

LECTURE: HISTORY AND SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY
(PSYCH 855) TEMPLE UNIVERSITY,

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**FROM THE RENAISSANCE THROUGH DESCARTES, THE
ENLIGHTENMENT, EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM**

I. RENAISSANCE ---BEGAN MIDDLE OF 15th CT.

A. Copernicus (1473-1543); Francis Bacon -- (Observational methods, hence induction; 1561-1626); Thomas Hobbs (mechanistic contemporary of Descartes; 1588-1679)

B. Note that the printing press was invented by Guttenburg around 1450 and this had a major impact. Interestingly first books printed were Greek books and these were often about practical things.

II. 17th CENTURY

A. Kepler - laws of planetary motion, (1629). Galileo - laws of moving bodies (1633); Harvey -- circulation of the blood (1633); Newton (theory, 1687).

B. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642).

1. Major importance is his subject-object split.

Search for pattern or all pervasive form underlying local motion. Form would appear in mathematical determination and arrangement according to measure and number. However, here he made the split where arrangement or pattern is in nature and not in mind.

This split like Democritus -- who maintained that some aspects of atoms of a "real" external world were directly perceptible (i.e., the weight and texture of things) and others (e.g., color, taste) are experiences.

This split also like Locke's primary and secondary qualities.

NOTE THAT IT IS A SPLIT THAT MAKES THE "REAL" AS NATURAL (HENCE NATURALISM) AND THIS CONSISTS OF PARTICULAR PROPERTIES WHICH ARE MIND INDEPENDENT AND "MIND" WHICH IS NOT NATURAL AND CONSISTS OF PARTICULAR PROPERTIES WHICH CONSTITUTE APPEARANCES.

C. DESCARTES (1596-1650)

1. Called last great RATIONALIST. Through REASON discover the nature of the world. Begin with INNATE IDEAS and deduce the world from these. DEDUCTION is the method.
2. How got to innate ideas? Answer; through his METHOD OF DOUBT. Doubted all things, but in the end could not doubt that he was doubting. Thus, to doubt was to think. This led to his famous "Cognito ergo sum" "I think, therefore I am."

3. One major implication of arriving at innate ideas was what was to be ever after known as the Cartesian split of subject and object.
 - a) The emphasis on the "I" and hence on the Subjective split this off from nature or the Objective. Thus, where we might have two poles of a unified matrix as we will have again in the dialectic, we now have two separate pieces.
 - b) This is called DUALISM and the world ever since has been trying to heal this split. It is generally called mind-body dualism but it is broader than this.
 - c) Descartes articulated this further by taking about MIND as a thinking substance (unextended substance) and BODY (extended substance).
 - (1). This becomes basis for Descartes' major role in developing the mechanistic approach, i.e., the body is subject to mechanical laws.
4. The innate ideas and subjective mind was also the basis for what has been called the Cartesian Theater of the Mind where ideas like characters run around (See Dennett, Consciousness explained)
5. Innate ideas and their implications also provided the motive force for the 18th Century's Empiricist attack on Rationalism.

Problem: What is the relation between concepts or ideas and objects or the objective world? All knowledge for Descartes derives from Innate Ideas (e.g., number, duration, extension). However, Descartes also claimed that these Innate Ideas point in two directions. They point forward to empirical reality (i.e., objective reality) because they also point back to the origin of reality, i.e.,

God. Innate ideas are the trademark which the divine workman imprinted on his product.

6. Descartes ended in a rather schizoid position. On the one hand his Rationalism expressed in this notion of innate ideas was the point that Empiricism would attack in the 18th Century. On the other hand, his mechanistic approach to the body was the solution that the Empiricists of the 18th Century would employ.

III. The ENLIGHTENMENT. THE 18th Century.

- A. Century defined as a reaction against Rationalism. (Wartofsky, p. 311-314) This is a reaction against authority of church. Against the repression of dogma. It was, in essence, an attempt to define freedom. (Note that this attempt to define freedom will be done according to reason and rationality. This will define what has been called the Modern Era. It will be distinguished from what will later be called the Post-Modern Era where freedom will again be defined but will be done so in the context of rejecting reason).
- B. Century a reaction against solving the problem of the relation between thinking (concepts) and things (objects) by appealing to something that was even less known than the problem itself, i.e., God. Problem had to be based on the ground of experience and solved there. Tried to not solve problems on Metaphysical grounds that rightfully belonged solved on Empirical grounds.
- C. Century started from basis of Newtonian research. Impressed with advances in Natural Sciences.

OBSERVATION (not reason) is primary in natural science. Obs produces the data, and leads to the laws which are the aim of science.

D. INDUCTION (not deduction) becomes the method. This is a new logic that establishes itself at this time. Here the path to knowledge becomes neither the Aristotelian Logic of Classification that the Scholastics used, nor the Deductive Logic (mathematical) of the Rationalists.

E. As the 18th Ct progresses (i.e., as the Empiricist-Realist program develops) REASON will become looked upon as an acquisition rather than a heritage. Both Hobbs and Bacon (see Rychlak, p. 272-273) have already downgraded the intellect and made reason something we must acquire. Note how important this is. Reason must be downgraded for observation to be upgraded.

1. As a heritage note that in the Metaphysical systems of 17th Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza, Leibniz, REASON or thinking is the realm of the "eternal verities" of those truths held in common by the human and the divine mind.

a. Note also as Gadamer says in "Reason in the Age of Science" Kant and Hegel continue to develop Metaphysical systems in which self-consciousness, subjectivism, Reason holds a privileged position.

2. As a heritage REASON is the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and determination of truth. It is a kind of force which can't be known by its results but only by its function. Its most important functions are its power to dissolve (analyze) and to bind (to synthesize).

F. Important to note that at the beginning of 18th Ct. there is still no major cleavage between thinking (REASON) and experience (OBSERVATION). This comes as we move from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. First step in the process was to find a point of demarcation between the mathematical (deductive) sciences and the new spirit of inductive sciences. Didn't want to get rid of Math (The Queen of the Sciences) because it had been too beneficial. Wanted to get away from the authority of math.

IV. NEWTON AND HIS LASTING EFFECT

Before proceeding to consider the Empiricist movement from Locke to Berkeley to Hume will look at what Newton did and then the Grand Effect of Newton on coming generations through the Grand Machine World View.

A. What Newton did.

1. Primary contribution was to maintain that bodies are fundamentally **inactive**. Prior to this it had been held that bodies are fundamentally active.

This had the effect of splitting "Being" or inactive bodies from "Force" or activity. This meant that Being had to be acted upon.

(Should note that Newton was himself a dualist. Believed that matter is inactive and that spirit is active. Also believed that his laws of motion and gravity could hold (Being) organized wholes together in their current form. The laws, however, could never bring (Becoming) the organized wholes into such forms (see Prosch, p. 65).)

2. Newton also claimed that he formulated no hypotheses. Claimed that his laws stood forth as "observed correlations." Thus, observation and induction were his methods.
3. Newton was, of course, a materialist as far as natural sciences were concerned.

B. GRAND Effect of what Newton did.

1. The Grand Image of the Machine begins to define reality and knowing.

Newton's splitting of matter (inactive) and force led to the Metaphysical understating of the Mechanical Universe. This sometimes called the Billiard Ball notion of the Universe:

- a) "The notion that basically everything was made up of small solid particles, in themselves inert (inactive) but always in motion and elastically rebounding from each other, bound together by the laws of motion and gravitational forces and operating mechanically (Prosch 66)".
- b) This cosmology of classic mechanics of Newton saw the universe (and everything in it including man, of course) as perfectly symmetrical and absolutely precise. A clockwork universe as it is sometimes called.

Just as a machine could be analyzed down to smallest objective elements and understood in terms of causal relations among elements, all events in the universe must have a natural and knowable efficient cause.

Just as a machine is Objective in the sense that it emits no novel activity, the universe is objective.

All knowable reality then is reduced to the dimension of Objective Mechanism.

Because this cosmology defines reality in the categories of the machine, anything that does not seem to fit is defined as appearance. And appearance must be reduced to reality according to the dogma of this doctrine

2. Effect on SCIENCE of Newton's Machine Universe.

When the belief in this way of understanding is applied to the definition of science and when it becomes a faith rather than a proposal, it becomes SCIENTISM rather than SCIENCE. Scientism is the magical conception of natural science as omniscient and omnipotent.

- a). The Scientific effect of Newton's Machine Universe was to make Science in any domain of investigation (e.g., biology, ecology, geology, psychology) identical with giving a Mechanical Explanation to the Appearances of the Domain.

Mechanical Explanation (Science) came to mean:

- 1). Reduce the Appearance down to the smallest stable objective element. This is the observe and analyze method or the "analytic ideal", or the atomism, or the reductionism of mechanical explanation. (i.e., Find the "atom" of the subject matter such as the "cell" of biology; the "strata" of geology; the "reflex" or "response" of psychology).

In specific experimental methodology this is called defining the dependent variable of your research.

- 2). Observe (i.e., find) the forces that operate on the

atoms. For example, in Psychology find the Stimulus that causes the responses, or find the "risk" factor.

In specific experimental methodology this is called the Independent Variable, or the Antecedent Variable.

3). Induce the laws as they relate the antecedent and consequent variables. These may be mathematical form but they are inductions from the observations.

- b). Materialism and Naturalism. What mattered was mater. All objects and fields of study were equally explainable by reduction to atoms and the physical forces which moved them. Ambition (value, aim) of science of 18th Ct was "to impose a mathematical finality on history and biology and geology and mining and spinning (from F. Matson The Broken Image). It was the narrowest of scientism: The systematic reduction of all subjects and fields of knowledge to the dimensions and categories of natural science.

3. Effect on Science of MIND -- i.e., Psychology.

- a). From the base of the Subject -- Object split where Descartes made mind the Subjective, Newton's effect was to make mind Objective.

If mind were to be a knowable reality it must be moved from the appearance of subjective self to the reality of objective world; from the appearance of knower (active agency) to the reality of the known. In other words, mind must be reduced to objective mechanism.

Only "primary qualities" (number, figure, magnitude, position, motion) located in objects "out there" were substantively real (really real); "secondary qualities" (all else which the senses perceive or the mind assembles)

located in human mind were the appearances.

- b). Thus, man and mind as active agent, as subject, disappeared and reappeared as object. Mind itself became dissolved into particles in motion. These particles or elements themselves came to be held together by laws of association.
- (1). The changes in mind were partially anticipated by Descartes who had allowed that the body was an automaton subject to the laws of the machine but had exempted mind from mechanical reduction.
- (2). Changes furthered by Hobbs: (contemporary of and correspondent with Descartes). Mind and thought, and other human activity all reducible to motions of animal organism (body and motion were only adequate explanation). "Mental activities are motions of the nervous system arising as reactions to motions in the external world (Watson & Evans, p. 183)."

REASONING: Hobbs is important precursor of what is today called 'artificial intelligence,' 'production systems,' 'computational theory of mind.'

Reasoning depends on names, names on imagination and imagination on motion of the material body.

REASONING is computing, reckoning. In others, Kant, Hegel reasoning involves inference, interpretation:

"When a man reasons, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total from addition of parcels, or conceive a remainder from subtraction of one sum from another; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the name of the whole, or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of the other part. ... For REASON is nothing

but reckoning (1651,Leviathan)”

EXAMPLE from Steven Pinker 1 Jan 99 Science p. 40:
“Hobbs uses ‘reckoning’ in the original sense of
‘calculating’ or ‘computing.’” For example, if the definition
of ‘man’ is ‘rational animal,’ and we are told that
something is ‘rational’ and an ‘animal (names of parts),
we can deduce it is a ‘man’ (name of whole). . If these
symbols are represented as patterns of activity in the
brain [note Hobbs notion of motion of the nervous system
described above], and if some patterns trigger other
patterns because of the way the brain is organized, then
we have a theory of intelligence. That theory became the
basis of... much later, information processing models in
cognitive psychology, Noam Chomsky’s theory of
generative grammar, and programs for language and
reasoning in artificial intelligence.”

- (3). Others who contributed to these mechanical changes but
who will not be systematically presented include:

Spinoza -- (contemporary of Descartes and Leibniz.
Lived in Holland). According to Leibniz "Spinoza begins
where Descartes ended, in Naturalism.

V. LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME & UTILITARIANISM: 18TH
AND 19TH CENTURY STEPS IN THE FULFILLMENT
OF THE EMPIRICIST-REALIST PROGRAM. THE
EMPIRICIST HISTORICAL ROUTE TO THE PRESENT.

Remember that a new spirit is arising. It is observational and
inductive. It follows the advances of Newton. It is a
program that step by step will empty the human mind of
any active agency and will increasingly move the
understanding of mind toward being one object among
others.

Empiricism is itself an epistemology. Says that all knowledge comes from observation and only observation.

A. **John Locke** (1632-1704) (Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1690)

1. Great admirer of Newton. Locke's views rested on assumed materialism (Prosch, p. 84).
2. Locke attacked Descartes' notion of innate ideas. Illustrated the new 18th ct spirit in statement, "there is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses. This is the battle cry of empiricism itself. It is also Locke's Tabula rasa. At birth the mind is a blank slate.

Note that Leibniz refuted Locke by saying "Nothing except the intellect itself.", i.e., affirming the activity of mind.

Note also that this principle "there is nothing in the intellect which is not in the senses" which is the basis of empiricism is, in fact, something which could never be proven by empiricism. It could not, in itself, be found in sense perception or induced from sense perception.

3. Ideas come from sense impressions. Sensing occurs when impression from sense organs is transmitted to the mind. This sensing produces simple ideas which are not themselves divisible. Mind seems very passive and an initially empty vessel.
4. Locke distinguished two types of sensible qualities. Primary qualities and secondary qualities. Primary qualities (solidity, substance, figure, and mobility) are inseparable from objects in the natural world. These constitute the real and our ideas must accord with them to be true. Secondary qualities

(color, sounds, and tastes) are dependent on the nature of mind and are only "apparently real". The problem then is how can the real explain the apparently real. This is another way of saying how can objects and concepts be related in such a way that objects generate concepts.

That is Locke was left with the problem of showing how the content of thought (concepts or complex ideas) could be generated from simple or primary qualities (objects, or sense data). How do mind independent factors (primary qualities) lead to or generate mind-dependent qualities (secondary qualities)?

5. Actually Locke didn't have to answer this question because as it turns out the mind is not as passive as it first seemed. Remember at this time there is still not a radical split between thinking and experience that there will be later. Thus, Locke leaves the mind with certain active powers or active functions. These are the functions of comparing, distinguishing, judging, and willing. All of these are captured under the rubric "Reflection."
6. Remainder of British Empiricists will have this problem because Empiricist movement from Berkeley through Hume, as well as the French philosophical criticism represents a successive purging of these remaining faculties of the mind.
7. Locke did away with innate ideas of mind but still left mind and its innate active operations. This is his advance beyond Descartes and the first step in the development of the program that will end with Hume where there will be no mind.

B. Position of Locke and other Empiricists. The physically defined qualities of the stimulus object are the "building blocks" out of which the content (or substance of thought is generated

finds its modern proponents in learning theories and information processing cognitive theories. The information or stimulus is mind independent; the processing or response is mind dependent. How can one effect the other without the postulation of some common ground of which they are both particulars (In other words if you make subject-object poles of a unified activity matrix, you can work it out; but that's the dialectical-relational solution to be discussed later).

C. Bishop **George Berkeley** (1685-1703) (An essay toward a New Theory of Vision, 1709).

1. Wanted to maintain empiricism (knowledge from experience) and Newtonian Physics but wanted to get rid of Materialism.

2. Begins from assumption of empiricists (i.e., all knowledge comes fr senses. i.e., there can be nothing in the mind that is not first in the senses.

Almost Ends in a Subjective Idealism and Solipsism (i.e., that mind can know only its experiences and thus only what one experiences is real. This is the extreme subjectivism and relativism of Protagoras. *esse is percipi*, perception gives the real. See J. Margolis, The truth about relativism)

Berkeley ultimately saved from extreme relativism by importing the idea of God as the Universal Principle of Order (i.e., the Universal mind of which each human mind is a particular). This led to dilemma of inconsistency vs. solipsism will discuss later.

3. This journey begins with Berkeley's attack upon Locke's distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities. Berkeley showed there is no real distinction between them. Both are dependent on sensation or perception. Thus, both are Mind dependent.

Consequently we are locked into our own Sense Experience. The Real is what is perceived. Thus, esse (being) is reduced to percipi (perception). This is sense perception is one's experience and thus it remains an empiricism

4. This leaves us with no independent objects. Instead we are left with just sense impressions which Berkeley calls ideas. Ideas, note, are not abstract forms such as the idea of pure extension or pure motion independent of any particular. Ideas are particularistic images.

An abstract idea is a figment of the imagination, an error or disease of language. Abstract ideas cannot come through the senses so they can't be real. Berkeley was a nominalist. Only particular images are ideas.

5. Left then with particularistic images and with mind. However, mind no longer as with Locke has a central power or activity or function of representation. Mind simply the experience (hence empirical) of abstract, universal ideas. The question is how we go from the reality of particularistic images to Mind.

6. To define the general problem again: In commonsense experience (and here I do not mean Sense Experience) we have order and organization. For example, cs experience suggests objects have a certain size (i.e., size is a relative concept thus there is order among objects that define size); cs objects have a certain distance from other objects (again a relative concept); a certain position. But the problem is none of these abstract ideas is given in specific sense experience. How then can we explain the cs experience. Locke would have appealed to the activity of mind through its function of representation. Berkeley doesn't have this available to him because mind is now a passive receptacle.

Berkeley himself recognized the problem when he said, regarding distance (this was the specific idea that he wanted to explain) "distance is in its own nature imperceptible and yet it is perceived by sight."

7. Berkeley's attempted solution. First step, he gives broader meaning to "perception" beyond simply passive sensation. Perception includes the activity of representation. However, this activity is not the central and general activity of mind that Locke used. Instead this activity is the activity of each particular sense. This is a particularistic and peripheralistic type of activity.

Second step. With this notion of representation he claims that the content of every sense impression becomes represented or re-presented to consciousness (sensations or ideas are themselves passive). Further, every representation **causes** all other content that it is associated with in experience to also be represented to consciousness.

Step three. It is therefore through the reciprocal interplay of sense impressions; through the empirical regularity with which the particularistic sense impressions recall each other and represent each other to consciousness that one ultimately gets the "idea" (image) of spatial distance.

Because in the course of experience visual and tactual impressions become firmly joined (associated although Berkeley does not actually discuss association) to eventually get the "idea" of space and spatial distance.

8. It is in the transition from one type of impression to another that we must find the "idea". The transition, however, is strictly empirical. It is based totally on Habit and Practice (these make the reciprocal interplay) and only Habit and Practice. Prior to Berkeley the transition was Rational. It was before Berkeley Logical or Mathematical REASONING that led to the

IDEA. That is, before Berkeley, REASONING worked on sense impressions. Now with Berkeley reasoning does not lead from touch to vision ect. or back again. Only Habit and Practice do this.

THIS IS BERKELEY'S ADVANCE BEYOND LOCKE IN DEVELOPING THE EMPIRICIST PROGRAM. Berkeley empties the organism even further of its own operations, its own activity, its own reasoning.

9. Problem here is that we cannot have any homogeneous space (e.g., space as an envelope) that underlies all the senses and serves as a substratum. Leibnitz had seen a homogeneous space that united the data from various senses as the creation of mind (i.e., the function of the activity of mind) (Piaget does too). For Berkeley, "Homogeneous space" is a wrong headed abstraction.

For Berkeley we have as many spaces as there are senses. Optical, tactile, Kinesthetic. These are not related by common essence or abstract form. They are related only by regular empirical connection.

If this is so any notion of a "true" space loses all meaning. In fact the notions of universal or true notions of space, time, object, causality etc. all lose meaning. So "truth" or "reality" are totally relative to the individual's experience. Thus, we lose the possibility of any Universal Order and Organization.

10. No general principle of Order and Organization eventually bothered Berkeley. He therefore imported a principle of Order -- God. Claimed that the order, consistency, and stability of objects that we find in commonsense (but do not find in his theory) reside in the perceiving mind of God and each individual Mind is a particular of the Mind of God. Thus, each individual mind receives the benefits of the mind of God. ("As our ideas are to our minds, the order of nature is to God's

mind" Heidbredder, p. 45).

This ultimately, of course, is not Empiricism.

11. Berkeley's ultimate dilemma: Inconsistency or Solipsism (Extreme Subjectivism).

If nothing exists apart from consciousness (experience) how can God exist apart from my consciousness.

If only "I" as a spirit exist, I cannot get beyond solipsism. Yet if I assume the existence of other minds and the mind of God, then the objection applies to these that applied to other material things, i.e., that what is unperceived cannot really exist.

D. David Hume (1711-1776) (Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding)

Hume carries the Sensationistic Doctrine to its extreme and ends in a complete Skepticism concerning the possibility of valid knowledge.

Bishop Berkeley had destroyed the notion that material substance was the real. He had not destroyed the notion of either MIND (spiritual substance) or CAUSALITY. (For B, the Mind of God was the cause of our experiencing order and organization). "Berkeley's criticism had removed material substance, but had left a world of orderly events, dependent on a spiritual substance (Heidbredder, p. 48)." Mind and Causality are necessary for Order and Organization.

Hume employs a very simple and powerful method and ends up destroying both the notion of MIND and the notion of CAUSALITY. As a consequence there can be no **Necessary Coherence** to the world, that is, no universal principle of Order and Organization. This means there can be no valid

Knowledge because valid knowledge is knowledge that has a Necessary Logical Coherence to it (i.e., Universal & Necessary). There can be contingent knowledge but that is a different thing.

A. Hume's Method.

1. He simply turns the sensationistic thesis on the problem. If everything must come from observation and only observation, where then in sensory experience do we find SOUL, SELF, PERSONAL IDENTITY, MIND or any such universal (abstract idea). The answer is we do not find these anyplace in sensory experience.

2. Hume then says, OK if they are not in sensory experience then they are notions that need to be explained, they can't do the explaining.

a). Later Kant will agree that you can't find them in sensory experience but will claim them as synthetic a priori statements, i.e., universals that are necessary to explain the knowledge we have.

3. All we have as real then are PARTICULAR PERCEPTIONS. Thus, we have a flux of particular images. There is no simple substance that underlies all change.

B. Hume's attempt to account for the appearance of universal knowledge, i.e., the order and organization we seem to experience.

1. Hume first divides Perception into two categories.

a). Impressions. All sensations, passions & emotions as they make their first appearance. These are what would today be called perceptions or sensations.

b.). Ideas. These were faint copies of the original impressions.

2. Hume then introduces the principle of ASSOCIATION to try account for the order we appear to have in our ideas. It is to be a strictly an empirical relationship between ideas. (Note: Associationism attempts to explain relationship between ideas; not between ideas and things).

a) Hume's principle of association. This will involve the specific principles of Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, Causality. That is the order and organization, the universality and coherence will have to be adequately explained by these principles.

b) But even here we run into trouble because Hume then realized that Causality itself is not found in sensory experience.

c) CAUSALITY reduced to Contiguity.

1. Idea of "cause" involves the idea of a "necessary connection" between the cause and the effect. Hume's question is, again where in sensory experience do you actually see, observe "necessity?" Answer: You don't. All you actually see is Contiguity and Succession. He says that sensory experience only gives temporal order. This is where the Billiard Ball example comes in.

d). This could be attacked by a reductio ad absurdum. Karl Lashley's paper on problem of Serial Order shows that individual items of a temporal sequence do not in themselves have a temporal value in their association with other elements. That is, temporal order is itself not found in sensory experience. Order is imposed by some other agent.

e). It could also be shown that the principle of RESEMBLANCE or SIMILARITY is not given in direct sensory experience. Similarity is imposed by the active subject. Give example of "faces" that are "similar" despite no identical elements.

f) Contemporary outcome of Hume's Associationism: (Pinker, 1999). "Replace Hume's 'ideas' or 'sensible qualities' with 'stimuli' and 'responses,' and you get the behaviorism of Ivan Pavlov, John Watson and B. F. Skinner. Replace the ideas with 'neurons' and the associations with 'connections,' and you get the neural network models of D. O. Hebb and the school of cognitive science called connectionism (p. 40)."

C. Hume's Skepticism (Doubting of all things)

1. "Thus under Hume's criticism, the world collapsed into an aggregate of ideas, supported by no substance and connected by no necessity. The world as Hume saw it was a drift of ideas without connection, without permanence, without unity, without meaning, simply present and passing (Heidbreder, p. 48-49.). All the complex ideas or abstract ideas or what would be called categories such as Space, Time, Substance, Order, Relations, were nothing but particular images called ideas.

2. This is a world of doubt and this is Hume's skepticism.

3. In the end he became bothered by the discrepancy between "the extreme skepticism to which his reasoning had led him and the demands of everyday life (p.49)" and he could find no way to logically (i.e., through reason) reconcile the two. Thus he said "I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends" (i.e., everyday life is one thing) "and when, after three or four hours' amusement, I return to these speculations, they appear so cold and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any farther (p. 49). Here you get the sense of what

happens to all skepticisms. You must turn from them and go on to other things. This, indeed is what happened in the next century with respect to the empiricist agenda.

4. But major point is Skepticism about VALID KNOWLEDGE (UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY). Left with just contingent knowledge based on empirical associations.

E. Hume and Relation of Ideas and Objects.

1. Also note in passing that on the one hand, Hume believed that in terms of (**epistemology**) knowledge, we are locked into our perceptions, i.e., can't know objects independently of our senses.

On the other hand, he assumed an **ontological** position that there is a real sense-independent order of existence and this may be either correctly represented or distorted by our ideas. Then the question becomes how can we decide whether an idea is correct or a distortion.

Answer: He assumed that True Ideas have a greater Vivacity, or force, or firmness or steadiness.

Here again relativism and subjectivity enter. How to determine Truth of Idea if I hold very firmly to one idea and you to another?

VIII. The 19th Century. Continuation of the Empiricist Program by the Philosophical Radicalism, or Utilitarian Movement.

Hume's skepticism destroyed the notion of a relationship between NATURE & KNOWLEDGE. Destroyed the notion that by starting in the natural (i.e., in the objective) valid

knowledge could be established.

Hume's argument also left Mind as no more than a heap of perceptions.

The skepticism did not destroy EMPIRICISM as a position that claims that whatever knowledge there is (even contingent knowledge) must come from observation and only observation.

Thus, with the 19th Century there is a change in the nature of the problem. Now an attempt will be made to find a relationship between NATURE & FEELING and this attempt which will be called the Utilitarian Movement carries forth the Empiricist doctrines, and carries forth a notion of mind as a heap of perceptions.

In general, the argument from Hume's skepticism concerning valid knowledge goes this way: Because the only thing that man knows is that he can't know about "things" or even about his own intellectual principles, there is no special reason to reject the guidance provided by those aspect of his **instinctual nature** that are most natural and agreeable to him (see Prosch, p. 107). Thus the notion here is to look to feelings and use Newtonian method to explain Values, Morals, and Politics. That is attempt to explain Life and Action.

Hume said, "If I must be a fool, as all who reason or believe anything *certainly* are, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable (Prosch, p. 106)"

A. British Utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham, founder)

1. Used Naturalism (Newtonian Methods) to understand man's actions, values, morals, politics.
2. They thought it was a clearly established natural fact that man does (act) and ought to (moral) pursue pleasure and

avoid pain, i.e., pursue happiness. (This is the force that causes behavior of a basically passive or inactive organism.)

a). This, which will later be called in Freud the Pleasure-Pain Principle, had already been the basis for a naturalistic attempt by Hobbs to develop an ethics.

3. It was also held that if you generalize this pursuit of pleasure to society and to an ethic, it becomes the pursuit of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number."

4. However, if you thought of persons as individual "atoms" each would act on the basis of the crassest self-interest, rather than the interest of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

5. So you need some way of understanding the movement from individual self-interest to individual society interest. Here the principles of Association were used.

6 Thus both the Naturalism and the Associationism of the Empiricist continue to frame the way of understanding man and his actions through the 19th Century.

7. To actually follow this story we should go back and trace the course of British Associationism. If we were to do this we would focus on Associationism and go back to Aristotle, Hobbs, Locke, Hume, Hartley (traditionally known as the father of Associationism). Then we would go forward to Brown, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Baine, Wundt. Then to contemporary Associationism that is contained in contemporary Realist and Mechanistic approaches to Psychology.

Rather than following Associationism at this time we will now go back to the time immediately following Descartes and trace

the second route in our route histories of the development of psychology

VIII. LEIBNITZ, KANT & HEGEL: 18TH AND 19TH CENTURY STEPS IN THE RATIONALIST-INTERPRETATIONIST-CONSTRUCTIVIST PROGRAM. THE INTERPRETATIONIST HISTORICAL ROUTE TO THE PRESENT.

In contradistinction to the Empiricist program, the Rationalist program affirms the activity of Mind.

As an **epistemology** it affirms that Mind does not passively perceive an object given to it in its complete form. MIND, THROUGH ITS ACTIVITY, PROVIDES INTERPRETATION, CONFERS MEANING, IMPOSES STRUCTURE ON THE KNOWN. Thus Mind through its activity, in some measure constitutes or "creates" the object known.

As a theory of MIND, Mind will be defined as a system of activity. In Hume and the later empiricist man had become a passive empty organism. Mind was a passive receptacle. A heap of perceptions. In the present approach Mind is defined by activity.

This is not a PURE IDEALISM. Idealism denies the existence of objects. Interpretationism accepts that objects exist. It asserts that objects are never known independent of the state, condition, or purpose of the knower.

The knower is always a participant in what is known. We could never know a world independent of a knower. This would be a split in the knower-known relationship.

Note that in S-R theory there has always been the assertion that the S must be defined completely independently of the R. Can S ever be defined independently of the R. In the split

world of Descartes and the Empiricist, yes. In the position that we will now discuss, no.

Important implication of this interpretationist perspective is that since knowledge depends on the purpose of the knower, there can be different types of knowledge, and each type can be as valid as the others. Thus, there can be religious knowledge, mythical knowledge, scientific knowledge and each has its own validity. This implication is called PERSPECTIVISM (See Cassirer).

1. LEIBNIZ

A. Veined marble rather than the blank marble of Locke. This was a commitment to Necessary Organization of the Organismic position

B. In reply to Locke's "There is nothing in the intellect which is not in the senses" his statement "Nothing but the intellect itself" is a commitment to Activity of the Organismic position.

C. His discussion of monads (active unit) and the relation between this unit (the part) and the general is an affirmation of the Holism of the Organismic position.