On the final prong, there will certainly be some physicians who contend that prescribing injection equipment to an IDU patient is not a legitimate medical practice. Generally, however, courts in other jurisdictions applying this standard do not require unanimity. See, e.g., Glover v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 231 Cal.App.3d 203, 282 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1991); Commonwealth v. Salameh, 421 Pa.Super. 320, 324, 617 A.2d 1314, 1316 (1992) (prosecution must prove not simply that some physicians disagree with the practice at issue, but that "'no' responsible segment of the medical profession exists which accepts appellant's methods"). See generally S.E. Stone, The Investigation and Prosecution of Professional Practice Cases under the Controlled Substances Act: Introduction to Professional Practice Case Law. 21 Drug Enforcement 23 (1983). There is ample support for the position that prescribing sterile injection equipment comports with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession. See Zita Lazzarini, Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users, and Josiah Rich, Syringe Prescription in Rhode Island: A Case Study.

Conclusion: A prescription for sterile injection equipment to an IDU patient is consistent with the standard for a valid prescription under New Jersey laws governing the physician's authority to prescribe.

We turn now to the second question: Do any other laws prohibit physicians from prescribing sterile injection equipment to IDU patients? There are two main possibilities.

The provisions of N.J.S.A. § 45:1-13 authorize the denial, suspension or revocation of the license of any medical practitioner, including a physician, who prescribes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance "in an indiscriminate manner, or not in good faith, or without good cause, or where the licensee reasonably knows or should have known that the substance or substances prescribed are to be used for unauthorized or illicit consumption or distribution or that a substance or substances previously prescribed or dispensed were used by the patient for unauthorized or illicit consumption or distribution." There are only three reported cases discussing this provision, none with a holding in point here. The statute may be raised by opponents of physician prescription as support for the argument that the legislature intended to prevent access to controlled substances for illicit use even when providing those substances for unquestionably legitimate medical purposes. By analogy, this would be offered as support for the proposition that the paraphernalia scheme should be read to bar any prescription or dispensing of needles to users, regardless of medical need.

The argument is one by analogy. Syringes are not classified as controlled substances. Indeed, both the medical practice and controlled substances act to which § 45:1-13 refers clearly exclude devices such as syringes from their definitions of controlled substances and drugs. By confining this provision to controlled substances, the legislature deliberately excluded other devices, such as syringes. Because the literal terms of the statute exclude syringes from coverage, the mere fact that the statute prohibits an arguably analogous act is insufficient to justify interpreting it to actually cover syringe prescription.⁽⁷⁾

A more serious possibility is the drug paraphernalia law. As we will discuss further in the pharmacy analysis below, we have concluded that the general drug paraphernalia provisions do not apply to syringes, which are instead regulated only in the sections of the drug paraphernalia law that explicitly mention them. For purposes of this portion of the analysis, however, we will assume that syringes are covered by both the syringe-specific and the general provisions of the drug paraphernalia law.

The syringe-specific paraphernalia provision makes it a crime to "sell, furnish or give" a syringe to any person "except as otherwise authorized by law." This memorandum has already concluded that syringe prescription is authorized within the laws governing medical practice and prescription generally (indeed, if it were not, this provision would prohibit possession or distribution of needles for any purpose). Even if syringe prescription were not authorized by law, a physician who writes a prescription does not "sell, furnish or give" a syringe to the patient. In the absence of a special definition in the statute, these words are given their ordinary meaning, which does not embrace facilitating the later purchase of a syringe by writing a prescription.

The result is the same if we assume that syringes fall under the prohibitions applicable to drug paraphernalia generally. The law makes it an offense to "for any person to distribute or dispense ... drug paraphernalia, knowing that it will be used to ... introduce into the human body a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog in violation of the provisions of chapter 35 of this title." N.J.S.A. § 2C:36-3 (italics added). Again, neither the paraphernalia statute nor the general definition section of the crimes code, N.J.S.A. § 2C:1-14, provide definitions of the key italicized terms. The controlled substances act, which is the most relevant statute in the crimes code, states that "Distribute" means "to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog." N.J. S.A. 2C:35-2. "Deliver" or "delivery" in turn "means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, whether or not there is an agency relationship." Id.⁽⁸⁾ A physician who writes a prescription for an item is not actually transferring possession of that item to the patient, but merely providing the patient with instructions and authorization for the pharmacist who will transfer possession by dispensing the prescription.

Nor does the concept of a constructive delivery embrace the writing of a prescription. Constructive delivery logically requires actual or constructive possession of the item being delivered. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 3 D & C. 4ths 381, 385-85 (Common Pleas Lebanon Cty PA 1989). A physician writing a prescription to be filled at a pharmacy does not have actual or constructive possession of the syringe. Constructive possession has been defined to require "both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise control over a thing, either directly or through another person." State v. Montesano, 298 N.J.Super. 597, 613, 689 A.2d 1373, 1382, cert. denied, 150 N.J. 27, 695 A.2d 670 (1997); see also State v. Campisi, 42 N.J.Super. 138, 126 A.2d 17 (A.D.1956), reversed in part on other grounds, appeal dismissed in part, 23 N.J. 513, 129 A.2d 880. The authority to write a prescription for a syringe does not give the physician the ability to exercise control over it; like the patient, he would have to go to the pharmacy and purchase the syringe in order to possess it, and so cannot be said to constructively possess it.⁽⁹⁾

Conclusion: Writing a prescription for a syringe does not violate any New Jersey law. A physician may therefore legally prescribe injection equipment to an IDU patient.

II. Does Dispensing a Needle by a Pharmacist to an IDU Based on a Physician's Prescription Violate New Jersey's Drug Paraphernalia or Syringe Prescription Laws?

A. The Regulatory Scheme

Professional Licensure Law

The practice of pharmacy in New Jersey is governed by N.J.S.A. § 45:14-1 et seq. , with regulations found in chapter 39 of title 13 of the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Act vests in the State Board of Pharmacy power to adopt such regulations as are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of that Act.

Pharmacists are governed by the needle prescription provision, N.J. S.A. 24:21-51, described above. No other provisions of pharmacy law or regulations explicitly address syringes.

The disciplinary provisions of the pharmacy act and the code also authorize action against the license of a pharmacist who "has been adjudged guilty of violating any State or Federal law or any law of the District of Columbia or of any territory of the United States relating to the

practice of pharmacy, or relating to the dispensing of drugs, or has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,... [or] is shown to be addicted to the use of narcotic drugs, or has been convicted of violating any law of this or any other state or of the United States relating to narcotic drugs." N.J.S.A. § 45:14-12; accord N.J.S.A. § 45: 1-13.. The Board can also punish "grossly unprofessional conduct," which is narrowly defined to cover pricing, advertising, and other general business practices but which the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled can be interpreted by the board more broadly in particular cases. Matter of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 374 A.2d 1191 (1977).

A pharmacist is authorized to dispense medications ordered by a valid prescription, and is ordinarily expected to do so in the absence of a good reason to refuse. Strauss S. The Pharmacist and the Law. Baltimore MD: Williams & Wilkins, 1980:29-31; Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining Pharmacists' Legal Responsibilities, XXIV Am. J. L & Med. 417 (1998). The pharmacy regulations state that:

(a) The pharmacist shall have the right to refuse to fill a prescription if, in his or her professional judgment, the prescription is outside the scope of practice of the prescriber; or if the pharmacist has sufficient reason to question the validity of the prescription; or to protect the health and welfare of the patient.

N.J.A.C. 13:39-6.1.

Controlled Substance and Drug Paraphernalia Laws

The controlled substances and paraphernalia discussed in I.A. above are also applicable to pharmacists. The regulations for the Controlled Substances Act make clear that a pharmacist has an independent responsibility to ensure that controlled substances are properly prescribed: "The responsibility for the proper prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances is upon the prescribing practitioner, but a corresponding responsibility rests with the pharmacist who fills the prescription. An order purporting to be a prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment or in legitimate and authorized research is not a prescription and the person knowingly filling such a purported prescription, as well as the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations of the provisions of Law relating to controlled substances." N.J.A.C. 8:65-7.4. The regulations also state that a "prescription for controlled substances may only be filled by a pharmacist acting in the usual course of his professional practice."N.J.A.C. 8:65-7.6.

B. Analysis

We have concluded above that a physician's prescription for sterile injection equipment, written under the factual conditions assumed for purposes of this Memorandum, is valid under New Jersey law. The syringe prescription statute does not set any additional substantive standards for a syringe prescription, but rather simply requires a prescription as a condition of sale. Ordinarily, the pharmacist is required to fill a valid prescription.⁽¹⁰⁾ The regulatory exceptions related to prescriptions for controlled substances are not applicable. The next question is whether filling the prescription would be prohibited under any other provision of law.

Here the issue is, again, the paraphernalia law. The pharmacist is undoubtedly transferring the syringe, so if a syringe is drug paraphernalia in this situation, then the transfer is illegal. We thus come to the fundamental question of whether a syringe dispensed by a valid prescription, for legitimate medical reasons, falls within the definition of "drug paraphernalia" under New Jersey law. We conclude that it does not.

This conclusion depends upon reading the general paraphernalia statute, N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:36-1 to -7, to make a systematic distinction between drug paraphernalia generally and syringes. The language of the statute, as analyzed using the applicable techniques of interpretation, bespeaks a clear legislative intention to treat syringes differently from other items used to ingest drugs, and by its plain terms, the paraphernalia law does not prohibit heath care distribution of syringes authorized under the medical practice and syringe prescription laws.

In New Jersey, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. The traditional common-law rules of construction are guides to this end, but are not themselves rules of law to be applied rigidly for their own sake. The first and best guide to legislative intent is always the language of the statute itself. In ascertaining what the framers of legislators intended,

"we must first look at the evident wording of the statute to ascertain its plain meaning and intent." Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 440, 435 A.2d 540 (1981). Our duty is to apply the legislative intent as expressed in the statute's language, and we are not to presume that the Legislature intended something other than what it expressed by its plain language.

Toll Bros., Inc. v. West Windsor Tp., 312 N.J.Super. 540, 547, 712 A.2d 266, 270 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 157 N.J. 543, 724 A.2d 803 (1998). The plain text of the paraphernalia statute evinces and accomplishes the intent to regulate syringes separately from other items that can be used with illicit drugs, and not to include syringes in any substantive provision of the statute other than those in which they are explicitly named.

Interpretation of the paraphernalia act begins with the federal Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, upon which the New Jersey law was based. See The Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 100; 462 A.2d 573 (N.J. 1983). A comparison of the two statutes' definitions of drug paraphernalia provides unmistakable evidence that the New Jersey legislature intended to exclude syringes from the general category of drug paraphernalia as defined in the statute. The Model Act includes two references to injection equipment, both italicized here:

The term 'drug paraphernalia' means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this Act (meaning the Controlled Substances Act of this State). It includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing or harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived;

(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances;

(3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in increasing the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance;

(4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identifying or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of controlled substances;

(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled substances;

(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled substances;

(7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining marihuana;

(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances;

(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes and other containers used, intended for use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances;

(10) Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances;

(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles and other objects used, intended for use, or

(12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body...

The Model Paraphernalia Act, reprinted in Annotation, Validity, under Federal Constitution, of So-called "Head Shop" Ordinances or Statutes, Prohibiting Manufacture and Sale of Drug Use Related Paraphernalia, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 15 (1984 & Supp. 1998) (italics added). Although the New Jersey Act is virtually identical to the Model Act, both references to injection equipment in the Model Act were omitted by the New Jersey legislators who drafted the state provision. The legislature deliberately diverged from the Model Act in this respect, a decision that makes perfect sense given a decision to exclude syringes from the general drug paraphernalia provisions, and which makes no sense if we assume that the legislature intended to include syringes within the general definition of drug paraphernalia.⁽¹¹⁾

Comparison of the next two sections of the two acts demonstrates that the removal of references to injection from the state statute's general paraphernalia provisions was no accident. Apart from minor technical changes,⁽¹²⁾ both the possession and distribution sections of the Model Act differ from their counterparts in the state law only in the exclusion of the word "inject" from the list of illegal uses knowledge of which satisfies the provisions' scienter requirements.

The very existence of section 2C:36-6 likewise manifests the intention to regulate syringes differently than other forms of drug paraphernalia. The Model Act, which explicitly defines paraphernalia to include syringes, has no separate provision for syringes. Of all the items that might fall under the general definition -- from cigarette papers, through paper clips, to gelatin capsules and glass vials -- only syringes are set apart in this statute for special treatment. This difference, moreover, is one of substance and not mere organization: the possession and distribution of injection equipment is a strict liability offense, while the general paraphernalia possession and distribution provisions impose a scienter requirement. Under both sections 2C:36-2 and -3, a violation occurs only when the possessor or distributor intends the item for one or more of the prohibited uses in the statute. Section 2C:36-6, by contrast, is an absolute ban on possession or distribution of any syringe "adapted for the use of a controlled dangerous substance." No knowledge or intent with respect to drug use is necessary to violate the provision. It is simply illegal to dispense or possess a syringe capable of injecting drugs for any purpose without a prescription. Thus section 2C:36-6 makes it illegal to sell a syringe without a prescription to a diabetic to inject insulin, even though such a sale would not violate section 2C:36-3 if it applied. The only exception to the strict prohibition of section 2C:36-6 is for syringes covered by a legitimate prescription. Unlike most other forms of drug paraphernalia, which the legislature did not wish to regulate in their conventional uses, syringes were intended to be totally regulated through the health care system.⁽¹³⁾

Finally, the statute's forfeiture provision, section 2C:36-7 treats paraphernalia and syringes as distinct, referring disjunctively to "[a]ny drug paraphernalia, hypodermic syringe or needle seized in violation of this chapter." If hypodermic syringes or needles were already included in the statute's definition of drug paraphernalia, then the separate reference to these items in the statute wold be mere surplusage. To so read a statute's language is to violate one of the most basic rules of statutory construction. See State v. Reynolds, 124 N.J. 559, 564, 592 A.2d 194, 196 (1991) ("A construction that will render any part of a statute inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless, is to be avoided."); Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Section 46.06.

Overall, the question of the statute's meaning on this issue is properly guided by the maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ("the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another") It is an accepted canon of statutory interpretation in New Jersey that "[w]here the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded." See GE Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 308, 625 A.2d 468 (1993); see also Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Section 47.24. In three separate sections of the paraphernalia statute, the legislature carefully excised references to syringes and injection from the Model Act it was adopting. In a fourth it added specific prohibitions applicable only to syringes, more stringent than those applied to drug paraphernalia generally. In a fifth, it referred to syringes and needles disjunctively from drug paraphernalia. No text could be clearer, and therefore no further discussion of the legislative intent is necessary or appropriate.⁽¹⁴⁾

A plain-text analysis of the statutory scheme shows that there is neither ambiguity nor conflict in the interpretation that distinguishes syringes from other forms of drug paraphernalia. This should dispose of any need to go beyond the text to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent. If such arguments arise, however, there is little support in the legislative history of the paraphernalia provision for the proposition that it was intended to govern physicians and pharmacists providing care consistent with professional standards. The paraphernalia law was passed in 1980, as part of a national trend, led by the federal government, to eliminate what had become a burgeoning commercial trade in the tools of drug use: By 1976, between fifteen and thirty thousand "head shops" did an annual three billion dollar business in such items as rolling papers, bongs and freebasing kits. See Kimmelman, supra; Lawrence O. Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, Prevention of HIV/AIDS Among Injection Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Disease Prevention, 46 Emory L. J. 587, 611-12 (1997) (reviewing Congressional investigation of paraphernalia problem). Paraphernalia laws, including New Jersey's, were aimed at head shops, not doctors and pharmacists. The syringe prescription law, which had existed in substantially the same form since at least 1955, see 1955 N.J. Laws ch. 277, was incorporated into the overall scheme set out in title 24. See 1980 N.J. Laws ch. 133. In 1987, the legislature recodified the controlled substances and drug paraphernalia laws, creating the current chapters 35 and 36 of title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. 1987 N.J. Laws ch. 106. At that time, the 1980 drug paraphernalia statute was moved to 2C, the current section 2C:36-6 was added, and the alternative reference to syringes was added to the seizure section, 2C:36-7. The legislature left intact the prior prescription law in title 24. This history demonstrates that the legislature never considered syringes to be covered under the general paraphernalia provision, but rather at every occasion treated the two categories as distinct.

Prosecutors have, as far as can be determined, themselves followed our interpretation of the statute in law enforcement practice. "An established usage in regard to the meaning and effect of a statute is a relevant and persuasive guide to its authoritative interpretation." Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Section 51.04. The drug paraphernalia and syringe prosecutions brought by New Jersey's Attorney General have arguably given rise to an "established usage" of these statutes. Both of New Jersey's major needle exchange prosecutions, State v. Sorge, 249 N.J. Super. 144; 591 A.2d 1382 (N.J. App.Div. 1991), and State v. McCague, 314 N.J.Super. 254, 714 A.2d 937 (1998), were brought under section 6, the syringe-specific provision, and not under the general drug paraphernalia prohibition of section 3.⁽¹⁵⁾ The fact that prosecutors have used the syringe-specific law and not the broader drug paraphernalia law to prosecute these high profile needle exchange cases provides further support for the argument that the general drug paraphernalia law was not intended to apply to syringe possession and distribution.

Finally, the rules of lenity and strict construction of criminal statutes should operate to produce a judicial interpretation of the syringe control statutes that excludes syringes dispensed or prescribed for a legitimate medical purpose. In State v. Dixon,114 N.J. 111, 117, 553 A.2d 1, 4 (1989), the Supreme Court held:

Like the United States Supreme Court, "we adhere to the time-honored interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788, 810 (1988) (citation omitted); see also State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 18, 519 A.2d 322 (1987) ("Penal laws cannot be extended by implication or intendment. Where more than one reasonable interpretation may be made, or where the language is ambiguous * * * the construction must be drawn against the state." (citation omitted)).

... In short, we should not be the ones to remold the statute when there is doubt about its application.

Conclusion: Dispensing sterile injection equipment by prescription to known IDUs probably does not violate New Jersey law.⁽¹⁶⁾

III. How Might New Jersey Law Be Changed or Clarified to Promote Access to Sterile Injection Equipment for IDUs Through the Health Care System?

This Memorandum has concluded that physicians may prescribe and pharmacists may dispense sterile injection equipment to IDUS as a health-care intervention to prevent the transmission of blood-borne pathogens. Nevertheless, several legal measures would add clarity to the legal situation or otherwise protect public health by enhancing access to safe injection equipment.

A. Changes in Statutes or Regulations

1. The legislature should amend the prescription and paraphernalia statutes to legalize the over-the-counter sale of injection equipment under all circumstances.

2. The Medical and Pharmacy Boards have the power to and should issue regulations explicitly stating that providing sterile injection equipment to IDU patients in order to prevent transmission of a serious communicable disease is an acceptable medical/pharmacy practice. See Lemmon Company v. New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners,

3. The Pharmacy Board should require training in the theory and practice of harm reduction as part of mandated continuing education. N.J.S.A. § 45:14-11.11, 45:14-11.12.

4. Can the Secretary authorize exceptions?

B. Declaratory Judgment

Declaratory judgments are available to people whose contemplated conduct could subject them to criminal prosecution. The applicable statute is N.J.S.A. § 2A:16-53.

A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

A brief review of the case law indicates that physicians or health care organizations that wished to prescribe injection equipment to IDU patients would have standing, along with dispensing pharmacists and the patients themselves, to sue a country prosecutor charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal law. In Keuper v. Wilson, 111 N.J.Super. 502, 507-07, 268 A.2d 760 (N.J. Super. Ch.1970), the Court explained:

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law has been increasingly used in this State to obtain a determination of the legality of a particular course of action rather than pursuing the course of action and risking criminal prosecution. E.g., Sanitary Vendors, Inc. v. Byrne, 40 N.J. 157, 190 A.2d 876 (1963); Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487 (1955), 20 N.J. 451, 120 A.2d 107 (1956); Thrillo, Inc. v. Scott, 15 N.J.Super. 124, 82 A.2d 903 (Cty.Ct.1951).

It appears from State v. Baird, 50 N.J. 376, 235 A.2d 673 (1967) that where there has been a determination under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law has a particular course of action would not be a violation of the criminal laws, such determination will be binding upon the prosecutor who was a party to the declaratory judgment action.

In another case, the court explained:

In this case there is a bona fide justiciable controversy as to the legal right of the plaintiff to engage in the kind of activity discussed herein....The duty of the defendant [county prosecutor] to prosecute violations of the criminal laws of this State within his county is clear, State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953). Accordingly, there are present the necessary elements for a declaratory action, Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941), chapter II. The salutary purposes contemplated by the Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S. 2A:16--50 et seq., N.J.S.A., are clearly served when such conflicting interests are determined without the necessity of compelling the plaintiff to expose itself and its customer to the risk of criminal prosecution.

Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 408, 117 A.2d 487, 491(1955).

C. Attorney General's Opinion

The law department may issue attorney general's opinions under N.J.S.A.§ 52:17A-4, but not to individual citizen requesters.Attorney General opinions are considered persuasive authority for the New Jersey courts but are not binding.⁽¹⁷⁾.