropolis, a gateway between West and East. In this year, just one year after the Hong Kong property magnate Li Ka-Shing purchased the former Expo '86 lands for a negligible sum, property in Vancouver, British Columbia, was the hottest real estate in the world.<sup>3</sup> It was a city on fire.

In 1989, Vancouver was rapidly and unceremoniously swept into a "progressive process of planetary integration" or, if not that, certainly into a new form of global currency. But there was trouble brewing in paradise—over changes in house styles and house prices and who was moving in next door, over landscapes and tree removal and the cost of renting an apartment, over neighborhood character and zoning amendments, and over who was making the decisions about these things and why. Minor troubles perhaps in the greater panworld vision of progressive planetary embrace, but in this book I show how these erstwhile local and confined tactics and struggles over the production of space matter, and matter in some large ways.

The main argument in this book runs along the following lines: certain kinds of global flows—for example, the flows of wealthy transnational migrants and their capital—are central to neoliberal state formations but also are deeply disruptive to national liberal, social, and political narratives as they have developed and become embedded through time in the crusty layers of urban social life. As a result, deep and abiding tensions have developed between state practices that facilitate these flows and render them abstract in rhetorical and spatial terms, and national norms that relate to the localized, territorial, and embodied practices and understandings of urban civil society. In Canada these tensions manifest some of the problems neoliberal politicians and planners have encountered when trying to roll out a new vision of warm planetary embrace, only to be caught in the sticky geographical banalities of everyday life.

Between Hong Kong and Vancouver in the final two decades of the twentieth century, there was a movement of people and capital unprecedented in scope.<sup>4</sup> This movement was part of a vast emigration of middle-class and wealthy Chinese residents out of Hong Kong and into a number of cities worldwide, a direct

consequence of the pending transfer of British colonial control to China in 1997. Two key events spurred the outflow of both people and capital: first, the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984, which indicated to the world that the transition to mainland-Chinese control would actually occur; and second, the massacre of students and workers at Tienanmen Square in 1989, which indicated that this transition would not take place without considerable human and financial costs. One key event directed many of the wealthiest among this group to Canada. This was the initiation of a new immigration law entitling those with capital or business experience to skip processing queues, procure landed-immigrant status, and “join” the greater Canadian community without the usual hurdles and aggravating bureaucratic delays.<sup>5</sup>

In the process of moving into and working through the urban spaces of Canadian society, the Hong Kong immigrant entrepreneurs challenged the implicit assumptions of British liberalism as they were adapted and transformed in Canada. Because of the vast wealth and cosmopolitan savvy of many of the immigrants who landed in Vancouver, they were able to contest, both discursively and by their very nonwhite presence in white neighborhoods, many of the normative assumptions of what constituted Canadian liberalism and national identity.<sup>6</sup> They also challenged, implicitly and explicitly, national narratives of tolerance, rationality, universality, normality, and harmony associated with legitimacy and consent in governance, narratives foundational to the premise of a liberal Western nation.

These challenges were conspicuous and had some purchase in society primarily because of the privileged economic position of the immigrants, which made them simultaneously symbolic “carriers” of capital and also much more visible and powerful than poor migrants. In a lengthy exegesis on the problem of ideology in Marx’s thought, Stuart Hall discussed the invisibility of certain key moments of the circuit of capital owing to the fetishization of the market and the lack of linguistic concepts and categories that might lend insight into the production process as a whole.<sup>7</sup> I argue that, in complex ways, the heretofore “invisible” workings of certain aspects of the circuits of capital in Vancouver were rendered visible (*vis-à-vis* the practical consciousness

of the residents) as a result of the spatial practices and presence of the Hong Kong immigrants, who were positioned as the ultimate vectors of fast capital. This sudden visibility forced Canadian residents to consider more fully the repercussions of the state's neoliberal agenda, which facilitated the creation of a spaceless, free-flowing, giant enterprise zone, especially with the booming Pacific Rim economies. At the same time, it exposed the limits of many taken-for-granted liberal assumptions in Canadian society, as well as the rapid hemorrhaging of liberalism's twentieth-century welfarist protections, as residents, politicians and immigrants simultaneously clashed over the meanings and implementation of liberalism *and* neoliberalism in space.

Documenting in detail the transformation of space and consciousness in a particular urban environment makes it possible to understand the tightly interwoven relationship between socioeconomic change, urban spatial transformation, and the narratives and practices of contemporary regimes of governance. As developers, long-term residents, politicians, and the Hong Kong Chinese immigrants struggled over the local and national spaces of Canadian society, liberalism was literally contested in the streets. What Uday Mehta calls the "synaptic links in liberal thinking" were thereby exposed, straining conscious thought "to the point where liberals [were] forced to bring to mind what otherwise remained unconscious."<sup>8</sup> The sotto voce language of reason, tolerance, and normality could no longer obscure the inherent exclusions and limitations within the narratives of multiculturalism, urban land governance, democracy, domesticity, and other touchstones of Western liberalism. The "wrong" bodies in the "wrong" places forced the whole panoply of ideological apparatuses out into the open. They rendered visible and public, for a time, what had formerly remained implicit, private, and assumed. The global and transnational nature of these particular "unfamiliar" bodies was crucial in this disruptive moment.

However, the economically liberal rhetoric of private property and individual rights expressed by many of the upper-class immigrants from Hong Kong provided a critique of contemporary Canadian civil society from a position that was by no means disruptive to the state's deepening neoliberal agenda. Thus, while many liberal social conventions of the twentieth century were shown

to mask ongoing racial inequities stemming from their historical provenance in British liberal thought, the *class-based* inequities of early economic liberalism were generally strengthened with the arrival of these immigrant-entrepreneurs. Contemporary social liberalism in Canada became vulnerable to the challenges posed by the wealthy and middle-class immigrants for two reasons: first, the constitution of the early British liberalism of Locke, the Mills, Macaulay, Maine, and Bentham as a fundamentally exclusionary and aggressive doctrine (despite its stance of inclusive neutrality);<sup>9</sup> second, the increasingly visible sedimentation of those exclusions and aggressions in space. The immigrants' and long-term residents' struggles over space highlighted the tension between an economically based global agenda of *economic* liberalism, harkening back to the earliest conceptualizations of the term, and a more recent national narrative of *social* liberalism, deriving from the context of twentieth-century welfarism and the claims of contemporary citizenship.

As is probably already evident, this book engages with a number of disparate literatures. My intention is not to intervene abstractly in philosophical debates, but to juxtapose my empirical work with those debates and bring them into tension with each other. If you ask me what is the object of my work, like Hall, "the object of the work is to always reproduce the concrete in thought—not to generate another good theory, but to give a better theorized account of concrete historical reality. This is not an antitheoretical stance. I need theory in order to do this. But the goal is to understand the situation you started out with better than before."<sup>10</sup> In addition, the theoretical frames that interest me most—those relating to liberalism and neoliberalism, transnationalism and globalization, and hegemony—are not literatures customarily put into conversation with each other, and certainly do not often engage with space in more than a metaphorical sense. In this work I ask how new kinds of transnational movements are putting pressure on liberal aspirations and self-conceptions—in particular, how the "spacelessness" of classical liberal thought (one of the cornerstones of *neoliberalism*) is challenged through the production of space by "outsiders" who play by a slightly different and unfamiliar set of rules. I also want to juxtapose the question of hegemony with the facts of globalization, to ask what

happens to our conceptualization of hegemony when it is no longer contained by the traditional nation format.<sup>11</sup> Finally, I take the question of space to heart. I consider through an emphasis on the interrelations of spatial scales how space (or its crucial absence) is deeply insinuated in the practices and policies of all varieties of liberal thought.

Aihwa Ong has engaged with similar themes in her thought-provoking book *Flexible Citizenship*, which documented the movements of wealthy Chinese transnationals and the shifting structures of power/knowledge in late capitalism.<sup>12</sup> While insightful and erudite with respect to questions of contemporary globalization, governmentality, deterritorialization, and the formation of alternative modernities, her narrative gives somewhat less attention to the processes of subjectivity formation for the transnational migrants themselves. Few locatable subjects are given much ethnographic substance or differentiation based on gender, class fraction, or urban and regional context. This lack leads to a different set of emphases in Ong's work.

For example, Ong's discussion of liberalism reflects this dearth of differentiated actors who form (or do not form) various kinds of social movements, who are divided (or not divided) by various kinds of class fractions or national origins or linguistic differences, and who resist (or do not resist) macro structures of authority. She writes of liberalism not as a political philosophy but as "an art of government" that includes an "array of rationalities whereby a liberal government attempts to resolve problems of how to govern society as a whole."<sup>13</sup> Through this privileging of the top-down, *state control* of philosophies such as liberalism, Ong becomes less attentive to the wide varieties of actually existing liberalism; the paradoxical tendencies between and struggles over economic, political, and social liberalism as they have developed through time and become encrusted in space and memory; and the different rhetorics and narratives of liberalism employed by the "subjects" of liberalism—people who live and work in cities that matter to them.<sup>14</sup> As with much of the literature on governmentality, the work produces an overly generalized and seamless account of a historical epoch, one that downplays the ambiguity and contingency of liberal and neoliberal projects and elides the messy actualities of resistance and rule.

As I show in this work, the spatial struggles over urban formation in Vancouver are directly implicated in the larger philosophical questions of regime change and of whose liberal “logic” becomes dominant. Clashes over which variety of liberalism takes precedence are rarely, if ever, decided by state decree, or by the outcome of regulatory strategies designed by the state to persuade its populations of the superiority of a particular kind of logic. The interesting ethnographic question to pursue, from my perspective, is not how subjects *adapt to* the contemporary problematics of time-space compression and transnational modalities. Rather it is how the *actions of* individual agents who negotiate the contradictory structures of late modernity consolidate and contest different logics of liberalism in space.

In this book I also engage with the question of transnationalism and its impact on national narratives and spaces. The spatial stretching across borders of transnational life is often theorized as one form of a national deterritorialization of both space and memory, leaving behind it a liberal policy vacuum that is then easily filled with the global-babble of neoliberalism. I argue instead that “respatialization” may be a more accurate term than “deterritorialization”: it indicates a back-and-forth reworking of spatial arrangements and associated hegemonies, rather than a single, seemingly autonomous event in time and space (a space that is generally metaphorically framed, moreover). Framing the disjunctures of late modernity in terms of deterritorialization, as does the work of Appadurai, neglects the ways that processes of reterritorialization nearly always occur in conjunction with deterritorialization, and often serves to further entrench the project of global neoliberalism.<sup>15</sup> But more than this, it also positions hegemony (and counter-hegemonies) at the scale of the nation, rather than embracing a more Gramscian understanding of the multiple scales and spheres in which hegemonies are nourished and maintained. Although Appadurai intends to merely call attention to the spaces of potential intervention in hegemonic national narratives, the generally celebratory tone he employs throughout *Modernity at Large* indicates the desire to herald these deterritorializing disjunctures as the premier sites of resistance in a postnational era. Further, as Sparke points out, despite the use of

the suffix “-scape” to describe five key disjunctures of the contemporary moment, the actual “land-scape” that serves as their referent is notably absent—aside from the usual ubiquitous but anemic spatial metaphors.<sup>16</sup>

Abstracting away from the specific contexts in which deterritorialization occurs limits the theorist’s ability to chart shifting practices of deterritorialization and *re*territorialization under the advance of neoliberalism. Abstract analyses also tend to privilege macro formations that relate to state or economic articulations and dearticulations rather than examining the particular socio-cultural configurations of power/knowledge that constitute and maintain them at a smaller scale. For example, as numerous scholars have discussed in recent years, an awareness of the social construction of scale gives insight into the manifold ways that different levels of governance are fluid and interlinked, and can morph into each other or “jump” from one to the other under certain conditions. Most research on scale emphasizes the role of the territorial state in the production of scalar fixes for capital, showing how and why the dominant scale of governance switches from national to local or supranational scales in periods of crisis.<sup>17</sup> Recent work by Marston, however, supplements this production-centered research by examining the ways in which social reproduction and consumption are also key processes in the construction of scale.<sup>18</sup>

Instead of focusing on the manner in which the state regulates and reconfigures scale for the purposes of capital accumulation, a focus that tends to position the state as unilinear and somewhat homogeneous, Marston emphasizes the multiple forces that constitute the state and affect its tactics and targets. One of the crucial ongoing factors for any given territorial state is legitimacy, which comes not only from the economic realm, such as effective capitalist management, but also from the cultural sphere, wherein the narratives of the nation predominate. Using a historical example from the progressive era in the United States, Marston demonstrates how women’s struggles for collective consumption entitlements in the city eventually led to a shift in both the material practices and the ideological discourse of social service provisioning by the state. Employing a discourse of maternalism and

domesticity, the women successfully challenged the prior legitimizing narratives of capital and altered, in significant ways, the practices of the state vis-à-vis the politics of scale.

This framing of scale construction with an eye toward the hegemonic, as played out in particular context-specific struggles over space, extends the question of state deterritorialization from a purely economic one to a more complicated examination of the ways that the state must negotiate the cultural tensions inherent in any liberal, democratic, and plural society. At the same time, it is a reminder that hegemonic formations can be actively unraveled by the collective agency of groups who manage, for a time, to articulate their desires in a configuration of power that works—that is to say, that effectively challenges normative understandings of state-society relations. That these interventions are in no way automatically progressive merely because they intervene in dominant narratives of nation or gender or race should be understood from the start. Indeed, as Marston made clear, the women who successfully fought for their rights to the city did so on the backs of immigrants and other minorities.

In this book I regard the literal spatial positioning, movements, and struggles of actors as integral to the conceptual analysis: first, of how neoliberalism is both entrenched and resisted; and second, of how modern liberal notions of reason, progress, equality, and tolerance become used as rhetorical tactics in this larger hegemonic battle. The question of race is an abiding concern of my analysis, reflecting its prominence in debates about the exclusions inherent within liberalism, as well as the actual physical spaces of inclusion and exclusion in cities and nations. Race is also shown here as a discursive construction employed strategically by different actors, including those who have been, and continue to be, racialized by dominant groups. The “self-orientalizing” moves by some Chinese immigrants were part of these discursive tactics;<sup>19</sup> they helped to dislodge cultural representations that had become naturalized and fixed spatially over time.<sup>20</sup> As mentioned earlier, however, although these reframing strategies may have actively worked to reorganize the landscape and thus intervened in dominant representations of race, place, and nation, they were not *necessarily* progressive agendas, and in fact often helped to entrench regressive socioeconomic formations such as neoliberalism.<sup>21</sup>

This work, then, is a spatial ethnography in the strongest sense, where space and the sedimented histories of life are not just theoretical variables but actively constitute what happens, how, and why.<sup>22</sup> In the following sections I touch on some of the theoretical literatures pertinent to this ethnography.

## TRANSNATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

Transnationalization is one feature of the globalizing trends of the last few decades. These trends embrace changes in the systems of world governance, including the proliferation of regional and cross-border trade agreements and pacts, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a so-called “new world order.” They are also evident in economic shifts that involve the nature of capitalism as a global socioeconomic system, especially new geographies of production, trade, and consumption, the accelerating flows of capital and labor, the rise of new kinds of commodity flows, and the increasing polarization of wealth on both macro (geographic) and micro (household) scales.<sup>23</sup>

All of these processes were clearly evident to some degree in different historical epochs of the past, especially the end of the nineteenth century (although Abu-Lughod dates many of these processes as far back as the thirteenth century).<sup>24</sup> But what most globalization theorists argue is that in terms of the scale of transnational networking, the extension of global ties across space, the density of international relationships and partnerships, the economic concentration of wealth and power, and the general cultural awareness and ecumenality of society, contemporary globalization does indeed herald something new.<sup>25</sup> For people living through this historical moment, the *experience* of everyday life is qualitatively different.<sup>26</sup>

One of the reasons for the deeply visceral “experience” of globalization for many lies not just in the actual material changes of society but also in the inescapable rhetoric that has accompanied them. The narrative of globalization is so ubiquitous and relentless that it has taken on a life of its own and seems to be an actor that does things to people. Globalization thus is seen to cause people to lose their jobs and to become displaced from their homes. It is an alienated force that creates unemployment and

dispossession. Because it is personless, however, this force can never be directly confronted. The narrative of globalization as agent thus releases corporations from responsibility and serves as a useful strategy for them in countering local resistance to unpopular managerial decisions. Beck writes of this common tactic: "All around, one hears the assertion that it is not corporate interests but 'globalization' which forces this or that painful break with the past. One of the 'laws' of the global market is that not-A must be done in order to achieve A: for example, that jobs must be axed or relocated in order to keep jobs safe where they are."<sup>27</sup>

Thus, although there are clearly a growing set of interdependencies between nations and regions, there is also a vast ideological apparatus associated with promoting the *idea* of interdependence. Further, the crucial aspect of this rhetoric of interdependence is not political (hence the current U.S. dismissiveness toward the United Nations and indeed any form of multilateralism), but *economic*. The rhetoric of globalism is the rhetoric of world market domination and the ostracizing, if not extermination, of all forms of government based on any alternative to this goal. Political action in other directions, especially in the realm of social reproduction, is attacked as diminishing the effectiveness, logic, and rationality of the laissez-faire marketplace.<sup>28</sup>

In this book I am interested in both the actual, material implications of transnational flows and networking, but also in the hegemonic production of and resistance to an ideology of world market domination, otherwise known as neoliberalism. It is the combination of the discursive framing of neoliberal globalization as necessary, inevitable, and beneficial, alongside the growth of global interdependencies in areas ranging from production, trade, finance and migration to cosmopolitan consciousness, ethno-scapes, the media, and culture, that makes contemporary globalization unique to this historical moment. Scholars of migration patterns, production complexes, and financial markets have pointed to the intricate, well-established linkages established between nations for centuries and claimed that globalization is just an old game with a few new tricks up its sleeve.<sup>29</sup> But even if we discount the differences in scale and volume of these historical connections, the overdetermined complex of multiple

threads coming together, including the discursive, constitutes a new formation with a new logic that is qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, different from the articulations of the past.<sup>30</sup>

Holding in mind this material-discursive conjunction helps illuminate the ways in which the inexorable rhetoric of “globalization” has helped entrench the form of governance now known as neoliberalism. It also points to the sites of slippage when the rhetoric cannot hold, and where resistance gains ground.<sup>31</sup> In this work, I examine the literal sites in which the rhetoric of an inevitable and invincible neoliberal form of globalization is used to promote specific kinds of policies related to the production and dispensation of urban land. I also look at the actual places and moments when these discursive constructions are contested or fail, as counter-hegemonies are employed that call on notions of the liberal nation and the rooted, stable, and compassionate city.

One of the most important threads in the globalization tapestry of my narrative is the globalization of production and the attendant spatial shifts of both people and organizational processes. Shifting trends in the organization of production show the growing importance of transnational corporations (TNCs), and an increased “stretching of corporate activity and business networks across the world’s major economic regions.” They also demonstrate the prominence of TNCs in “organizing and managing cross-border business activity through the ownership of plants, outlets or subsidiaries in different countries.”<sup>32</sup> Transnational corporations have been able to rapidly move both jobs and productive complexes to the lowest-cost regions of the world. This ability—combined with the computer-aided capacity to break down the production process into numerous different components, and then to research, design, manufacture, integrate, fabricate, and harmonize these different components in different parts of the world—has led to significant changes both in production patterns and in migration streams and migrant ways of life.

Contemporary global production has given transnational corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises, and their managerial elite far greater latitude in the establishment of different sites of productive activity *and* reproductive leisure. While the structural division of labor in the production of particular commodities has been well documented, the new types of divisions

between production and reproduction have not received as much attention.<sup>33</sup> Both laborers and the owners and executives of businesses and corporations have often been required to move vast distances between the site of home and family, and the site of production. This kind of transnational movement of labor, including managerial labor, is an essential component of the globalization of production. There is relatively little choice for most manual and domestic laborers, who must move between nations polarized by differences in wealth and employment opportunities, and whose sites of social reproduction remain the cities in which they were born and where the bulk of their families remain. But for most entrepreneurs and executives, there is choice on both fronts: in the site of investment and in the site of family life. As Beck notes vis-à-vis transnational corporate choice: "In the manufactured and controlled jungle of global production, they are able to *decide for themselves their investment site, production site, tax site and residence site*, and to play these off against one another. As a result, top executives can live where it is nicest to live, and pay taxes where it is cheapest."<sup>34</sup>

The movements of both laborers and owner/executives between sites of production and social reproduction across national borders caused scholars and politicians in the early 1990s to "reconceptualize the nature of immigration, and to create a new vocabulary and theory to describe the transnational connections of contemporary immigrants."<sup>35</sup> They began to refer to the new immigrants as transmigrants, and to their lives as transnational. With the term "transnational," migration scholars were indicating a dynamic of migration and of migrant lives that was multi-local, often associated with a separation between the realms of production and social reproduction.

Transmigrant laborers generally work and settle in highly industrialized countries such as the United States, Canada, Germany, England, or Denmark; at the same time, however, they travel "home" frequently, communicate with those left behind on a weekly or daily basis, buy property and build houses and schools there, and send money and gifts back to family members.<sup>36</sup> They thus can be conceptualized as living within a network or "social field" that extends across national borders, and in which their actions and thoughts can be seen to be *simulta-*

*neously* connected and involved with more than one nation at once.<sup>37</sup> While producing goods or services in the advanced economies of the world, transmigrant laborers remain connected to their less developed "homeland" through various reproductive functions, often continuing to raise and educate children there, take care of elderly parents, receive medical attention and recover from illness and stress. They also often expect to retire to or die in their country of origin. For many transmigrants, this relationship is not just material in terms of these personal ties, but extends to a deeply felt nationalism that revolves around a desire to obtain justice for the homeland, which has been shut out of the cornucopia of global wealth and its concomitant displays of dignity and respect.<sup>38</sup>

The technological innovations of jet planes, electronic banking, television, email, home videos, and especially transatlantic phone service facilitated this form of simultaneous living; as physical distances were increasingly collapsed, migrants were able to participate more fully in the social, political and economic activities of more than one national site. In numerous empirical case studies, migrants have been shown to live fully and actively in two nations, and often to conduct business, politics, and family affairs in both.<sup>39</sup>

But while this growing body of research has aided our understanding of the transnational lives of migrant laborers, there is less scholarly output on the movements of transnational entrepreneurs and executives.<sup>40</sup> This lack of attention is especially significant because of the important question of *choice* in sites of production and reproduction. Members of the transnational laboring class have relatively little choice with respect to the site of either their productive activity or their reproductive "home." This is not the case for the transnational elite, however, who are often able to strategically manipulate or evade the regulatory systems of state borders and systems of governance, and who also are, more often than not, able to purchase citizenship in more than one locale.<sup>41</sup> With this increased flexibility, the transnational elite can choose their site of investment *and* the site in which they intend to raise a family, get an education for their children, rest, receive medical care, and retire. I believe that the spatial splitting of production and social reproduction and the

question of choice in this area have great ramifications for the social and political, as well as the economic, realms of sending and receiving societies.

In the last two to three decades, especially in the economies of greater China, the internationalization of production has been greatly augmented by the incorporation of small and medium-sized enterprises that operate autonomously and within the larger TNC production and distribution networks.<sup>42</sup> Most transnational Chinese investors and entrepreneurs from Hong Kong choose productive sites for their factories in southern China.<sup>43</sup> For many of this group, one of the premier sites for social reproduction has been Canada. With its reputation for quality in the areas of education, health care, and the environment, and with a history of migration from southern China and Hong Kong, as well as the incentive of the Business Immigration Program, Canada became an extremely attractive destination for numerous wealthy business migrants from Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>44</sup>

As I show throughout this book, the spatial splitting of production and reproduction was important in constituting a particular outlook and set of priorities for the migrants and their families, as well as in their general social and economic reception in Canada.<sup>45</sup> The business immigrants and their families were quite literally brought into the society on the basis of their economic "worth," and were expected to deliver on that value in their new home. As we shall see, however, their differing ways of understanding and being in the world, based in part on this economic worldview, were bitterly contested in the battles over the logic of liberalism as manifested in the production and reproduction of the Vancouver landscape and its associated institutions of governance.

## SITUATING NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY IN GLOBAL SPACE

After nearly a decade of reading, teaching, and writing, I keep coming back to the question of hegemony. How does the social thinking of a particular historical bloc come to form the dominant mode of understanding how the world works, and how is this a fundamentally spatial question? More to the point, I am inter-

ested in how this social thinking can change. What are the processes by which new conceptions arise? How exactly does collective consciousness shift? Why do the events of particular historical moments bring about deep ruptures in dominant political thought and argument, and lead to new articulations and alliances?

In most contemporary discussions of hegemonic production there remains a primarily *abstract* use of the sites or “spaces” of society, and a general privileging of the historical over the spatial.<sup>46</sup> History clearly establishes the temporal layers on which subsequent hegemonic formations are established. But hegemonic formations are also made in the production of, movement through, and representation of space. The sites of spatial securing, the “spaces” of civil society or the state, are concrete, lived, and produced spaces. Hegemony is made not just in time, but also in space—in the taken-for-grantedness of bodies in specific places, what those bodies are, what those places are, and how they constitute and define each other. Every future moment of hegemonic formation is affected by the spaces of the past. And they are spaces produced and reproduced at different scales. This is a key point, because the widely assumed locus of hegemonic formation is in the institutional spaces of the state, but the idea of the fixed state as an implicit territorial container of these concrete spaces is an outmoded one. This political transformation has vast implications for how we need to rethink hegemony.

Althusser, for example, located hegemonic formation primarily in state institutions. He found the workings of ideology in the material, concrete practices of schools, family policy, laws, and so on.<sup>47</sup> Hall widened his theoretical catchment area to include the institutions of “civil society,” arguing that authority won *outside* the state could be especially important for establishing legitimacy *for* the state.<sup>48</sup> Both these theorists, however, implicitly located state and civil society practices within “the nation.” The primary story of the articulation of power in relation to the state was the story of institutional practices (associated with the state either directly or indirectly) contained within a physically defined national territory. This scholarly story made sense vis-à-vis the ideas and practices of most modern nation-states, where the nation was equated with a contained physical territory, and the idea of fixed containment was absolutely central to national

narratives. But what if the state and civil society and even its citizens' practices extended beyond the national territory, as they do now? Globalization and transnational processes have produced major disjunctures for the state, where bodies moving outside the national territory must be "governed" by state practices in new ways. "The conception of a *national* community of citizens, made up of male breadwinners and female domestic workers, has been usurped by a new understanding in which not only are firms to be entrepreneurial, enterprising and innovative, but so too are political subjects."<sup>49</sup> These new political subjects are not just autonomous entrepreneurial actors, but are now fundamentally *unmoored* from previous discursive regimes relating to the physical territory of the nation-state.

What does this do to theories of hegemony? The first thing to consider is the distinction between the state and its practices, and the nation and its territory. Civil society, for the most part, has been unthinkingly equated with *national* society, with the institutions and practices of people located within the territorial borders of the nation-state. Stuart Hall's discussion of the rise of the neoliberal discourse of Thatcherism, for example, showed how numerous institutions of civil society helped to promote many of the supremely nationalist ideologies that coalesced to form the hegemonic bloc of Thatcherism—"nation before class, the organic unity of the English people, the coincidence between the 'English genius' and traditionalism," not to mention the profound media hype surrounding the Falklands/Malvinas War.<sup>50</sup> The question to ask is not whether the equation of civil society with national society worked, as Thatcherism clearly pervaded an entire decade, but whether this particular moment of suturing, this type of hegemonic articulation, could work again.

I believe that the hegemonic formation underpinning Thatcherism was able to succeed so dramatically because of the particular context in which state practices and national narratives could, for a time, coalesce. With the increasing imperative from business to transcend state borders, a transcendence materialized and visible in contemporary flows of money and migrants, the coalescence broke apart. This came to a particular *dénouement* at Maastricht, where the contradictions between the world of high finance, with its strong advocacy of closer links with the

European Union, and the world of nationalist, territorialist rhetoric (expressed most loudly during the Falklands/Malvinas War) became painfully apparent and led ultimately to Prime Minister Thatcher's downfall.

The ways that power coalesces in relation to the state (with, against, and around it) have changed dramatically in the past three decades and are continuing to transform in relation to contemporary globalizing forces. Cities, for example, are now positioned in a different functional role vis-à-vis both the state and the global economy. In the neoliberal vision, cities, as Jessop noted, are now perceived as key "engines of economic growth," as well as centers of innovation and crucial galvanizing forces of entrepreneurialism and competition. They are also envisaged as "managing the interface between the local economy and global flows, between the potentially conflicting demands of local well-being and those of international competitiveness, and between the challenges of social exclusion and global polarization and the continuing demands of liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and so on."<sup>51</sup> The spaces of cities are the spaces where the hegemonic struggles over liberalism are now being fought. Whose liberalism? Whose hegemony? The socially revisionist liberalism of "well-being" or the neoliberal mantra of "international competitiveness"? There are clearly new alliances, new struggles, new forms of subject formation, new forms of consciousness, new narratives, and new and ongoing imperatives to rework the ever-shifting articulations of state and nation, and nation and city. The disjunctures between neoliberal state practices and national or urban narratives of social liberalism, for example, create a rent in the fabric, a tear in the sutures, a moment where the taken-for-granted becomes suddenly visible.

But the question remains, When do people understand and act on these visible disjunctures and contradictions? How does the collective thinking of a society *shift*? This, as Hall succinctly put it, is "the problem of understanding how already positioned subjects can be effectively detached from their points of application and effectively *repositioned* by a new set of discourses."<sup>52</sup> It is the problem of thinking about change, the transformation of both subjectivity and society. The study of hegemony begins, for me, with the understanding of change as not just possible, but constitutive

of hegemonic formations. Indeed, not only is the process one of change and of tendencies rather than of final moments, but also it is clearly not a linear process, nor is the formation of counter-hegemonies necessarily progressive. Hegemony is not so easily produced or maintained by conservative forces as its theoretical legacy seems to bear witness; the acquiescence of dominated groups to their own subordination is always uneven, fragmented, and partial.

How then shall we theorize hegemony, if we take as a starting point its fundamentally unessential character, its processual nature, its dialectical constitution and shifting, chameleonlike qualities? The concept loses coherence without a sense of domination and subordination, a domination whereby an elite group wins and maintains power not by force but through the acquiescence of the subordinated group. This acquiescence is based primarily on the insistent and inexorable effects of numerous unequal institutional apparatuses in society that take on the characteristic of the self-evident, the normal, and the correct. Further, these institutions, and the unequal values they embody and uphold, become a concrete, material part of the social world inhabited by both the dominant and subordinate, and thus become part of the everyday practices and lifeworld experiences of these groups in a mutually reaffirming cycle. Hegemony thus can be thought of as an interconnected system or formation where "specific distributions of power and interest" are related to "the whole social process."<sup>53</sup>

Most contemporary theorists would not quibble with this as a starting point, but there is considerable disagreement as to exactly how this acquiescence works. It seems to me that much of this disagreement arises from the tensions between theorizations that rely primarily on abstractions, and those that apply to particular cases. Even within the corpus of Marx's work there is a tension between the early pronouncements of *The German Ideology* and the empirically detailed analysis of *The Eighteenth Brumaire*. As examples, here are a few sentences from the former work: "As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their produc-