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| A digest of research from the Laboratory for Student Success |
No. 205 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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by Kenneth K. Wong, Robert Dreeben, INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE Prior to 1995, decentralization was the dominant reform strategy in the Chicago Public Schools. The School Finance Authority and the Public Building Commission limited the policymaking ability of the Chicago School Board, and the board was further constrained by powers exercised by the Local School Councils (LSCs), the centerpiece of an earlier reform effort. Students in Chicago schools continued to perform poorly, parent involvement had dropped, budgetary crises arose often, and public confidence in the system was low. By the seventh year of LSC empowerment, the mayor, state policy makers, and various stakeholders groups were increasingly frustrated. In 1995, the Republican-controlled legislature, with the support of Mayor Richard Daley, the business community, and the governor of Illinois, passed legislation that altered the governance arrangements of the Chicago Public Schools. The Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act reversed the trend toward decentralization of authority over school operations and redesigned the governance arrangement so that power and authority became integrated. Integrated governance reduces competing authorities and coordinates activities in support of system-wide policy goals. Integrated governance in Chicago is characterized by:
Most importantly, the law expanded the financial authorities of the board. The legislation removed the balanced budget requirement and suspended the budget oversight authority of the SFA. It also collapsed a number of funded programs (for example, K-6 reading improvement, Substance Abuse Prevention, Hispanic Programs, and Gifted Education) into a general education block grant and a number of categorical funds into an educational services block grant. Additionally, state Chapter 1 funds not allocated to the schools could now be used by the district, and changes in the pension fund requirements allowed for greater flexibility in the use of pension monies. Finally, the board's tax levy authority was changed so that there were no longer separate levies earmarked for specific purposes. The law also altered the division of labor in terms of the top administrative offices. It created five chief administrative officers, with the CEO at the top of the system. The Chief Purchasing Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and Chief Fiscal Officer were placed in charge of financial management and the operation of the system, and the Chief Education Officer was placed in charge of the educational programs and academic accountability. Finally, the 1995 law enhanced the authority of the board and CEO, transferring authority from other administrative layers to the central office. The law streamlined the process for placing schools on remediation by expanding the authority of the CEO to identify and intervene in poorly performing schools and reducing the number of actors involved in the process. The law eliminated the subdistrict superintendencies (eleven positions) and transferred the duties of that office to the CEO. To encourage privatization, the board was given the authority to contract with third parties for services otherwise performed by employees. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES Between July 1995 and June 1996, a team of researchers examined the redesigned governance system in Chicago. Three research strategies were used to collect information: the administration of two survey questionnaires to key stakeholders, an analysis of the media coverage of educational issues, and interviews with school administrators and principals. Our study of the Chicago Public Schools found that (a) the integrated governance system tends to improve the conditions for teaching and learning, and (b) there are several identified needs that the new leadership must address. Table 1 summarizes those improved conditions and needs. CONCLUSION Integrated governance holds promise as a strategy to improve urban school systems. It reduces the competing authorities that tend to constrain urban schools, thereby allowing the board and administration to implement their educational vision. Appointed administrators and board members often have an advantage over elected officials because they bring their management expertise to the school system. Moreover, they are less accountable to particular constituencies and are therefore better able to put system-wide concerns above constituency demands. Whether integrated governance can be widely adopted in other urban districts depends on several conditions: (a) the political capital of the mayor, (b) effective use of authority and influence by the top administration, and (c) evidence that policy initiatives will improve educational outcomes. Currently, Chicago is the only district where mayoral commitment is highly visible and where political capital is used to improve the system. Further research is needed to better understand how integrated governance can work in other urban districts and to identify the crucial components of the redesigned system that are transferable. Table 1
RELATED PUBLICATION Wong, K. K., Dreeben, R., Lynn, L. E., Jr., & Sunderman, G. L. (1997). Integrated governance as a reform strategy in the Chicago public schools. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, Department of Education & Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies.
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| Spotlight on Student Success is an occasional series of articles highlighting findings from the Laboratory for Student Success (LSS) that have significant implications for improving the academic success of students in the mid-Atlantic region. For more information on LSS and other LSS publications, contact the Laboratory for Student Success, 9th Floor, Ritter Annex, 13th Street and Cecil B. Moore Avenue, Philadelphia, PA, 19122; telephone: (215) 204-3000; E-mail: <LSS@vm.temple.edu>. |