My friends in the English department often ask me to explainthedifference I so often talk about between analytic and continentalphilosophy. For some odd reason they want to relate our discipline with theirsin aneffort, maybe, to understand both better. Thus, I welcome theopportunityoffered by Schuylkill's general theme this year to give a verygeneral and un-rigorous presentation on Philosophy, intended forthe University Community atlarge.
One fine, if annoying, tradition in philosophy is that ofhedging ourbets. It's the fine art of being slippery. And we actually thinkit'smotivated by a wish to be exacting. Accordingly, I should beginsuch a paperby saying that neither analytic nor continental philosophy aretruly cohesive,unified, groups; much which seems inconsistent flows under theirbanner, asdoes much disagreement. However, today, few groups of any meritare cohesiveand unified, if they ever were. Even science isn't unified anymore. So muchfor fine print bordering on the platitudinous.
This paper has four sections. The first section placesanalytic andcontinental philosophy within a historical tradition, specificallyin relationto Kant. The second details analytic philosophy, particularly withrelationto 'the linguistic turn' and 'ordinary language' philosophy. Thethirdjuxtaposes what I take to be a continental response in terms ofHeidegger'sview of language and Foucault's view of power/knowledge, and showssome of thedisrepute in which these are held. The last reviews some recentjournalarticles on the subject, and delivers a summation and prognosis.
I. You all know about the Pre-Socratics, of which Ithinkfondly ofHeraclitus, so often quoted despite the fact that no one can "stepinto" his"same river" twice. You know about the martyrdom of Socrates whichissupposed to stand at the head of a rather ascetic and unassumingtradition ofcontemplation for contemplation's sake. But perhaps you don't knowaboutDescartes, the founder of "modern philosophy," and the mostarmchair of thearmchair philosophers. Doubting all that can be possibly doubted,no matterhow he tried he couldn't bring it about that he ceased to exist. He thought,and this established the idea of himself as innate to himself. Ofcourse JohnLocke wasn't having any of this. He announced that his mind was atabula rasa(blank slate) endowed instead with certain "capacities" and filledin like anempty cabinet by the world of sense.
Thus the rationalist/empiricist tradition was born. Throughmanytorturous turns it persists into the analytic and continentaldivide. Indeed,it is still an open question whether analytic philosophy has everleft thisearly beginning or whether it remains, as according to JosephMargolis(Temple), "Pre-Kantian" (Historied 57). Margolis argues thatanalyticphilosophy, to the extent that it does not eschew "all cognitiveprivilege"and a "principled disjunction between an independent actual worldand theworld we experience and claim to know," is Pre-Kantian,particularly mostforms of "externalism"--the view that all thought contents areindividuated atleast partly by "external" factors in the environment. Incontrast, it isdifficult to find an example of what I would call "Continental"philosophythat does not accept these claims--i.e., the denial of a privilegedepistemicstance or "God's eye view," and something like the symbiosisbetween mind andworld--though, perhaps not in Margolis' full-fledged sense of"symbiosis"(Historied 57).
Kant is supposed to have fused the rationalist and empiricisttraditionsinto his empirical idealism and transcendental realism, but somehowhe wentwrong. On the one hand, Kant's "Copernican Revolution" (hisempiricalidealism) gives the subject efficacy: "We must therefore maketrial whetherwe may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if wesuppose thatobjects must conform to our knowledge" (Critique bxvi). But, onthe other,Kant's transcendental realism gives the world a bite: for example,in Kant'sown refutation of (material) idealism: "Thus perception of thispermanent [inme] is possible only through a thing outside me and notthrough the mererepresentation of a thing outside me" (Critique b274-279). He pursued thebest of both the idealistic and realistic worlds and, somehow,failed to makethem cohere.
Kant stands at what I would like to call the nexus ofthe analytic andcontinental divide. It could have ended before it began. But itwas not tobe, partly because Kant is so difficult to understand. Germanidealists tookone horn of the idealism/realism dilemma; British empiriciststook theother. They have been stretching the bull between them ever since.
II.
Analytic Philosophy
logical Ordinary language
--------
Continental Philosophy
phenomenology existentialism hermeneutics structuralism
deconstructivism neo-Thomism neo-Marxism
Table 1-1. (Adapted from Follesdal 193).
The table is accurate if misleading. Clearly, continentalphilosophyhas enormous variety. But that is part of the problem with it: itis dis-unified. Continental philosophy no longer provides a unitedfront againstAnglo American philosophy, or as Follesdal puts it, "Analyticphilosophy hasdominated in the English-speaking world for the last sixty yearsand is nowencroaching upon the continent" (193).
This way of approaching the analytic/continental divide is viatheso-called "linguistic turn," which if you believe Michael Dummett,has itsgenesis shortly after Kant with Gottlob Frege. Philosophy oflanguage savesus (as Wittgenstein put it) from "the bewitchment of grammar":
Philosophy is concerned, not to establish truths of averygeneral kind,not even truths which can be arrived at by ratiocination alone, buttorectify certain kinds of misunderstanding, the misunderstandings wehaveof our concepts; and this means our misunderstandings of ourlanguage,since to possess a concept is to be the master of a certainfragment oflanguage (Dummett 438).
Dummett argues compellingly, if somewhat needlessly, thatFrege is the"fountainhead of analytical philosophy" (440), not Wittgenstien,Russell, orthe Vienna Circle. Revived interest in Frege has effected arapproachment of"orientation" among British and American schools of thought.
"Ordinary language" philosophy (a statement of which is quotedabove) orto use Morris Schlick's famous phrase that "by means of philosophystatementsare explained, by means of science they are verified" (56) replacedmetaphysics, the branch of philosophy concerned to detail whatis. (Metaphysics is the phoenix of philosophy: perpetually dying andreappearing.) "Logic" with its insistence on deductively valid formal rules ofinferenceobscured more general epistemologies as the pre-eminent way inwhich we cometo know anything. Language replaced thought (at least to theextent thatthere is no other way to talk about thought, and a public languagemustindividuate our thought content). Verification replaced "meaning,"in termsof a statement being true if it can "in principle" beverified and false ifnot. And when verificationism began to have problems because, forexample,verifiability is both too strong and too weak (Hempel), or becausethere is noprincipled disjunction between "statements of meaning" and "mattersof fact"(Quine), "use" replaced verification (as in Wittgenstien's widelyinterpreteddictum "meaning is use.")
It is important to note that "ordinary language" philosophyis, thus, atechnical term as well as a philosophical maneuver, and it haslittle to dowith the 'ordinary' language of the man in the street (far from it,it wasoften highly technical and jargonized). It also has very little todo withthe ways that many continental philosophers speak of different'discourses'which speak through human beings or in which people investthemselves (as weshall see in the next section).
In another example, John McDowell (Pittsburgh) disagrees withDummettthat language has the "principle functions" of "instrument ofcommunication"and "vehicle of thought," but only so he can argue other "principlefunctions":
the feature of language that reallymatters is rather this: that a natural language, the sort of language into which humanbeings are first initiated, serves as a repository of tradition,a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is areason for what (McDowell 126).
Although McDowell labels our second (linguistic) nature"Bildung," whichfor Hegel means a more robust historicized social interaction, itseems clearto me that Mcdowell's vision is rather more like Kant's attenuatednotion of asecond nature which answers the dialectic of reason. Since freewillcontradicts the necessity of nature, we must suppose a "secondnature" which"which puts [man] himself into another order of things" (Grounding57). Ofcourse, I don't mean to settle the issue here. The point I wish tomake isthat most analytic philosophy appears asocial (methodologicallysolipsistic)and unhistoricized (insistent on tacitly invariable "firstprinciples") inaddition to following a logically rigorous method, and beingforemostconcerned with semantic or linguistic issues (at its best).
III. As you can see, analytic philosophy has much initsfavor. (I continueto count myself both an analytic and a continental philosopher--ifthat'spossible.) But contrast it with the (clearly) continentalphilosophy ofMartin Heidegger. His work is historicized (strongly), sociallycontiguous(to the point of denying any subjective/objective distinction),logicallyunrigorous (it appears to work through coherence rather thantraditionallogic--as I will explain below), and also concerned with semanticorlinguistic issues but rather as an elucidation not as areplacement for metaphysics.
In fact both analytic and continental philosophy are highlyconcernedwith "linguistic analysis." They just mean a very different thingby it. Thus, Heidegger:
Our proposed way to language is woven into a speaking thatwouldlike to liberate nothing else than language, liberate it in orderto present it, giving utterance to it as somethingrepresented--which straightway testifies to the fact that languageitself has woven us into its speaking (Way 398).
For Analytic philosophers, language is something to beexplained, or avoided(paradoxically) by other forms of 'discourse': it is not somethingwhichrequires liberation. It is not some pent-up primal force requiringus as itsinstrument. We (at best) constitute our idea of ourselves byusing publicterms we learn when we are growing up (after all, there is noprivatelanguage): but language remains a tool, we remain its controller. We use itto communicate our thoughts, recasting it in our image. The "way"to language(or anything else) is through careful, deductive or inductivearguments basedon clear premises and conclusions which follow by certain "forms ofinference": but for Heidegger,
"Truth" is not a feature of correctpropositions that are assertedof an "object" by a human "subject" and then "are valid"somewhere, in what sphere we know not; rather, truth is disclosureof beings through which an openness essentially unfolds [west](Essence 127).
I am not sure why this notion appeals to me, except for thesense thatanalytic philosophy sometimes manufactures closed and, therefore,moribundpossibilities. It is sometimes better to have live ones even ifthey areobscure. There is also the sense in which analytic philosophy's"Mr. Spock"approach remains cold, elusive, idealistic, impractical and aboveallarbitrarily privileged (maybe it's the egalitarian in me whosenerves aregrated). Such opinions are hardly limited to Heidegger, vis.Foucault whoelaborates:
We should admit rather that powerproduces knowledge...thatpower and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is nopower relation without the correlative constitution of a fieldof knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose andconstitute at the same time power relations. These'power-knowledge relations' are to be analyzed, therefore not onthe basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free...Inshort, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge thatproduces a corpus of knowledge,...but power-knowledge...thatdetermines the forms and possible domains of knowledge (27-28).
Foucault's practical "real-politik" observation seems obvious totheconverted. I think it means something like this. Knowledge ispower, andpower relations inevitably constitute a "specialty" or "profession"whichthemselves are primarily concerned with 'knowledge' (through thephysicalenactment of discipline). Every political system has a make-up bywhich someknowledge (and practices) are coveted and others are marginalizeduntil they"disappear." Whatever the interpretation, the unconverted remarkin some suchway: "What does modus ponens have to do with power relations?"
This is a particularly good example of the kind of thing thatoccurs inanalytic philosophy. The analytic philosopher will say that if youhave arule of the form 'A>C', i.e., a conditional (whichmeans, alternatively, Aimplies C, If A then C, A isnecessary for C, and so on), and you havesupplied the antecedent (A), then the consequentC, just follows. Diagrammatically this is known as modus ponens or morecolloquially,conditional elimination:
A>CA
-----
C
and this is correct so far as it goes. It has nothing to dowith external,contextual, contingent relations such as what is meant by 'powerrelations'. It is a deductively valid inference form for any A and any C. Andby this ismeant something which invariably and necessarily follows.
What the analytic philosopher seems to see as above questionand whatthe continental philosopher is going to point out as contingent arethe veryassumed notions of what it means to have a rule of the form Aimplies C, tohave an A and to have a C. "Of course," they willsay "if you make enoughassumptions, then you will get invariant fixities and necessarilyvalidforms." I suspect, though I cannot show here, that behind everyspecificallyanalytic philosophy there are some such tacitly assumed governingassumptions(and probably behind some "continental" ones too). Surely, theanalyticphilosopher might respond that we have to make someassumptions. And, this isprobably true. It is when these "posits" lose their contingencythat dogmaticproblems arise.
Only within a given field of discourse is modus ponens notsubject topower relations. Or, to put it another way. Only within certainpowerrelations (both political and practical) does modus ponensappear independentof 'power relations'. I like this field of discourse, and more orless thisset of power relations, it appears extremely viable and apt tosolve a variedand large number of problems. But, I don't claim that it has someabsolute oruniversal nature, nor that it will be viable in all contingenciesandsituations.
This is as close as I will get to an actual argument againstanalyticstrategies (as opposed to merely explaining them). Yet, if thegeneralattitudes of many philosophers is any good indication of theanalytic/continental divide, the point is already made. Specimensaren't hardto find, vis. Dummett:
And despite the fact that Ryle had started his careeras theEnglish exponent of the philosophy of Husserl, and had in 1929published a critical but highly respectful review of Sein und Zeit[Heidegger's Being and Time], the enemy, at the time when I was astudent, was not Heidegger; Heidegger was perceived only as afigure of fun, too absurd to be taken seriously as a threat to thekind of philosophy practiced [sic] in Oxford (437).
Dummett suggests not only that many analytic philosophersthink badly ofHeidegger, but that in contrast to Dummett's days as a student,they nowperceive him as "the enemy."
Other opinions aren't hard to find. In a rare talk withMichael Tye(Temple), in which we argued whether one of my many tirades onrealism was"unintelligible," I asked him what he thought the differencebetween analyticand continental philosophy is. He replied (to his credit) that hedidn'tthink that there was much of a difference any more, but that ingeneral,analytic philosophy is any philosophy which is "clear," implying,I think,that continental philosophy is any philosophy which is "unclear." Anotheroutspoken student in the department boasts of using Heidegger'sBeing and Timeas a doorstop. (He only has a copy because he was once required totake aclass in Continental philosophy).
I don't suppose personal opinions would matter so much, ifthey weren'tso prevalent.
IV. If recent journal articles are any indication, theanalyticandcontinental divide is an on-going concern. Ratio recentlypublished a specialissue devoted to the topic, and it wasn't at all difficult to findarticlesfrom just this last year in Review of Metaphysics andPhilosophical Forum. One can easily become immersed in many philosophical quagmires inthe courseof what is intended to be a short paper. However, a quick reviewof thisliterature will provide for some good concluding remarks.
Fundamentally, the analytic and continental divide is aliveand well (atleast in the opinion of their strongest adherents). There are atleast a fewviews that constitute a kind of "holding action" or "diplomaticparlance"between the two "domains." Christopher Norris has recentlyremarked on muchof this literature which includes many "pragmatist" or"post-analytic"thinkers, most prominently Rorty, Davidson and Quine. The extentto whichpragmatism affords an alternative to the analytic/continentaldivide hasalways interested me. Yet, I think much of the current work iseither too newto be decisive, or it is subject to the same old problems.
For example, Joseph Margolis (Temple) takes a hard lineagainst thesenew critics in a paper provocatively titled "A Biopsy of RecentAnalyticPhilosophy." Margolis charges what I have been saying all along,thatanalytic philosophy "though technically scrupulous," holds on tocertain"fundamental philosophical convictions" (Biopsy 161). He analyzesthreeprominent analytic strategies vis., naturalism, postmodernism andphysicalism. I want to take the first and the second as examples. The specificsof thesearguments are to detailed to entertain here, but there mainstrategy is thesame one which I have been calling "continental," and this is worthpointingout.
First, Quine's naturalism (the theory that explanation is"causal")fails to replace epistemology with psychology because it uses anepistemological argument (Biopsy 163). Epistemology is only"naturalized"when it is assumed.
Similarly, Davidson and Rorty reject "standards ofinterpretation" orinterpretive tertia--a view known as "postmodernism." ButDavidson's realismfails to provide substantive theses concerning justification andtruth (Biopsy166-167), as I think all forms of realism must. Realism isn't asubstantivedoctrine. It merely says that there is something logicallyindependent of thehuman mind. This logical independence prohibits it from being asubstantivedoctrine, if what you mean by a "substantive doctrine" is somethingyou candraw logical inferences from. Reality is only "postmodern" when itisassumed.
Thus, we have placed the analytic and continental device at ahistoricaljuncture which tries to figure out the relation between the mindand theworld. Kant tried to join the two, but was unsuccessful. Insteadwhatdeveloped was a united front of analytic philosophy along the linesof the"linguistic turn" and "ordinary language" philosophy against adisunited frontof many "continental" philosophies. The continental strategy worksbest topoint out the tacit assumptions of analytic philosophy,particularly in regardto language and the supposed hegemony and independence of certaindiscoursesthrough a strong notion of the relation between power andknowledge. Finally,recent developments are either too new to sew up the analytic andcontinentaldivide, or they are subject to the same problems of tacitassumptions.
My feeling is that the divide can never be sewn up, nor shouldit. Although attempts to do so are just as helpful as anything else inphilosophy,philosophy is dialectical (like political systems). It needs an'other' topit itself against. What happens when we get rid of the tacitlyfundamentalconvictions of what I have been calling analytic philosophy? Obscurity. Butit is a pregnant obscurity. Where do we go from here? Well, it isthe sameold story. Philosophy will develop new posits which will congealintoinvariant truths until the world/future philosophy finds acounterexample, andthe process starts anew.
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