Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education

Beasley School of Law

Project on Harm Reduction in the Health Care System

Memorandum

Date: November 23, 1999

Subject: Prescribing and Dispensing Injection Equipment in Colorado

INTRODUCTION

Numerous medical organizations and even the federal government itself now recommend that injection drug users employ a new, sterile syringe each time they inject.(1) Unfortunately, the number of sterile syringes required to follow this standard -- approximately one billion(2) -- exceeds the available supply by many millions. The continuing shortage of syringes contributes to the spread of HIV, and is thus a major health problem. Many commentators have suggested that the health care system can help increase access to safe injection equipment through prescription, pharmacy sales and other measures such as hospital or clinic-based needle exchange programs (NEPs).(3)

This Memorandum assesses the legality, under Colorado law, of physician prescription and pharmacy sale of injection equipment to patients who are known to be injecting illegal drugs. It assumes that ensuring a patient's access to sterile injection equipment is clinically effective and conducive to public health, is ethical, and constitutes only one facet of the care the patient is receiving from the physician. These assumptions are justified and discussed in two companion reports: Zita Lazzarini, Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users, and Josiah Rich, Syringe Prescription in Rhode Island: A Case Study. The risk of malpractice liability is discussed in a third companion piece, Professional Liability in the Prescription and Dispensing of Sterile Injection Equipment to IDU Patients, by Maxwell Mehlman.

We conclude that physicians may legally prescribe and pharmacists may legally dispense syringes to injection drug users (IDUs) as a health care intervention to prevent a patient acquiring or transmitting HIV.

This Memorandum addresses the following specific questions:

1) May a physician legally prescribe sterile injection equipment to an IDU patient?

2) May a pharmacist legally fill such a prescription?

3) How might Colorado law be changed or clarified to promote access to sterile injection equipment for IDUs through the health care system?

I. May a Physician Legally Prescribe Sterile Injection Equipment to an IDU Patient?

Answering this question requires a two-step analysis. We determine first whether prescription of sterile injection equipment is consistent with the general law governing medical practice. If so, we then ask whether any other law, such as a drug paraphernalia provision, prohibits prescription of syringes to an IDU patient. We begin with an overview of the regulatory environment.

A. The Regulatory Scheme

Medical Practice Law

The practice of medicine in Colorado is governed by the Colorado Medical Practice Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-36-101 et seq., with regulations found in volume 3 section 713-1 et seq. of the Colorado Code of Regulations. The Act vests in the State Board of Medical Examiners [the "Board"] the power to adopt such regulations as are necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of that Act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-36-104(1)(a).

Colorado medical licensure law is silent on the physician's general authority to write prescriptions for or dispense drugs and devices. Leaving aside any limitations imposed by other laws, a physician is free to prescribe any drug or device she believes will benefit the patient and the prescription of which is consistent with the accepted standard of care. According to the Medical Practice Act, unprofessional conduct includes: . .

(f) Any conviction of any offense of moral turpitude, a felony, or a crime that would constitute a violation of this article. For purposes of this paragraph (f), "conviction" includes the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the imposition of a deferred sentence.

(g) Administering, dispensing, or prescribing any habit-forming drug, as defined in section 12-22-102(13), or any controlled substance, as defined in section 12-22-303(7), other than in the course of legitimate professional practice;

(h) Any conviction of violation of any federal or state law regulating the possession, distribution, or use of any controlled substance, as defined in section 12-22-303(7), and, in determining if a license should be denied, revoked, or suspended, or if the licensee should be placed on probation, the board shall be governed by section 24-5-101, C.R.S. For purposes of this paragraph (h), "conviction" includes the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the imposition of a deferred sentence.. . .

(n) Violating, or attempting to violate, directly or indirectly, or assisting in or abetting the violation of or conspiring to violate any provision or term of this article;. . .

(p) Any act or omission which fails to meet generally accepted standards of medical practice;. . .

(u) Violation of any valid board order or any rule or regulation promulgated by the board in conformance with law;. . .

(ff) Any violation of the provisions of section 12-36-202 or any rule or regulation of the board adopted pursuant to that section;

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-36-117(1).

A court will assess a practice alleged to be unprofessional and beneath the standard of acceptable care by considering what the practitioner has done in the particular circumstances, and by comparing his conduct with what a similarly situated segment of the medical profession says should have been done. Colo. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 547(1996); Colo. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. McCrosky, 940 P.2d 1044(1996).

The Board may revoke or suspend the license, or otherwise discipline a licensee for unprofessional conduct. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-36-118(5)(g)(III).

Controlled Substances Law Generally

Prescribing powers are defined with respect to certain drugs in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1992 ("the Controlled Substances Act"). Because syringes do not fall within the definition of "controlled substances,"(4) these rules are relevant only by analogy. The "Prescriptions" regulation, which requires a prescription for the dispensing of a substance listed in schedules II, III, IV, or V, also states:. . .

(5) A practitioner may dispense or deliver a controlled substance to or for an individual or animal only for medical treatment or authorized research in the ordinary course of that practitioner's profession.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-308. Both relevant requirements - purpose of medical treatment and dispensing in the ordinary course of business -- must be satisfied for a prescription to be valid. See generally McKay v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Colo. 305, 86 P.2d 232 (1938); Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Slonim, 844 P.2d 1207 (1992).

The Controlled Substances Act has a specific section setting out violations and penalties dealing with controlled substances. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-401 et seq.

(1)(a) Except as authorized by part 3 of article 22 of title 12, C.R.S., or by part 2 or 3 of this article, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, dispense, sell, distribute, possess, or to possess with intent to manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute a controlled substance; or induce, attempt to induce, or conspire with one or more other persons, to manufacture, dispense, sell, distribute, possess, or possess with intent to manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute a controlled substance.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-405. Violators are guilty of a felony, the class determined by the substance's schedule and by any extenuating circumstances.(5)

Drug Paraphernalia Law

The Controlled Substances Act includes a drug paraphernalia provision, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-425 et seq., loosely based on the Justice Department's model act, reprinted in Annotation, Validity, under Federal Constitution, of So-called "Head Shop" Ordinances or Statutes, Prohibiting Manufacture and Sale of Drug Use Related Paraphernalia, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 15 (1984 & Supp. 1998). The statute provides a tripartite definition of "drug paraphernalia." First, it defines drug paraphernalia generally as "all equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use" with a controlled substance. Second, it lists seven types of items as examples of drug paraphernalia. Finally, it offers eleven factors to be considered when determining whether an item is drug paraphernalia.

Following the Model Act, the statute refers to injection in the roster of drug-use practices that contribute to defining paraphernalia under the first part of the definition, but removed the words "[h]ypodermic syringes, needles and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally injected controlled substances into the human body" in its list of items that can qualify as drug paraphernalia under some circumstances. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-426. The eleven factors a court may consider, in addition to all other relevant factors, are:

(a) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use;

(b) The proximity of the object to controlled substances;

(c) The existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object;

(d) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the knowledge of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, or evidence that such person reasonably should know, that it will be delivered to persons who he knows or reasonably should know, could use the object to facilitate a violation of sections 18-18-425 to 18-18-430;

(e) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;

(f) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use;

(g) National or local advertising concerning its use;

(h) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;

(i) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a supplier of like or related items to the community for legal purposes, such as an authorized distributor or dealer of tobacco products;

(j) The existence and scope of legal uses for the object in the community;

(k) Expert testimony concerning its use.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-427(1).

The Drug Paraphernalia Act states:

Any person who sells or delivers, possesses with intent to sell or deliver . . . equipment, products, or materials knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that such equipment, products, or materials could be used as drug paraphernalia commits a class 2 misdemeanor.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-429. A class 2 misdemeanor is subject to a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment of up to twelve months, or both. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-1-106.

B. Analysis

The Medical Practice Act and the Controlled Substances Act judge the validity of a prescription by essentially the same standard: it is valid if it is written (1) in the usual course of professional treatment, and (2) accords with the generally accepted standards of medical practice. This is a variant of the controlled substances prescription standard that applies in one form or other in nearly all states. Generally these hold that a prescription for a controlled substance is legal if it is written by a practitioner in good faith, in the usual course of practice, for a legitimate medical purpose. See, e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.071; S.D. Codified Laws §22-42-4.2,5; Commonwealth v. West, 270 Pa.Super. 301, 411 A.2d 537 (1979). Both the Colorado and the national standard address the essential logical elements of validity for any prescription, and are consistent with the standards of professional conduct set out in Colorado medical licensure law. We therefore assume that the Colorado standard would be the one, or equivalent to the one, that a court would apply in assessing the propriety of a syringe prescription. A prescription for sterile injection equipment, issued to a patient who cannot or will not enter drug treatment, for the purpose of preventing the transmission of a serious communicable disease during injection, would seem to be well within the parameters of allowable discretion set by this standard.

No Colorado cases have clearly defined "course of professional treatment" as used in this test, but see y McKay v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Colo. 305, 86 P.2d 232 (1938); Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Slonim, 844 P.2d 1207 (1992) (applying medical practice and controlled substances laws to physicians). There is, however, ample case law applying equivalent standards under other states' and federal law. In determining whether a prescription arises within the usual course of professional practice, courts would probably consider such indicia as whether a bona fide physician-patient relationship existed, whether other care was provided, whether proper records were kept of the encounter, whether the prescription was based on a proper history or individualized assessment of the patient's risk factors, efforts to provide other harm reducing services, follow up and so on. See generally United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 142-43, 96 S.Ct. 335,345 ("The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that respondent's conduct exceeded the bounds of "professional practice."... [H]e gave inadequate physical examinations or none at all. He ignored the results of the tests he did make.... He did not regulate the dosage at all, prescribing as much and as frequently as the patient demanded. He did not charge for medical services rendered, but graduated his fee according to the number of tablets desired. In practical effect, he acted as a large-scale "pusher" not as a physician.") A physician prescribing syringes to bona fide patients in his regular office or in a clinic, keeping records and providing other treatment services, would not be at risk of failing this test.

Finally, a prescription, to be valid, must accord with prevailing standards of proper professional practice. In Colorado, a failure to meet professional standards in treatment must normally be shown by expert medical testimony that the physician failed to possess and exercise that reasonable degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his or her school of medicine in similar circumstances. Short v. Downs, 36 Colo.App. 109, 537 P.2d 754 (1975). The standard of care determined by the expert testimony will help the finders of fact evaluate the appropriateness of the physician's treatment choice, even if it differs from those followed by other skilled practitioners. People ex rel. Woodard v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373, 1379(1989). In other states, case law suggests a standard looking to whether or not other physicians would regard the practice as legitimate, see, e.g. Possinger, 264 Pa.Super. 332, 339 , 399 A.2d 1077, 1081 (1979); cf. Greenspan v. Osherhoff, 232 Va. 388, 398, 351 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1986) (One measure of legitimacy is whether a physician "render[s] proper medical care to his patients."). Unanimity of medical opinion is not required. See, e.g., Glover v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 231 Cal.App.3d 203, 282 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1991); Commonwealth v. Salameh, 421 Pa.Super. 320, 324, 617 A.2d 1314, 1316 (1992) (prosecution must prove not simply that some physicians disagree with the practice at issue, but that "'no' responsible segment of the medical profession exists which accepts appellant's methods"). See generally S.E. Stone, The Investigation and Prosecution of Professional Practice Cases under the Controlled Substances Act: Introduction to Professional Practice Case Law. 21 Drug Enforcement 23 (1983). There is ample support for the position that prescribing sterile injection equipment comports with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession. Zita Lazzarini, Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users, and Josiah Rich, Syringe Prescription in Rhode Island: A Case Study.

Conclusion: A prescription for sterile injection equipment to an IDU patient is consistent with the standard for a valid prescription under the Medical Practice Act and the prescription provision of the Controlled Substances Act.

We turn now to the second question: Do any other laws prohibit physicians from prescribing sterile injection equipment to IDU patients?

The drug paraphernalia law is the one serious possibility. As we will discuss further in the pharmacy analysis below, syringes can be drug paraphernalia under some circumstances. Although it may be argued that prescription of syringes is governed by the prescription provisions of the Medical Practice and Controlled Substances Acts, and not by the more general drug paraphernalia law, for purposes of this analysis, we will assume that syringes are drug paraphernalia.

The law prohibits any person from selling or delivering, or "possess[ing] with intent to sell or deliver . . . equipment, products, or materials knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that such equipment, products, or materials could be used as drug paraphernalia." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-429.

Delivery means to "transfer or attempt to transfer a substance, actually or constructively, from one person to another, whether or not there is an agency relationship." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-102. A physician who writes a prescription for an item is not actually transferring possession of that item to the patient, but merely providing the patient with instructions and authorization for the pharmacist who will transfer possession by dispensing the prescription.

Nor does the concept of a constructive delivery embrace the writing of a prescription.

A constructive delivery is effectuated when, without actual transfer of the goods or their symbol, the conduct of the parties is such as to be inconsistent with any supposition other than there has been a change in the nature of the holding. There may be a completed delivery . . . [if] nothing further remains to be done by either party to complete the sale.

Jelen and Son, Inc. v. Bandimere, 801 P.2d 1182, 1186(1990)(citations and internal quotations omitted). Ordinarily and as a matter of logic, constructive delivery requires "actual or constructive possession [of the syringe] prior to transfer." Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 3 D & C. 4ths 381, 385-85 (Common Pleas Lebanon Cty 1989). Whatever his intent, a physician writing a prescription to be filled at a pharmacy does not have possession of the syringe.

It is well established that possession can exist without physical contact so long as the defendant has dominion and control over the drug. United States v. Cox, 2 Cir., 277 F.2d 302, 303. Such dominion and control without physical custody has been termed 'constructive,' as opposed to actual, possession. Physical custody by an employee or agent whom one dominates, or whose actions one can control, is sufficient to constitute such constructive possession by the principal.

United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 90 (2d. Cir. 1961), quoted with approval in People v. Storr, 186 Colo. 242, 247, 527 P.2d 878, 881(1974). The authority to write a prescription for a syringe does not give the physician the ability to exercise dominion over it; like the patient, he would have to go to the pharmacy and purchase the syringe in order to complete the sale and possess it. Likewise, though his prescription would facilitate the purchase, it does not create an agency relationship with the pharmacist. The physician cannot set the price, or compel the sale. Hence the physician cannot be said to constructively possess the syringe.(6)

Conclusion: Writing a prescription for a syringe does not violate any Colorado law. A physician may therefore legally prescribe injection equipment to an IDU patient.

II. May a Pharmacist Legally Fill a Such a Prescription?

A. The Regulatory Environment

Pharmacy Licensure Law

The practice of pharmacy in Colorado is governed by the Pharmacy Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-22-101 et seq., with regulations found in 3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-1 et seq. of the Colorado Code of Regulations. The Act vests in the State Board of Pharmacy power to adopt such regulations as are deemed necessary to carry out the purposes of that Act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-22-108. The Act also authorizes the Board of Pharmacy to control and regulate the sale of devices, but the board has not promulgated any regulations governing the sale of devices. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-22-112(2).

The disciplinary provisions of the Pharmacy Act authorize action against the license of a pharmacist who. . .

(b) Is guilty of the commission of a felony or has had accepted by a court a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony;

(c) Has violated any of the provisions of this part 1, the lawful rules and regulations of the board, or any state or federal law pertaining to drugs.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-22-125(1).

Like the Board of Medical Examiners, the Board of Pharmacy has the authority to punish licensees for unprofessional conduct. See generally Mitchell v. Klapper, 626 P.2d 1163(1980); People v. Caponey, 647 P.2d 668(1982). The Board has promulgated regulations setting out general rules of professional conduct. 3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-1 et. seq. These regulations specify that:

A pharmacist shall at all times conduct his/her profession in conformity with all federal and state drug laws, rules and regulations; and shall uphold the legal standards of the current official compendia.

3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-1.00.11.

A pharmacist shall not be a party or accessory to any fraudulent or deceitful practice or transaction in pharmacy, nor discredit his/her profession.

3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-1.00.12. The Board has also set out regulations dealing with dispensing. 3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-3 et. seq.

Medical need No licensee or registrant shall compound, dispense, deliver or distribute any drug to any person in such quantity or in any situation where the licensee or registrant knows or reasonably should know said drug has no recognized medical utility or application. Violation of this rule shall constitute prima facie proof of violation of C.R.S. 12-22-125.

3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-3.00.20.

A pharmacist is authorized to dispense medications ordered by a valid prescription, and is ordinarily expected to do so in the absence of a good reason to refuse. Strauss S. The Pharmacist and the Law. Baltimore MD: Williams & Wilkins, 1980:29-31; Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining Pharmacists' Legal Responsibilities, XXIV Am. J. L & Med. 417 (1998). The Pharmacy Act states that:

(6) No civil or criminal liability or administrative sanction may be imposed on a pharmacist for action taken in reliance on a reasonable belief that an order purporting to be a prescription was issued by a practitioner in the usual course of professional treatment or in authorized research.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-308.

Controlled Substance and Drug Paraphernalia Laws

The controlled substances and paraphernalia discussed in I.A. above are also applicable to pharmacists. The regulations for the Controlled Substances Act make clear that a pharmacist has an independent responsibility to ensure that controlled substances are properly prescribed:

Each time a prescription drug or device is dispensed in a prescription drug outlet, a pharmacist shall make the final evaluation of the transaction. At the time of such final evaluation, the pharmacy shall take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the container, label, and prescription drug or device dispensed, as well as all records relating to the transaction are complete, accurate, and appropriate.

3 Colo. Code Regs. §719-3.00.50.

B. Analysis

We have concluded above that a physician's prescription for sterile injection equipment, written under the factual conditions assumed for purposes of this Memorandum, is valid under Colorado law. Ordinarily, the pharmacist is required to fill a valid prescription.(7) The next question is whether filling the prescription would be prohibited under any other provision of law.

Here the issue is, again, the paraphernalia law. The pharmacist is undoubtedly transferring the syringe, so if a syringe is drug paraphernalia in this situation, then the transfer is illegal. We thus come to the fundamental question of whether a syringe dispensed by a valid prescription, for legitimate medical reasons, falls within the definition of "drug paraphernalia" under Colorado law.

Any person who "sells or delivers, possesses with intent to sell or deliver . . . equipment, products, or materials knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that such equipment, products, or materials could be used as drug paraphernalia commits a class 2 misdemeanor." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-429. To determine culpability, a court asks two questions:

Looking objectively, is this person possessing or selling drug paraphernalia? If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the next question would be: looking subjectively, does this person intend to use the paraphernalia for illegal drug purposes or intend for the purchaser to use the paraphernalia for such purposes? ... The possessor or seller may not be penalized for possessing or selling drug paraphernalia unless he has the requisite intent to use it, or for others to use it, for illegal drug purposes.

MacFarlane, 660 F.2d at 1366,

Assuming for the moment that sterile injection equipment is objectively drug paraphernalia," liability depends upon whether the seller knows or has reason to know that it could be used for illegal drug use. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-429. The Supreme Court of Colorado has stated:

[W]e construe these [drug paraphernalia] crimes as requiring a culpable mental state of 'knowingly' . . . [which] is defined as follows:

A person acts 'knowingly' ... with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts 'knowingly' ... with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result. Thus . . . a defendant must be aware that the paraphernalia 'is practically certain' to be put to an illegal use in connection with a controlled substance. Our construction employs a standard of actual knowledge that is consistent with the statutory definition of 'knowingly' in section 18-1-501(6) and gives meaning to the statutory term "could be used."

Lee v. Smith, 772 P.2d 82, 87(1989). Therefore, a drug paraphernalia offense requires the following elements: (1) a sale or delivery; (2) equipment, products or materials; (3) with knowledge that the items so sold or delivered are practically certain to be used as drug paraphernalia. Id. In all cases in which the pharmacist does not in fact know or have reason to know that the patient intends to use the syringe to inject illegal drugs, the pharmacist does not violate the paraphernalia law even if in fact the item will be used for drug abuse.

Conclusion: Dispensing sterile injection equipment to an IDU does not violate Colorado law where the pharmacist does not and reasonably should not know that the patient intends to use the equipment to illegally inject drugs.

Many pharmacists will have occasion to learn or reasonably suspect that a patient presenting a valid syringe prescription is an IDU likely to use the syringes for illegal drug injection. A sale with this knowledge squarely raises the ultimate question of whether sterile injection equipment, prescribed by a physician to prevent transmission of bloodborne disease, falls within the definition of "drug paraphernalia."

In Colorado, the "primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Corbetta v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 P.2d 718, 721(1999). A faithful effort to determine legislative intent should be guided by both the language of the statute and the expressed purposes of the lawmakers who wrote it.

In order to discern legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself. However, if the intended scope of the statutory language is unclear, we may look to principles of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent. For example, we may consider: (1) the problem addressed by the legislation; (2) the statute's legislative history; (3) the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment; and (4) the textual context of the legislation in an effort to clarify the legislative intent.

Id.

The most cautious view is that dispensing to a known IDU, even with a prescription, would violate the paraphernalia law. Syringes are covered, despite their exclusion from the list of specifically enumerated items, because the statute still covers an item that can be used to "inject" drugs illegally. The paraphernalia statute may be read as a limitation on the practitioner's authority to prescribe or dispense. General professional practice law, on this reading, allows a pharmacist to fill a prescription written with a valid medical purpose and, in the course of medical practice, except when the pharmacist knows or should know the patient intends to use the item for drug use, when the drug paraphernalia provision interposes its prohibition. This reading is consistent with the terms of the paraphernalia statute, which prohibit any person, without exception for health care providers, from providing drug paraphernalia to someone knowing it will be used to ingest illegal drugs.

The sounder view, however, is that the paraphernalia act does not and was not intended to regulate health care professionals acting within the scope of their professional practice, and that the text and legislative history alike support the conclusion that injection equipment prescribed and dispensed by regulated medical and pharmacy professionals for health purposes are not "paraphernalia." This interpretation has strong support in both the text of the law and its legislative and social history.

The state's original paraphernalia law was enacted in 1980, as part of a national trend, led by the federal government, to eliminate what had become an enormous retail trade in the equipment necessary to use illegal drugs. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Zita Lazzarini. Prevention of HIV/AIDS Among Injection Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Disease Prevention, 46 Emory L.J. 587 (1997). (describing origins of drug paraphernalia statutes). By 1976, between fifteen and thirty thousand "head shops" did an annual three billion dollar business in such items as rolling papers, bongs and freebasing kits. Gostin & Lazzarini, supra, at 611-12 (reviewing Congressional investigation of paraphernalia problem). "The impetus behind the legislature's action was the belief that the possession, sale, manufacture, delivery, and advertisement of drug paraphernalia encourage and glamorize the illegal use of controlled substances, as well as increase the public's acceptance of such use." High Gear and Toke Shop v. Beacom, 689 P.2d 624, 627 (Co. 1984). After several court challenges, the act was amended in 1986, chiefly by adopting the Justice Department's model act's definition of "drug paraphernalia." As noted above, however, the legislature did not adopt the model act's text verbatim, but made several key deletions, the most notable of which for present purposes was the subsection explicitly identifying hypodermic needles and syringes as paraphernalia. The most reasonable, if not the only, explanation for this omission is that the legislature did not intend to cover syringes at all.

The focus on commercial paraphernalia traders can also be seen in the factors provided to guide the judicial determination of whether an item is paraphernalia. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-426. These plainly apply to commercial enterprises depending on illicit drug use for their business. The fact that a pharmacist is a legitimate supplier of legal syringes to the community (factor i) and that syringes have legitimate uses in the community quite apart from the legitimate purpose of preventing disease transmission (factor j) supports a finding that syringes provided for legitimate medical purposes are not "drug paraphernalia" under the statute. Further support would come from expert testimony (factor k).

Beyond this textual evidence is the legislature's intention in passing the law. The paraphernalia law was carefully designed to close down head shops that glamorized and promoted drug use. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d at 1361. There is absolutely no indication in the statute that the General Assembly was intending to limit the discretion of health care providers to provide medical devices necessary for the care or prevention of disease in the usual course of their professional practices. Colorado law has protected the discretion of physicians to prescribe even controlled substances in the course of their professional activities. See generally Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Slonim, 844 P.2d 1207(1992).

Prosecutions and convictions under the paraphernalia law have been consistent with this interpretation: all the reported cases under the Act involve head shops or individuals also convicted of possession and/or distribution of controlled substances. See, e.g., People v. Olson,

921 P.2d 51(1996); People v. Ceja, 904 P.2d 1308(1995); Hejira Corp., 660 F.2d 1356.

The rule of lenity also supports this interpretation. "When interpreting an ambiguous statute concerning a criminal offense, the rule of lenity requires that the statute be strictly construed in favor of the defendant." People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 432(1998). The rationale for the rule is the injustice of convicting a person without clear notice to him that his contemplated conduct is unlawful, as well as notice of the penalties. Given the obvious ambiguity in the proper interpretation of the paraphernalia law, which indiscriminately includes any object, and a practitioner's broad prescription discretion, lenity requires a court to hold that a practitioner acting legally under medical or pharmacy law cannot be charged with violating the paraphernalia law.

Finally, the view that the prescribing and dispensing of injection equipment for health purposes by health and pharmacy professionals is not covered by the paraphernalia law has support in precedent. In Spokane Health District v. Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d 140, 839 P.2d 324 (1992), the Supreme Court of Washington was faced with the question of whether needle exchange programs operated by health authorities under their general powers were prohibited by the Washington drug paraphernalia statute. The Court wrote:

It is undisputed the needles at issue in this case are "drug paraphernalia". Those distributing the needles know they will be used to inject controlled substances unlawfully. Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue, the needle exchange program is authorized under the Washington Constitution, statutes granting broad powers to local health officials, and the omnibus AIDS act. Therefore, they conclude, the drug paraphernalia act, which is aimed at criminal conduct, simply does not apply to their actions. We agree, finding the SCHD's needle exchange program permissible under the constitution and statutes of this state.

120 Wash.2d 140, 147, 839 P.2d 324, 327-28. The law that controls their decisions about prescribing or dispensing medication are the professional practice and controlled substances laws, not a paraphernalia law aimed at commercial drug businesses. Indeed, were the drug paraphernalia law to apply to legitimate disease prevention activities, it would be illegal to even provide IDUs with bleach for sterilizing needles or alcohol pads for disinfecting an injection site, Brockett, 120 Wash.2d 140, 148, 839 P.2d 324, 328, yet these are universally accepted measures.

Conclusion: Dispensing sterile injection equipment to known IDUs probably does not violate Colorado law, although the contrary conclusion is also reasonable.

Even if needles dispensed by prescription for health purposes are "drug paraphernalia," pharmacists are apparently immune from liability for selling a needle ordered by prescription. The pharmacy act states that "[n]o civil or criminal liability ... may be imposed on a pharmacist for action taken in reliance on a reasonable belief that an order purporting to be a prescription was issued by a practitioner in the usual course of professional treatment..." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-308. We have already established that a prescription for injection equipment is valid, so a pharmacists belief that it was so would plainly be reasonable.

Conclusion: Even if syringes prescribed to prevent disease are "drug paraphernalia," pharmacists are immune from criminal liability for filling valid prescriptions.

III. How Might Colorado Law Be Changed or Clarified to Promote Access to Sterile Injection Equipment for IDUs Through the Health Care System?

This Memorandum has concluded that physicians may prescribe and pharmacists may dispense sterile injection equipment to IDUS as a healthcare intervention to prevent the transmission of blood-borne pathogens. Nevertheless, several legal measures would add clarity to the legal situation or otherwise protect public health by enhancing access to safe injection equipment.

A. Changes in Statutes or Regulations

1. The General Assembly should amend the Controlled Substances Act to legalize the over-the-counter sale of injection equipment under all circumstances.

2. The Medical and Pharmacy Boards have the power to and should issue regulations explicitly stating that providing sterile injection equipment to IDU patients in order to prevent transmission of a serious communicable disease is an acceptable medical practice.

3. The Pharmacy Board should require training in the theory and practice of harm reduction as part of mandated continuing education.

4. The Board of Health, pursuant to its powers under Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-4-1408, should specifically authorize the dispensing of syringes as a proper means of controlling HIV infection. Colorado has already enacted several health statutes dealing with disease control. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-4-1401 et. seq. Of relevance to this Memorandum are the sections dealing specifically with HIV and AIDS. Id. The legislature has stated:

(1) It is the duty of state and local health officers to investigate sources of HIV infection and to use every proper means to prevent the spread of the disease.

(2) It is the duty of state and local health officers, as part of disease control efforts, to provide public information, risk-reduction education, confidential voluntary testing and counseling, educational materials for use in schools, and professional education to health care providers.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-4-1405. Authorizing the prescription of syringes to an IDU for the purpose of preventing the spread of HIV is consistent with the purposes of these statutes. See Brockett, supra.

B. Declaratory Judgment

A practitioner wishing to prescribe or dispense injection equipment could also consider bringing an action for a declaratory judgment by one or more of the relevant agencies. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-4-105(11)(every agency shall provide by rule procedures for obtaining a declaratory judgment); 3 Colo. Code Regs. §713-2(declaratory judgments by the Medical Board); 3 Colo. Code Regs. §13.00.00 et seq.(declaratory judgments by the Board of Pharmacy). According to the regulations of both boards:

Any person may petition the Board for a declaratory order to terminate controversies or to remove uncertainties as to the applicability to the petitioner of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the Board.

3 Colo. Code Regs. §713-2(2); accord 3 Colo. Code Regs. §13.00.10. A declaratory judgment would thus probably be available to test the legality of prescribing and dispensing syringes for the purpose of preventing the spread of HIV.

C. Attorney General's Opinion

State agencies, but not individual citizens, can request an opinion of the attorney general on the proper interpretation of a statute. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-31-101(b).

1. U.S. Public Health Service & Infectious Diseases Society of America, Guidelines for the Prevention of Opportunistic Infections in Persons Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 48(RR10) MMWR 1 (1999); U.S. Public Health Service, HIV Prevention Bulletin: Medical Advice for Persons Who Inject Illicit Drugs (May 8, 1997); accord J. Normand, D. Vlahov, & L. Moses eds. Preventing HIV Transmission: The Role of Sterile Needles and Bleach (1995) (National Academy of Sciences); Statements/Resolutions/Policies on Increased Access to Clean Needles and Syringes (collected at http://www.sfaf.org/prevention/needleexchange/statements.html); T. Stephen Jones and David Vlahov, Use of Sterile Syringes and Aseptic Drug Preparation Are Important Components of HIV Prevention Among Injection Drug Users, 18 J Acquir. Immune Defic. Syndr. S1 (Supp. 1, 1998).

2. Peter Lurie, T. Stephen Jones & J. Foley J, A Sterile Syringe for Every Drug User Injection: How Many Injections Take Place Annually, and How Might Pharmacists Contribute to Syringe Distribution? 18 J Acquir. Immune Defic. Syndr. S45 (Supp. 1, 1998).

3. Id.; Scott Burris, Peter Lurie, Daniel Abrahamson, and Josiah Rich, Physician Prescribing of Safe Injection Equipment to Prevent HIV Infection: Time for Action, __ Annals of Internal Medicine __ (2000); T. Stephen Jones, Should Pharmacists Sell Sterile Syringes to Injection Drug Users? 39 J Am Pharm Assoc 1 (1999); Alvin Novick, A Duty to Care: Sterile Injection Equipment and Illicit-drug Use, 11 AIDS & Pub. Pol'y J. 63 (1996).

4. Under Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-18-102,

(5) "Controlled substance" means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules I through V of part 2 of this article, including cocaine, marihuana, and marihuana concentrate.

5. The penalty for a schedule V substance is a class 1 misdemeanor, unless the violator has a prior conviction. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-5-405(2)(d).

6. Although a physician who prescribes a syringe does not physically provide a needle to the patient, and therefore could not be said to engage in conduct potentially covered by the paraphernalia statute, there is a risk that prescribing a syringe could be prosecuted as aiding and abetting a violation of the paraphernalia statute that would occur when the pharmacist dispensed the syringe, or for conspiracy to violate the paraphernalia statute.

These charges are available to a motivated prosecutor. The risk to the physician is slight, however, for several reasons. Such a prosecution would be unusual: there is no reported case in Colorado of a charge of aiding and abetting a paraphernalia violation, nor are either conspiracy or accomplice charges commonly deployed where the core offense is a misdemeanor. More importantly, both crimes depend upon the underlying illegality of providing sterile injection equipment by prescription. Our analysis suggests that this behavior is not a crime. With a valid prescription, a patient is not violating the paraphernalia law when he purchases the needle, and the physician, or pharmacist, cannot be his accomplice or co-conspirator.

7. A pharmacist presumably could refuse to fill a syringe prescription under 3 Colo. Code Regs. §§719-3.00.20 or 719-3.00.50 if he believed that the prescription was not for a legitimate medical need or was inappropriate.