

Political and Economic Motivations for Labor Control: A Comparison of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore*

Sandra Suárez

The global economy imposes many constraints on small economies, especially those pursuing export-oriented industrialization (EOI) through the attraction of foreign direct investment. It has been argued that the success of EOI depends on the government's ability to meet the labor requirements of this economic model—labor peace and low wages—through labor control policies and even repression. This article compares the histories of labor control in Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore, three island-nations of similarly small size and high degree of integration with the global economy. While the pressures for labor control during EOI are evident in each case, there is a great deal of variation in the strategies governments adopted to rein in organized labor. I argue that the labor control methods employed during EOI are not explained by an economic logic but by a political one inherited from an earlier period when labor control was motivated by the efforts of a dominant party to consolidate its power.

One of the most salient preoccupations of governments pursuing export-oriented industrialization (EOI) based on foreign direct investment (FDI) is to make sure that labor conditions are propitious. Such economic motivations have played an important role in shaping labor policy throughout the developing world. However, this article argues that legacies of dominant party efforts to consolidate party power years or even decades before the adoption of EOI are central to our understanding of labor relations. The use of inducements and constraints to control organized labor is examined before and after the transition to EOI in Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore. Even though their political structures and traditions are widely different, the party in power attempted to control labor as a way to consolidate its power. Later, dominant parties sought to meet the requirements of EOI—labor peace and low labor

Sandra Suárez obtained her Ph.D. from Yale University. She is an assistant professor in the department of Political Science at Temple University. Her research interests are in the areas of comparative economic development, investment and political strategies of multinational corporations, and industrial relations policies. She is the author of *Does Business Learn? Tax Breaks, Uncertainty and Political Strategies*.

Studies in Comparative International Development, Summer 2001, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 54–81.

costs—by relying on labor policies inherited from the past, even though they had been forged to pursue party consolidation under import substitution industrialization (ISI).

A comparison of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore helps assess the relative importance of economic and political motivations for labor control in three ways. First, the global economy is said to have a greater impact on small economies than on large ones (Haggard 1990: 29–32; Katzentein 1985). In addition, international market pressures have a greater impact on the domestic politics of countries that adopt an export strategy based on FDI because multinationals are attracted by a stable political framework in the host country, access to markets, low taxes, low wages, labor docility, and government control of unions (Bjorkman, Lauridsen, and Marcussen 1988; Deyo 1989; Gilpin 1987: ch. 6; Haggard 1990: 39, 222; Kuruvilla 1996). This argument implies that in the case of small economies pursuing an EOI strategy based on FDI, economic pressures must offer a better understanding of labor policies than political motivations. By contrast, this article argues and documents that, even in the case of small open economies, labor relations during EOI are best understood if we examine the political motivations for labor control that preceded the adoption of the new economic strategy.

Second, the comprehensive switch from ISI to EOI was not accompanied in Ireland, Puerto Rico or Singapore by a corresponding transition from old to new forms of labor control, but rather by a fundamental continuity in labor relations. While the outcome of labor control has been documented in many newly industrialized countries, this sequence of events is inconsistent with explanations based on the different functional economic requirements of ISI and EOI. And third, the persistence over time of politically motivated forms of labor control helps explain why differences in labor relations policies across the three countries are apparent even when the same economic strategy is pursued.

In Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore, the early stimulus for labor control came from political parties seeking to consolidate power years before the implementation of EOI. Labor control strategies were adopted by Fianna Fáil in Ireland long before the switch to export-oriented industrialization in the late 1940s, by the Puerto Rican Popular Democratic Party (PPD) before the 1947 policy shift towards exports, and by the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore before the 1965 embrace of export-led growth. Fianna Fáil sought the rationalization of the labor movement and a voluntary incomes policy under the threat of statutory control of wages. In Puerto Rico, efforts to control the labor union movement coincided with the coming to power of a new populist political party and with the demise of the old political regime based on agriculture and the protection of absentee landowners. In Singapore, the PAP's initial efforts to subordinate labor occurred when the country acquired its independence from Britain and was seeking a political union with the Federation of Malaysia. While not exclusively identified with its efforts to court labor, Fianna Fáil considered itself more representative of working class interests than the Labor Party, and sought to mobilize labor as a base of support. The Puerto Rican PPD adopted a populist strategy and also sought to mobilize or-

ganized labor as a base of support subject to the control of the party. In Singapore, the PAP sought the demobilization of organized labor because it was associated with the opposition. In the three cases, dominant parties, whose main goal would continue to be the consolidation of their power, retained and adapted, rather than dismantled, the institutions and practices of labor control inherited from the past in order to meet the requirements of export-led industrialization.

Political Parties, Labor Control, and Export-Oriented Industrialization

This article focuses primarily on the motivations and forms of labor control rather than on the outcomes of labor control. It follows the approach proposed by Collier and Collier (1979, 1991) to include as labor control not only constraints but also inducements. Constraints represent a more direct exercise of control “of labor organization and labor leaders,” whereas inducements are generally offered to persuade organized labor to accept government intervention in industrial relations (Collier and Collier 1991: 51–54, 1979: 969–970). Specific strategies of labor control differ in the balance between constraints and inducements, and in the number and range of measures introduced by the government. Though we can distinguish between four different strategies of labor control mentioned in the literature—corporatism or cooptation, partisan affiliation, repression, and the discipline of the market—they are not mutually exclusive.

Corporatism, broadly defined, is a non-competitive, institutionalized, and state-regulated system of interest representation (Schmitter 1974: 93–94). While corporatism is characterized by an exchange of inducements and constraints between the state and labor, inducements such as monopoly of representation or state subsidies “ultimately lead to state penetration and domination of labor organizations” because unions must agree to the controls imposed by the state (Collier and Collier 1991: 53). Classic examples of corporatism in the literature come from Western Europe and Latin America, but some corporatist arrangements are found in almost all political systems (Collier and Collier 1991; Schmitter 1974; Linz 1975: 311).

The second strategy, labor control through partisan affiliation, involves the deradicalization of unions that become affiliated to populist parties. Examples of labor-affiliated parties include the Peronists in Argentina, Democratic Action in Venezuela, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico. The use of repressive tactics to achieve the control and subordination of labor clearly involves more constraints than inducements. Many East Asian governments during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s opted for a more repressive approach to labor control (Deyo 1989). Finally, market liberalization is also a form of control where workers cease to be protected from the vagaries of the market. Unions in Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, South Korea, and Spain initially resisted liberalization policies because they feared the weakening effect of unemployment in formerly protected industries, an increase in union competition, and a reduction of subsidies. Mexico is an example of a country where all of these types of labor control mechanisms have been employed since the incorporation of the labor movement in the early 1900s (Burgess 1999; Collier and Collier 1991; Collier 1992, 2000; Murillo 2000).

Parties in power may be motivated to control labor for either economic or political reasons, or both. The literature on the relationship between economic and industrial relations policies has long emphasized that import-substitution and export-led strategies require different types of industrial relations frameworks. Under ISI, local firms and foreign multinationals manufacture goods for a protected domestic market. This economic strategy sanctions labor and union power as well as high wages, which presumably generate enough purchasing power to make import-substituting production profitable. Organized labor often becomes part of a political coalition with business and the state that focuses on protecting import-competing economic activities. This economic model, though in some cases the consequence of political consolidation, provided the basis for the creation and maintenance of labor-based parties in Latin America. By contrast, under EOI wages need to be kept relatively low so that a comparative advantage in labor-intensive production enables local and/or foreign firms to sell standardized goods in international markets. Both business and government generally see autonomous labor organization as a threat to EOI because it tends to put upward pressure on wages. Only wage hikes below productivity increases are willingly tolerated (Bjorkman, Lauridsen, and Marcussen 1988; Deyo 1989; Haggard 1990; Kuruvilla 1996; Gereffi and Wyman 1990).

Previous research has established a connection between EOI and government efforts to control labor costs and secure industrial peace. In his study of labor relations in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, Deyo (1989) argues that the goals of national development became hegemonic and legitimized the political exclusion of labor. The state severely curtailed the unions' independent capacity for political action in the early stages of implementation of the export-growth strategy and before unions could develop an independent capacity for political action. Kuruvilla (1996) also argues that in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the adoption of an export-oriented strategy was accompanied by the enactment of repressive labor policies. Deyo (1989) and Kuruvilla (1996) emphasize the particular requirements of an export-led strategy as the most important factor explaining labor relations policies. Hence, we would expect a similar degree of pressure for labor control legislation in other economies that adopt the same industrialization strategy. In the cases of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore, the evidence confirms the relationship between EOI and pressures to control labor.

Both Deyo (1989) and Kuruvilla (1996) acknowledge that the ability of the state to respond to the pressure for labor control policies under EOI will depend on "the institutional history of industrial relations," but do not explore this thesis systematically. In doing so, however, they present labor control strategies during EOI as new forms of control motivated solely by an economic logic. They fail to emphasize that labor control strategies are not only associated with the requirements of a new economic strategy, but follow a political logic that in many cases represents a continuation of prior labor relations policies. In the cases of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore, the labor control strategies during EOI were inherited from the past. In turn, these pre-EOI labor control strategies were primarily shaped by the efforts of dominant parties

to consolidate their power, and secondarily by the requirements of a particular model of economic development.

In their comparative study of Latin America, Collier and Collier (1991) examine the political motivations for labor control. They argue that in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela the driving force behind the incorporation of labor into the political arena was the effort of parties or party movements to gain popular support. In these cases, inducements played a central role in the exchanges between labor and political leaders. By contrast, the cases of Brazil and Chile are an example of what Collier and Collier refer to as "state incorporation" where the main goals of the state are the "depoliticization" of the labor movement (1991: 163). More recently, new forms of labor control represent a crisis in the attempt of labor-based parties to retain popular support when they adopt liberal market reforms. As historically labor-based parties withdraw their economic patronage of labor, they must find ways to diversify their support, further diminishing the political and economic role of unions (Collier 1992, 2000; Burgess 1999; Murillo 2000). When the party is not able to punish unions for withdrawing their support, unions are likely to sever their allegiance to the party, as in the case of the General Workers' Union and its relationship to the Socialist Party in Spain during the 1980s (Burgess 1999). By contrast, in Mexico, market liberalization during the 1980s, combined with strikes and the use of the state's administrative power over union registration, resulted in a decline in organized labor's political and economic influence (Middlebrook 1995: 254–307; Collier 1992).

In Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore one also observes the government combining constraints and inducements to secure labor support. But while the decisive switch to EOI posed new challenges, labor policy followed a general political logic that proved remarkably resilient. Thus, Fianna Fáil's labor policies did not deviate from the rationalization and voluntary incomes policies adopted during the pre-EOI period, when it sought to control labor but also retain the support of important segments of the movement. The Puerto Rican PPD also continued with its efforts to both control labor as well as secure its support by co-opting labor leaders and obstructing the role of unions in collective action. The populist appeal of the party was no longer based solely on material benefits offered by the government but on the initial success of the EOI strategy. And Singapore's PAP continued its policy of repression and statutory restrictions on organized labor in an effort to domesticate it. Only in Ireland would the discipline of the market have an impact on the behavior of organized labor, encouraging the leading labor leaders to become partners in economic policy making thirty years after the government's adoption of EOI.

A Comparative Study of Three Island-Nations

Judging from the experiences of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore, the key to industrialization and economic growth is to adopt an export-led growth strategy based on the attraction of foreign direct investment through tax breaks. By all accounts, this strategy has contributed to the transformation of these islands into economic miracles within their respective regions. Today, the per

capita GDP adjusted for inflation of Ireland has surpassed that of the United Kingdom, Singapore's is the highest among Asian countries, and Puerto Rico's remains the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank 2000).

The three economies are also closely integrated with other economies: Ireland with those of Britain and the rest of the European Union, Puerto Rico with the United States, and Singapore with the global economy in general. In the three economies, foreign investment and manufacturing exports have come to represent a substantial component. In 1998 the ratio of exports-to-GDP was 84.4 percent in Ireland, 112.7 percent in Puerto Rico, and 200.2 percent in Singapore (EIU 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Puerto Rico was the first to experiment with an export strategy based on the attraction of FDI, and its experience helped influence the governments of Ireland and Singapore, among others, through the dissemination efforts of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and the United States International Cooperation Administration (Arndt 1987: 84; Drysdale 1984: 250; NYT 1960: 35). The three cases are also similar in that there was a period of ISI prior to the adoption of an export-led strategy, although in Puerto Rico and Singapore it was considerably shorter than in Ireland.

In addition to the adoption of an EOI strategy based on FDI, there are a number of similarities that warrant a comparative study of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore. The three islands have small populations, between 3.2 and 3.9 million, and long colonial histories, which had a considerable impact on the character and extent of labor unionization. In the three cases, one dominant party was clearly discernible, and was able to hold on to power over a long period. The differences in political system and structure are considerable, however. Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a strong multiparty system. Puerto Rico is not a sovereign country but a U.S. territory. Yet, its development policy has not been dictated by the colonial authority, in stark contrast to Hong Kong under British rule (Haggard 1990). Its political leaders are democratically elected and its political institutions are characterized by separation of powers and checks and balances. Ireland and Puerto Rico have different yet quite significant limitations to their sovereignty, the former as a member of the European Union and the Euro, and the latter as the oldest colony in the world, whose laws have to be consistent with U.S. federal statutes. Finally, Singapore is a titular democracy with a parliamentary system, and a strong executive with one dominant party. These differences in political structure have shaped each government's approach to labor relations independent of the similarities in economic strategy.

The next sections examine the experiences with labor control in Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore during the period preceding the transition to export-led growth, and during the subsequent implementation of this industrialization strategy. This analysis underscores the sequence of events leading to labor control and the interplay between political and economic considerations. Particular attention is given to (1) dominant political parties' political and economic motivations for labor control, and the different labor control strategies (i.e., the different combinations of constraints and inducements they offered to labor); (2) organized labor's strength measured in terms of unity and/or mem-

bership, and its response to the control efforts of the dominant party; and (3) the outcomes in terms of the success or failure of the government in controlling labor costs and achieving industrial peace. Though the degree to which labor control was achieved is not the object of this study, it is a necessary part of the story. As the discussion to come suggests, dominant political parties in Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore sought to control labor years, even decades before the EOI strategy required such controls. In turn, these politically motivated forms of control proved extremely durable even after EOI became the dominant economic development strategy.

Ireland: Europe's "Tiger Economy"

Fianna Fáil, whose main political ideology was nationalism, began its efforts to secure labor as a base of support soon after the party gained a majority of seats in the Dáil (Irish parliament) in 1933. New social and labor legislation was designed to gain favor with labor. Regulation of organized labor coincided with World War II and contained a combination of constraints and inducements designed not only to rationalize but also to divide the trade union movement by favoring Irish-based unions at the expense of British-based unions, thereby ensuring the support of the former. After the war, labor support of Fianna Fáil was equivocal partly as a result of the restrictions imposed on labor, and partly because the party was no longer able to improve the material conditions of workers. Electoral defeats in 1948 and 1954 reflected the loss of labor support. After its return to power in 1951 and 1958, Fianna Fáil was unable to come up with a strategy that would simultaneously secure the political support of labor and meet the requirements of EOI. The party's actions suggest that it continued to be primarily motivated by political concerns as it sought to restore its alliance with the working class. Thus, while in the early 1960s the party began to encourage union participation in corporatist institutions, other than appeal to the unions for wage restraint, there was no radical change in labor policy under EOI. This state of affairs lasted until the mid-1980s when Irish unions finally agreed to become a partner in economic planning.

Labor Control Before Export Growth, 1922–1948

At the time of independence in 1922, the trade union movement in Ireland was divided. Irish labor leaders, feeling ignored by the British Trade Union Congress, had decided in 1894 to organize their own Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC). Still, divisions continued between British-based (also known as amalgamated) and Irish-based unions, and between general and craft unions. In the early 1920s British-based trade unions represented over half of Irish union membership. Sectionalism was also characteristic of Irish-based unionism, exemplified by the rivalry between the Irish Transport and General Workers Unions (ITGWU) and the workers Union of Ireland (Gunnigle, McMahon, and Fitzgerald 1999: 10; Allen 1997: 27–28; O'Connor 1992: 55, 58, 119).

In 1926 Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Ireland) was established under the leadership of Eamon de Valera. The party's platform included the introduction of

protective tariffs to promote the development of domestic industry and reduce the country's economic dependence on Britain. In 1933 the party won an absolute majority in the Dáil. Fianna Fáil was a catch-all party, and it "managed to be simultaneously sympathetic to trade unionism and to state capitalism" (Lee 1982: 182; O'Connor 1992: 129; Allen 1997: 25–6). The protectionist program of the party resulted in an increase in industrial employment and income, and social and labor legislation was designed to consolidate the electoral support of labor. This included a housing program, unemployment benefits, and the Conditions of Employment Act of 1936 and 1939, which provided workers with benefits such as paid holidays, a working week of 48 hours, and the legal enforcement of wage agreements. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, Séan Lemass, defended the legislation by arguing that "the employment of workers and their remuneration 'cannot be left to be determined by the laws of supply and demand'" (Horgan 1997: 83–84; Allen 1997: 47; O'Connor 1992: 129–30). As Horgan explains, the actions of Lemass "could be interpreted as a canny and hugely successful attempt ... to consolidate Fianna Fáil's electoral support" (1997: 84).

The improvement in labor conditions "lent a new confidence to workers" (Allen 1997: 51). Union membership increased and labor unrest was on the rise. However, Irish unions continued to be divided. The leadership of the ITGWU insisted that British-based unions and the proliferation of smaller unions were the cause of unrest. A few years earlier, the leadership of the ITGWU had argued that "it is inconceivable that an English-organized union can continue to operate indefinitely in this country. Sooner or later this must be fought and the sooner the better for the working class of Ireland" (as cited in Allen 1997: 59). By the 1940s some Fianna Fáil ministers agreed that union fragmentation and British-based unions were the cause of labor instability and began to press for more repressive action against the unions. The party supported the idea of a fully Irish labor movement because it believed that for British-based unions class interests would always supersede the interests of the Irish Free State. Hence, in spite of the pressures to take repressive measures against the unions, Fianna Fáil did not entirely lose the allegiance of an important segment of organized labor because the party's support for Irish unionism dovetailed with the interests of the largest Irish-based union, the ITGWU (Allen 1997: 51–60; O'Connor 1992: 132–33, 135).

World War II resulted in shortages of food, imported fuel, raw materials, and manufactured goods, and marked the beginning of Fianna Fáil's change in attitude towards labor exemplified by its efforts to control and rationalize the movement through legislation. Clearly, the party and Lemass were being pulled in many different directions. First, there was the objective of securing trade union support at the same time that some members of the party pressed for more repressive labor legislation. Second, the fact that Irish workers were members of amalgamated unions was politically objectionable and presumably an obstacle to a national industrial policy, but a divided movement was not conducive to a national wages policy either. And third, the party's effort to divide the labor union movement in favor of the Irish-based unions at a time when a considerable number of unionized workers were members of British-

based unions was also an obstacle to the rationalization of the movement (Horgan 1997: 121). These conflicting objectives were evident in the balance between constraints and inducements in the labor legislation of the 1940s.

The goals of the Trade Union Act of 1941 were “to discourage the formation of new unions and to cut down the number of existing ones.” In effect, however, the statute was also designed to gain the support of Irish-based unions for the government’s intervention in industrial relations. It stipulated that bodies that wanted to have collective bargaining privileges needed to acquire a “negotiating license,” mainly by depositing a fixed sum of money with the High Court. The rationale was that small unions would have trouble raising the necessary funds for the license. Irish-based unions would have part of their deposit waived, however. The Act also established a Trade Union Tribunal with the power to confer sole negotiating rights to one or two unions, but British-based unions would not be permitted to secure sole negotiating rights. A few days after the publication of the Trade Union Act, the government announced the Wage Standstill Order, which prohibited employers from granting wage increases and made strikes challenging the order criminal acts. The wage freeze, which represented an obvious constraint on organized labor and was perceived by many unions as worse than the Trade Union Act, served to increase the “acceptability” of the latter. In turn, Lemass “announced that he would be prepared to consider changes in the Wages Standstill Order, but only for unions that had taken out negotiating licenses under the Act” (Horgan 1997: 120–125; McCarthy 1977: 204–5, 245; Allen 1997: 74). The amendments were seen as an effort to preserve the support of labor (Farrell 1991: 76).

In 1945, interunion rivalry and the efforts of Fianna Fáil to divide the movement culminated in a split within the ITUC. Irish-based unions seceded from the union congress to form the Congress of Irish Unions (the split lasted until 1958 with the creation of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions [ICTU]). Still, Fianna Fáil’s efforts to control the labor union movement and keep the support of Irish unions suffered a serious setback when in 1946 the Supreme Court declared that the exclusion of British-based unions from enjoying sole negotiating rights was unconstitutional. The party’s bias in favor of Irish-based unions continued to be reflected, however, in official appointments to government boards and international organizations (Farrell 1991: 76; Horgan 1997: 124).

In another effort to gain favor with labor, the party enacted the Industrial Relations Act, establishing a Labor Court to settle disputes between workers and employers, which were bound to surface after the lifting of the wage freeze. The statute was another “Fianna Fáil strategy for forging an enduring alliance with the working class,” and also involved a combination of constraints and inducements (Bew, Hazelkorn, and Patterson 1989: 170–71). For example, the Court was made up of representatives of both unions and employers, but only licensed unions would be recognized. Licensed unions gained “a more secure status,” and the implicit and explicit obstacles to the formation of new small unions promoted the rationalization of the movement (O’Connor 1992: 155). Labor supported the act, and once the Wage Standstill Order was lifted, negotiations over wage increases (sometimes under the threat of statutory control of wages) led to a regular increase in wages that became known as the “wage

rounds.” While not successful in controlling the rise in wages, the rounds characterized labor relations during the first ten years of EOI in Ireland (Gunnigle, McMahon, and Fitzgerald 1999: 190–91; Roche 1989: 116–17).

Labor Control and Export-Led Growth after 1948

After the war, labor support of Fianna Fáil was ambiguous as a result of the restrictions imposed on labor and because the party was no longer able to improve the material conditions of workers. The party’s apparent move to the center opened the way for the Labor party and Clann na Poblachta (made up of republican activists committed to social justice), among others, to gain support (Mair 1987: 52–53). In 1948 a coalition of conservative, populist, and left-leaning parties took office as the first “interparty government,” which lasted until 1951. It was under this coalition government that reforms to encourage industrialization, exports, and foreign investment were first introduced. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was created in 1949 and put in charge of attracting foreign capital and efforts to encourage exports included the creation of the Irish Export Board in 1951 (Lee 1989: 309–310). The second interparty government took office in 1954. In October of 1956, IDA was given the power to distribute grants to export oriented industries (Kennedy, Giblin, and McHugh 1988: 63; Allen 1997: 108). But the key to the attraction of foreign direct investment was the Export Profits Tax Relief of 1956, exempting 50 percent of profits earned from increases in exports sales for a period of ten years. In 1958 the exemption was raised to 100 percent (O’Malley 1989: 72–3).

Though the interparty government initiated the country’s shift to EOI, the newly elected government of Fianna Fáil was credited with the comprehensive switch from protectionism to free trade and export-led growth in 1959. The shift in policy coincided with a period of economic growth. The unions had supported the shift in strategy from protectionism to free trade and attraction of foreign capital, but, as had been the case in the 1940s, one of the effects of economic growth was the increase in trade union membership, militancy, and demands for pay increases. Aware that the wage increases and labor unrest were hurting Ireland’s competitiveness, then Prime Minister Séan Lemass, tried to coordinate unions and employers through the creation of the Employer-Labor Conference (1962) and the National Industrial and Economic Council (1963). Lemass also sought to “reinvigorate Fianna Fáil’s claim to be ‘Ireland’s Labour Party’” through increases in social spending made against the advice of his economic advisers and of domestic capital (Bew, Hazelkorn, and Patterson 1989: 84–85).

In turn, while union leaders had begun to see themselves as national decision makers, rank-and-file revolts continued throughout the 1960s. Trade union membership increased from 310,000 in 1960 to 362,400 in 1965, and 416,300 in 1970. Between 1959 and 1970, six more wage increases were negotiated, but the difference of pay between the different types of labor led to a great deal of discontent and an increase in wage competition among unions. A number of bills designed to increase government control of wages were considered but

failed due to lack of political will and opposition from the unions (Allen 1997: 116–122; Hardiman 1988: 47, 129; Gunnigle, McMahon, and Fitzgerald 1999: 91–2). By the same token, Lemass was criticized for being swayed by political rather than economic considerations when it was seen as supporting higher than expected wage increases. Thus, Farrell tells us, “Lemass was willing to sacrifice economic good sense on the altar of electoral necessity” (Farrell 1991: 121; Lee 1989: 402).

In the meantime, progress towards free trade continued with the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement of 1966 and Ireland’s entry into the European Economic Community in 1973 (Lee 1989: 357–8). Access to the European common market offered new incentives to foreign investors, but wage increases continued to reduce Ireland’s competitiveness. Accordingly, labor-intensive sectors suffered in the 1970s and unemployment rose (Kennedy 1989: 358). Once again, the government of Fianna Fáil sought union involvement in the Employer Labor Conference, but the ICTU refused to support the idea. It only agreed to participate after the government proposed statutory control of wages. The First National Wage Agreement was reached in 1970 and it involved for the first time considerable intervention by the government in the process of pay determination, and by organized labor in the public policy-making process (Roche 1989: 118; Hardiman 1988: 57–8). In 1971 the government of Fianna Fáil passed another statute which combined elements of constraints and inducements to promote the centralization of the trade union movement that began with the Trade Union Act of 1941. “The aim of the [Trade Union Bill] was to help shore up the authority of the ICTU leaders by making it more difficult to establish ‘breakaway unions’” (Allen 1997: 145; Kerr 1989: 218–219). The Trade Union Act of 1975 also promoted rationalization by offering inducements in the form of financial support to unions that merged (Kerr 1989: 223).

Six more wage agreements were reached in the period between 1972 and 1978, and two national understandings were negotiated in 1979 and 1980. While these agreements became more “sophisticated,” they did not secure industrial peace, control inflation, or create jobs (Hardiman 1988: 46). During this period, Fianna Fáil and a series of coalition governments pursued similar policies that sought to maintain a centralized framework for pay agreements. Yet, in the late 1970s Fianna Fáil was more likely than not to support agreements even if the level of pay increase was higher than what the government had initially recommended (Hardiman 1988: 215; 1992: 345). The party’s behavior towards the unions is not surprising if one considers that the 1970s featured a great deal of electoral volatility. Between 1973 and 1987, Fianna Fáil, while still the dominant party, was the governing party for only five out of fourteen years (Mair 1987: 38). Heightened electoral competition combined with “Fianna Fáil’s own vaunted freedom from ideological commitments dispose[d] it to adopt a relatively short-time scale ... approach to mediating distributive conflict” and resulted in a relatively accommodating attitude towards organized labor (Hardiman 1992: 344).

During the 1980s Ireland experienced a long recession. There was a decrease in union membership and in unofficial and official strikes, reflecting an increasingly weaker trade union movement. The government also faced a cri-

sis in its public sector deficit, and debt resulting from rising payroll and social welfare costs and foreign debt (Gunnigle, McMahon, and Fitzgerald 1999: 195–99; Hardiman 1988: 221–2; Sinnot 1995: 38–40, 50; Sweeney 1995). With the trade union severely weakened, the ICTU saw no other choice but to collaborate with the government. “By collaborating with government policy and entering into a national agreement the unions would be seen to be getting wage increases, albeit modest ones, which they hoped would help to retain and attract new members” (Gunnigle, McMahon, and Fitzgerald 1999: 205). The Programme for National Recovery was finalized in 1987. Though the rank and file was not pleased with the severity of the spending cuts and government demands for wage moderation, union leaders agreed that the alternative would have been to become “marginalized ‘as British trade unions had been under Thatcherism’” (quoted in Hardiman 1988: 234).

Other agreements were negotiated in 1990, 1994, and 1997. And in early 2000, the ICTU voted to enter into a new agreement, the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness. Together these five agreements have resulted in moderate wage increases, especially when compared to the 1970s. For the first time since independence, the country is now characterized by its industrial peace. The social partnership agreements, the legislation to encourage trade union rationalization, and the discipline of the market have combined to enable Ireland to meet the requirements of EOI 30 years after the policy shift to EOI.

The Irish case makes evident that efforts by the dominant party to consolidate its power shaped labor control strategies before and after the adoption of EOI. During the early 1940s Fianna Fáil began to promote the rationalization of the labor movement and passed legislation requiring unions to pay for a negotiating license, establishing a Trade Union Tribunal that could grant sole negotiating rights to one or two unions, and a Labor Court where only licensed unions would be recognized. These efforts were supported by important segments of Irish labor. By the end of the 1940s, however, Fianna Fáil faced numerous challenges to its power and consequently, other than unsuccessful appeals for wage restraint, the party did not work out a new labor relations strategy to fit the new economic logic. While the party began to promote corporatists arrangements more forcefully in the 1960s, it was also concerned with securing the support of labor and was more likely to place political interests before economic ones even after its decisive switch to EOI. When these efforts failed, the party considered but did not have the political will to take more decisive action to control wages, in spite of the fact that Irish exports were becoming less competitive as a result of the wage hikes. During the 1970s the party continued its accommodating attitude towards labor in the context of heightened party competition.

Puerto Rico: “Showcase of Development”

In Puerto Rico, the PPD sought to control the organized labor movement to win the legislature in 1940 and then to consolidate its power. The methods employed by the PPD to rein in labor included control over the registration of unions, regulation of wages, as well as the creation of institutions to facilitate

conflict resolution and mechanisms to manage the internal organization of unions and other terms of employment. The biggest obstacle to the development of an autonomous labor union movement in Puerto Rico, however, was the fact that many union leaders were government officials and party leaders. Efforts by the PPD to co-opt the labor movement resulted in the split of the leading labor organization, the General Confederation of Workers (CGT). These institutions and practices of labor control primarily followed a political logic, and they were maintained after the government's shift to EOI in 1947. Subsequently, the PPD made sure that improvements in wages, education, and health were associated with the party, thereby ensuring the workers' support for the party and for the government's involvement in industrial relations. From the mid-1940s on, the Puerto Rican labor movement has been characterized by its fragmentation, compounded since the 1950s by the activities of U.S. mainland unions. Yet by the early 1960s workers were so satisfied with their material advancements that very few saw the need to join unions (Wells 1969: 274). After contributing to the depoliticization, fragmentation, and weakening of organized labor, the leader of the PPD justified the government's involvement in labor relations by arguing that the labor union movement was too divided to effectively represent the interests of Puerto Rican workers (Galvin 1979: 149).

Labor Control Before Export Growth, 1898–1947

In 1898 the U.S. gained possession of Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American war. Two years later the island was granted free access to the U.S. market, made part of the U.S. monetary system, and prohibited from setting its own tariffs or negotiating commercial agreements with other countries. Puerto Rico, however, was allowed to keep its own separate tax jurisdiction. Since 1917 Puerto Rico has had an elected House and Senate while U.S. presidents appointed the governor. Puerto Ricans were allowed to elect their own chief executive in 1948.

In the early 1900s the island's economy became transformed by the influx of U.S. mainland capital into sugar and tobacco production. By 1930, 60 percent of sugar production was controlled by U.S. absentee owners, 80 percent of tobacco, 60 percent of public utilities and banking, and 100 percent of the shipping business (Lewis 1963: 88–89). Industrial relations in the sugar industry were tense and strike-prone. Sugar corporations refused to sign or simply ignored agreements made with the workers and the AFL-affiliated Free Federation of Workers (FLT) (Galvin 1979: 72–6). By 1915, Puerto Rican labor leaders, convinced that labor militancy had not resulted in a significant improvement in the lot of Puerto Rican workers, decided to resurrect the Socialist Party. From 1932 to 1940 the Socialist Party became part of a governing coalition with the Republican Party, which represented the landowners. The leadership of the FLT became “conciliatory” to the colonial government as it fought for government jobs and control over patronage (Galvin 1979: 64, 82). Ultimately, the FLT leadership's collaboration with the landowners and the government cost them the support of the rank and file (Galvin 1979: 64, 84–5).

In 1940, citing the failure of the FLT and the Socialist party to represent the interests of the workers, 42 unions representing over 70,000 workers came together to form the CGT (Silén 1978: 96–7). The “CGT was calculated to avoid the traps the FLT had fallen into . . . it was crucial to avoid the co-optation of the labor movement by any particular political party” (Dietz 1986: 222). Involved in the creation of the new confederation, however, were the same individuals who had founded the PPD party two years earlier. The latter had an interest in controlling the labor movement as the means to gain and subsequently retain political power.

The PPD’s platform emphasized agrarian reform; government-sponsored enterprises; minimum wage legislation; and unemployment, disability, and retirement insurance (Morales Carrión 1983: 244; Pagán 1972: II 154–6). In the 1940 elections the PPD won a parliamentary majority in the senate with the help of the CGT, and in 1944 a majority in both the House and Senate. The CGT also gained strength at the expense of the FLT and, by 1942, the confederation represented 159 unions with a total membership of 150,000 (Silén 1978: 106–10). The PPD delivered on many of its electoral promises, including the Minimum Wage Board, the Water Resources Authority, the Development Bank, and the Puerto Rico Development Company (also known as Fomento). Under the Leadership of Teodoro Moscoso, Fomento invested in government-owned and run cement, glass, paper, pottery, and shoe factories. These companies represented Puerto Rico’s failed experiment with import substitution. The companies operated at a loss, and strikes in the glass, cement, and cardboard factories affected their productivity (Maldonado 1997: 48). Problems with the unions were seen as a liability for the PPD, which claimed to be a pro-worker party.

In the meantime, the CGT had been experiencing tensions between those members who sought to prevent the fate of the FLT and wanted to prohibit confederation leaders from becoming government officials, and those who wanted to promote a close association with the party in power. The former resented the PPD’s efforts to “control the direction” of the confederation. The party named CGT leaders to political posts and expected party leaders to be leaders of the confederation as well. The PPD also became involved in an anti-communist campaign, which contributed to the alienation of communist labor leaders and further divided the union movement (Silén 1978: 113–15). The leader of the PPD, Muñoz Marín, who at the time was the president of the Senate, became personally involved in labor conflicts, generally on the side of the unions. He acquired a reputation for being a “champion of the underdog and ultimate authority in all controversies” (Galvin 1978: 96–98). In 1945 the party succeeded in splitting the confederation into two factions, the government faction known as CGT Gubernamental, and the authentic faction known as CGT Auténtica. By the mid-1950s both factions had dissolved.

The breakup of the CGT coincided with the enactment of the Labor Relations Law of 1945, formulated to enable the state to “intervene in labor disputes in order to ‘preserve industrial peace and to guarantee the maximum productive capacity for society’” (Cabán 1984: 158–9). The law also defined collective bargaining agreements as “instruments by which to advance the public policy of the government in its efforts to stimulate production to the maxi-

num” (Ibid., 159). Separate agencies were also established to regulate the registration of unions, facilitate conflict resolution, and provide educational, technical, and monetary aid to unions. Clearly, these institutions combined constraints and inducements designed to gain the support of organized labor. They were the means through which “the state sought to formulate a rationalized and highly integrated structure [to facilitate its influence over] the conduct of unions” (Ibid., 160).

Export-led Growth and Labor Control after 1947

By 1947, there was a realization that Puerto Rico lacked the capital necessary for an industrialization drive. Moscoso and Muñoz Marín decided that industrialization would be achieved not with government enterprises but through the attraction of private foreign capital. The government’s strategy to lure U.S. investors to the island included low-wage labor but also a 100 percent local tax exemption—to work in conjunction with U.S. federal tax breaks that allowed tax-free investments in the possessions (Dietz 1986: 275; Suárez 2000: 24–25).

The PPD, which initially sought control over the labor union movement for political reasons, would now discipline the workers in order to ensure the success of the new industrialization strategy based on export-oriented FDI. Labor control was facilitated by labor legislation enacted during the period of import-substitution. These laws, which represented “an overall policy of closely regulating the formation and operation of trade unions while at the same time undermining working class support for these organizations,” were passed because government officials had foreseen that the industrialization of the island would likely be accompanied by the development of industrial unions (Cabán 1984: 157–58). In turn, the PPD wanted to control the development of industrial unions and secure their allegiance to the party before they developed an autonomous capacity for political action. Subsequently, any legislation that attempted to increase the power of unions was blocked. Then Governor Muñoz Marín argued that such legislation was unnecessary because “the workers of Puerto Rico have right here in La Fortaleza [the governor’s mansion] an indubitable representative of their justice” (as quoted in Anderson 1965: 214). In 1951, leaders of the PPD, which dominated the Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention, dealt a severe blow to the labor union movement by denying government employees the right to strike and bargain collectively. The constitution did guarantee these rights for persons employed in the private sector and 101–3 public corporations (Galvin 1979: 101–103; Cabán 1984: 158).

The means to control wages had also been established prior to the adoption of EOI with the creation of the Minimum Wage Boards in 1941. Minimum wage levels for a number of Puerto Rican workers had come under the jurisdiction of the federal government after the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Initially, enforcement of the law in Puerto Rico adversely affected a number of industries. In 1940 the U.S. relaxed its application on the island (Ross 1976: 41–44). The majority of Puerto Rican workers, however, came under the jurisdiction of insular minimum wage legislation which, compared to the federal statute, extended government control over labor well be-

yond wages. “In addition to minimum wages, higher occupational rates could be established, as could provisions concerning hours, overtime pay, vacations, and other terms of employment” (Reynolds and Gregory 1965: 42–48). Both federal and insular minimum wages were determined by the Minimum Wage Boards, under which tripartite committees representing employers, labor, and the government set wages on an industry-by-industry basis. This minimum-wage fixing process clearly preempted the role of unions in collective bargaining. The Wage Boards were instructed not to grant wage increases that would threaten employment and in effect served to maintain “low, internationally competitive wages . . . during the 1950s” (Cabán 1984: 158–59). Muñoz Marín and the PPD justified this policy by arguing “the worst wage of all is no wage” (Galvin 1979: 147). Generally, however, the application of the minimum wage in Puerto Rico did improve the salaries of many workers. Hence, while government’s statutory control over wages is an example of a constraint provision, it had a positive effect on the affected workers, thereby ensuring their cooperation.

In addition, socioeconomic achievements in the areas of health and education contributed to the workers’ continued support for the industrialization strategy and the PPD. The period between 1949 and 1967 was characterized by a “relatively high degree of labor tranquility . . . only with rare exceptions did effective challenges to the state or foreign capital emerge from organized labor” (Cabán 1984: 150). This in spite of the fact that in the 1950s labor unions based in the U.S. mainland, also known as internationals because of their Canadian affiliates, had started to arrive in Puerto Rico along with the subsidiaries of U.S. mainland companies.

In 1968 the PPD was divided, and the rival, pro-statehood New Progressive Party (PNP) won control of the executive and the House. Labor unrest and strike activity increased as labor sought to negotiate wage increases that had been denied during the PPD government. In 1972, the PPD returned to power, but the new administration encountered a labor union movement markedly different from the one during the Muñoz Marín era: hopelessly divided between the internationals and the independent, unaffiliated Puerto Rican-based unions (Cabán 1989: 579–80; Pantojas García 1990: 132–33). In 1972 there were about 550 labor organizations, 100 of which were independent and the remainder 450 were nominally affiliated with one of the 17 central organizations. Moreover, the island economy was in a recession in 1973–1976, and the pressures to maintain memberships during this period led to unprecedented levels of competition and “cannibalism” among unions (Pantojas-García 1990: 122–23, 103; Cabán 1984: 164–65, 1989: 581–83; Galvin 1979: 168–69).

The new PPD administration invited organized labor to participate in economic planning as participants on the Governor’s Advisory Council on Labor Policy. Unions refused, claiming that their role was to “advise on industrial and state-labor relations and not economic policy” (Cabán 1989: 586). New unions, in particular, were not willing to be subjected to political control by the PPD, and strikes as well as related acts of sabotage continued unabated in the early to mid-1970s, especially as the government saw the need to freeze public sector wages to deal with what had become an economic crisis (Cabán 1989: 587).

The austerity program contributed to the defeat of the PPD in the 1976 elections and the return of the PNP. The new governor supported an increase in the minimum wage in accordance to the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act, allowing the party to argue that it promoted the interests of the workers, in stark contrast to the PPD strategy of maintaining minimum wage flexibility (Carr 1984: 217 fn. 22). Today, Puerto Rican wages are on average lower than on the mainland, but the island has lost its comparative advantage. In 1991, labor costs in Puerto Rico were greater than in Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea, countries with higher GNP per capita (Stewart 1994: 104–5). Thus, while the PPD was able to meet the low labor costs requirement of EOI during the 1950s and 1960s, it is no longer considered an attractive investment site for labor-intensive investments (Suárez 2000). Labor unrest, however, is not an issue for foreign companies doing business in Puerto Rico (Interview, Fomento, San Juan, P.R., 2 February 2000). Trade union membership is currently about 6 percent of the workforce and there is no single central organization that can speak for Puerto Rican workers. New legislation extending public employees the right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike was passed by the Puerto Rican legislature in 1998. While it is too early to tell what impact the law will have, it is likely that the number of unionized workers in Puerto Rico will rise (Fernández Colón 1999: 14).

As in Ireland, Puerto Rico's PPD sought to mobilize organized labor as a base of support. In contrast to Fianna Fáil, however, the PPD was also able to subject labor to the control of the party. Legislation providing for wage regulation, conflict resolution, the internal organization of unions, and the co-optation of labor leaders exemplified some of the labor control strategies employed by the PPD in the early 1940s. These policies and practices of labor control became useful when the party decided to adopt an industrialization policy based on export promotion and the attraction of FDI. Accordingly, the abandonment of ISI was not accompanied by a significant shift in the labor relation's policies that characterized the pre-EOI period.

Singapore: "The Nation Corporation"

Prior to the implementation of EOI, the labor movement in Singapore had been the subject of a great deal of political suppression, first by the colonial government and thereafter by the governing party on the island. In the period between 1959 and 1965 the PAP, using laws inherited from the British government, but amended to suit the party's need to consolidate power, deregistered unions and encouraged employers to fire labor leaders associated with the opposition. The PAP's labor control efforts were motivated in part by its desire to make a merger with Singapore more attractive to Malaysia, but the primary reason for the repressive tactics of the PAP was the elimination of the political opposition. Even after the party received an electoral mandate in 1963, it ordered the arrests without trial of union leaders and the freezing of the bank accounts of dissident unions. As a result of these actions, industrial unrest and union membership declined. By the time the PAP decided to switch its industrialization strategy from ISI to EOI, the labor union movement had been robbed of any

capacity for autonomous political action. Labor laws enacted and institutions created to meet the labor costs requirements of EOI continued this trend.

Labor Control before the Switch to Export Growth, 1945–1965

Before World War II, the British colonial government had responded to labor unrest in Singapore by arresting trade unionists and breaking up communist unions. After the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the attitude of the British changed: communists were freed from jail and recognized as pro-British patriots. At the time, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) claimed control over a considerable number of unions, and it was only with its help that the British were able to mobilize the workers (Turnbull 1979: 178). After the war, the communists capitalized on the economic dislocation and their newfound prestige. The communist General Labor Union (GLU) built up its membership, and labor unrest resumed in earnest. Initially, the British military government responded peacefully. But the increasingly aggressive tactics of the GLU led the government to adopt repressive measures (Deyo 1989: 122; Turnbull 1979: 228).

Political instability in the Malay Peninsula led to the declaration of a state of emergency in Singapore in 1948. The combination of the colonial government's crackdown over organized labor and the emergency controls resulted in a severely weakened labor movement. As the Malayan emergency began to calm down, the atmosphere of repression was slowly lifted and the Communist Party once again sought to infiltrate the unions and Chinese schools (Turnbull 1979: 238, 248–49). The colonial government tried to encourage an alternative trade union movement and the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC) was organized in 1951. By 1954 unemployment was higher than in the aftermath of the war and most Chinese blamed the colonial government for their situation. Tapping into the discontent was the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers Union (FSWU) and the Singapore Bus Worker's Union (SBWU), which became two of the most radical unions and achieved control over whole manufacturing and public sectors (Rodan 1989: 56).

In addition to the revival of the labor union movement, 1954 saw the emergence of two new parties—the Labor Front and the People's Action Party. The PAP resulted from an alliance between communist trade unionists and moderate English-educated middle class nationalists. PAP moderates were well aware that such an alliance was “dangerous,” but also essential because any party seeking the support of the Chinese-educated and working class Singaporeans could not be seen as “anti-communist.” In turn, the left-wing radicals gained respectability and political security by associating with the moderates. The common denominator of both wings of the PAP was their anti-colonialism (Turnbull 1979: 253; Pang 1971: 2; Rodan 1989: 57). Lee Kuan Yew, a British-educated lawyer and advisor to trade unions, became the secretary-general of the party.

The colonial government, which had been planning the island's transition toward self-rule, drafted a new constitution, and elections to implement it were held in 1955. The Labor Front won ten seats and formed a minority govern-

ment while the PAP won three out of the four seats it contested. The Labor Front did not approve of the extremism of the left and sought to govern with the support of the moderate STUC. The success of the Labor Front was problematic for the PAP alliance because in order to challenge the ruling party it had to come across as more radical than the Labor Front and thus seem more extremist than what its non-communist wing wanted to appear. In 1956 the Labor Front government arrested union and student leaders including the General Secretaries of the SBWU and the SFSWU. In 1957 the government again ordered the arrest of leading communists and trade unionists, including the newly-elected left-wing members of the PAP's central committee. With the left-wing leadership of the PAP in jail, the moderate wing was able to consolidate its control over the party (Pang 1971: 4; Turnbull 1979: 260; Rodan 1989: 58–59).

Elections were scheduled for 1959 to implement a new constitution creating a 51-member elected legislature with a prime minister and cabinet with control over domestic affairs, with Britain retaining control over foreign policy and defense (Turnbull 1979: 262, 267). The PAP election manifesto emphasized a merger with the Malayan Federation because moderate party leaders recognized the limits of depending on *entrepôt* trade for economic growth and were well aware that they needed to create employment for the exploding workforce (Rodan 1989: 61–62). While it was generally agreed that manufacturing should provide the engine for growth, the local market was small. The merger with Malaysia offered Singapore access to a larger market and the opportunity to pursue an import-substitution industrialization strategy. The high level of wages in Singapore, which were considered to be “20-30 percent too high for world markets,” could be dealt with by means of a protected market with quotas and tariffs (Huff 1994: 308, 309, 322).

The PAP won the elections and Lee Kuan Yew became prime minister. Soon thereafter the government amended the Trade Union Ordinance of 1940 to give the Registrar of the Trade Unions the power to deregister unions. The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1960 provided for an ‘orderly’ system of conciliation, arbitration, and settlement of disputes, and an industrial court with legally binding decision-making powers (Chew and Chew 1995: 64). Both of these statutes contained a combination of constraint and inducement provisions. For example, unions that were permitted to operate would be in an advantageous position *vis-à-vis* deregistered unions, with the former being presumably more likely to support the government's actions. But in Singapore, where industrial conflict was a reflection of political dissent as well as economic demands, Lee Kuan Yew used labor legislation and repressive tactics to consolidate its power over the left wing of the PAP, which turned out to be his most immediate concern (Haggard 1990: 106).

The merger with Malaysia was not only pursued as part of Lee's ISI strategy, but also in an effort to gain electoral support independently from the leftist wing of the PAP. In order to gain support for the merger, Lee needed political stability and absolute control of the government. In turn, the latter was only possible if the opposition and its unions were brought under control. Lee himself explains: “The pro-communists had been an albatross around our necks.

But we had to be careful how we ditched them. If we appeared opportunistic, dropping them after we had made use of them, we would lose the Chinese-speaking ground. Merger was the perfect issue on which to break” (Lee 1998: 373). In turn, the union’s political activism, which until 1959 reflected primarily their opposition to British rule, would now reflect their opposition to the merger and to the moderates within the PAP.

In the 1961 by-election, the PAP candidate suffered a crushing defeat, prompting Lee to consider resigning. The “speculation” over Lee’s resignation made the Prime Minister of Malaya afraid that communists would take over Singapore and forced him to consider the merger seriously. The communist unions responded quickly and produced a series of political demands that included “genuine self-government for Singapore and the abolition of the Internal Security Council” (Rodan 1989: 67). Soon after, the left wing of PAP defected from the party to form the Barisan Socialis. The PAP government responded by disbanding the now communist-dominated STUC. The defection of the left wing left the PAP without many party workers, grassroots organizers, and supporters. At the time Barisan Socialis-dominated unions accounted for about 75 percent of the total union membership. The precarious political situation of the PAP was also reflected in its decline in membership. In 1962, over 80 percent of former party members let their membership lapse (Pang 1971: 14).

To challenge the government-supported National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), leftist leaders formed the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU). There was also an increase in union membership, most of it in Barisan Socialis-dominated unions. The PAP leadership responded by encouraging employers to fire key union organizers that were known socialist supporters (Turnbull 1979: 278, 283; Pang 1971: 14; Chan 1984: 210).

The PAP’s control of the government became more shaky when the party lost its parliamentary majority after one of its members joined the Barisan Socialis. Thus, even after Singaporeans endorsed the merger in a referendum in 1962, repression of union and opposition party leaders continued. In 1963, Operation Cold Store resulted in the arrests and detention without trial of trade union leaders including members of the Barisan Socialis’ executive committee, and leaders of SATU. The protests that followed resulted in even more arrests of Barisan leaders and their supporters. The bank accounts of three of the largest Barisan Socialis supporting unions were frozen (Bellows 1970: 92–3; Lim and Fong 1986: 11; Turnbull 1979: 281, 283). These and other efforts to minimize the possibility of losing to the Barisan Socialis in the 1963 elections succeeded, and the PAP won 37 seats in the assembly with 46.9 percent of the vote. After the election, the government continued to consolidate its control over the union movement by deregistering unions associated with the opposition. As a result, the majority of the 60,000 newly unaffiliated workers were left without union representation (Bellows 1970: 93–4). The success of the government’s efforts was reflected in the decrease in strike activity (Huff 1994: 295). In turn, divisions within the Barisan Socialis’ leadership trickled down into the autonomous labor movement, and SATU began to lose its influence over the workers at the expense of the NTUC. The latter received a great deal of financial and manpower support from the PAP (Rodan 1989: 71, 82).

Labor Control and Export-Led Growth after 1965

The goals of the PAP had become clear: “the creation of a state in which only one party, that is, the PAP, would ever enjoy the right to govern” (Rodan 1989: 73). While the PAP consolidated its power, however, the prime minister of Malaya had grown uneasy about the allegiance and expelled Singapore from the Federation in 1965. Without access to the Federation’s market, the ISI strategy collapsed. The PAP government then decided to switch to EOI. The atmosphere of crisis and the new direction in economic policy provided a justification “for the further and complete defeat of the labor movement” (Rodan 1989: 85). The Trade Union (Amendment) Bill of 1966 contained obvious examples of constraint provisions. Strikes were made illegal unless approved by a majority of union members, sympathy strikes and in essential services were outlawed, and the formation of a union federation in essential services was prohibited (Rodan 1989: 87, 91).

In 1967, the British government announced the closing of all of its military bases by 1975, and subsequently advanced the date of withdrawal to 1971. This development was a great shock, for British military expenditure accounted for over 17 percent of the island’s GDP and about 20 percent of employment. The government responded by increasing economic incentives for the attraction of FDI and intensifying its control over labor. The constraint provisions in the Employment and Industrial Relations Acts of 1968 included the removal of issues such as recruitment, dismissal, and promotions from collective negotiations. The duration of collective bargaining agreements was increased and the terms of those agreements were also subject to control as the acts set limits for fringe benefits such as bonuses, paid leaves, overtime, retirement pay, sick days, etc. Work hours were increased from 39 to 44 and holidays reduced from 15 to 11. By the end of the decade Singapore had ceased to be high labor cost and the number of strikes had been reduced to zero (Rodan 1989: 91–92, 105; Tanand Hock 1982: 283; Huff 1994: 295). Clearly, labor unions had ceased to be an independent political force in Singapore and union membership continued to decline. However, the repressive tactics of the PAP were not the only reason why the autonomous union movement suffered. Divisions within the Barisan Socialis leadership resulted in its loss of control over an increasingly fragmented dissident union movement.

It is common knowledge that the industrialization policies of Singapore have been an economic success. In early 1970, the government declared that unemployment was no longer a concern. In fact, there were labor shortages and consequently pressures on wage rates. The government responded by forming the National Wages Council (NWC) with representatives from labor, business, and the government to submit annual wage recommendations to the government for implementation. Labor representatives were drawn from the government-controlled NTUC. The creation of the NWC combined elements both of constraints and inducements. Primarily, the NTUC’s representation in the NWC gave workers a reason to join unions and union membership doubled in the 1970s (Inagami 1998; Leggett 1993: 119).

In the early 1970s the NWC recommended a substantial rise in wages (Rodan 1989: 103–5). In 1985–86, the Singapore economy experienced a recession,

attributed by some to the increase in labor costs. The NWC recommended a wage freeze, and the government further reduced labor costs by cutting the mandatory employer's contribution to the Central Provident Fund. These policies, which represented a 20 percent reduction in pay across the board, were supported by the NTUC and led to no industrial unrest (Chew and Chew 1995: 69–71). The government also moved to a flexible wages policy, which allowed for pay to be more closely related to employee and firm performance. By 1987, the economy was again growing at a rate of 9 percent. The Asian crisis resulted in a slowdown during 1998, but by 1999 Singapore was on its way to recovery with a GDP growth of 5.4 percent. Trade union membership has increased from 205,000 in 1987 to 260,000 in 1997, but has not kept up with employment growth. As a result, trade union density has decreased from 15.5 percent in 1987 to 13.9 in 1997 (*Yearbook of Statistics Singapore* 1997: 54).

Today, in spite of the fact that it has been argued that labor relations in Singapore are “inclusive” rather than repressive, some caveats are in order. In an effort to make organized labor more in tune with national priorities, NTUC leaders are also PAP leaders, and since the late 1970s the party has replaced experienced union leaders with a “technocratic elite.” In 1995, 90 percent of existing unions were NTUC members and represented 98.5 percent of total union membership (Inagami 1998; Leggett 1993: 124). In turn, leaders of unions affiliated with the NTUC are also expected to be PAP supporters. Given that the PAP controls the NTUC, these facts suggest that the great majority of unionized workers in Singapore have no independent capacity for political action.

In Singapore, efforts to control labor by the PAP prior to the adoption of an export strategy based on FDI were aimed at eliminating the political threat of the left. The formation of the Barisan Socialis was an even greater concern to the PAP, which sought to become the only relevant political party in Singapore. Political repression of the labor opposition became the main strategy of the PAP in the period between 1959 and 1965. Subsequently, the switch from ISI to EOI did not result in the dismantling of the party's repressive policies against the unions. Rather, the need to achieve labor peace and control wages made the “political defeat” of an autonomous labor movement “essential” (Rodan 1989: 91). As Rodan explains, “In Singapore the repression of the labor movement was principally intended to serve political purposes. The PAP's political needs did, however, come to fuse neatly with the subsequent requirements of a new economic strategy based on EOI” (1989: 84; see also Haggard 1990: 260).

Discussion and Conclusion

A combination of political and economic factors motivates labor control in newly industrialized countries. While the labor requirements of EOI are straightforward, implementation of labor control is also shaped by a political logic of dominant party consolidation, a process that need not take place simultaneously. In fact, in Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore labor control efforts by a party aspiring to become dominant preceded the adoption of the new economic strategy. These labor control strategies were embodied in different combinations of inducements and constraints that later formed the basis for labor policies geared

towards export-led growth. After the shift to EOI, a new economic logic should have dominated the labor control strategies in each case, yet the goal of party consolidation continued to be relevant and hence the basic labor control policies remained in place (see Table 1).

Table 1

	Ireland	Puerto Rico	Singapore
Pre-EOI period	1933	1940	1959
Dominant party	Fianna Fáil	Popular Democratic Party	People's Action Party
Political logic	Party consolidation (maintain electoral support of labor)	Party consolidation (labor mobilization under populist party control)	Party consolidation (absolute control of government by PAP moderates and merger with Malaysia)
Labor control strategy	Social and labor legislation; rationalization efforts; promotion of Irish-based unions; voluntary incomes policy under threat of statutory control of wages	Co-optation and social and labor legislation	Repression and statutory restrictions
EOI Period	After 1948	After 1947	After 1965
Economic logic	Achieve labor peace, need to keep wages under control.	Need to keep wages under control.	Achieve labor peace, control labor costs.
Political logic	Continue party consolidation in the face of electoral losses in 1948 and 1954	Continue party consolidation.	Continue party consolidation after failed merger with Malaysia and withdrawal of British bases.
Labor control strategy	Voluntary incomes policy under threat of statutory control of wages; rationalization efforts; corporate control; discipline of the market	Co-optation	Corporate control; repression and statutory restrictions

The empirical evidence in this article has focused on the goals of political parties, the constraints and inducements they offered to labor in exchange for its collaboration, the responses of labor's, and strength as an organized actor. The specific goals of the parties during the consolidation period differed slightly among the three cases and resulted in two discernible patterns of labor control. Fianna Fáil and the PPD sought to mobilize labor in an effort to secure its electoral support. Initially, both parties adopted populist policies, but Fianna Fáil was soon forced to rely solely on its nationalist ideology as an electoral strategy. By contrast, the overall improvement in the living conditions of Puerto Rican workers allowed the PPD to maintain its populist appeal. And while both parties dominated the political arena for a long time, they operated under a democratic framework. By contrast, even as it sought a merger with Malaysia, the PAP sought to become the only relevant party in Singapore.

The goals of the parties, and whether or not they were operating within a democratic framework, help explain the different combinations of constraints and inducements offered to organized labor. When Fianna Fáil was no longer able to offer material incentives to labor in exchange for its support, the party offered inducements to Irish-based unions at the expense of British-based unions. When that failed, the party created the Labor Court, which embodied a combination of constraints and inducements and was to have an enduring impact on labor relations. After the transition to EOI, Fianna Fáil's policy towards labor consisted mostly of appeals for wage restraint and a continuation of the efforts to rationalize the movement. The party did not formulate a new labor policy to match the new economic strategy, as it was unsure how to regain the support of labor and at the same time meet the requirements of EOI. The PPD co-opted union leaders as one of the ways to control labor through a combination of constraints and inducements. By most accounts, the PPD's most effective tools of control were its expectations that party leaders be leaders of the largest labor confederation, and its practice of appointing labor leaders to political posts without giving them any real power. The PPD also encouraged the creation of unions and promoted itself as the party of labor, but made sure that workers would have no autonomous capacity for action. After the adoption of EOI, the Minimum Wage Boards were instructed to keep wages competitive, but they did contribute to an improvement in the wages of many Puerto Rican workers. By contrast, the PAP sought to consolidate its power not through the mobilization of organized labor, but by obliterating the opposition through repression. Some incentives were offered, like financial support for unions that supported the government. The PAP also embarked on an extensive housing and education program. But the party's treatment of dissident unions was more characterized by constraints such as deregistration of unions, incarceration of union leaders, and restrictions against strikes. After EOI, an important constraint was the government's statutory control over labor costs.

Labor control during the initial party consolidation period contributed to the fragmentation of the organized labor movement in the three cases. The policies of Fianna Fáil contributed to the fragmentation of the movement but did not have a detrimental effect on union membership. The party was for the most part able to count on the support of the largest Irish-based union, the

ITGWU, which supposedly contributed to the drafting of the Trade Union Bill of 1941. But since World War II, labor's support of Fianna Fáil wavered mostly due to the lack of inducements offered. While the unions agreed to participate in the wage negotiations, the latter did not solve the problem of wage competition and industrial unrest continued. In the long run, however, the 1941 legislation along with the 1971 and 1975 statutes did contribute to the rationalization of labor unions. The efforts of the PPD also contributed to fragmentation of the labor union movement. In the end, the CGT was not capable of avoiding the same fate of the FLT. And the involvement of union leaders in party politics rendered them unable to represent labor independently of the PPD's position. The initial success of EOI and improvements in health and education associated with the party resulted in a further weakening of organized labor, as workers did not see the point of joining unions. In Singapore, an autonomous trade union movement was the casualty of the PAP's effort to eliminate any serious opposition to its power. After Barisan Socialis and labor leaders were arrested during operation Cold Store, both the party and the labor movement started to weaken. Repressive action against dissident unions, the division within the Barisan Socialis, and the help offered by the government to the NTUC combined to eliminate the threat that an autonomous labor union movement posed to the PAP and its economic strategy.

Only Puerto Rico and Singapore were able to meet the labor requirements of EOI with relative expedience. In Puerto Rico, the practices and policies of labor control employed during the party consolidation period clearly proved useful when economic policymaking shifted to EOI because the PPD had been successful in its efforts to co-opt and weaken organized labor before the shift in economic strategy. Similarly, by the time the PAP decided to control labor costs more directly with the Employment Act of 1968, labor unrest was a thing of the past. By contrast, in Ireland it would be the discipline of the market—high unemployment, reduced trade union membership, the crisis in public finances and recession—that would compel Irish labor to become a real partner in economic policymaking more than 30 years after the government's shift to EOI.

Contrary to accounts emphasizing economic requirements as determinants of labor control institutions and practices (Deyo 1989; Kuruvilla 1996; Bjorkman, Lauridsen and Marcussen 1988), this article has redirected attention to domestic politics. Dominant party consolidation efforts institutionalized a pattern of labor control in each country that persisted even after a comprehensive switch from ISI to EOI took place. To some extent, labor control strategies seem decoupled from the economic requirements of the industrialization model, a finding that in the cases of Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore is significant because research on newly industrializing countries suggests that labor control strategies are a response to the external economic pressures that characterize export-oriented industrialization strategies based on the attraction of foreign direct investment.

Notes

- * For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Pedro Cabán, Miguel Centeno, Mauro Guillén, Gary Mucciaroni, Joseph Schwartz, two anonymous reviewers and the editor, Ruth Berins Collier. I am also grateful to Temple University for a sabbatical leave.

References

- Anderson, Robert W. 1965. *Party Politics in Puerto Rico*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Allen, Kieran. 1997. *Fianna Fáil and Irish Labour*. London: Pluto Press.
- Arndt, H.W. 1987. *Economic Development*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bellows, Thomas J. 1970. *The People's Action Party of Singapore*. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
- Bew, Paul, Ellen Hazelkorn and Henry Patterson. 1989. *The Dynamics of Irish Politics*. Lawrence & Wishart: London.
- Bjorkman, M., S. Laursidsen and H.S. Marcussen. 1988. "Types of Industrialization and Capital-Labour Relations in the Third World." Pp. 59–80 in *Trade Unions and the New Industrialization of the Third World*, ed. R. Southall. London: Zed Books.
- Burgess, Katrina. 1999. "Loyal Dilemmas and Market Reform: Party-Union Alliances under Street in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela." *World Politics* 52 (October): 105–34
- Cabán, Pedro A. 1989. "Industrial Transformation and Labor Relations in Puerto Rico: From 'Operation Bootstrap' to the 1970s." *Journal of Latin American Studies* (October): 559–591.
- _____. 1984. "Industrialization, the Colonial State, and Working Class Organizations in Puerto Rico." *Latin American Perspectives* 11 (Summer): 149–172.
- Carr, Raymond. 1984. *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment*. New York: New York University Press and Vintage Books.
- Chan, Heng Chee. 1984. *A Sensation of Independence*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Chew, Soon Beng and Rosalind Chew. 1995. "The Development of Industrial Relations in Singapore." Pp. 62–87 in *Employment Relations in the Growing Asian Economies*, ed. Anil Verma, Thomas A. Kochan and Russell D. Lansbury. London: Routledge.
- Collier, Ruth Berins. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1992. *The Contradictory Alliance*. Berkeley: International Area Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
- Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1979. "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism.'" *American Political Science Review* 73 (December): 967–986.
- Deyo, Frederick. 1989. *Beneath the Miracle*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dietz, James L. 1986. *Economic History of Puerto Rico*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Drysdale, John. 1984. *Singapore: Struggle for Success*. North Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.
- EIU. 1999a. Economic Intelligence Unit, Second Quarter Country Report: Ireland.
- _____. 1999b. Economic Intelligence Unit, Second Quarter Country Report: Puerto Rico.
- _____. 1999c. Economic Intelligence Unit, Second Quarter Country Report: Singapore.
- Farrell, Brian. 1991. *Seán Lemass*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Fernández Colón, José. 1999. "Recobran terreno los sindicatos locales." *El Nuevo Día* (San Juan), 31 August.
- Galvin, Miles. 1979. *The Organized Labor Movement in Puerto Rico*. Rutherford, NJ: Associated University Presses.
- García, Gervasio L. and Quintero Rivera, A.G. 1997. *Desafío y Solidaridad*. Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán.
- Gereffi, Gary and Donald L. Wyman. 1990. *Manufacturing Miracles*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gunnigle, Patrick, Gerard McMahon and Gerard Fitzgerald. 1999. *Industrial Relations in Ireland*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Hardiman, Niamh. 1988. *Pay, Politics, and Economic Performance in Ireland 1970–1987*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- _____. "The State and Economic Interests: Ireland in Comparative Perspective." Pp. 330–358 in *The Development of Industrial Society in Ireland*, ed. J.H. Goldthorpe and C.T. Whelan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haggard, Stephan. 1990. *Pathways from the Periphery*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Horgan, John. 1997. *Seán Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Huff, W. G. 1994. *The Economic Growth of Singapore*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Katzentein, Peter J. 1985. *Small States in World Markets*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kennedy, Liam. 1989. "The Modern Industrialization of Ireland 1940–1988." *Studies in Irish Economic and Social History* No. 5. Dundalgan Press: W. Tempest.
- Kennedy, Kieran A., Thomas Giblin and Deirdre McHugh. 1988. *The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge.
- Keogh, Dermont. 1995. *Twentieth-Century Ireland*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kerr, Tony. 1989. "Trade Unions and the Law." Pp. 217–224 in *Industrial Relations in Ireland: Contemporary Issues and Developments*. University College: Dublin
- Kuruvilla, Sarosh. 1996. "Linkages Between Industrialization Strategies and Industrial Relations/ Human Resource Policies." *Industrial Relations Review*, 49 (July): 635–657.
- Lee, J.J. 1989. *Ireland 1912–1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, Kuan Yew. 1998. *The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew*. Singapore: Prentice Hall.
- _____. *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Leggett, Chris. 1993. "Singapore's Industrial Relations in the 1990s." Pp.116–133 in *Singapore Changes Guard*, ed. Garry Rodan. Melbourne: Longman.
- Lim, Linda and Pang Eng Fong. 1986. *Trade, Employment, and Industrialization in Singapore*. Geneva: International Labor Office.
- Linz, Juan J. 1975. "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes." Pp. 175–323 in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Mair, Peter. 1987. *The Changing Irish Party System*. St. Martin's Press: New York.
- Maldonado, A.W. 1997. *Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Ministry of Finance. 1961. *State of Singapore Development Plan 1961–1964*. Singapore: Government Printer.
- McCarthy, Charles. 1977. *Trade Unions in Ireland: 1894-1960*. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.
- Morales, Carrión. 1983. *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Murillo, M. Victoria. 2000. "From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reform in Latin America." *World Politics* 52 (January): 135–74.
- NYT. 1960. Puerto Rico's Economic Progress Attracts World Attention. *New York Times*, 1 February.
- O'Connor, Emmet. 1992. *A Labour History of Ireland 1826–1960*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
- O'Malley, Eoin. 1989. *Industry and Economic Development*. Gill and Macmillan Ltd.: Dublin.
- _____. 1985. "The Problem of Late Industrialisation and the Experience of the Republic of Ireland." *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 9 (June): 141–54.
- Pagán, Bolívar. 1959. *Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños*. 2 vols. San Juan: Librería Campos.
- Pang, Cheng Lian. 1971. *Singapore's People's Action Party*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Pantojas García, Emilio. 1990. *Development Strategies as Ideology*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Reynolds, Lloyd G. and Peter Gregory. 1965. *Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto Rico*. Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin.
- Roche, W. K. 1989. "State Strategies and the Politics of Industrial Relations Since 1945." Pp. 115–131 in *Industrial Relations in Ireland: Contemporary Issues and Developments*. University College: Dublin
- Rodan, Garry. 1989. *The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization: National State and International Capital*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- _____. 1997. "Singapore: Economic Diversification and Social Divisions." Pp. 148–178 in *The Political Economy of South-East Asia*, ed. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison and Richard Robison. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Ross, David. 1976. *The Long Uphill Path: A Historical Study of Puerto Rico's Program of Economic Development*. San Juan: Editorial Edil.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Pp. 85–131 *The New Corporatism*, ed. Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Strich. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Silén, Juan Angel. 1978. *Apuntes para la historia del movimiento obrero puertorriqueño*. Río Piedras: Cultural.

- Sinnott, Richard. 1995. *Irish Voters Decide*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Stewart, John. 1994. "Economic Development." Pp. 83–120 in *Puerto Rico: The Meeting of the Hispanic and the Anglo-Saxon Cultures in the World of Work*, ed. Milagros Guzmán. Hato Rey, P.R.: Institute for Productivity of Puerto Rico.
- Suárez, Sandra L. 2000. *Does Business Learn? Tax Breaks, Uncertainty, and Political Strategies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Sweeney, Paul. 1995. "Economic Development: A Trade Union Response." Pp. 69–80 in *Development Ireland*, ed. Peter Shirlow. London: Pluto Press.
- Tan, Augustine H. H. and Ow Chin Hock. 1982. "Singapore." Pp. 280–309 in *Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies*, ed. Bela Balassa. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Turnbull, C. M. 1977. *A History of Singapore: 1819–1975*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Von Prondzynski, Ferdinand. 1998. "Ireland: Corporatism Revived." Pp. 55–73 in *Changing Industrial Relations in Europe*, ed. Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Whitaker, T. K. 1973. "From Protection to Free Trade." *Administration* 21 (Winter): 405–23
- World Bank. 2000. *World Development Indicators* CD rom. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.