

PART I

Classical Problems and Perspectives

This section presents a selection of classic discussions of bureaucracy and organization.

Max Weber's essay is probably the most **well-known** classic of all, and it **set** the stage for most subsequent thinking. *It is* no accident that such a major contribution on bureaucracy came out of Germany; the Prussian bureaucracy **was** renowned **the** world over and had **provided** the context for Hegel and **Marx's** analyses **in** the nineteenth century. In this selection, **Weber** discusses the **general** features of the bureaucratic type, some of the reasons for its development, its advantages over previous **types** of organization, and why, **once** established, it is extremely difficult to **destroy**. While Weber himself favored legislative controls over bureaucracies, he **was** quite pessimistic about the long-term prospects for reigning in bureaucratic power.

Karl **Marx**, though usually not considered a **theorist** of organization **per se**, **had** a number of **acute** insights into bureaucracy, and his general analysis on social development **provided** a point of reference for many of the debates that **were** to **follow**. In his discussion of the "spirit of bureaucracy" **from** 1843, **Marx** develops a stinging critique of the Prussian bureaucracy. Though written in the dense philosophical style of his **youth**, **Marx's** basic points **are** clear enough. Bureaucracy, obsessed with its **power** and its formalism, views the world as an object to be administered and **extends** its tentacles as far as it is able to reach. **Marx** notes bureaucracy's formal characteristics: hierarchy and **secrecy**. He explains how the levels of the bureaucracy mutually deceive each other; how bureaucrats, concerned above all **with** their own careers, mask their own interests as general interests of state; and how the bureaucratic meaning of **things is** often quite different **from** the real meaning. **Marx's** own hopes for the complete elimination of bureaucracy **are more** fully **revealed** in his discussion of the **radically** democratic organizational features that **he**

perceived in the Paris Commune, the municipal **system** that was **developed** by the mass of Parisian citizens in rebellion against their **own** centralized and insensitive state in 1871. The Paris Commune subsequently became the **symbol** of an alternative form of participatory **gov-**ernment for **many** radicals throughout the world.

Robert Michels directly **addressed** himself to **Marx** and attempted to show that real **democracy** in organizations is **impossible, although many** social struggles would continue to dress themselves in its mantle. **Based** on his **analysis** of the **Social Democratic** party and the **trade** unions under **the** kaiser, Michels argues that oligarchy, or rule by a **clique** of leaders **who do all they** can to protect their **own** position in the organization, is inevitable. For profound organizational and psychological reasons, oligarchy asserts itself **as** an “iron” sociological **law**.

Much of the labor **turmoil** in the early decades of this century, in both Europe and the United States, **was a** motivating concern behind the **next** **essay**, **Frederick Taylor**, known **as** the father of **scientific** management, **developed a** set of principles for what he considered the best and most efficient way to organize production. While **few** adopted Taylor’s views totally, **they** did have a profound impact on organization thinking and on the reality of **work** organization in the lives of **many** people. Taylor argued not only that management should have complete **authority over** the organization of **work**, but also that **tasks should be simplified** and fragmented **as** much as possible and that the **brain work** should be concentrated **in** the hands of management.

In the 1970s, after it became clear that Taylorist principles, far from dead, had even spread to **various** forms of white collar **work**, Harry Braverman undertook a reevaluation of the significance of Taylorism. **His** study **was particularly timely, in** light of the rising degree of dissatisfaction **among** both blue- and white-collar workers not **only in the** United **Sates, but in many** other major industrial countries. Since its publication in 1974, Braverman’s analysis has become a classic, and perhaps the **most** cited piece, in the study of the modern workplace. Braverman attempts to **show** that the real meaning of Taylorism **lies** not in some neutral organizational precepts about efficiency, but in the struggle by management **to secure control over** the workplace and to **lower** the cost of labor. **The** fragmentation of **work** and the separation of conception and **execution are not inevitable** features of the modern workplace and **advanced** technology, but reflect management’s interest in profit and control.

In a classic essay of the human relations school, Roethlisberger and **Dickson** develop an **analysis** of the organization as having both a human and a technical side, an informal as well as a formal **one**. On the **basis** of their **famous** studies at the Hawthorne Plant of Western Electric, the **authors argue** that **the** network of **personal** relations and the “non-rational” sentiments are **crucial for** understanding **what** makes an organization **function—and** what **makes workers often** resist the demands of

management. Although **the value** of **human relations theory** has been much **debated** (Part I, Chapter 6), there **can** be **little** doubt that Roethlisberger and Dickson alerted organization theory to the **necessity** for **studying** the informal human **side** of organizations **as well as** the formal and technical **features**.

In the **final** selection, Alvin Gouldner, a major figure in the revival of **critical** thinking in American sociology, addresses **himself to the** various types of bureaucracy in industrial **settings**. The **three types** (**mock, representative, and punishment-centered**) reflect different **degrees** of **agreement** or conflict between **workers and** management. The **values legitimating** them are different, and the consequences of violating them also vary. Gouldner's **analysis** attempts to **expand** Weber's **theory** by uncovering those **aspects of bureaucracy** that concern human relations, consent, and democratic **process** in **addition** to authority, efficiency, **and expertise**.

1

Bureaucracy

Max Weber

Characteristics of Bureaucracy

Modern officialdom functions in the following **specific** manner:

I. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.

1. The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a **fixed way** as official duties.
2. The **authority to give** the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a **stable way** and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which **may be placed at** the disposal of officials.
3. Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the execution of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed,

In public and lawful government these three elements constitute "bureaucratic authority." In private economic domination, they constitute bureaucratic "management." Bureaucracy, thus understood, **is** fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, and, **in the private economy, only** in the most **advanced** institutions of capitalism. Permanent and public office authority, with **fixed** jurisdiction, **is** not the historical rule **but** rather the **exception**. This **is** so even in **large** political structures **such as those** of the ancient Orient, the Germanic and Mongolian **empires of conquest, many of many feudal structures of state**. In all these **cases**, the **ruler executes** the **most** important **measures** through personal **trustees**, table-companions, or court-servants. Their **commissions and authority** are not **precisely** delimited and **are** temporarily called into **being for** each case.

II. *The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.* Such a system offers the governed the possibility of **appealing** the decision of a lower *officer* to its higher authority, in a definitely regulated manner. With the full development of the bureaucratic **type**, the office hierarchy is monocratically organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in **all** bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for **the** character of bureaucracy whether its authority **is called** "private" or "public."

When the principle of jurisdictional "competency" is fully carried through, hierarchical subordination—at least **in public office**—does not mean that the "higher" authority **is** simply authorized to take over the business of "lower." Indeed, the opposite is the rule. Once established and having fulfilled its task, an office tends to continue in existence and be held by another incumbent.

III. *The management of the modern office is based on written documents ("the files"), which are preserved in their original or draught form.* There is, therefore, a staff of subaltern officials **and** scribes of all sorts. The body of officials actively engaged in a "public" office, along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, **make up a** "bureau." In private enterprise, "the bureau" is often called "the office."

In principle, the modern organization of the civil service separates the bureau from the private domicile of the official, and, in general, bureaucracy segregates official activity as something distinct from the sphere of private life. Public monies and equipment **are** divorced from the private property of the official. This condition is everywhere the product of a **long** development. Nowadays, it **is** found in public as well as in private enterprises; **in** the latter, the principle extends even to the leading entrepreneur. In principle, the executive office **is** separated from the household, business from private correspondence, and business assets from private fortunes. The more consistently the modern **type** of business management has been carried through **the more are** these separations the case. **The** beginnings of this process are to be found as early as the Middle **Ages**.

It is the peculiarity of the modern entrepreneur that he conducts himself as the "first official" of his enterprise, in the **very** same **way** in which the ruler of a **specifically** modern bureaucratic state spoke of himself as "the first servant" of the state. The idea that the bureau activities of the **state** are intrinsically different in character from the management of private economic offices **is a** continental European notion and, by **way** of contrast is totally foreign to the American **way**.

IV. *Office management at least all specialized office management—and such management is distinctly modern—usually presupposes thorough*

and expert training. This increasingly holds for the modern executive and employee of private enterprises, in the same manner as it holds for the state official.

V. *When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.* In the normal case, this is only the product of a long development, in the public as well as in the private office. Formerly, in all cases, the normal state of affairs was reversed: Official business was discharged as a secondary activity.

VI. *The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned.* Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, or administrative or business management.

The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature. *The theory of modern public administration, for instance, assumes that the authority to order certain matters by decree—which has been legally granted to public authorities—does not entitle the bureau to regulate the matter by commands given for each case, but only to regulate the matter abstractly.* This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships through individual privileges and bestowals of favor, which is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism, at least in so far as such relationships are not fixed by sacred tradition.

The Position of the Official

All this results in the following for the internal and external position of the official:

I. *Office holding is a "vocation."* This is shown, first, in the requirement of a firmly prescribed course of training, which demands the entire capacity for work for a long period of time, and in the generally prescribed and special examinations which are prerequisites of employment. Furthermore, the position of the official is in the nature of a duty. This determines the internal structure of his relations in the following manner: Legally and actually, office holding is not considered a source to be exploited for rents or emoluments, as was normally the case during the Middle Ages and frequently up to the threshold of recent times. Nor is office holding considered a usual exchange of services for equivalents, as is the case with free labor contracts. Entrance into an office, including one in the private economy, is considered an acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence. It is decisive for the specific nature of modern loyalty to an office that, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person, like the vassal's

or disciple's faith in feudal or in patrimonial relations of authority. Modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal: and functional purposes. Behind the functional purposes, of course, "ideas of culture-values" usually stand. These are *ersatz* for the earthly or supra-mundane personal master: ideas such as "state," "church," "community," "party," or "enterprise" are thought of as being realized in a community; they provide an ideological halo for the master,

The political official—at least in the fully developed modern state—is not considered the personal servant of a ruler. Today, the bishop, the priest, and the preacher are in fact no longer, as in early Christian times, holders of purely personal charisma. The supra-mundane and sacred values which they offer are given to everybody who seems to be worthy of them and who asks for them. In former times, such leaders acted upon the personal command of their master; in principle, they were responsible only to him. Nowadays, in spite of the partial survival of the old theory, such religious leaders are officials in the service of a functional purpose, which in the present-day "church" has become routinized and, in turn, ideologically hallowed.

II. *The personal position of the official is patterned in the following way:*

1. Whether he is in a private office or a public bureau, the modern official always strives and usually enjoys a distinct social esteem as compared with the governed. His social position is guaranteed by the prescriptive rules of rank order and, for the political official, by special definitions of the criminal code against "insults of officials" and "contempt" of state and church authorities.

The actual social position of the official is normally highest where, as in old civilized countries, the following conditions prevail: a strong demand for administration by trained experts; a strong and stable social differentiation, where the official predominantly derives from socially and economically privileged strata because of the social distribution of power; or where the costliness of the required training and status conventions are binding upon him. The possession of educational certificates—to be discussed elsewhere²—are usually linked with qualification for office. Naturally, such certificates or patents enhance the "status element" in the social position of the official. For the rest this status factor in individual cases is explicitly and impassively acknowledged; for example, in the prescription that the acceptance or rejection of an aspirant to an official career depends upon the consent ("election") of the members of the official body. This is the case in the German army with the officer corps. Similar phenomena, which promote this guild-like closure of officialdom, are typically found in patrimonial and, particularly, in prebendal officialdoms of the past. The desire to resurrect such phenomena in changed forms is by no means infrequent among modern bureaucrats. For in-

stance, they **have played** a role among the demands of the quite proletarian and expert officials (the *tretyj* element) during the Russian revolution.

Usually the social esteem of the officials **as such** is especially low where the demand for **expert** administration and the dominance of status conventions are weak. This **is** especially the case in the United States; **it is** often the case in new settlements **by** virtue of their **wide** fields for profit-making **and** the great instability of their social stratification.

2. The **pure type** of bureaucratic official is **appointed by** a superior authority. An official **elected by** the governed is not a purely bureaucratic figure. Of course, the formal existence of an election does not by itself mean that no appointment hides behind the election—in the state, especially, appointment **by** party chiefs. Whether **or** not this is the **case** does not depend upon legal statutes but **upon the way** in which the party mechanism functions. Once firmly **organized**, the **parties** can turn a formally free election into the mere acclamation of a candidate designated by *the* party chief. **As a rule**, however, a formally free election is turned into a fight, conducted according to definite rules, for **votes** in favor of one of **two** designated candidates.

In all circumstances, the designation of officials by means of an election among the governed modifies the strictness of hierarchical subordination. In **principle**, an official who **is** so elected has an autonomous position opposite the **superordinate** official. The elected official does not **derive his** position “from above” but “from below,” or at **least** not from a **superior** authority of the official hierarchy but from powerful party men (“**bosses**”), who **also** determine his further career. The career of the **elected** official **is** not, or at **least** not **primarily**, dependent **upon** his chief in the administration. The official **who** is not elected but appointed **by** a chief normally functions **more exactly**, from a technical point of **view**, because, all other circumstances being **equal**, **it is** more **likely that purely** functional **points of** consideration and qualities **will** determine **his** selection and career. **As** laymen, **the** governed can become acquainted **with** the **extent** to which a candidate is expertly qualified for office **only in terms** of experience, and hence **only** after his service. Moreover, **in every** sort of selection of **officials by** election, **parties quite** naturally **give** decisive weight not to expert considerations but to the services a follower renders to **the party** boss. **This** holds for all kinds of procurement of officials by elections, for the designation of formally **free**, elected officials by party bosses when they determine the slate of candidates, or the free appointment **by** a chief who has himself been elected. The contrast, however, **is** relative: Substantially similar conditions hold where legitimate **monarchs** and their subordinates appoint officials, except that the influence of the followings are then less controllable.

Where the demand for administration by trained **experts** is considerable, and the **party** followings have to recognize an intellectually de-

veloped, educated, and freely moving "public opinion," the use of unqualified officials falls back upon the party in power at the next election. Naturally, this is more likely to happen when the officials are appointed by the chief. The demand for a trained administration **now** exists in the United States, but in the large cities, where immigrant votes are "corralled," there is, of course, no educated public opinion. Therefore, popular elections of the administrative chief and also of his subordinate officials usually endanger the expert qualification of the official as **well** as the precise functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism. It also weakens the dependence of the officials upon the hierarchy. This holds at least for the large administrative bodies that are difficult to supervise. The superior qualification and integrity of federal **judges**, appointed by the president, as **over** against elected judges in the United States is well known, although both types of officials **have** been selected primarily in terms of party considerations. The great changes in American metropolitan administrations demanded by reformers have proceeded essentially from elected mayors working with an apparatus of officials who were appointed by them. These reforms have thus come about in a "Caesarist" fashion. Viewed technically, as an organized form of authority, the efficiency of "Caesarism," which often grows out of democracy, rests in general upon the position of the "Caesar" as a free trustee of the **masses** (of the army or of the citizenry), who is unfettered by tradition. The "Caesar" is thus the unrestrained master of a body of highly qualified military officers and officials whom he selects freely and personally without regard to tradition or to **any** other considerations. This "rule of the personal genius," however, **stands in contradiction** to the formally "democratic" principle of a universally elected officialdom.

3. Normally, the position of the official is held for life, at least in public bureaucracies; **and this is** increasingly the case for all similar structures. As a factual rule, *tenure for life* is presupposed, even where the giving of notice or periodic reappointment occurs. **In contrast to the** worker in a private enterprise, the official normally **holds** tenure. **Legal** or actual life-tenure, **however, is** not recognized as the official's right to the possession of office, **as was** the case with many structures of authority in the past. Where legal guarantees against arbitrary dismissal or transfer are **developed, they** merely **serve** to guarantee a strictly objective discharge of specific office duties **free from** personal considerations. In **Germany**, this is the case for all judicial and, increasingly, for all administrative officials.

Within the bureaucracy, therefore, **the** measure of "independence," legally guaranteed **by** tenure, is not always a source of increased status for the official whose **position is** thus secured. Indeed, often the **reverse** holds, especially in old cultures and communities that are highly differentiated. In such communities, the stricter the subordination under the arbitrary rule of the master, the **more** it guarantees **the** maintenance of

the conventional seignorial style of living for the official. Because of the very absence of these legal guarantees of tenure, the conventional esteem for the official may rise in the same way as, during the Middle Ages, the esteem of the nobility of office³ rose at the expense of esteem for the freemen, and as the king's judge surpassed that of the people's judge. In Germany, the military officer or the administrative official can be removed from office at any time, or at least far more readily than the "independent judge," who never pays with loss of his office for even the grossest offense against the "code of honor" or against social conventions of the salon. For this very reason, if other things are equal, in the eyes of the master stratum the judge is considered less qualified for social intercourse than are officers and administrative officials, whose greater dependence on the master is a greater guarantee of their conformity with status conventions. Of course, the average official strives for a civil-service law, which would materially secure his old age and provide increased guarantees against his arbitrary removal from office. This striving, however, has its limits. A very strong development of the "right to the office" naturally makes it more difficult to staff them with regard to technical efficiency, for such a development decreases the career-opportunities of ambitious candidates for office. This makes for the fact that officials, on the whole, do not feel their dependency upon those at the top. This lack of a feeling of dependency, however, rests primarily upon the inclination to depend upon one's equals rather than upon the socially inferior and governed strata. The present conservative movement among the Badenia clergy, occasioned by the anxiety of a presumably threatening separation of church and state, has been expressly determined by the desire not to be turned "from a master into a servant of the parish."⁴

4. The official receives the regular *pecuniary* compensation of a normally fixed salary and the old age security provided by a pension. The salary is not measured like a wage in terms of work done, but according to "status," that is, according to the kind of function (the "rank") and, in addition, possibly, according to the length of service. The relatively great security of the official's income, as well as the rewards of social esteem, make the office a sought-after position, especially in countries which no longer provide opportunities for colonial profits. In such countries, this situation permits relatively low salaries for officials.

5. The official is set for a "career" within the hierarchical order of the public service. He moves from the lower, less important, and lower paid to the higher positions. The average official naturally desires a mechanical fixing of the conditions of promotion: if not of the offices, at least of the salary levels. He wants these conditions fixed in terms of "seniority," or possibly according to grades achieved in a developed system of expert examinations. Here and there, such examinations actually form a character *indelebilis* of the official and have lifelong effects on his career. To this

is joined the desire to qualify the right to office and the increasing tendency toward status **group** closure and economic security. **All** of this makes **for** a tendency to consider the offices as “prebends” of those **who** are qualified by educational certificates. The necessity of **taking** general personal and intellectual qualifications into consideration, irrespective of the often subaltern character of the educational certificate, **has led** to a condition in which the highest political offices, especially the **positions** of “ministers,” are principally filled without reference to such certificates. . . .

Technical Advantages of Bureaucratic Organization

The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism **compares** with other organizations exactly *as* does the machine **with** the non-mechanical modes of production.

Precision, **speed**, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and **of** material and **personal** costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form. **As** compared with all collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy **is** superior **on all** these points. And **as far as** complicated tasks are concerned, paid bureaucratic **work** is not only more **precise** but, in the **last analysis**, it is often cheaper than even formally unremunerated **honorific** service.

Honorific arrangements make administrative **work** an avocation and, for this reason alone, honorific service normally functions **more** slowly; being **less** bound to schemata and being more formless. Hence it **is less precise and less** unified **than** bureaucratic **work** because it is less dependent upon superiors and because the establishment and exploitation of **the** apparatus of subordinate officials and filing services are **almost un-**avoidably less economical. Honorific service **is less** continuous than bureaucratic and frequently **quite expensive. This is especially the case** if one thinks not **only** of the money **costs to** the public treasury—costs **which** bureaucratic administration, in comparison with administration by notables, **usually** substantially increases—but also of the frequent economic **losses of** the governed caused **by** delays and lack of precision. The possibility of administration by notables normally and permanently **exists** only where official management **can be** satisfactorily discharged as an avocation. With the qualitative increase of tasks **the** administration has to face, administration **by** notables reaches its **limits—today**, even in **England. Work organized by** collegiate bodies causes friction **and** delay and **requires** compromises between colliding interests and views. The admin-

istration, therefore., **runs less precisely and is more independent** of superiors; hence, it is less unified and **slower**. All advances of the Prussian administrative organization have **been** and will in the future **be advances** of the bureaucratic, and especially of the monocratic, principle.

Today, it is primarily the capitalist market economy which demands that the official business of the administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as **much** speed as possible. Normally, the **very** large, modern capitalist enterprises are themselves **unequaled** models of strict bureaucratic organization. Business management throughout **rests** on increasing precision, steadiness, and, **above all**, the speed of operations. **This, in turn, is determined by the** peculiar nature of the **modern** means of communication, including, among other things, the news service of the **press**. The extraordinary increase in the speed by which public announcements, **as** well as economic and political facts, **are** transmitted **exerts a steady and sharp** pressure in the direction of **speeding up** the tempo of administrative reaction towards various situations. The optimum of **such** reaction time **is** normally attained only by a strictly bureaucratic organization.⁵

Bureaucratization offers **above all the** optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative Functions **according** to **purely** objective considerations, **Individual** performances are allocated to functionaries **who have specialized training and who** by constant practice learn more and more. The "objective" discharge of business primarily **means** a discharge of **business according to calculable rules** and "without regard for **persons**."

"Without **regard for persons**" **is** also the watchword of the "market" **and, in general, of all pursuits of naked economic interests**. A consistent execution of bureaucratic domination means the leveling of **status** "honor." Hence, **if the** principle of the free-market is not at the same time restricted, it means the **universal** domination of the "class situation." That **this** consequence of bureaucratic domination has not set in everywhere, **parallel** to the **extent** of bureaucratization, **is due** to the differences **among possible** principles by which polities may meet their **demands**.

The second element mentioned, "**calculable rules**," **also is** of **paramount** importance for modern bureaucracy. The peculiarity of **modern** culture, **and specifically of its** technical and economic basis, demands this **very** "calculability" of results. When fully developed, bureaucracy **also** stands, in a specific sense, **under** the principle of *sine ira ac studio*. **Its specific nature**, which is welcomed by **capitalism**, **develops** the more **perfectly** the more **the** bureaucracy **is** "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely **personal**, irrational, and emotional elements which escape **calculation**. **This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue**.

The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the **personally** detached and **strictly** "objective" **expert**, in lieu of the **master** of older social structures, who **was** moved **by** personal sympathy and favor, by **grace** and gratitude. Bureaucracy offers **the** attitudes demanded **by** the external apparatus of modern culture in the most **favorable** combination, **As** a rule, only bureaucracy **has** established the foundation **for** the administration of a rational law conceptually systematized on the basis of such enactments as the latter Roman imperial period first created **with** a high degree of technical perfection. During the Middle Ages, **this law was received** along with the bureaucratization of legal administration, that is to say, with the displacement of **the old** trial procedure **which** was bound to tradition or to irrational presuppositions, by the rationally **trained** and specialized **expert**. . . .

The Concentration of the Means of Administration

The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master. This concentration occurs, for instance, in a **well-known** and typical fashion, in the development of big capitalist **enterprises**, which **find** their essential characteristics in this process. **A** corresponding **process** occurs in **public** organizations.

The bureaucratically led **army** of the Pharaohs, the **army** during the later period of **the Roman** republic and **the** principate, and, above **all**, the army of **the** modern military state are characterized by the fact that their **equipment** and provisions are **supplied** from the **magazines** of the war lord. This is **in** contrast to **the folk** army of agricultural tribes, the armed citizenry of ancient cities, the militias of early **medieval** cities, and **all** **feudal** armies; for **these**, the **self-equipment** and the self-provisioning of those obliged to **fight** was normal,

War in our time is a war of machines, **And** this makes magazines **technically** **necessary**, just **as** the dominance of the machine in industry promotes **the** concentration of the means of production **and** management. **In** the **main**, however, the bureaucratic armies of **the** past, equipped and provisioned **by** the lord, have risen when social and economic development has absolutely or **relatively** diminished the stratum of citizens **who** were **economically** **able** to **equip** themselves, **so** that their **number** was no longer **sufficient** for putting **the** required armies in the **field**. **They** were reduced at least **relatively**, **that** is, in relation to **the** range of power claimed for the polity. Only the bureaucratic **army** structure allowed for **the** development of **the** professional standing armies which are **necessary** for **the** constant pacification of **large** states of the **plains**, **as** well as for warfare against far-distant enemies, especially **enemies** over-

seas. Specifically, military discipline and technical training can be normally and fully developed, at least to its modern high level, only in the bureaucratic army.

Historically, the bureaucratization of the army has everywhere been realized along with the transfer of army service from the propertied to the propertyless. Until this transfer occurs, military service is an honorific privilege of propertied men. Such a transfer was made to the native-born unpropertied, for instance, in the armies of the generals of the late Roman republic and the empire, as well as in modern armies up to the nineteenth century. The burden of service has also been transferred to strangers, as in the mercenary armies of all ages. This process typically goes hand in hand with the general increase in material and intellectual culture. The following reason has also played its part everywhere: The increasing density of population, and therewith the intensity and strain of economic work, makes for an increasing "indispensability" of the acquisitive strata⁶ for purposes of war. Leaving aside periods of strong ideological fervor, the propertied strata of sophisticated and especially of urban culture as a rule are little fitted and also little inclined to do the coarse war work of the common soldier. Other circumstances being equal, the propertied strata of the open country are at least usually better qualified and more strongly inclined to become professional officers. This difference between the urban and the rural propertied is balanced only where the increasing possibility of mechanized warfare requires the leaders to qualify as "technicians."^{*}

The bureaucratization of organized warfare may be carried through in the form of private capitalist enterprise, just like any other business. Indeed, the procurement of armies and their administration by private capitalists has been the rule in mercenary armies, especially those of the Occident up to the turn of the eighteenth century. During the Thirty Years' War, in Brandenburg the soldier was still the predominant owner of the material implements of his business. He owned his weapons, horses, and dress, although the state, in the role, as it were, of the merchant of the "putting-out system," did supply him to some extent. Later on, in the standing army of Prussia, the chief of the company owned the material means of warfare, and only since the peace of Tilsit has the concentration of the means of warfare in the hands of the state definitely come about. Only with this concentration was the introduction of uniforms generally carried through. Before then, the introduction of uniforms had been left to a great extent to the arbitrary discretion of the regimental officer, with the exception of individual categories of troops to whom the king had "bestowed" certain uniforms, first, in 1620, to the royal bodyguard, then, under Frederick II, repeatedly,

Such terms as "regiment" and "battalion" usually had quite different meanings in the eighteenth century from the meanings they have today. Only the battalion was a tactical unit (today both are); the "regiment"

was then a managerial unit of an economic organization established by the colonel's position as an "entrepreneur." "Official" maritime ventures (like the Genoese *maonae*) and army procurement belong to private capitalism's first giant enterprises of far-going bureaucratic character. In this respect, the "nationalization" of these enterprises by the state has its modern parallel in the nationalization of the railroads, which have been controlled by the state from their beginnings.

In the same way as with army organizations, the bureaucratization of administration goes hand in hand with the concentration of the means of organization in other spheres. The old administration by satraps and regents, as well as administration by farmers of office, purchasers of office, and, most of all, administration by feudal vassals, decentralize the material means of administration. The local demand of the province and the cost of the army and of subaltern officials are regularly paid for in advance from local income, and only the surplus reaches the central treasure. The enfeoffed official administers entirely by payment out of his own pocket. The bureaucratic state, however, puts its whole administrative expense on the budget and equips the lower authorities with the current means of expenditure, the use of which the state regulates and controls. This has the same meaning for the "economics" of the administration as for the large centralized capitalist enterprise.

In the field of scientific research and instruction, the bureaucratization of the always existing research institutes of the universities is a function of the increasing demand for material means of management. Liebig's laboratory at Giessen University was the first example of big enterprise in this field. Through the concentration of such means in the hands of the privileged head of the institute, the mass of researchers and docents are separated from their "means of production." In the same way as capitalist enterprise has separated the workers from theirs.

In spite of its indubitable technical superiority, bureaucracy has everywhere been a relatively late development. A number of obstacles have contributed to this, and only under certain social and political conditions have they definitely receded into the background. . . .

The Permanent Character of the Bureaucratic Machine

Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying "community action" over into rationally ordered "societal action." Therefore, as an instrument for "societalizing" relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order — for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus.

Under otherwise equal conditions, a "societal action," which is methodically ordered and led, is superior to every resistance of "mass" or

even of "communal action." **And** where the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried through, a form of **power** relation is **established** that is **practically** unshatterable.

The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is **harnessed**. In contrast to the honorific or avocational "notable," the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity **by** his entire material and **ideal** existence. **In** the great majority of cases, he is only a single cog in a **ever-moving** mechanism which **prescribes** to him an **essentially fixed** route of march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot **be put** into motion or arrested by him, but only **from** the very top. The individual bureaucrat is thus **forged** to the community of all **the** functionaries who are integrated into **the** mechanism. They have a **common** interest in **seeing** that the mechanism continues its functions **and** that the societally exercised authority carries on.

The ruled, for their part, cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic **apparatus** of authority once it exists. For this bureaucracy **rests** upon **expert** training, a functional specialization of **work**, and an **attitude** set for habitual and virtuoso-like mastery of single yet methodically integrated functions. If the official stops **working**, or if his work is forcefully interrupted, **chaos** results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements **from** among the governed who are **fit to master** such chaos. This holds for public **administration as well** as for private economic management. **More and more** the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organizations of private capitalism. The idea of eliminating these **organizations** becomes more and more utopian.

The discipline of officialdom refers to the attitude-set of the official for precise obedience within his *habitual* activity, in public as **well as in private** organizations. This discipline increasingly becomes the **basis** of all order, however great the practical importance of administration on the basis of the filed documents **may be**. The naive idea of **Bakuninism** of **destroying** the basis of "acquired rights" and "domination" by destroying **public** documents overlooks the settled orientation of *man* for keeping **to** the habitual rules and regulations that continue to **exist** independently of the documents. **Every** reorganization of beaten or dissolved troops, **as well as the** restoration of administrative orders destroyed **by** revolt, **panic**, or other catastrophes, is realized **by appealing** to the trained orientation of obedient compliance to **such** orders. Such compliance **has been** conditioned into the **officials**, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, into the governed. If such an **appeal is** successful it brings, as it **were**, the disturbed mechanism into gear again.

The objective indispensability of the **once-existing** apparatus, **with its** peculiar, "impersonal" character, means that the mechanism—in contrast to feudal orders based upon personal piety—is easily made to **work** for anybody who knows how to gain control over it. **A** rationally ordered

system of officials continues to function smoothly after the enemy has **occupied** the area; he merely needs to change the top officials. This body of officials continues to operate because it **is** to the **vital** interest of everyone concerned, including above **all** the **enemy**.

During the course of his long years in power, Bismarck brought his ministerial colleagues into unconditional bureaucratic dependence by eliminating all independent statesmen. Upon his retirement, he saw to his surprise that they continued to manage their offices unconcerned and undismayed, as **if** he had not **been the** master **mind** and creator of these creatures, but rather as if some single figure had been exchanged for some other figure in the bureaucratic machine. With all the changes of masters in France since the time of the First Empire, the power machine has remained essentially the same. Such a machine makes "revolution," in the sense of the forceful creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication (telegraph, et cetera) and **also** by virtue of its internal rationalized structure. In classic fashion, France **has** demonstrated how this process has substituted *coups d'état* for "revolutions": all successful transformations in **France** have amounted to *coups d'état*. . . .

The Power Position of Bureaucracy

Everywhere :he modern state is undergoing bureaucratization. But whether the *power* of bureaucracy within the **polity** **is** universally increasing must here remain an open question.

The fact that bureaucratic organization is technically the **most** highly developed means of power in the hands of the man who controls **it** does not determine the weight that bureaucracy **as** such **is** capable of having in a particular social structure. The ever-increasing "indispensability" of the officialdom, swollen to millions, **is** no **more** decisive for this question than is the **view** of some representatives of the proletarian movement that the economic indispensability of the proletarians **is** decisive for the measure of their social and political power position. If "indispensability" were decisive, then **where** slave labor prevailed and where freemen usually abhor **work** **as** a dishonor, the "indispensable" slaves ought to **have** held the positions of power, for they were at least as indispensable as officials and proletarians are today. Whether the power of bureaucracy as such increases cannot be decided *a priori* from such reasons. The drawing in of economic interest group; or other non-official experts, or the **drawing** in of nonexpert lay representatives. the establishment of local, inter-local, or central parliamentary or other representative bodies, or of occupational associations—these *seem* to run directly against the bureaucratic tendency. How far this appearance is the truth must be

discussed in another chapter rather than in this purely formal **and** typological discussion. **In** general, only the following can be said **here**:

Under **normal** conditions, **the power** position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always towering. The "political master" finds himself **in the position** of the "dilettante" **who** stands opposite the "expert," facing the trained official **who** stands within the management of administration. **This holds** whether the "master" whom the bureaucracy **serves** is a "people," **equipped with** the weapons of "legislative initiative," the "referendum," and the right to remove officials, or a parliament, elected on a more aristocratic or more "democratic" basis **and equipped with the** right to vote a lack of confidence, or with the actual **authority** to vote it. It holds whether the master is an aristocratic, collegiate body, legally or actually **based** on self-recruitment, or whether he is a popularly elected president, a hereditary and "absolute" or a "constitutional" monarch,

Every bureaucracy **seeks** to increase the superiority of the professionally informed **by keeping** their knowledge **and** intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be **an** administration of "secret sessions": **In** so far as it can, it hides its **knowledge** and action from criticism. Prussian church authorities **now** threaten to use disciplinary measures against pastors who **make** reprimands or other admonitory measures in any way accessible to third parties. They do this because the pastor, **in** making such criticism available, is "guilty" of facilitating a possible criticism of the church authorities. **The** treasury officials of the Persian shah **have** made a secret doctrine of their budgetary art and even use secret script. **The** official statistics of Prussia, **in** general, **make** public only **what** cannot do any harm to **the** intentions **of** the power-wielding bureaucracy. The tendency toward **secrecy** in certain administrative fields follows their material nature: Everywhere that the power interests of the domination structure toward *the outside* **are** at stake, **whether** it is **an** economic competitor of a private enterprise, or a foreign, potentially hostile polity, **we find** secrecy. **If it is to** be successful, the management of diplomacy can only **be** publicly controlled to a **very** limited extent. The military administration must **insist** on the concealment of **its** most important measures; **with** the increasing significance of purely technical aspects, this is **all** the more **the case**. Political parties do **not** proceed differently, **in spite** of all the ostensible publicity of Catholic congresses **and** party conventions. **With** the increasing bureaucratization of **party** organizations, this **secrecy will** prevail even more. Commercial policy, in Germany for instance, brings about a concealment of production statistics. Every fighting posture of a social structure toward the outside **tends** to **buttress** the position of the group in power.

The pure interest of the bureaucracy **in power, however, is efficacious** far beyond those areas where **purely** functional interests **make** for **secrecy**. The concept of the "official secret" is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing **is so** fanatically defended **by** the bureaucracy **as**

fically **qualified** areas. In facing a parliament, the **bureaucracy**, out of a sure power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain **knowledge** by **means of its own** experts, or from interest groups. The so-called

Notes

1. Frederick II of Prussia.
2. Cf. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 73 ff. and part II [German editor's note].
3. *Ministerialen*.
4. Written before 1914 [German editor's note]
5. Here we cannot **discuss in detail how the bureaucratic apparatus may, and actually does, produce definite obstacles to the discharge of business in a manner suitable for the single case.**
6. *Erwerbende Schichten*.