Introduction

OUR GUARDIANS

GUARDIANS are the armed citizens, police and military, who protect their unarmed fellow citizens. What is important (and, perhaps, curious) is that although they possess the potential to oppress, guardians instead serve. Why do they do so? How are we guarded from our guardians?¹

The power of the U.S. military is unparalleled. Its reach is global; its weaponry is expensive and lethal; and at senior levels, officers’ salaries and status are substantial. In general, the public and media accord the military respect, for although there are monitors and critics of the military, they are more likely to pay attention to waste and excess than to complain about actual or potential oppression.

One safeguard against oppression is the fact that our military is used almost exclusively outside the United States. Another is the military’s division into services—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines—and these services’ further division into active-duty, guard, and reserve components. Rapid rotation of assignments also prevents our guardians from developing independent bases of power. Perhaps the most important factor, though, is the education of our guardians.

GUARDIAN EDUCATION

Plato believed that the education of guardians was so important that he devoted most of The Republic to a detailed account of what he believed would be their ideal education. In that classic, Plato proposed a program that began in the womb and continued until age fifty. It included physical, intellectual, military, moral, and practical education. It also specified that guardians accept the wisdom and direction of a “philosopher-king” (or kings). The guardians, then, protected the citizenry, but they did not make rules for them. Their role was limited to applying force when and as directed.
U.S. military officers also receive a good deal of physical, intellectual, military, moral, and practical education. This begins not in the womb but before induction, at a military academy (West Point, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy); through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at a civilian college or university; or at Officer Candidate School (OCS).\(^2\) Specialty training occurs shortly after induction and recurs throughout an officer’s career. In about the tenth year of service, an officer who plans to make the military a career attends a command and general staff college that emphasizes the planning and execution of large and complex military operations. In about the twentieth year of service, selected officers attend a war college where they learn to manage even larger operations and to think strategically.

It is important to note that the curriculum at a war college is not solely concerned with the application of force. Officers also learn how military strategy fits into a more inclusive national-security strategy, and they learn how to work with and advise civilian leaders. The war-college year is intended to prepare war fighters and to educate strategists.\(^3\) It melds training and education. It is the subject of this book.

The education of U.S. officers differs from that of Plato’s guardians in one important way. Instead of being trained to accept the direction of a philosopher-king who has successfully completed guardian training, demonstrated superior wisdom, and forsworn the pleasures of both private property and family, a U.S. officer is taught to take direction from a civilian commander-in-chief whose authority comes solely from electoral victory. Apart from reaching age thirty-five and being native-born, political success is the only requirement for becoming president and, hence, commander-in-chief. The U.S. commander-in-chief can be ignorant of, or even opposed to, the military. His or her personal and political values and behavior can be antithetical to those of the officer corps. She or he may give orders that officers believe are unethical or unwise. Thus, just as guardians possess a potential to act oppressively, there is also potential for a significant gap between the views of military officers and those of their leaders who may or may not be well informed and judicious.
CIVIL(IAN)–MILITARY RELATIONS

Legally, civilians control the military in the United States. Practically, they have done so, as well. The public does not worry about the military exercising a veto over policy issues; nor does it worry that the military might take over the government. This is true even though militaries elsewhere regularly take political and governmental action—sometimes even in countries that are ostensibly democratic. The phenomena of the armed obeying the unarmed and of the armed obeying directives with which it disagrees and directives that can lead to certain death seem counter-intuitive. That is why this volume will take as a recurring theme the content of military teaching about civil–military relations.

Those relations are most significant at senior levels, where professional interaction between officers and civilian officials is most likely to occur. The senior military leadership has a duty to advise its civilian “masters.” Although some critics may think that advising too easily becomes advocacy, or even insistence, advising involves more than staying silent until queried, then answering only what is asked. Further, officers have participated in long-term planning, for example, in weapons procurement. They must anticipate which policies are likely to be developed by civilian leaders—leaders who are not only not yet in office but may not even be regarded as candidates for office. In addition to advising and planning, military officers serve in, or as liaisons to, a number of executive agencies. They serve as attaches to embassies. Again, no sturdy fence separates senior military and civilian officials.

THE WAR COLLEGES

The war colleges are almost invisible institutions, but they are important because they offer the last formal, professional military education given to the officers who form the pool from which generals and most admirals are selected. One of the colleges’ important tasks is to take highly successful, disciplined, and focused officers and retool them for “the general.” This involves teaching them to recognize the frailty of firmly held beliefs, the limitations on resources, the fickleness of the political, the role of diplomacy and economics in security strategy; it also involves teaching them to weigh the lessons to be learned both from
history and from the latest technology. At the war colleges, officers with twenty years of experience learn even more about how to make war. But peace is a part of their curriculum, too.

**PEACE**

The founder of the Army War College, Elihu Root, said that the Army’s purpose was “not to promote war but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.”

Again, although there is always a good deal of talk about “killing people and breaking things” and about “fighting and winning the nation’s wars,” the military does not necessarily actually want to do these things. It does believe, though, that strength is a deterrent and hence a means to peace.

Over the past fifty years, the United States has participated in major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. It has fought a war in the Persian Gulf approved by the U.S. Congress and by the United Nations. It has invaded Panama and Grenada. It has fought proxy wars in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. But the “Big One”—the war with the Soviet Union—was never fought. It was prepared for, but it was deterred. The extent and expense of both sides’ preparations led to the coining of the phrase “the Cold War.” With the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union, that “war” is over. Peace has broken out. The military, the war colleges, and security specialists are having to retool and rethink. The question is: What do, and what should, soldiers study in the face of peace?

**AN OVERVIEW**

The first two chapters of this volume set the stage. Chapter 1 discusses the different purposes (missions), programs, and character of the Army’s sister war colleges. These are the College of Naval Warfare (commonly referred to as the Naval War College and the first of the war colleges), the Air War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College (created after World War II and intended to enhance cooperation among the services), and the new (and small) Marine War College. The differences among the services and among these schools are both substantial and significant. Chapter 2
provides a history of the Army War College from its inception to the mid-1980s.

The war colleges are a peculiar hybrid. They share many characteristics with civilian academic institutions: They have libraries and offer both required and elective courses; they feature guest lectures and collect student evaluations; some grant degrees. In other ways, the war colleges are distinctly military—and not just with regard to subject matter. Uniforms are prevalent; days are fully scheduled; and bodies are buff. The vital ingredients of a college are, of course, its students, its faculty, and its administrators. Thus, Chapter 3 takes U.S. Army War College (USAWC) students, a select and experienced group of (about) forty-year-old career officers, as its subject. Chapter 4 deals with USAWC faculty, who are largely active-duty officers and recent war-college students. They are not as schooled as civilian faculty, and instructional demands made on them are more onerous than those made on faculty at civilian institutions. USAWC administrators are the subject of Chapter 9. These include the commandant and his staff. War-college administrators are less autonomous than those in many civilian schools. Thus, the Army Chief of Staff, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense all may conduct reviews and give direction. So may the U.S. Congress. In each of these three chapters, attention will be given to the ways in which the war colleges are like, and the ways in which they are unlike, civilian institutions.

Chapter 5 offers a description of the Carlisle experience, including a chronological account of the events of the school year. Chapters 6–8 analyze the curricula presented to the USAWC’s class of 1985; its class of 1990; and a composite of the curricula presented to the classes of 1995, 1996, and 1997. Perhaps reflecting the author’s bias, more emphasis has been given to the courses taught by the departments concerned with leadership and strategy than to the courses offered by the department that concentrates on operations.

The concluding chapter pursues three themes. One concerns the tensions that exist within an institution that is both military and academic. The second considers what is taught and learned about civil–military relations at the senior level. The third involves the institution’s responsiveness to the end of the Cold War. What happened when strategic thinkers had to abandon their mantra of “Russia, Russia, Russia” and
shift to a consideration of the role of the military in peacetime? In 1997, as in 1897, the nation was secure and at peace. In 1997, however, the U.S. possessed a large, standing army stationed all over the globe. Our “defense” had become very “forward.”

Peace has not made things easier for the military and the war colleges. In fact, the USAWC’s response was to create a new, acronymized mantra, “VUCA, VUCA, VUCA.” VUCA is said to describe the new security environment and stands for “volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.” War-college administrators, faculty, and students know that even in peacetime they must attend to strategy, education, and curricula. Pentagon officials know that decisions must be made about weapons and technology. But neither the changed circumstances nor civilian authorities have provided the military much in the way of direction and definition. Being prepared is certainly the military’s mission. For what is something of a puzzle.
1 The War Colleges

Although this volume focuses on the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, senior military leaders are drawn from not one but six war colleges. Thus, it is important to provide an overview of those institutions and note how they differ from one another. One, the National War College, is a joint (multi, with no lead service) school. A second, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, is also joint, but it also has a significant number of civilian students and faculty. Both are included in the later discussion of war-college curricula. But first, in preparation for an account of the four service war colleges (Army, Naval, Air, Marine Corps), it is worth sketching the ways in which the services differ from one another. Just as “Africa” encompasses nations as different as Tunisia, Kenya, South Africa, and Senegal, so the word “military,” which refers to the services collectively, fails to reflect their differences. After a discussion of the missions and cultures of the various services, the curriculum offered at each of the Army’s sister war colleges will be reviewed.

Sorting Out the Services

Perhaps a story will help to set the stage. Jokes that distinguish the services from one another abound, but one of the most repeated goes as follows:

Four officers were ordered to “Secure the building.” The Naval officer turned out the lights and locked the door. The Army officer laid mines around the perimeter and posted sentries. The Marine officer ordered an assault. The Air Force officer tenured a lease with an option to buy.

Most civilians would recognize the Army officer’s green; the Navy officer’s black; the Air Force officer’s blue; and the Marine officer’s red, white, and blue uniforms. Most know the services’ different missions. The Army fights on land; the Navy on water; the Air Force in the air (and space); and the Marines from the Halls of Montezuma to the shores
of Tripoli. (Specifically, Marines mostly fight in areas where the land meets the sea.) A smaller number of civilians would be prepared to describe the services’ different cultures—cultures whose differences have been described as “profound, pervasive, and persistent.”

First, it must be remembered that all are “services.” Society has given members of the military the special responsibility of taking human life on behalf of society. Also, service members have the duty of risking their lives, and some have the additional duty of sacrificing their lives. Service members, then, are deeply committed to the nation and presumably to its values of liberty, democracy, and the free market—but, perhaps ironically, the cultures of none of the services are particularly free, democratic, or income maximizing. Thus, it could be said that military professionals are people willing to die for values that are not the ones by which they have chosen to live.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu tried to sum up the central value of different kinds of governments. For instance, he said, the core value of despotism was “fear”; that of a limited monarchy, “honor”; and that of a republic, “virtú.” Carl Builder tries to do the same for the services by describing their “altar for worship.” That of the Navy, he says, is tradition, and one of its strongest traditions is the independence and absolute power of a ship’s commander. Builder argues that the Air Force altar is technology, while that of the Army is service to “the nation and its citizens.”

The services have internal hierarchies as well as service altars. Within the Navy the carrier-based aviation community (especially tailhookers, pilots who fly on and off carriers) may hold the most clout. (Or they did until their infamous Las Vegas convention, at which female officers were manhandled and the Navy tried to cover up.) Then comes the submarine, and then the surface-warfare community. At the bottom of the hierarchy is mine warfare and support. This structure is quite rigid. Once one has been assigned to a kind of ship or plane in the Navy, one usually sticks with it. In the Air Force, the division and the hierarchy is simpler: There are pilots and non-pilots. There may be some rivalry between bomber (a strategic weapon) and fighter (a tactical weapon) pilots, but there is room for crossover among pilots, and some room for mavericks. The Army also has an apparently simple division: combat and non-combat. The combat branches—infantry, artillery, and armor (sometimes called cavalry and meaning tanks)—are the more honored and
risky branches, but Builder believes that Army officers acknowledge branch interdependence and accord one another more mutual respect than is true of the hierarchies of the Navy and Air Force.8

The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 was supposed to reduce rivalry and increase cooperation among the services. But competition has not been eliminated. Perhaps the most obvious way competition is displayed is in funding requests to Congress. In the budget arena the services compete head-on—and make rather consistent arguments on their own behalf. The Navy’s argument is almost always framed as the need for a certain number of ships. When he was Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., successfully called for the “600 ship navy.” Prodigiously expensive, that number was soon reduced to just 320 ships and 12 carriers. Builder calls the Navy the “hypochondriac of the services” and claims that its arguments rarely vary, no matter who is in charge, who is seen as the enemy, and what advances have been made in technology. In (slight) contrast, the Air Force makes its argument in terms of wings—that is, planes—but the Air Force’s numbers are not as stable as the Navy’s. To the Air Force, new and more marvelous can outweigh numbers.9 The Army talks about divisions or “end points” (people) in the Regular (not Guard or Reserve) Army, but its numbers fluctuate greatly between wartime and peacetime, and the Army expects this to happen. Only recently have the Abrams (tank), the Bradley (fighting vehicle), computer technology, and the panels studying the Army of the future brought technology to the fore in the Army’s budget discussions. In the past, Army officers’ pride has rested more with their soldiers and their skills than with their equipment. The Army’s job, the taking and controlling of territory, means that when it is in action, it will always require large numbers of people.

Builder suggests that the Army knows it is the core service—that it is indispensable.10 Moreover, the Army does not just “fight and win the nation’s wars.” It has long been akin to a handy man who does a variety of requested tasks. Thus, the Army ran the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in the 1930s; its engineers build levees and dams; it responds to natural disasters and to humanitarian emergencies; and it serves in noncombat tasks such as peacekeeping. The fact that the real variety of Army activities is not congruent with the narrow mission of “fighting and winning” is a matter of recurring discussion, and sometimes even of what one might call fretting.
The Air Force knows its firepower is relevant, but its legitimacy as an independent service is sometimes challenged by the fact that 1) the other services also have aviation, and 2) the Air Force cannot win a war alone. In contrast, the Navy’s existence as a separate service is measured in centuries. It is sure that when the site of warfare is water (which covers more than 70 percent of Earth), the mission is the Navy’s. However, the Navy’s significance is contested by the Air Force, which has a greater capacity to move troops, supplies, and equipment rapidly, as well as having enormous firepower.

Overall, the Army’s sense of security about its centrality and relevance, combined with its knowledge that all nations have always had armies, may have made it the most willing to act jointly, and even to contemplate unification. The Navy, which is as old as the Army, has great regard for its tradition, its independence, and the independence of its commanders. Since World War II, though, it has had to absorb aviation, nuclear power, and nuclear weapons. It has also found itself in competition with the Air Force for transportation and force projection assignments. The Air Force, the offspring of the Army, does not monopolize flight, but it savors new technology and argues that it provides “decisive” force. It has made much of its role in the Persian Gulf and in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where it used “smart” bombs in urban areas and conventional bombing on the battlefield. But air power has never settled a conflict. In every case, ground troops must take and hold terrain and organize any occupation.

Again, their different missions, histories, and cultures distinguish the services from one another. Builder claims that their differences are reflected even in something as abstract as analysis, where the Air Force is “sophisticated and elegant,” the Army is “ingenuous and credulous,” and the Navy is “suspicious and pragmatic.” Differences among services are also apparent in something as concrete as their war-college curricula.

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Naval War College is the oldest (1885) war college and is perceived as the most intellectual, the most academic. Its motto is in Latin, and, unsurprisingly, says “Victory through sea power.” Located on an island
in historic and scenic Newport, Rhode Island, the Naval War College enrolls students in four different schools: the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff (both for U.S. officers and some civilians), and the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College (for some sixty international officers).

The first president (not commandant) of the Naval War College, Stephen B. Luce, stated its mission: research on war, on statesmanship connected to war, and on the prevention of war. Luce appointed Alfred Thayer Mahan as one of his first four faculty; Mahan promptly published *The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660–1783*. The Influence quickly had a powerful and international influence on military thinking. Soon thereafter Mahan became the president of the college.

The Naval War College developed a reputation for war-gaming as early as 1887. (Its reputation has been sustained.) Closed during World War I, the college spent the years after that war and before World War II preparing (planning) for almost exactly the battles it would, in fact, fight in World War II. It has been said that the only two things not planned for were the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Japanese kamikaze (suicide) pilots. The Naval War College did not close during World War II, although the importance of attendance declined and continued to be low through the Vietnam era.

In the 1970s, the school underwent a dramatic transformation under the direction of Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner. It was then that the three areas of decision-making, strategy, and operations became the central elements of the curriculum. These remain the curriculum core to this day. About the same time, electives were introduced, and the Center for Advanced Research was established. In 1981, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) subsumed the Advanced Research Program for students, the Naval War College Press, and the War Gaming Department, thus drawing together all research programs.

The CNWS emphasizes research. Three departments offer the core curriculum in three blocs, each lasting about three months. The blocs are: National Security Decision Making, Strategy and Policy, and Joint Military Operations. The same subjects are taught by the same departments (but sequenced differently) at the (co-located) Command and Staff School. Both colleges are accredited to confer master of arts degrees in national security and strategic studies. Senior Naval officers have...
generally attended one of the two Newport schools, but not both. This has not been true of the other services, which see their command and staff and war colleges as sequential and each as necessary.

A typical academic year at the Naval War College is shown in Figure 1.

The National Security Decision Making unit is concerned with the relationship between military strategy and the national resources, economic, political, and organizational factors that affect military strategy and decision-making dynamics, especially under conditions of uncertainty. Attention is given to joint and coalition planning and to the use of reserve as well as regular units in the development of strategy. The unit concludes with a week-long strategy and force-planning exercise.

Prominent elements of the Strategy and Policy course are the study of strategists such as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, Corbett, Douhet, Mao, and, of course, Mahan; examination of historical cases such as the Peloponnesian War; and case studies of recent wars as well as scenarios for possible future wars. Special attention is given to the match between military strategy and political objectives, civil–military and coalition relationships, and assessment of the results of conflicts.
The final third of the core curriculum is devoted to joint military operations and to an examination of law—international, naval, and that of armed conflict. The course proceeds by examining concepts first, then moves to case studies and to application through war-gaming.

A wide range of electives is also offered, from “Negotiation for the Commanding Officer” to “Abraham Lincoln” and “Expeditionary Warfare.” One elective is taken each trimester. A small number of students are given permission to omit a trimester elective in order to focus on a research project.

The core is completed by two two-day conferences and a three-day Current Strategy Forum. In recent years, the two conferences have frequently taken professional ethics and the media as their topics. In 1999, though, a conference on civil–military relations was substituted for the media conference. The end-of-year Current Strategy Forum includes a number of civilian participants with a wide variety of experience.

Although the college is in a small town, the class does not have the unity one finds at some of the other schools, because only half the students enter together in the summer trimester. The remainder enter at the beginning of one of the other two trimesters.

Students do extensive reading; they prepare briefings; they write papers; they take exams; and they are graded. The best get honors. The atmosphere is very schoollike.

Approximately a third of the research faculty are civilians. More than 40 percent of the departmental faculty are civilians, and almost all of the civilians have Ph.D.s. Typically, civilian faculty have renewable appointments of one to four years, and military faculty have three-year assignments, the first year of which they spend as students. Seven core faculty have “indefinite” appointments. These factors give the Naval War College faculty more expertise and continuity than is characteristic of the other war colleges.

The Naval War College is recognizably an academic institution, and it is conducted as a college is conducted. It emphasizes that the curriculum is a “thinking curriculum” and that the faculty “owns” the curriculum. Paradoxically, while it is admired, attendance is not required for promotion to admiral. Getting to the top in the Navy still depends on going down to the sea in ships.
THE MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE

The Marine Corps does not have an academy of its own. It does not have an ROTC program of its own. It does have a war college of its own—well, sort of. It all began in 1989 with the founding of the Marine Corps University (at Quantico, Virginia), which was given responsibility for all Marine Corps professional military education. Almost at once (1990), the Marine Corps War College was founded and became an integral part of the university.22

When the Marine Corps’ War College catalogue says the student body is small, it means small. In 1997–98, in fact, there were six Marine, two Navy, two Air Force, and two Army students, for a total of twelve.23 These twelve students functioned as a unit for a full year—quite the opposite of the Naval War College.

“Academic Freedom” is given an extended discussion at the very beginning of the Catalog (p. 3).24 Also, all through its descriptive literature the Marine Corps War College emphasizes “original thought,” “new ideas,” “new concepts,” “innovative critical thinking,” and the freedom to “seek changes in academic and institutional policies.”25

The curriculum shown in Figure 2 and the education received by the Marine Corps War College students differ from those of the other colleges. First, not only does everyone do everything together, but the class is peripatetic: Students spend a fair amount of time on the road. For example, they go to Washington, D.C., to see Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs—and to a number of the combatant commands, as well. Also, a substantial part of the curriculum is focused on a variety of peacekeeping missions, activities that the Army also does but seems to be ambivalent about.

Further, everyone studies every region in the Regional Studies segment of the curriculum and attention is given not just to security, but also to economics, politics, and culture.26 And in General Studies, everyone takes the Executive Speaking Course, Economics, and the Total Quality Leadership class. Each student also prepares a research paper (“of publishable quality”), and that paper is developed in conjunction with a one-week internship in the private or governmental sector.

The goal is “holistic” understanding, and grading is done “holistically”—but competitively. Letter grades are given; only the top three in
each segment can expect to receive an “A.” The top two students overall (of twelve) are designated “Distinguished Graduates.”

“Active learning” is central to the program and includes field trips, discussions, tutorials, exercises, and war games. “Active preparation,” though, probably understates what is done by the faculty to create the situation for that learning. University faculty would be astounded at the planning that goes into the teaching of most war-college courses. Further, at the end of each course at the Marine War College, a formal review of every element of the course is conducted by an internal committee of seven, including a faculty member, a student, and administrators. Further, an external review is implemented that involves evaluation by alumni, senior Marine leaders, and others who employ the graduates.

Importantly, the first item for student evaluation is “Effectiveness of the College in imparting an atmosphere that fosters creative and open thought,” and the second is “Effectiveness of the College in providing an intellectual foundation from which to assess past, present, and future national and military strategies.” The Marine Corps wants thinkers from this group.
Again, the Marine Corps is an extraordinarily disciplined and directive institution. It is also highly organized. Its Marine Corps War College Standard Operating Procedures manuals make sure that there are few sins of omission in spite of staff and faculty turnover. Through this program, though, it tries to produce a small number of creative, yet pragmatic senior leaders. Its efforts to achieve “free” thinking in an “unfree” culture bear careful scrutiny. Does its year of intensity, of immersion, and of intimacy foster the original, deep, useful thought it seeks? In *The Laws*, Plato lays out a scheme for the best possible state, as contrasted with his more utopian *The Republic*. In *The Laws*, he gives an account of the creation of a small group of highly reliable citizens who are sent into the world to explore what is done elsewhere and to consider possible benefits from innovation. The Marine Corps War College does not provide a broad and general education for a large number of senior officers. Like *The Laws*, it invests in only a few, but for that few it appears to be encouraging intellectual risk-taking and critical thinking beyond that of its sister schools.

**THE AIR WAR COLLEGE**

The Army and Navy War Colleges are small installations in historic, small-town settings. The Marine War College is located on a major installation, but the class of twelve spends a good deal of its time elsewhere. The Air War College is located on Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. It is located with the Air Command and Staff College, but the two colleges are not as interrelated as the schools at Newport, and senior officers tend to attend both schools during their career.

A typical class numbers about 250, making the student body significantly smaller than that of the Army War College. The Air War College, too, assigns students to a seminar (but for the whole year), which provides “an optimum balance of diverse backgrounds.” Some of the factors that are considered in making seminar assignments are listed—for example, rated (pilots) or non-rated, Guard or Reserve. Race, ethnicity, and sex are not listed, but . . .

The Army War College encourages the wearing of civilian clothes. (It does require jackets and ties, a “uniform” that is more appropriate to the business world than to a civilian graduate school—well, maybe to
a business school.) Air War College students, by contrast, wear uniforms. Theirs is clearly a military environment.

The Air Force has been teaching “Curriculum 2000” since 1995. Its three key concepts—leadership, strategy, and jointness—are similar to the concepts highlighted at the Naval War College, although “leadership” is substituted for “decision-making.” Topics recently added to the curriculum include the effect of downsizing, peace operations, and the continued acceleration of change. Course material is conceived as moving from principles of warfare through process to application. The college’s intended product is a “soldier-statesman.”

The departmental organization at the Air War College differs from that of the other colleges. It has five departments. One of them is Leadership and Ethics, which teaches a year-long required course (see Figure 3). This course establishes the difference between the certainty of the tactical situation and the uncertainties of the strategic environment. It uses Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and the Strategic Leadership Development Inventory (SLDI) during its unit on individual development. In thinking about leadership in the Air Force, it may be helpful

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**Figure 3.** Air War College Curriculum.

to remember that only those who fly are in combat—and that pilots represent only a small percentage of the force. Thus, most Air Force personnel have civilian-like jobs, and Air Force leadership is more managerial in style than is, for example, Army leadership. Army leaders, two-thirds of whose troops are in combat specialities, emphasize leading by example.

The first core course is offered by the Department of Conflict and Change. It assumes that “not only is war against the United States possible, but indeed, unless human nature has changed, likely.” The “prudent scholar/warrior” ought not simply accept the view of “experts” that “there’s no threat. So we can down-size, bottom-up review, and convert the U.S. armed forces into a joint collection of armed social workers.” An important lesson to be learned is that “the American people need to understand why money is still required to sustain a large military establishment of standing forces [even] when obvious threats are diminished.” Other topics include operations other than war; the possibilities of space combat; biological warfare; and study of British strategy in the late nineteenth century, when Britain dominated the world as the United States does today. Motivations are described as “realist” when promoting national interests and “liberal” when directed toward advancing democracy, free trade and enterprise, and human rights.

Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power are featured in term two. The same strategic thinkers studied at Carlisle and Newport are studied at Maxwell. With “theory” under their belts, students move on to a set of case studies drawn from World War II, the Cold War, and Vietnam, and then to consideration of lessons learned by the different services through the Gulf War.

The third term is offered by the Department of International Security Studies and brings the political, economic, and global to the seminar room. Terrorism, civil–military relations, the media, allies, and the different commands are given attention.

The fourth and final term focuses on Joint Force Employment. It is capped by a two-week war game of two major regional conflicts.

While students march through this curriculum, they also take electives. Some eighty are offered. Also, during their work in Regional Studies, students make a ten-to-twelve-day field trip to one of twelve geographical areas, including Russia, China, and Central Asia. Their trip is
preceded by twenty-eight hours of “focused academic preparation” and
followed by a four-hour “hot wash” on return.

A set of non-credit electives is also available. These include courses
on the media, wellness, executive writing, speed reading, Microsoft
Word and PowerPoint, personal finance, and grant writing.

The final event before graduation is the week-long National Security
Forum, which is similar to that held at the Army War College. This
brings some one hundred guests to discuss issues with students and
invited experts. According to its primary stated goal, it “provides the
USAF a means to influence community leaders nationwide.” Secondary
goals are “to demonstrate the capabilities of tomorrow’s military lead-
ers” and to show “[Air War College] students current civilian under-
standing of and support for military issues.” Once again, the implicit
message seems to be that the Air Force tail needs to wag the civilian dog.

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

This is one of the two colleges located at Fort McNair in Washington,
D.C. Both are components of the National Defense University (NDU)
established in 1976. Both are free of a particular identification with
any of the four services. Neither is residential. The city bustles with dis-
tractions. The experience is quite different from that at the other colleges.

Jointness is all. Only at the National Defense University college do
students fulfill all requirements for the Joint Specialty Officer designa-
tion. Students who attend the service war colleges must complete a six-
week “Phase II” course before receiving that designation.

The presidency of the university rotates among the services. The vice
president is an ambassador. At the National War College (NWC), joint-
ness includes working with government agencies, not just the other
services. Thus, while 75 percent of the students are military, 25 percent
are from the State Department and other federal agencies. The “inter-
agency process” is a central concern.

The faculty is organized into just two departments: Military Strategy
and Operations and National Security. The latter includes decision-
making, the constitutional order, bureaucratic politics, the media, and
the nature of U.S. society. In 1994, the faculty comprised twenty-three
military officers (30 percent of whom held Ph.D.s); seventeen civilian
professors; and eleven agency representatives. The civilian faculty all
held Ph.D.s, all had taught at major civilian universities, and all but one had worked in the federal government. Two-thirds of the faculty were war college graduates. Fourteen percent were women. A model curriculum is shown in Figure 4.

In the Student Handbook the curriculum’s “integrating themes” are spelled out:

- “Policy is often as much an outcome of bureaucratic processes, compromise, and the influence of a dominant personality as it is of a ‘rational’ calculus.”
- “State resources are limited.”
- “Ethical norms inform and constrain policy-makers’ freedom of action.”
- “A national security strategy must identify the interests of the nation ... the challenges to those interests ... and specify the objectives to be met through the use of specific policy instruments, particularly in any use of military force.”
- “Instruments of policy must be orchestrated within a cohesive strategy.”
- “Military strategy and operations require the development within the Armed Forces of a joint culture.”