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Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society.

by Carol C. Gould

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$$(AP): [\diamond \exists X \exists s(AR(X,s) \ \& \ \Phi'(X,s)) \ \& \ \diamond \exists Y \exists t(AR(Y,t) \ \& \ \Psi'(Y,t))] \\ \rightarrow \diamond [\exists X \exists s(AR(X,s) \ \& \ \Phi'(X,s)) \ \& \ \exists Y \exists t(AR(Y,t) \ \& \ \Psi'(Y,t))]$$

In terms of the “possible worlds” metaphor, (AP) states that if there is a world W1 that contains a model M1 of second-order arithmetic such that M1 satisfies Φ and if there is a world W2 that contains a model M2 of second-order arithmetic such that M2 satisfies Ψ , then there is a world W3 that contains a model satisfying Φ and a model satisfying Ψ . Since the latter two models occur in the same world, Hellman can safely conclude that they are isomorphic, and so Φ and Ψ hold in both. Notice that (AP) is an instance of $(\diamond p \ \& \ \diamond q) \rightarrow \diamond (p \ \& \ q)$, which, of course, is not generally valid (in S5). Hellman argues that (AP) is correct because all of the quantifiers in $\Phi'(X,s)$, for example, are restricted to X, and so $\Phi'(X,s)$ only refers to matters “internal” to a given structure, arithmetic in this case. Other matters about the world are presumably irrelevant. But if the worlds were Henkin models, matters “internal” to a given structure could depend on which classes (or properties) exist in the given world, and, for that reason, (AP) could fail. There may not be a single world which has the classes of numbers (or whatever) needed to sustain both Φ' and Ψ' in models of arithmetic. However, the worlds are supposed to be *standard* models, and so this shouldn't happen. It seems to me that the principle (AP) holds because second-order arithmetic is really categorical. *All* of its models are isomorphic, not just those that occur in the same world. But, as noted, this is something Hellman does not want to say.

There is insufficient space here to adequately deal with Hellman's rich, subtle, and insightful treatments of set theory and applied mathematics. Perhaps such studies belong in research papers rather than reviews. I trust that many such papers will be spawned by this important work.

References

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Carol C. Gould: *Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), x + 363 pp.

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Professor Gould proposes that democratic decision-making be applied to economic and social life as well as to politics. Such decision-making should be participatory to the extent possible, representative otherwise. (p. 25) Her proposal for such an extension of

democracy is grounded in an argument for the “preeminent value of the freedom of individuals and their equal right to the conditions of self-development.” (p. 1) Such an argument requires that the apparently conflicting values of individual liberty and of social cooperation and equality be shown to be in fact compatible. By establishing the compatibility of the apparently conflicting values in question the central deficiencies of two of the major approaches in modern political philosophy can be remedied. One such approach is that of the traditional democratic theory of liberal individualism, the other that of socialist or holistic theories. The first, while meritorious in emphasizing individual liberty, fails to acknowledge adequately the requirements of social cooperation and equality. The second, while emphasizing such cooperation and equality, tends to subordinate individual rights to the welfare of society taken as a whole. Although she does not put it in these terms, one of the central aims of Dr. Gould’s book may perhaps be said to be to effect a synthesis of these two approaches by incorporating the insights of each in such a way as to remove the deficiencies of each.

The achievement of such a synthesis involves supplementing the concept of negative freedom, employed by traditional liberal individualist democratic theories, with the concept of positive freedom, a concept largely ignored or eschewed by such theorists. Negative freedom is freedom from constraint by others. Such freedom is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of positive freedom, which “requires not only the absence of external constraints but also the availability of the objective conditions that are necessary if choices are to be effected.” (p. 37) Such conditions are enabling or positive conditions for action, and in their absence a person is not free, in the sense that he is unable, to do certain things he might want to do even though no other person or group attempts to prevent him from doing them. The existence of such enabling or positive conditions is therefore a necessary condition of positive freedom. Such freedom is “the freedom to develop oneself through one’s actions” or to realize “one’s projects through activity in the course of which one forms one’s character and develops capacities.” (p. 40) Since each person has an equal right to such positive freedom or self-development, it follows (although Ms. Gould does not use such language) that each has a duty to exercise this right only in those ways compatible with its exercise by others.

The account of freedom presented by Ms. Gould constitutes the basis of her argument designed to establish the compatibility of individual liberty with social cooperation and equality and of her synthesis of the insights of liberal individualist democratic theory with those of the socialist or holistic tradition. Since each person has a right to freedom equal to that of any other person, this right as possessed by any given person would be violated or unjustifiably limited if he were denied a voice equal to that of others in determining the character of the policies and rules to which they are subject. Respect for persons and their rights therefore requires that each person have a voice equal to that of any other person in the determination of such policies and rules, either directly or through the election of representatives. Should any person be denied such a voice he would be subjected to the will of others, which would constitute a violation of his right to freedom from external constraint. At the same time, however, the possession by each person of such negative freedom requires of each that he use it in such a way as to establish, to the extent possible, the enabling or positive conditions necessary for each person to possess the positive freedom to develop himself and his capacities in the way he chooses.

The preceding requirements apply not only to politics but also to economic and social life. This leads Ms. Gould to advocate that firms be managed by their workers on terms of

equality with one another. Although she claims that her book is not utopian, (p. 29) there does seem to be something utopian about such a proposal, given that large firms require large amounts of capital and that the scheme she proposes "excludes deriving income from investment." (p. 254) Unless income from investment is permitted and unless those who provide the capital for firms have a significant voice in the management of the firms in which they invest, it is hard to see how capital can be provided for relatively large firms except through the use of income acquired by the state through taxation, which would doubtless lead to the kind of centralized state bureaucracy she opposes.

Despite this criticism and others that space does not permit, Ms. Gould has given us a rich, systematically developed and argued, and clearly written (although somewhat wordy and at times repetitive) defense of democracy informed throughout by a remarkable knowledge not only of recent American and British but also of recent continental European, political thought. Those interested in the central issues of political philosophy, most of which she treats in the course of the book, owe her a debt of gratitude.

James W. Forrester, *Why You Should: The Pragmatics of Deontic Speech* (Hanover and London: Brown University Press), ix + 246 pp.

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Forrester explicitly states that his purpose in *Why You Should* is to identify and explain the maxims of deontic pragmatics (pp. 11, 235). But it is clear throughout the book that he hopes to do more: to sketch a plausible argument against moral skepticism, nihilism, and some types of ethical relativism. By arguing there are some absolute standards that all moral codes should conform to, he is defending a "highly tempered ethical absolutism" (p. 236). By arguing in addition that these threshold conditions for a moral theory provide a good reason for being moral, he is providing a new answer to the traditional "Why Be Moral?" question. I shall describe and assess Forrester's presentation on the structure of deontic pragmatics and then discuss the extent to which he accomplishes his more ambitious goals.

Deontic speech is the language of obligation and permission. Forrester's novel project is to give a systematic study of the pragmatics of deontic speech, that is, of "how the conditions under which a speech act is made contribute to the effect of that speech act" (p. 1), or, in Grice's terms, the standard rules by which conversations are conducted. Because such rules are not part of the meaning of the utterances, they are taken to be pragmatic rather than semantic. Forrester sets out eighteen pragmatic rules that he believes govern the effective utterance of statements of obligation and permission.

Forrester motivates his study by showing why the well-known Kantian "ought" implies "can" principle is best regarded as a pragmatic, rather than logical, deontic principle. He then describes and defends his maxims of deontic speech, utilizing a variety of examples from law, morality, history, etiquette, and contemporary life. Finally, he applies his system by explaining how his rules are used in a well-known court case, the *Bakke*