

An Education for Occupation
Army Civil Affairs Training
And Military Planning for Postwar Germany

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Primary Abbreviations

CA – Civil Affairs

CAD – Civil Affairs Division

CAO – Civil Affairs Officer

CATS – Civil Affairs Training School

MG – Military Government

MGD – Military Government Division (of the PMG)

PMG – Provost Marshal General

SHAEF – Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

SMG – School of Military Government

France, 1944

Introduction

On August 22, Lieutenant Colonel Bion C. Welker climbed into his commandeered German Volkswagen to conduct a reconnaissance of the nearby areas. Welker was a Civil Affairs officer (CAO) attached to the American 12th Army, which was rapidly moving into the heart of France. Assigned to perform civilian administration duties in the wake of the Army's advance, he was trying to gain an idea of what facilities remained standing as the hostilities moved towards Paris. Heading down the road towards the ornate Palace of Versailles, where many great men had gathered to end the last world war, Welker was ready to do his duty to ensure that a new peace would someday come to the continent of Europe.¹

Imagining such a scene just a few years before would have surprised Bion Welker. He was a successful newspaperman in his home of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, having worked his way up the ladder to reach the position of editor for the local *Telegraph*. Though he had served briefly as an artillery officer in World War I, he had spent most of his time since his return to the United States having little to do with the military. He had only joined the National Guard in 1932. By 1940, his middling age and limited experience in the Army made it seem unlikely that he would find himself overseas, if recalled to service for any length of time at all. Nonetheless, he followed his unit to active duty in 1941, as the military establishment prepared itself for the looming war. There he followed the path of many men of his age and experience, bouncing back

¹ Bion C. Welker, "The Personal Narrative of Experiences as a Prisoner of the Germans in Paris From 22 August to 25 August," manuscript, 1, Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 3, Folder Personal Narrative, The Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (Hereafter referred to as MHI).

and forth between various training schools that would prepare him for an exciting war at the home front filling out supply forms or preparing younger men to fight in foreign lands.² Considering the many factors that kept so many older men in the States, his trip that morning seemed all the more exceptional.

Yet while Bion Welker may have been surprised by his situation, his story was not unique. Many men of his age and background found themselves just behind the front lines in Europe, armed not only with guns, but with knowledge and a mission. They were the first Allied agents to arrive in Europe to begin the monumental task of reconstruction – of the government, the infrastructure, and the lives of ordinary citizens in liberated and conquered territories alike. On the ground during the important period of 1944-46, these officers were responsible for ending Germany's war and helping it to prepare for the peace that lay ahead. They were the men tasked with implementing Allied policy in conquered territories, and when no policy existed, they were the men who made it. They stood at a crossroads, where a familiar world had been destroyed by war and the future had yet to take shape. Their actions set the stage for a new page in history, taking the first steps down the road that would eventually result in a new and more active American presence on the international scene. The following pages will attempt to relate part of their story, demonstrating how the ideas they espoused on the ground in Germany helped shape the policy that would emerge from the meeting rooms of Washington.

It is doubtful that Welker was aware of how important his role in the coming years would be, or whether he gave it much thought at all. His duties gave him more pressing matters to consider, and on that morning those duties would lead him out of the

² "Col. Welker Wins U.S. Bronze Star; Diplomacy Cited," *The Harrisburg Telegraph*, 27 September 1945, newspaper clipping, Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 3, Folder Newspaper Articles, MHI.

rear area and into the thick of the fighting. During the reconnaissance, he passed a group of Germans on the road to Versailles – a road he had assumed was well beyond the front. Surprised by the jeep with American markings, the two German soldiers could do little more than gape as Welker gunned his vehicle past them. Attempting to turn back towards familiar territory, he swung onto a side road and found himself “looking into the muzzles of two [German] machine guns, with the gunners just hitting the dirt,” preparing to fire.³ Slamming on the brakes, Welker looked around to find another soldier, grenade raised, standing just behind him. Realizing that he was surrounded, the American officer stepped from the vehicle with his arms in the air. It looked like the war was over for Lt. Col. Bion Welker.

The soldiers took hold of Welker and quickly escorted him away as a prisoner of war. They marched the man to various platoon headquarters in the area, eventually placing him in a building just off the road. While the Germans rifled through his bags and began an inconsistent kind of interrogation, the situation began to dawn on Welker:

Since I was then beginning to realize my predicament, and it was a question of getting frightened or angry; I chose to get angry... I had been taught at the Psychology Course at the [Civil Affairs Training School at the] University of Wisconsin that the German soldier was accustomed to being bellered at by the officers and the best way to handle him was by being haughty and arrogant. I decided to adopt that course as a policy and throw my weight around.⁴

He demanded to see a commanding officer, which stilled the soldiers who had been ransacking his baggage. His imperious manner continued as he cajoled and ordered his captors to take him this way and that, even having one sheepish German soldier carry his bags while they changed vehicles.⁵

³ Welker, Personal Narrative, 1.

⁴ Ibid, 1.

⁵ Ibid, 2.

Arriving in Paris, Welker continued in his general demeanor when he arrived at German headquarters. He spoke to the Germans almost as a father scolding his inconsiderate children, repeatedly reminding them of his rights as a prisoner of war and taking every opportunity to confidently defy the wishes of his captors. At one point, he actually went so far as to correct a general regarding Germany's democratic experiment during the Weimar Republic – another lesson he most likely learned during his time in Wisconsin. But beyond his arguments over Germany's political possibilities, Welker sought to use his newfound powers over his captors to achieve a more important goal. As he remembered it a few days later, "I had long thought what a mess Civil Affairs would have on its hands if...the utilities were demolished."⁶ Telling the German soldiers that Allied forces were just beyond the tree line, Welker convinced them that destroying the water, electrical, and communication systems as they left the city - a familiar German practice – would be foolish. Just a day later, he would perform yet another feat, convincing his captors to surrender to him. Instead of ending his war in a German prison camp, the quick thinking Col. Welker delivered 350 German troops and an intact sewer system to the first Americans who entered Paris.⁷

Welker was an officer in the Civil Affairs Division (CAD), one of many men trained and ordered to perform the duties of military government in newly occupied territories. Military government, shortened to MG in the language of military acronyms, was essentially a dictatorial rule by military officers over the civilian populace. MG officers became responsible for the upkeep of public utilities – water, electricity, phone lines – to pacify the populace and to ensure the war effort continued unhampered. These

⁶ Ibid, 5.

⁷ Welker Wins.

men carried out the essential duties of a peacetime government – law, order, public welfare, and education – to make sure civilian life regained a modicum of normality and rear echelon conflict did not disrupt soldiers on the front. In its purest form, military government controlled liberated and conquered territories while necessity prevailed, preventing any hindrance of military advance and ensuring the war stayed won.

The Army and Navy recognized the importance of this mission and poured extensive resources into preparations for military government. MG and its decrees would lay the groundwork for the peace that would end the conflict, helping to shape the future of friends and enemies alike. Keeping this in mind, the military services sought out a special kind of soldier – men like Bion Welker, who were more familiar with Main Street USA than an army barracks. Yet while such a man was important, no individual could know the intricacies of individual political structures or of strikingly different cultures. To solve this problem, training schools were set up, like the one at the University of Wisconsin, to train Civil Affairs officers (CAOs) in the necessities of MG – both in the knowledge to understand a foreign people and in the art of governing an occupied, and potentially hostile, population. It was this combination of men and knowledge that the military deployed to secure the fruits of victory.

Yet despite the importance of these men, historians have only given brief consideration to the preparations and training that may have laid the foundations for postwar reconstruction in Germany. The majority of historians force the story of MG into one of two footnotes. The first treats it as an epilogue to the great military victory of World War II, a tedious denouement after the heroic narrative of Roosevelt, Churchill, Patton, and Eisenhower. While this is especially true of popular military historians like

John Keegan and Martin Gilbert, Mark Stoler and other academics studying this period regularly follow the same trend.⁸ Any movement away from the fighting focuses on the halls of Washington or Eisenhower's planning rooms in Europe, failing to consider the actions of the lower echelons. These authors depict MG administration only in relation to highly visible institutions and individuals, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and George C. Marshall.

The second cites it as part of a prologue to the Cold War, a period where the first glimmer of a more international American mindset arose under the pressures of Soviet territorial ambitions. Some of the great diplomatic and international historians of the last half century grace this second category. These scholars look mainly at the high level policy decisions made during and shortly after the war, taking the approach that the occupation was something that was thrust upon America, a necessary duty that the United States acquired due to its wartime policies – especially that of unconditional surrender.⁹ Focusing heavily on the increasingly powerful State Department, many of these individuals dismiss the efforts of the military, agreeing with John Gaddis that “the Civil Affairs Division had carefully avoided involving itself in the formulation of occupation policy.”¹⁰ These traditionalist authors assume that a majority of the decisions made in the initial stages of German occupation were improvisations, rarely offering a coherent policy until after Germany became a major piece in the East-West game of chess.

⁸ For examples, see Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy In World War II* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003) and Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁹ A sampling of works includes Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs* 46 (October 1967): 22-52 and Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970).

¹⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, Revised Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 108.

Even those scholars commonly referred to as revisionists and their less dogmatic supporters treat the period in a similar manner. Still, it is important to note that these interpretations stress the aggressive, expansionist aims and actions of the United States, especially as viewed from the Kremlin. Though this is again largely concerned with U.S.-Soviet relations, the idea that the search for new economic markets and lingering imperial ambitions inspired American policies abroad (succinctly set forth by William Appleman Williams) is quite important when considering postwar actions. By occupying Germany and working, even in subtle ways, to reshape its societies in a liberal/democratic vein, the United States was expanding its borders and influence through “open-door imperialism.”¹¹ Far from being a reluctant world leader or a passive exemplary state, the United States was actively seeking opportunities to expand its influence abroad, especially in Europe. While rarely mentioning any specific policies at the ground level, these theories insinuate that military government was a manifestation of informal imperialism and the expansion of the American system abroad.

Between these two extremes is a line of scholarship that recognizes certain trends in preparation for postwar planning, but is unwilling to make the extreme claims of Williams. These authors of the moderate synthetic school, while recognizing preparation as neither completely absent nor completely imperialistic, fail to appreciate the degree to which actions on the ground in Germany set the stage for some of the high level American policy that followed by the end of the decade. The tedious process, which took

¹¹ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Rev. ed. (New York: Dell Publishing, 1972). Also see Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) and Andrew Bacevich, *American Empire* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002). Bacevich is an excellent example of the continuation of this line of thought, seeing American actions throughout the 20th century as a long process of creating a uniquely American Empire.

place amongst the majors and colonels, is too deeply mired in the bureaucratic process to warrant much attention. Melvyn Leffler, for instance, admits not only that the Civil Affairs Division made plans for the postwar period, but that “The Army’s responsibility for implementing occupation policy and for preserving order afforded it significant opportunity to influence, if not to dictate, the overall pattern of U.S. postwar relations with most former enemy states.”¹² As with many historians of the Cold War, this tantalizing statement leaves to others the job of studying the creation and implementation of policy on the ground level. What these historians focus on instead are the beliefs and actions of the individual generals who ruled over the vanquished, like Lucius Clay and Mark Clark. Such a top-down focus, while valuable, misses policies and actions that bubble up from the lower levels.

Those historians who do attempt to reconstruct the policy implementation among the lowest echelons appear mainly within the field of post-war German history. Notable among this group are John Gimbel in the United States and a number of German scholars, such as Karl-Ernst Bungenstab and Lutz Niethammer.¹³ While interpreting the events of post-war German reconstruction differently, these early scholars agree on their disdain for military government, which they consider ill-prepared and relatively unimportant.

Recent authors, including Rebecca Boehling and Giles MacDonogh, echo these

¹² Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 28.

¹³ For examples, see John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969); Karl-Ernst Bungenstab, “Die Ausbuilding der amerikanischen Offiziere für die Militärregierungen nach 1945 [The Training of American Officers for Military Government after 1945],” in *Jahrbuch Für Amerikastudien*, Band 18 (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 1973), 195-212. These two authors treat the training in distinct ways, Gimbel beginning his story with 1945 and Bungenstab focusing solely on training, but dismissing it as narrow-minded, haphazard, and relatively unproductive. Niethammer composed a number of studies that looked specifically at the effect of American policies on individual German cities.

statements, largely because they draw heavily from previous literature on the topic.¹⁴ The few scholars who do compliment U.S. policy are by no means in agreement on the reason for success, crediting everything from last-minute planning to the general resourcefulness of the average GI for the desired outcome.¹⁵

Only military sources have given military government the attention it deserves. Appearing in the first three decades after the war, most of these scholars were either personally involved with the military government programs or commissioned by one of the armed forces to write official history.¹⁶ Though these men attempted to write broad narratives on the topic, their works suffer from the limitations of their own personal understandings of the many programs involved with military government, the unavailability of classified documents, and their relationships with their historical objects. More often than not, the resulting works focus narrowly on the procedural and strategic ramifications of these military preparations at the cost of larger questions of foreign policy or American political identity. Unable to integrate their narratives into the larger international context of this period, the valuable works are unable to explain the

¹⁴ Boehling relies heavily on German and American publications which are largely critical of the heavy-handedness of American policy. MacDonogh also relies on German sources, but his is less academic in nature. It is cited mainly as a source of the erroneous nature of statements about pre-war planning in well received studies. The books I have relied upon are Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996) and Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

¹⁵ Jeffrey S. Gaab, *Justice Delayed: The Restoration of Justice in Bavaria under American Occupation, 1945-1949*, (The United States of America: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999) and Boyd L. Dastrup, *Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945-1949* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985) are two examples of recent authors who have studied MG, both adopting the new trend of looking at specific regions. Dastrup, for instance, recognized the early trend of bending the orders from Washington, but believes this has more to do with the failure of initial policy than anything else.

¹⁶ Examples of personal histories include Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government, It's Organization and Policies* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); Carl Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart, 1948); Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947). The two best examples of official histories are Harry L. Coles and Albert G. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), which was part of the famous Green Series, and Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1990).

importance of military government programs to German national development or American foreign policy.

Yet despite the poverty of discussion in the existing literature, military planning for occupation was far more extensive and important than the majority of historians have been willing to admit. Developing at a pivotal time in American history, the formulation and implementation of military government lies at the heart of a shift in American concepts of international relations. Under the traditions of a cautious and largely reactionary United States high level policy, practitioners of MG tread a new path into the realm of foreign relations that would characterize American interaction with the world for the rest of the century. Abandoning traditional fears regarding European intervention and ambivalence towards the armed forces, American policy under MG adopted a democratic nation-building component through the actions of a more proactive and powerful military establishment. Far from being reactionary or improvisational, the military worked to create a culture of liberal internationalism that would continue despite the high-level battles of American foreign policy and serve to influence later decisions that would shape America's entry into the Cold War.

Chapter I

“The governing of occupied territories...is a civilian task” The Creation of Military Government

The occupation of enemy territory was neither a unique concept to the American government nor to the armed forces. Efforts in Mexico, the Confederate South, Cuba, the Philippines, and Europe after World War I demonstrated the need for a certain amount of

forethought, but ingrained concerns about federal authoritarianism convinced the government of the United States that any such actions were either unnecessary or politically infeasible. The military, which was conveniently on the ground when hostilities ended, reluctantly accepted these duties as a case of absolute necessity, creating military governments of various character and ability. Trained in the ways of the gun and bayonet, these men found themselves occupying towns and cities with little more than ingenuity and luck to accomplish their final missions.¹⁷ As Colonel Irwin Hunt reflected after his participation in the hastily improvised German occupation of 1918, “Despite the precedents of military governments... the lesson [of preparedness] has seemingly not been learned.”¹⁸

World War II disrupted this pattern. The unprecedented scale of the conflict that consumed the world at the beginning of the 1940s threatened the very existence of entire nations, promising the collapse of national infrastructures alongside battlefield casualties. The very nature of the war, combating fascist governments that threatened American ideals of freedom and capitalism, demanded that new governments be established after the cessation of hostilities. Under these circumstances, the United States could not rely on its past tradition of improvisation, in either its military or its occupation policies. While committing the nation to its first ever peacetime draft, military officers also gathered interwar reports concerning the issue of MG and commissioned a study of the international law relating to the subject. The resulting work, the *Field Manual of Military*

¹⁷ Captain H.L. Pence, reproduction of Lecture “Port Administration,” delivered at School of Military Government. (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 15 April 1943), 5, RG/6-34, Small Special Collections Library, The University of Virginia, Charlottesville Virginia, (hereafter referred to as Small).

¹⁸ Irwin L. Hunt, Report, “American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920,” 4 March 1920, OCMH files, pp.56-57 in Coles and Weinberg, 6.

Government (Army manual FM-27), was designed to be the “bible” for soldiers in occupied territories.¹⁹

Initial steps to train soldiers in the methods of military government began in early 1941, but it was not until after Pearl Harbor that the Army diverted resources towards the project. Only two months after the attack, Secretary of War Henry Stimson ordered Provost Marshall General (PMG) Allen Gullion, a lawyer and former head of the Judge Advocates General corps, to create a training center for MG before the end of the spring.²⁰ The PMG, who was traditionally in charge of overseeing discipline through the office of military police, was not an obvious choice for this mission, but the ambitions of the “aggressive-minded” Gullion and his ability to work the program into his established training facilities convinced the Army General Staff.²¹ This action would prove somewhat controversial; other general officers in charge of everything from training to supply felt that the position should be theirs.²² While many of these men had valid arguments for their roles in MG, the Army repeatedly chose expediency over organizational legitimacy, keeping military government solely under the PMG until well into 1943. With mandate in hand, Gullion quickly assembled a cadre of lawyers and

¹⁹ Letter, Miller to Burton, 7 October 1943, 1, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 333.5, National Archives and Research Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter referred to as NARA). and U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs. “Inquiry into Army and Navy Educational Program.” Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, 21 and 25 January 1944 (Washington; United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 2 and Memo, Brig. Gen. William E. Shedd, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18 Jan 40, G-1 files, 9985-41 in Coles and Weinberg, 7.

²⁰ Memo, Allotment of Officers, Allen Gullion, Provost Marshall General (PMG) to CO Army Service Forces, 1, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 738, Folder 1, NARA.

²¹ Patricia Grady, “Gen Allen W. Gullion,” *Washington Post* (Washington, DC), 28 January 1943, B4 and Memo, ACofS, for CofS 3 December 1941, AF Files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), School of Military Government (SMG), EST in Coles and Weinberg, 9.

²² John C. Hilldring, interview by Forrest C. Pogue, 30 March 1959, tape 41 copy 1, 18, Oral History Collection, Marshall Library.

academics to staff the Military Government Division (MGD), with the School of Military Government (SMG) as its core.

The opening of the SMG in May of 1942 touched off a jurisdictional battle that went far beyond the functional boundaries of the military hierarchy, becoming the topic of heated debate all the way to the White House. Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, was the first to sound an alarm. As his department administered the island possessions of the United States, including the Philippines when they were under MG, Ickes felt the Army had deprived him of a rightful and highly public duty.²³ Word soon spread throughout Washington that the school was an imperialist tool of overambitious military leaders, churning out “gauleiters” that were designed to conquer nations, not liberate them.²⁴ The association with the well known German political soldiers associated with “a system of plunder and ruthless nazification at every stage of life” placed the SMG into an awkward association with not just the enemy, but with totalitarianism itself.²⁵ These accusations eventually snowballed to the point that rumors placed General Marshall at the center of a plot to overthrow the government.²⁶

²³ Note, Harold L. Ickes to President Roosevelt, 11 November 1942, President’s Official File (OF) 5136, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter referred to as FDR Library) and Memo, R.N. Young to CO Services Supply, 30 October 1942, 1, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 738, SMG General Folder, NARA. Also see Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round, in *The Washington Post*, 5 January 1943, quoted below. This was in fact after Secretary Stimson had sought out assistance from the various cabinet positions, which may very well have first revealed these plans to the wider government. Memo, Henry Stimson to the Secretary of Labor, 26 September 1942, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 738, SMG General Folder, NARA .

²⁴ While it is not clear where the use of this term for the SMG students originated, it became quite popular within government circles during this period. It alluded to the Nazi military officers who wielded absolute power over conquered peoples. They were often trained ahead of time for specific occupation duties.

²⁵ Frank Kelly, “Course at Virginia Looks to Postwar World,” *The Washington Post* (Washington DC), 3 January 1943, S4. The soldiers of SMG were initially portrayed as commissars as well, offering political advice to military commanders like the party members in the Soviet Army.

²⁶ Marshall, 453-454. One such rumor actually had General Marshall being at the head of a military conspiracy bent on a coup in Washington.

While it is doubtful that many in Washington gave credence to the most extreme rumors, enough people took notice that the issue eventually drew the attention of President Roosevelt. Though unable to agree how to settle postwar issues, other executive departments including State, Agriculture, and the Treasury joined Ickes in their attacks on the military.²⁷ The President sided with the majority of his advisors, and an irritated memorandum from the White House soon appeared on Stimson's desk. Demanding information from the Secretary of War, Roosevelt reprimanded Stimson for not consulting him "at the first instance" and added tersely that "the governing of occupied territories... is a civilian task."²⁸ Such sentiments were the norm in Washington, but few civilian agencies were ready for the responsibility of postwar government. Stimson pointed this out, but also skillfully dismantled many of the President's worst fears about the school by jovially showing how exaggerated many of the rumors concerning the school were, treating the issue as lightly as he felt it truly was.²⁹ This, combined with additional reassurances from Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson and Chief of Staff Marshall, did much to assuage the President, who eventually gave his somewhat grudging support.

Though government suspicions had been successfully subdued, the public rumblings were just beginning. Leading this attack on the national scene was the anti-New Deal *Chicago Daily Tribune*. In January of 1943, the simply-titled article

²⁷ Memo, Jonathan Daniels to the President, included in Memo, Jonathan Daniels to Marvin McIntyre, 2 December 1942 (Washington D.C.; 1942) OF 5136, FDR Library.

²⁸ Apparently quite angry, FDR rebuked Stimson: "This whole matter is something which should have been taken up with me in the first instance. The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task..." Memo, President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, 29 October 1942, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 738, SMG General Folder, NARA.

²⁹ E.C. Neary, Transcription of comments made by Secretary Stimson concerning the cabinet meeting of November 6, 1942, 1 December 1942, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 738, SMG General Folder, NARA.

“American Gauleiters” described the military training as dangerous and “absurd.”

Drawing direct connections with fascist ideology, it continued:

Hitler has his school for gauleiters and the Japanese have their school for a similar purpose. Evidently the high command in Washington was determined that we must ape our enemies at every degrading point... The whole idea of this school runs contrary to the instincts of the American people and the principles of our government.³⁰

Such vicious attacks were unusual, but more moderate papers like the *Washington Post* had their doubts as well. Articles demonstrated a clear ambivalence towards the program, offering fact-based descriptions of the school only after describing it as controversial or suspect. Thus, public statements and the release of plans for military government became thinly veiled defenses of the program. Undersecretary Patterson responded to such fears, quickly reasserting the oft heard claim that the Army had “no use for imperialism.”

Echoing Stimson’s lighthearted approach to the matter, he attempted to ridicule such fears:

Patterson said that fears of “rule by the sword” had been expressed in both the Revolutionary War and again in 1860, that they proved “imaginary, that dire consequences predicted by statesman of that day never came to pass.”

“So,” he declared, “when we hear once more talk about the military wanting to take over, the best thing to do is to keep our sense of humor. There is no military caste in this country.”³¹

Yet despite his own dismissal of military caste and dictatorial ambitions, it is clear that by addressing the issue he was himself aware of a nascent fear within the American populace. As the always bombastic *Tribune* explained to its readers later in the year,

³⁰ “American Gauleiters,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 8 January 1943, 12. The first attack appears to have come a week prior, when an article sub-titled “School for pro-consuls follows Nazi patterns” appeared on page 2. “U.S. is Training Men to Govern Occupied Areas,” *Chicago Daily Tribune* (Chicago), 31 December 1942, 2.

³¹ Associated Press, “Patterson Says Military Rule Formulated for Occupied Areas,” *The Washington Post* (Washington DC), 30 December 1942, 13.

“some people in Washington” established the training program “with the thought that the graduates can be used in due time to rule Americans rather than enemy peoples.”³²

Such rhetoric might seem absurd to the modern reader, but it was a manifestation of the insecurity that many in the country felt during the period. As Edward A. Purcell has written in his excellent *The Crisis in Democratic Theory*, people around the globe were questioning the tenets of democracy as an idea itself. Many nations had adopted such a form of government in the wake of World War I, only to see it dissolve into dictatorship and petty tyranny under the strain of economic depression.³³ Fears that such a fate could befall the United States remained subtly present in many aspects of society even after the war began. In an article about the future of America’s colleges, one Harper’s magazine author reminded his readers that “Historically, most democracies have been short lived, and we would better beware the easy course of taking the situation for granted.”³⁴

Many of these suspicions focused on the government in Washington. Historian Michael Sherry has demonstrated that international events and the growing role of federal authorities unnerved citizens throughout the country. Commentators like Charles and Mary Beard asserted that the increasingly centralized Roosevelt administration was cloaking the birth of fascism in the fabric of foreign affairs and world peace, building a belligerent foreign policy he could then turn on an unwilling public.³⁵ This seemed an especially prescient prediction when observing the growing military establishment, which

³² “Yankee Gauleiters,” *Chicago Daily Tribune* (Chicago), 14 August 1943, 10. Apparently what the Tribune lacked in creativity regarding their articles, they made up for in their conspiracy theories.

³³ Edward A. Purcell, Jr., *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 117, 221.

³⁴ Wallace Brett Donham, “The College in a Changing World,” *Harper’s Magazine*, 184 (1941: Dec-1942: May), 136.

³⁵ Sherry, 61.

Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of *The Nation*, claimed would soon be “well along the road to the ‘nation in arms’ which the dictators abroad have now achieved.”³⁶ Such sentiments were not uncommon in peacetime, but surprisingly continued even after Pearl Harbor forced America into the fighting. The relatively liberal *New Republic* speculated on “how many embryo fascist leaders are in the armed forces” in the late spring of 1942, while respected reporters like Drew Pearson wondered why the federal government (and the armed forces in particular) was establishing military rule over wholly American territory in Hawai’i.³⁷ With crackdowns already beginning on civil rights, it seemed to the most imaginative that the Army could as easily deploy these trainees in Baltimore as Berlin. Never before had the military grown so large and been granted such authority.

While the blurring of well defined boundaries between the two worlds of peacetime administration and wartime authority was disconcerting to a wary public, the nature of World War II demanded that the military adopt new responsibilities. The armed forces had carried the burden of governing over conquered peoples in the past, but never had Washington specifically sanctioned and ordered preparations for such tasks in advance. Compared with similar developments in Europe, this process implied to many observers the presence of fascist tendencies within American society, threatening to undermine the very values it claimed to protect. Yet faced with a war that refused to

³⁶ Oswald Garrison Villard, *Our Military Chaos: The Truth about Defense* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 154.

³⁷ “The Fascists in our Armed Forces,” *The New Republic*, Vol. 106 Issue 18 (4 May 1942), 604. Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round,” *Washington Post* (Washington DC), 5 January 1943, B7. Apparently this comment came during the cabinet session where the SMG was discussed. When Roosevelt offered that civilian administration might be preferable, Ickes “acidly” responded: “And what about one spot of completely American territory – Hawaii? Let’s begin by establishing civil government at home.” For another example, see William Henry Chamberlain, “Why Civil Liberties Now,” *Harper’s Magazine*, 185:1109 (1942: October), 530. The author feared that the necessary limitations of liberties were creating dangerous precedents, which might well lead to an American fascism. In regards to the internment of Japanese Americans, he described the action as “definitely what one would expect in a totalitarian, not a democratic state...”

differentiate between combatants and civilians, which involved the clash of two ideologically opposed systems, the military felt it must be prepared to fill the structural void left in the wake of any American advance.

Chapter II

“Ancient Military Gentleman on Tour” The Instructors and Students of Military Government

Despite the fears of excessive militarism and dangerous ambitions, the Army insisted that these fears of prenatal fascism were unfounded. The very nature of MG training made military values secondary in importance. Faced with performing what were essentially civilian tasks, the Army – and the armed forces in general – had committed themselves to creating a corps that was more a civil administration body than a fighting force. Expecting to invade nations that had inherently undemocratic regimes in place, the Army felt it was in America’s interest to create a large force of trained democratic citizens who could replace the burgomeisters and mayors who had conspired with, or at least accepted, Nazi rule. The officers from the SMG were to act as administrators and technicians for an entire nation, making policy programs that would impact the lives of millions. Their technical decisions to rebuild roads or reopen schools could decide the future of the German people, but it would be the average citizens who would teach American liberalism to the conquered peoples.

With this in mind, the Army sought to make the MGD a bastion of civilian values in the largely hierarchical military. This began with the actual selection of the school,

which many thought should be outside the austere tradition of Army staff colleges. Only a proper civilian institution could keep alive the sense of democratic identity that the military hoped to preserve. Nonetheless, officers noted that it would be much easier to train men in the secondarily important aspects of warfare than it would to train competent and knowledgeable public servants. Therefore recommendations demanded a school that was “easily accessible to the War College,” located in Washington at the time, which held “the bulk of essential reading materials” necessary for a proper course of this type.³⁸ The University of Virginia soon offered its services to the war effort, providing a perfect candidate for the role. With a convenient location near Washington, a tradition of democratic ideals, an established reputation, and expanding facilities, the University seemed an excellent host for the new school.³⁹

While the Army realized it could not train men to be governors, it also recognized that there were many men with such talents willing to serve their nation. Practicing business leaders, lawyers and politicians, as one instructor at the school put it, had the “experience and stature in the management of men and affairs” to most readily replace the fascist leaders who often had an intimate knowledge of all aspects of their civic charge.⁴⁰ It was in essence the “tact, diplomacy, understanding of social behavior and attitudes, imagination, and adaptability” of a successful civic leader that was needed in

³⁸ Memo, Jess I. Miller, in Coles and Weinberg, 10.

³⁹ Memo, Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, PMGO, for PMG, 21 February 1942, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, EST in Coles and Weinberg, 11. The selection of the University made excellent fodder for the *Tribune*: “The father of the institution was Thomas Jefferson, who penned the Declaration of Independence. Apparently the administration which claims Jefferson as its guiding light has only contempt for his teaching. There is no place for the gauleiter in Jefferson’s philosophy of government. His whole life was dedicated to freeing mankind from just such institutions. He knew, as most of the American people know today, that the nation which sends its proconsuls to rule conquered territory is only preparing for the day when these men will return in arms to tyrannize over their own people.” “American Gauleiters.”

⁴⁰ Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol7. No. 4, *The Occupation of Enemy Territory* (Winter 1943), 701.

peacetime Europe, not the strategic mind of a military man.⁴¹ These men would have the skills necessary to fulfill the two roles needed by the army concerning proper administration of the populace and proper maintenance (and to a lesser extent reformation) of the more technical areas of public works, courts, the education system, and the like. It was decided that administrators would come from the business and political worlds, taking advantage of their abilities to organize and lead people. Specialists would be drawn from more technical fields, including educators, sanitary technicians, police chiefs, and even accountants.⁴² Any military knowledge would be of secondary importance to the job at hand, so the Army could overlay this information upon the existing and more important civilian backgrounds of these men. So while administration would take place under the guise of the Army, these men would have the experience and the mindset of traditional civilian administrators.

Though this seems logical, it is also interesting to note the military's clear preference toward specific occupations. While specialist officers were needed, the bulk of men who would lead detachments and govern cities came largely from the business, law, and political professions. This selection shows an interesting correlation with the make-up of the American civil elite at the time, both in and out of government. While the Army imagined itself achieving maximum efficiency, its ideal of the American promoter of democracy was a reflection of American concepts of leadership.⁴³ Lawyers and businessman understood representative democracy, republican values, and the capitalist

⁴¹ SPCP 210.1 Provost Marshal January 26, 1943 War Department Services of Supply/Officer Procurement Service Washington "Memo for the Chief, Field Operations Branch, 1, RG-6/34, Small.

⁴² Harris, 702 and Cornelius Wickersham, reproduction of address, delivered at the Joint Committee on Military and Naval Affairs of the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association (13 January 1943), 1, RG/6-34, Small.

⁴³ It is interesting to note that two of the domineering personalities in the MGD, Gullion and civilian-advisor-turned-officer Jesse I. Miller both came from legal backgrounds. Pearson.

system. They also represented the largest portion of elected officials, so it seemed logical to turn to this particular demographic when exporting liberal, free market values. Such biases were apparent throughout the whole of the MG experiment, in many ways developing a cadre of soldiers that would be able to deal with like-minded individuals in Europe, promoting a new liberal system in the image of the United States.

While recognizing the importance of established experience, the military struggled to create the new system. The military initially focused on finding personnel within its own system, pulling people from the active and reserve forces that had “experience in a former military government or in Federal, state, or local government” or other civilian leadership and infrastructure roles.⁴⁴ Some were career army officers, but often they were selected from the flood of men who volunteered for service after Pearl Harbor – “bastard lieutenant[s]” from World War I who felt more comfortable in courts and boardrooms than in uniform.⁴⁵

Though many of the students proved to be of a high caliber, the Army had to expend great effort to keep the quality high. The school tended to act as a kind of clearing house for older officers; commanders would transfer men who were technically proficient but often lacked the imagination necessary for combat leadership – and for military

⁴⁴ Army Service Forces, “The Schooling of Civilian Officers,” The School of Military Government, Charlottesville Virginia, 2, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 753, Folder 3, NARA.

⁴⁵ Malcolm MacLean, *Adventures in Occupied Areas*, unpublished memoir, (July 1975), I, Malcolm S. MacLean Papers, MHI. Captain MacLean used the phrase to describe his service in World War I. This information is largely draw from a study of the biographical information provided for the first three classes of military government. Along with the extensive experience came a corresponding age, with student ages averaging around 50 at first but falling with subsequent classes. In order not to take away from the war effort, an initial age range was established between 35 and 50 for any officer candidate, though thought the Army waved this in special cases for classifications that made a candidate otherwise ineligible for combat service or in cases of unique expertise in an area. When deployed, the age of these men caused them to stand out among the young men that populated much of the military during the war. Acquiring various nicknames and jokes concerning their age, the most creative may have been the reworking of American Military Government Occupied Territories (AMGOT) into the amusing Ancient Military Gentleman on Tour. Robert M. Hill and Elizabeth Craig Hill, *In the Wake of War* (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1982), 17.

government.⁴⁶ The Army tempered this problem with an increasingly rigorous selection and screening process – which rejected roughly 92% of the applicants for the third class – but worries existed among many of the administrators that they could not recruit high quality officers indefinitely under the current system.⁴⁷ To solve this problem, they began to seek out military government officers directly from the civilian population. This existed on an essentially individual basis in the early classes, but by the end of 1942 it was assumed that an organized recruitment drive would be necessary to accomplish the final mission.⁴⁸ This change of thinking gained momentum as studies, most likely done at the SMG, created an increasingly accurate evaluation of the numbers that would be required to properly govern vast regions of foreign territory. These estimates stated that the MGD would need a minimum of 6,000 officers by the end of 1944, when many within the military hierarchy assumed the war might return to mainland Europe.⁴⁹ While over half of these men would still come from military sources, officials finally decided to obtain 2,500 officers directly from civilian life to supplement the quantity and quality of student officers.⁵⁰ They would come from a variety of sources, including recommendations and applications from various civilian institutions, but also took a more proactive form when various government departments actually approached notable

⁴⁶ Memo, Harry I. Jones to PMG, “Excerpts from Gen. Holmes’ letter,” 2 October 1943, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 804, Folder 353, NARA. A majority of the officers were considered of high quality, but some of the senior colonels were either too old or just unqualified.

⁴⁷ Wickersham, 6 and Memo, Gullion for CofS Through CG, SOS, 27 November 1942, G-1 files, Personnel, SMG, Misc Info in Coles and Weinberg, 24.

⁴⁸ Memo, Gullion to Commanding General, Services of Supply, 23 June 1942, 1-3, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 777, SMG General Folder, NARA and Memo, Wickersham to PMG, 10 December 1942, 1, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 777, Folder 325.1, NARA.

⁴⁹ Memo, Wickersham to PMG, “Cooperation in the Field of Military Government,” 17 June 1942, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 738, Folder 1, NARA and Memo, Wickersham for PMG, “Military Government Division,” 15 August 1942, 2, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 813, Folder 321, NARA and “Inquiry into Army and Navy Educational Program,” 14

⁵⁰ Memo, Gullion to Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, 6 February 1943, 1, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 806 Folder 352.11, NARA.

individuals.⁵¹ With this final step, the Army insured that the face of its military government officers would not be the spit-shined jackboots of fear and fantasy, but one that Americans saw on a daily basis in local schools, banks, and neighborhood drugstores.

Despite the good intentions of the military, some critics in and out of government still feared that these men could fall under the guidance of insidious or disingenuous professors. Much of the criticism focused on the supposedly militaristic character of some instructors or the aggressively imperialistic stance of civilian professors. Essentially taking the two points together, imperialism in this context seemed to become a kind of civilian reflection of militarist fascism. These fears are apparent from a number of letters of complaint, including one where a noted European professor implied that many of the civilian teachers were dangerous “American Imperialists” and “pro-Germans.”⁵² These criticisms were no different than those that had attached themselves to the students – exaggerated and essentially false. Like the men who sat before them in class, the professors were generally from the most prestigious levels of their fields and at worst represented a relative cross-section of American thinking on democratic ideals and international policy. Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham, the commandant of the school, is an excellent example of the individuals who made up the institution and the wider MG establishment. Though he would play a major role in both the creation and eventual expansion of military government, he was anything but the stereotypical military

⁵¹ Memo, PMG to Officer Procurement Districts, Fr-21, “Provost Marshal General’s Requisitions Nos. 12 to 22: Specialists’ Reserve,” 1, RG/6-34, Small. FDR asked Malcolm MacLean to enroll in the SMG, but also obtained a commission for his son-in-law, John Boettiger, to do the same. MacLean, 7-8. Robert Hill was in a similar situation when the governor of Alabama asked him. Hill and Hill, 1.

⁵² Letter, S. Harrison Thomsen to PMG, 28 June 1943, 1, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 777, Criticism Folder, NARA

man. He was a noted New York lawyer and had practiced constitutional law for many years, counting among his personal friends Undersecretary Patterson and even President Roosevelt.⁵³ A long-time reserve officer after serving in World War I, Wickersham was one of the first men to return to the Army after hostilities broke out and was described as “one of the prime movers in securing the Selective Service Law.”⁵⁴ After receiving his new position, this man, who was oft credited for his imagination and diplomatic skills, sought out advice on instructors from the finest academic administrators in the country, including the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Michigan.⁵⁵

The end product of his search was in many ways a reflection of the working relationship between military and civilian spheres that would come to symbolize MG for the rest of the war. The Army recruited men to address two main foci within the school. The first dealt mainly with military and public policy matters. They focused on the necessary organizational and strategic aspects of governing a town – working to assure the life and liberty of local peoples while guaranteeing military needs for multiple national armies. The second group of instructors largely dealt with teaching their students specific knowledge of individual peoples and places. This study of language, history, and culture offered the student officers a special knowledge of their future charges, overcoming cultural differences and allowing the conquerors a chance to understand and reform the people under their care. Through this combination of regional and technical knowledge, superior compromises would placate the conquered and keep the war won.

⁵³ Memo, Wickersham to PMG, 24 July 1942, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 804, Folder 353, NARA and Letter, Wickersham to Field Marshall Viscount Alanbrook, 23 May 1960, 1, Cornelius Wickersham Papers, Box World War II 1940-1968, SMG Folder 1, Syracuse University Archives, Syracuse, New York.

⁵⁴ Letter, H.A. Drum to George C. Marshall, 14 July 1941, Cornelius Wickersham Papers, Box World War II 1940-1968, SMG Folder 1, Syracuse University Archives, Syracuse, New York.

⁵⁵ Various letters in Record Group 389 Entry 442 Box 777 Folder 325.01 Establishment of SMG, NARA.

In the formation of this especially important piece of the program, Wickersham and the PMG placed an emphasis on the quality of instruction and first-hand knowledge of the subject, as opposed to any purely academic qualifications.⁵⁶ Joseph P. Harris was an excellent example of the right type of man for the position. Though inducted into the army to perform his teaching duties, he was in fact an instructor in public administration at the University of California at Berkeley with years of experience on federal public works committees.⁵⁷ Similarly, area instructor Arnold Wolfers was an expert on German national policy, not just from his position as an instructor in international relations, but from extensive personal experience obtained while living in the country. A native of Switzerland, he ran the Berlin Institute for Politics before the war forced him to flee to Yale University.⁵⁸ Such descriptions are relatively representative of a majority of the instructors. Like the Army's plan for their students, these men combined first-hand experience and academic knowledge, a combination that the military believed would be most effective in producing realistic and practical instruction. While most would eventually wear military uniforms, they were generally civilian volunteers.⁵⁹ Like their students, they had a thoroughly democratic mindset. Far from being a tool of American militarism or imperialism, they were a utilitarian sampling of American academia.

While the actual promotion of a civilian outlook was quite innovative, the general concept of civilians in uniform was familiar. This program was in many ways possible only because the military had a long tradition of using citizen soldiers – men who were

⁵⁶ Memo, Gullion for SW, 9 November 1942, PMGO files, 321.19, MG in Coles and Weinberg, 23.

⁵⁷ Inclusion "Biographical List: The Provost Marshall General, Commandant, Staff, and Faculty," 2, included with memo, PMG to Secretary of War, 9 November 1942, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 777, SMG General Folder, NARA.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 3.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 2-4.

farmers, businessmen, and laborers by trade, but took up arms in times of war. Both teachers and students volunteered to serve their nation because of this special ethos. Many of these men had entered the service, either during World War I or after Pearl Harbor, because all members of American society were expected to make themselves available to the country in time of war. These men had answered the call as their fathers and grandfathers had before them.

This tradition of volunteerism was a mainstay of the American experiment from the very origins of the nation. As historian Lawrence Cress has noted, many of the founding fathers had seen themselves as giving birth to a new republic in the image of the ancient societies of Greece and early Rome. Military traditions based around the civilian seemed a logical and complementary ideal. Only through a combination of civil pursuits and military service could men truly appreciate their rights and liberty, which would serve to motivate citizens to their protection.⁶⁰ Such service was essential to maintain the health of a true republic, as military service sought to reinforce American values. Even before 1776, soldiering had taken its place as an almost mythical test of true citizenship.⁶¹ This fact is apparent in 1940, when President Roosevelt described the draft, not in terms of a tool for national security, but as the “three-hundred year old custom of the American muster.”⁶² The ideal of the American citizen did not see military service as a burden or even as a duty per se, but as an opportunity to demonstrate one’s true commitment to the nation.

⁶⁰ Lawrence Delbert Cress, *Citizens in Arms: The Army and American Militia to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 22-23.

⁶¹ Cress, 12.

⁶² Quoted in John O’Sullivan, *From Volunteerism to Conscription: Congress and Selective Service, 1940-45* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1982), 92.

One of the reasons why this ethos had taken such a strong hold went far beyond its role in creating citizens. The ideal of the citizen soldier was an outgrowth of a long-held, if somewhat exaggerated, fear of tyranny. As Cress has argued, American thinking was in many ways influenced by radical Whig philosophy, which saw standing professional armies as insidious threats to individual freedom.⁶³ This school of thought considered military power a tool that could be used by an individual to unduly influence democratic institutions. The only force that could stand in the way of such military might was the power of the common people, brought together in the form of a militia.⁶⁴ The young nation quickly adopted this theory as fact when events like the Boston Massacre and the Coercive Acts of 1774 demonstrated the antagonism between the standing military and colonial civil liberties.⁶⁵

This culture bred a national disinclination to a professional military, which led the government to limit the size of standing armies throughout American history. While the military grew to keep up with changing national conditions, it always remained disproportionately small, especially when compared to European forces. These numbers would increase dramatically during wartime, depending on reserve units and volunteers to inflate numbers, only to fall again after hostilities ceased. One can see the continuation of this unique pattern in the twentieth century, when modern warfare did little to dissuade American boys from volunteering to fight. From 1914-1918, the Army quickly ballooned from just over 100,000 soldiers to a force 4 million strong. Yet with the signing of the Armistice, the country again demanded that the force be reduced, and Congress soon whittled the numbers down to just 300,000 – larger than before the war, but much smaller

⁶³ Cress, 79.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 18-22.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 42-43.

than some of the weakest armies in Europe. This high-water mark would fall during the interwar period due to budget constraints and a general apathy towards military preparedness. Even after the United States had already begun to build for the looming war, numbers remained low and the Army had only 185,000 active personnel in 1938.⁶⁶ Such actions were those of a country still very much attached to its traditional ethos of volunteerism and still very much suspicious of a large peacetime military.

But when the threat of war did appear, men lined up at recruiting offices. This was no different in regards to military government, where a flood of applications answered the Army's need for 2,500 civilian specialists to train with MG. Even Congressmen were willing to step down from their seats to serve their country.⁶⁷ The flood of new bodies posed a problem for the limited facilities available in Charlottesville. Even after General Wickersham requested an expansion of class size, only 150 students graduated during each 16 week period, making only 450 officers each year.⁶⁸

The PMG attempted to alleviate some of the burden by training junior officers, roughly defined as the two grades of lieutenant, in its school at Fort Custer in Michigan. While these men were not expected to be assuming the high level positions that SMG graduates would some day fill, it was deemed that even low level military officials would benefit from a familiarity with the countries and peoples that they would one day oversee. Therefore, in December of 1942 the PMG School created the first military government programs outside the SMG, training not only junior officers in the "I" course but also

⁶⁶ James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement 1945-1970* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 5-7.

⁶⁷ Various letters and applications included in OF 5136, FDR Library. Though a number would apply including Senator Albert Gore, the President was hesitant to have federal level politicians serving in the unit.

⁶⁸ Memo, Wickersham to PMG, "Cooperation in the Field of Military Government," 17 June 1943, 3, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 738, Folder 1, NARA.

enlisted men in the “H” course.⁶⁹ This, however, only added a few hundred more men. Since the military plan had envisioned having a minimum of 6,000 military government officers ready by the beginning of 1945, the facilities currently operating would fall far short of the stated goal.⁷⁰

Fortunately, in the patriotic times of post-Pearl Harbor America, institutions were queuing up to be of service to the military. Columbia opened a similar military government school to train naval personnel in the summer of 1942, sharing many ideas and a few staff members with the Army.⁷¹ By June of 1942, just a month after the classes in Charlottesville first began, universities were already approaching the military offering their services in training officials for “projects relating to post-war problems.”⁷² While the military accepted a number of offers, establishing programs to do everything from simple research to the training of radar operators, the Army was especially careful when accepting applications for military government assistance. It looked specifically at the quality of the institutions, hoping to use faculty as well as facilities.

The Army, therefore, conducted an exhaustive and meticulous search to find proper homes for the training program. By November, representatives from the SMG and the larger MGD were repeatedly meeting with different university officials.⁷³ By early the next year, the MGD had created a set of necessary standards that schools were

⁶⁹ Provost Marshall General’s School, “Specialist Officer’s Course and Company Officer’s Course,” Fort Custer, Michigan, included as part (c) in History of Military Government Training, Volume III, 1, RG 165 Entry 472, Box 797, NARA.

⁷⁰ Inclusion, PMG to Director of Training SOS, 6 February 1943, 2, included in memo, WL Wieble to Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, 23 February 1943, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 806, Folder 352.11, NARA.

⁷¹ Wickersham to PMG, 17 June 1943, 4, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 738, Folder 1, NARA.. Phillip Jessup, who first had the idea for such a school, involved himself with the SMG before the Columbia school was green-lighted.

⁷² Ibid. 4.

⁷³ Memo, Hardy C. Dillard to Commandant SMG, “Trip to Washington, November 3, 1942,” 4 November 1942, 1, NARA, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 804, Folder 353, NARA.

required to meet before consideration.⁷⁴ The Army invited those that fulfilled the standards to send representatives to a conference held in Chicago in late March, where a final overview of the program was presented to the interested parties.⁷⁵ Six universities qualified in early April: Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Chicago, Michigan, and Pittsburgh. Various faculty members then met together at a conference, where they not only observed the current facilities of the SMG in operation, but then held a detailed discussion on how best to establish the new program regarding both instruction methods and materials for students.⁷⁶ The process of university selection and the creation of new programs would be largely the same until the end of the war, with the Army carefully deciding who would train its most valuable and politically important men.⁷⁷

The Army did not design these schools to be mere replicas of the Charlottesville program. The Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), as the army dubbed them, were far less concerned with the high level, regional and national planning for which the SMG graduates would one day be responsible. The Army expected the CATS to focus more on the day-to-day work of running an occupied city or town. The focus was therefore more on the individual nations that the United States expected to occupy – the language, the traditions, “the government, judicial system, and economic, industrial, and commercial

⁷⁴“Report on the Organization and Operations of the Civil Affairs Training School at the University of Pittsburgh,” 7 November 1944, included as part (b) 8 in History of Military Government Training, Volume III, 1, RG 165 Entry 472, Box 797, NARA.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 1.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 2 and memo, Fred Eggan, “Conference on Training Requirements for Military Government Specialists,” 16-18 April 1943, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 337, NARA.

⁷⁷ Four additional universities would eventually be selected at the peak of training later in 1943: Boston University, Northwestern, Western Reserve, and Wisconsin. Princeton would eventually supplement Columbia as a training center for Navy men. Memo, “Types of Civil Affairs Training,” 6 October 1944, RG 389 Entry 442 Box 804, Folder 353, NARA.

system of the country.”⁷⁸ These men, interacting with natives every day, would benefit more from a thorough knowledge of the people and cultures than they would from a broad understanding of strategy or management. As one officer stressed during a discussion on the program, “the feeling that even a slight knowledge of the language gives” goes far in “overcoming the feeling of being an outsider.”⁷⁹ This attempt to make officers comfortable in foreign environments and among foreign peoples is evident in the selection of the University of Pittsburgh, which to its director’s chagrin was immediately shortened to the Army acronym of CATSUP.⁸⁰ Supplementing its professional and experienced staff, which was the basis of selection for most schools, Pittsburgh offered a unique opportunity for cultural immersion. Taking advantage of the unusually strong ethnic European communities that existed in and around the city, the Army was excited to be able to expose its trainees to “the folkways of the official and professional classes as well as of the working and agricultural classes of the countries to which they may be assigned.”⁸¹ Such specialization displayed a departure from what was just a single aspect of the Charlottesville school. Instead of creating impersonal gauleiters, the army was training administrators that could and would interact with those people they would eventually govern.

The Army designed the CATS to retain a highly civilian nature for just this reason, hoping to instill in the officers a responsibility beyond military necessity. Instead of the hodgepodge staff that had been assembled by the military and placed on the

⁷⁸ Inclusion, “Text Materials – Civil Affairs Training Program,” included in memo, Jesse I. Miller to H. Ralph Burton, 7 October 1943, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 333.5, NARA.

⁷⁹ Memo, Eggan, 16-18 April 1943, 9.

⁸⁰ Letter, John Geise to Charles Hyneman, 24 August 1943, 3, RG 389 Entry 444, Box 918, Folder 350.06, NARA.

⁸¹ Memo, “24 Weeks Course To Prepare Candidates For Service In Occupied Territory,” Environment, RG 389 Entry 444 Box 919, Folder 352, NARA.

grounds of the University of Virginia, the Army placed the administration of the individual CATS in the capable hands of the university employed civilians. There was rarely more than a single military officer on campus, always assigned to teach military government classes and often a graduate of Charlottesville.⁸² Directors had wide discretion as to professors and texts, though military authorities retained loose control of all aspects of the program. Beyond adherence to the basic tenets of military instruction and a focus on specific countries, the universities found themselves quite free to create their own schedules, assignments, teaching methods, and even student policy.⁸³ This had the ability to make the learning environment much more malleable than traditional military education, though it also created a problem of inconsistencies across schools, especially in regards to morale.⁸⁴ The fact that schools focused more on the abilities of the individual as opposed to any rank created a different dynamic that seemed to be unusual within the largely hierarchical army. At Charlottesville, rank largely fell by the wayside in favor of the close relations fostered not only between students, but even among professors who often found themselves similar in age and background to those they taught. The CATS took this one step further, recommending to program directors that students select their own group leaders by vote instead of appointment by seniority.⁸⁵

⁸² I cite examples for Pittsburgh and Yale, though all evidence indicated that this was a widespread practice. A Whitney Griswold, "Organization, Faculty and Record of Instruction at the Civil Affairs Training School Yale University," (New Haven, Connecticut: 1 November 1943), 2, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 333.5, NARA and inclusion, "Exhibit I," included in memo, John Giese to Charles S. Hyneman, "Report on Instruction in the Civil Affairs Training School at the University of Pittsburgh," 31 October 1943, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 333.5, NARA.

⁸³ Representatives of Harvard University, "Summary of Sessions of the University Conference at the School of Military Government," (Charlottesville, Virginia: 16 and 17 April 1943), Part 4, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 337, NARA.

⁸⁴ Various Reports from CATS in NARA RG 389, Entry 442. Some examples are in Box 771 and there are more in individual boxes devoted to specific CATS.

⁸⁵ Memo, Eggan, 16-18 April 1943, 12.

Such practices were largely emblematic of what lay beneath the polished brass insignias of these institutions and their graduates – a liberal democratic set of values.

Yet the military was still a major presence in this training program, especially when one considers the entire process the average MG officer destined for Europe was likely to endure. CATS, and for some the SMG, were simply the main parts of a much larger and somewhat longer journey. Most of the officers who went through CATS were from the Specialist Reserve. These men came directly from civilian life and had little or no past affiliation with the military, so officials expected that they would need some familiarization with the Army. This was done by sending them through a newly created program at Fort Custer, the J course, which gave them a basic introduction to the army and to military government. Spending roughly a month within the confines of the camp, instructors put new and recently returned officers through a period of basic training, weapons handling, physical training, and other military necessities. Additional classes in military government problems subsidized this basic training, mainly focusing on the necessary aspects of administration, liaison, and such, but also working in a superficial knowledge of area studies. Visiting professors from Chicago and Michigan taught much of this information.⁸⁶ This period often presented the worst side of military life to many of the recruits, a culture shock into a physically demanding, strict, and hierarchical world.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, the army felt the severity of the process created a necessary, if unintentional, “comradeship and esprit de corps... that served many of the officers well

⁸⁶ Provost Marshal General’s School, “Specialists Officers Course and Company Officers Course,” 2-4.

⁸⁷ Criticism has focused on the harshness of this training for the older men, often averaging in their lower 40s. This seems to be largely true, and the letter from one graduate makes the reality painfully clear, but also highlights the comradeship that came from the experience: “There have been a couple of accidents – one man broke an ankle, another cracked some ribs. Today I actually went to sleep on my [rifle butt]. We have a close connection on getting away from here.” Letter, Earl Crum to Wife, Wednesday August 1943, 1, Smith-Crum Papers, Box 5, Folder 11, Marshall Library.

in their later experience.”⁸⁸ This could easily be dismissed as mere rhetoric, but groups of Fort Custer graduates like the self-proclaimed “Eager Beavers,” who adopted an especially tongue-in-cheek pride in themselves after a harsh training period, demonstrate that there was at least a kernel of truth in the statement.⁸⁹ It was this training that would be their main indoctrination into the Army, but for many also served to establish a close kinship with their fellow civilian recruits.

Beyond this basic training period was the main portion of military government instructions – a period that would essentially last from their exit from Fort Custer until the day they deployed. For the majority of Specialist Reserve soldiers, and later regular military ones, this would involve instruction at one of the CATS for a period of two or three months, depending on the demand for qualified officers at any one point.⁹⁰ Some officers, either after or instead of their period at the other universities, went to the SMG to gain staff level training in military government.⁹¹ After graduation, however, they still continued the process of education. Contrary to what many recent authors have stated, the Army did not return many of these men to civilian life or abandon them in holding areas. A handful remained at their previous institutions, particularly at the SMG, where they would continue their education and work in what was termed the “graduate cadre,” which seems to have busied itself with additional language study and the formulation of basic occupation policy.⁹² The majority moved to a specifically designated civil affairs pool at the staging area of Camp Reynolds in Pennsylvania. The military developed the camp in

⁸⁸ Provost Marshal General’s School, “Specialists Officers Course and Company Officers Course,” 2.

⁸⁹ Memo, DI Glossbrenner to Lt. Col. Harris, “Saga of the Eager Beavers,” 23 October 1943, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 805, Folder 352.15, NARA. The Eager Beavers were all part of the 5th Class of the SMG.

⁹⁰ “Inquiry into Army and Navy Educational Program,” 14-16.

⁹¹ Representatives of Harvard University, Part 4.

⁹² Memo, Wickersham for PMG, “Military Government Division,” 15 August 1942, 2, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 813, Folder 321, NARA and Memo, H.E. Robison for Director CAD, 4 January 1944, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 805, Folder 352.16. Various letters also speak of additional language work for qualified students.

late 1943, between the period when MG officers were leaving for Italy in large numbers and when preparations for the final assault into Europe began. While many men would spend less than a fortnight in the camp, some would spend up to two months waiting for their debarkation orders.⁹³ To pass this time “profitably,” a training program developed to continue MG education and prevent established knowledge, especially in language, from being “adversely affected” by time out of the classroom.⁹⁴ The Army replicated this process when it moved the pool to the Civil Affairs Center in the quiet English town of Shrivenham, which would eventually be the staging point for the invasion of the continent.⁹⁵

Still, this process reflected the largely civilian nature of previous training, removing the military hierarchy and creating a highly flexible system of learning. Lines between staff and officers consistently blurred, so that men waiting for orders would help run every-day programs and processes. Most of the regular activities consisted mainly of language practice run by student-officers, but a library and discussion groups were available for individuals interested in MG issues.⁹⁶ The informal and apparently successful structure of this program even mixed enlisted men with officers, something which was rare within the regular Army. Young sergeants found themselves leading language groups filled with men twice their age and well above their rank.⁹⁷

⁹³ “Staging Area School, Camp Reynolds, Pennsylvania,” included as part (d) in History of Military Government Training, Volume III, 1-7, RG 165 Entry 472, Box 797, NARA.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 7.

⁹⁵ Various letters and memos in Frank McSherry Papers, Box Civil Affairs Center, MHI. The Frank McSherry Papers are in a unique situation and box numbers are in transition, as some have been relabeled while others have not, I will attempt to use titles, unless the contents were somehow different from the label.

⁹⁶ “Staging Area School, Camp Reynolds, Pennsylvania,” 9-12.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 10.

The culture of education and civilian discipline had by this time become a major part of CA/MG identity. From induction to deployment, the men who would govern Europe had created a distinct niche within the Army. They essentially retained a largely civilian character. This fact and the tendency to work outside of the military structure created a unique set of values among the MG men. They tended to work with less emphasis on stature, as many were close in rank, abilities and age. Participation in this unique program created a force that tended to think differently from regular Army soldiers, which became apparent in their actions after deployment. Familiar with the harshness and pointlessness of military logic from Fort Custer, but also the more comfortable civilian life from CATS, they often looked down on military procedure. This in many ways seems to have influenced their later actions, when they often chose civilian necessity over military expediency. While these officers held the winning of the war as their primary goal, their training gave them a different culture and mindset from their more belligerent fellow officers.

Chapter III

**“The purpose of our occupation, then, will not be government alone, nor recovery, nor rehabilitation, but resurrection”
Inside the Classroom of Military Government**

While a number of authors have discussed parts of the proceeding narrative, no historian has ever conducted an in-depth investigation of the curriculum of these schools. Considering the fact that these men would make up the majority of the officers deployed in the European theater for MG duties, the lessons taught at these schools constituted an

important aspect of American foreign policy. Directives were slow to emerge from Washington, as bureaucratic infighting and Roosevelt's own management style created a bottleneck for post-war strategies for rebuilding Europe. In light of these events, the officers deployed in Italy, Germany, and other occupied territories had little to inform their decisions besides the loose mission statements and background information provided during their training. This made the SMG and CATS schools vitally important, as they crafted the initial American attitudes and actions that would begin the process of European reconstruction.

Recognizing this, administrators of the various schools worked hard to create a common direction for the curricula. The MGD and the SMG, where many of the lessons first originated, created a set of guidelines to ensure some sense of uniformity within the various civilian institutions that participated in the CATS program.⁹⁸ The various school administrations also gathered for a number of conferences to discuss the "objectives, subject matter content, and method of instruction... in some detail."⁹⁹ Professors in the programs eventually compiled texts (this took place most often with language, where the emphasis on the spoken word and constant drill differed from traditional teaching methods) and shared them amongst the schools, especially within the CATS.¹⁰⁰ Capping this broad attempt to reach a consensus was the fact that many of the schools shared

⁹⁸ Memo, Jesse I. Miller, MGD Training Circular No. 2, "Training Requirements, Military Government Specialists," 10 April 1943, 1, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 738, Folder 3, NARA.

⁹⁹ Letter, Hyneman to Dillard, 2 April 1943, 1, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 3, NARA. Box 806, Folders 334 and 337, NARA contains a number of letters and minutes of various conferences concerning CATS and SMG and the common curriculum between them.

¹⁰⁰ Inclusion, "Text Materials - Civil Affairs Training Materials." The sharing of materials can also be seen in the correspondence between Bernard Bloch and various individuals at Northwestern and Chicago. MS 1129, Bernard Bloch Papers, Box 33, Folder 331 Yale Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven Connecticut. Interestingly, teachers eventually developed material in part by inquiring of students what vocabulary they would need to accomplish their mission, which were then translated for them to use with the already acquired basics of the language. Excerpt, Language Section, History of Yale Far Eastern, 7 Bloch Papers, Box 33, Folder 340, Yale.

faculty, visiting lecturers regularly appearing in front of students at Yale and Charlottesville, Harvard and Pittsburgh.¹⁰¹

A review of the surviving lectures demonstrates a fair amount of uniformity. Most of these come mainly from the SMG, which mimeographed copies of presentations for the student-officers to study at their leisure. Taken from various classes at the school, they show a general trend in subject matter, especially after the third class (January-May 1943), when Army administrators established the basic outline of MG problems, area studies, and language.¹⁰² While the CATS focused more heavily on language and area knowledge, the tendency to share professors and often include graduates of the SMG on its faculty points towards an effectively similar curriculum. A comparison of subject headings within various CATS schools, along with the few surviving lectures available in various repositories, seems to confirm this assumption.¹⁰³ This is further verified by the extensive collection of Civil Affairs Guides produced by the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to advise its officers on recommended policies under CA/MG. Drafted by a

¹⁰¹ Various letters from a number of Archives shows that Arnold Wolfers, Joseph Harris, Ralph Gabriel, and others visited a number of the schools. Some of Wolfers' SMG transcripts, for example, are present in Yale CATS educational materials, RG 389 Entry 444, Box 934, NARA. Others like Lewis Underhill, Cuthbert Stearns, and Hardy Dillard would later be involved with the Civil Affairs Center and Civil Affairs Staging Area in England and California respectively. CAOs even requested Wolfers assistance with the German Country Unit, though it is unclear if he ever made it to England. His lectures, however, did make it into the curriculum at Shrivenham. Letter, Edgar Lewis to G-5, July 18 1944, Frank McSherry Papers, Box 39 (Personnel), MHI and various letters in RG 389 Entry 444, Box 918, NARA.

¹⁰² Though copies were made of most, if not all, of the lectures at the SMG, a majority come from the first five classes of military government. Comparisons of various lectures demonstrate that they remained relatively consistent in each class, as a majority instructors remained the same. There was a slight move towards more specific area knowledge, though it remained quite broad as it covered Germany and Japan, with knowledge of Italy before the beginning of 1943, and a slight familiarization with France. CATS focused on a specific area, most looking heavily at central Europe (mainly Germany) after the first courses were completed. The training would change in 1944 when the SMG and CATS merged, having students move through SMG to gain MG training and then to the various CATS for Far Eastern area studies. In this form, the training would last until the end of the war, replacing it with the almost wholly military School for Occupied Areas at Carlisle Barracks until 1946.

¹⁰³ Lists of the curriculum for Yale, Harvard, and Pittsburgh, among others, show a clear link with the remaining Charlottesville material. Remaining lectures and problems also appear to share criteria and general attitudes toward the occupation. Yale information is held in RG 389 Entry 442, Boxes 932-935, NARA. Pittsburgh documents are held in Box 919.

contingent of officers within the CAD, which included a large number of graduates from SMG and CATS, these booklets show a clear connection with the information that remains from the various home front training institutions.¹⁰⁴ In the following pages, mention will be made of these various sources, essentially treating them as a single, multi-tiered system of educating student-officers from the moment of induction to the time of implementation.

So what exactly was the military teaching its untraditional students? The answer is quite a bit. This training began with basic instruction in military matters that might be unfamiliar to the civilian-minded officers. This included extreme examples of physical training and military etiquette at Fort Custer, but also included occasional firing practice and drill at the SMG and even, to a lesser extent, at the CATS. More importantly, MG classes stressed that students should adopt new ways of thinking, especially in regards to issues of the local security, troop supply, billeting, and transportation.¹⁰⁵ Instructors also touched on various other aspects of the military hierarchy, internal relations, and similar subjects.¹⁰⁶ Such material did not offer a detailed knowledge of strategy or even military process, because the Army intended for these men to retain their civilian identities. Recognizing the necessary components of the mission of CA/MG, the military wanted these men to utilize their already established abilities and skill sets, with military surroundings offering only the context for the mission. The truth of this statement is quite

¹⁰⁴ Survey of the material demonstrates this, including a belief in local reeducation efforts, economic reconstruction, and a subtle development of democratic political parties. For a brief discussion of the similarities between training and publications, see Ziemke, 83-85.

¹⁰⁵ The importance of these objectives was first outlined in War Department, FM-27-5, *Basic Field Manual of Military Government*, Prepared under direction of The Judge Advocate General (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), 3.

¹⁰⁶ "Index of Third Course Lectures and Numbers," School of Military Government, 1943, Richard W. Van Wagenen Papers, MHI.

clear in the emphasis the Army placed on the independence of these “soldiers,”

something that critics could not imagine within the strict hierarchy of the military:

On the shoulders of the graduates of this School, then, as Colonel Stearns has suggested, there rests a responsibility beyond that of merely doing well the jobs assigned... the civil affairs and liaison officer with work to be done that may be of the most critical importance will nowhere find a description of his duties. His job is not laid out for him... I cannot emphasize too strongly, then, that your jobs as civil affairs and liaison officers will be precisely what you yourselves make of them, no more and no less.¹⁰⁷

While instructors expected these duties to be subservient to the larger goals of American policy, instructors at the SMG made it clear that the men in their classrooms should not

fear taking initiative “given the wide latitude within the limits of his responsibilities.”¹⁰⁸

This attitude required a flexible mindset, one that should anticipate and prepare for

problems whether orders existed or not: “in many cases, some of the policies that should

come from higher authority will have to be recommended to them if their need has not

been foreseen by that higher authority.”¹⁰⁹ The leaders within the MGD and CAD, often

civilians themselves, realized that answers did not always come from the top echelons;

entrepreneurial policy on the ground often decided whether implementation would fail or

succeed. They attempted to train their students to be good soldiers, but soldiers that

would take responsibility for a situation that might go beyond the limitations of existing

military strategy.

The ideas and skills taught at Charlottesville were therefore not necessarily directives or specific plans of action, but attempts to teach attitudes and procedures most

¹⁰⁷ Paul Shipman Andrew, reproduction of lecture, “What the Civil Affairs Officer Engaged in Liaison Work Should be, Should Know, Should Do,” given at School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 16 March 1943), 3, Van Wagenan Papers, MHI.

¹⁰⁸ C.P. Stearns, reproduction of lecture “Civil Affairs Functions in the Present War (Remarks at the Opening Exercises, School of Military Government),” given at School of Military Government, (Charlottesville, VA: 15 January 1943), 2, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook 3, Small.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

likely to result in a positive and constructive outcome. The Civil Affairs Guides eventually distributed to the officers after they arrived on the continent reflect the attitude of the entire education process: it was “designed to aid civil affairs officers dealing with problems in liberated areas... [and] to point the factual information toward the making and executing of plans by those civil affairs officers assigned to this work in the theaters of operations.”¹¹⁰ This guidance included recommendations regarding specific actions for expected problems, but all of these actions tended towards a common goal. This goal as first stated in Army Field Manual FM-27-5 – commonly referred to as the “bible” of military government and the inspiration for much of the training procedures – was “to obtain a favorable and enduring peace.”¹¹¹ It then pointed out the most effective way of establishing that peace:

A military occupation marked by harshness, injustice, or oppression leaves lasting resentment against the occupying power in the hearts of the people of the occupied territory and sows the seeds of future war by them against the occupying power when circumstances shall make that possible; whereas just, considerate, and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying army will convert enemies into friends.¹¹²

Military attitudes toward the governed also relied heavily on the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, which Army officials considered the closest thing to official postwar policy for the majority of the war. The aims of the agreement, which promoted “economic prosperity” and the “freedom from fear and want” in “all States, great or small, victor or vanquished,” influenced military thinking.¹¹³ This combined body of thought would lay the basis for the entire process of education for CA/MG officers.

¹¹⁰ War Department Pamphlet 31-110, “Civil Affairs Guide: Dissolution of the Nazi Party and its Affiliated Organizations,” (War Department, 22 July 1944), IV.

¹¹¹ FM 27-5, 4.

¹¹² Ibid, 4.

¹¹³ Atlantic Charter, as reprinted in Douglas Brinkley, ed., *The Atlantic Charter* (Scranton, PA: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994), xvii.

Bearing these aims in mind, the MGD crafted a system that would constantly reiterate the importance of benevolent policy, which had at its heart not only the benefit of the conquerors but of the conquered. Warfare in this understanding was not a tool of destruction, but a necessary evil to achieve the means of a mutually beneficial and lasting peace. This latter goal was the inherent domain of the CAO.

Lessons therefore focused on the application of this attitude towards the specific circumstances of liberated regions. Indeed, the very use of the term “liberated” demonstrates a certain attitude towards conquered nations.¹¹⁴ Instructors attempted to teach a nuanced policy of understanding recent German history “dispassionately and without preconceived ideas.”¹¹⁵ They repeatedly stressed that students should “not take the attitude the people [original emphasis] are to blame for their present condition since it is the result of a war in which they took part.”¹¹⁶ These men considered the people of Germany to be victims of the Nazis, not fellow perpetrators. Arnold Wolfers even reminded his students that the people under Hitler’s rule in Germany were not so different from Americans and it was not unimaginable that peoples in similar circumstances to those in Germany could again follow a path to totalitarianism.¹¹⁷ To truly understand the decision of the German people, it was important “to understand the other man’s point of view” and therefore “judge them [the occupied peoples] by their

¹¹⁴ Army officers specifically used this word in the Civil Affairs Guides as cited above and also the Handbook for Military Government in Germany. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the term, see Ziemke, 88.

¹¹⁵ Arnold Wolfers, reproduction of lecture “How to Treat the Germans,” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: 1 May 1943), 1, RG/6-34, Box 2, Folder 3, Small.

¹¹⁶ Dr. Karl Brandt, reproduction of lecture “Economic Aspects of the Military Government, with Special Reference to the Situation In North Africa (Abstract),” given at School of Military Government, (Charlottesville, VA: 25 February 1943), 2, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small.

¹¹⁷ Arnold Wolfers, reproduction of lecture “Existence and Impact of Nazi Philosophy,” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 1943), 1, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small.

standards, not by ours.”¹¹⁸ These lessons fostered a sympathetic understanding of the German population, attempting to portray them to their future governors as people to be pitied instead of punished. They were not inherently enemies, but peoples the Allies could bring back into the community of nations under the right circumstances.¹¹⁹

Thus, studies in history, anthropology, psychology, and even geography sought to explain how specific circumstances and actions could reform the beliefs and ideals of a conquered people. In attempting to describe the way a people construct their identities, both personal and political, distinguished professors like Ralph Gabriel explained to the students that a national identity constituted everything from language to institutions to how a people access certain kinds of knowledge. To work with a people, he said, the military government officer must approach them through their own culture; he “must understand its institutions and its values.”¹²⁰ The history, beliefs, and biases of a nation have the “ability to survive” and will not disappear after military defeat, so conquerors must not assume that they will be working with a blank slate.¹²¹ This meant that the occupiers had to avoid forcing policies onto the people, instead assuming a flexibility and understanding that was rare within the military.

¹¹⁸ Paul Shipman Andrews, reproduction of lecture “A Technique for Liaison,” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: 20 April 1943), 1 and 3, RG/6-34, Box 2, Folder 3, Small.

¹¹⁹ This idea took almost a messianic tone in the language of Paul Andrews, the usually straightforward Dean of Syracuse law that taught at the SMG. He claimed it was “America’s predestined task” to partake in an “act of creation” through military government. MG would be the saviors of Germany, returning it to its rightful place in the family of nations: “The purpose of our occupation, then, will not be government alone, nor recovery, nor rehabilitation, but resurrection... As America faces her grave responsibility, so shall she succeed or fail in the great task that is set before her, the task, in the words of an older time, ‘to make invincible’ for the nations ‘a commonwealth to invite the souls of men.’” Paul Shipman Andrews, reproduction of lecture “Liaison - Preliminary,” delivered at the School of Military Government, (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 18 May 1943), 10, Accession 2001.036, Box 1, Folder 14, Fort Bragg.

¹²⁰ Ralph H. Gabriel, reproduction of lecture “Military Government and the Civil Population,” delivered at the School of Military Government, (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 15 September 1943), 2, RG 389, 442 Box 742, Folder 1, NARA.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

Looking at specific examples, education was a favorite topic to illustrate not only the difficulties of military government but the possible merits of it as well. The Army taught that when approaching education, it would be best to adopt a minimalist model and remove only the most offensive and inflammatory items, not rewrite the textbooks or ban all former materials.¹²² CA guides and lessons also made clear that removing Nazi textbooks was a wholly German duty. Military government was only there to insure that responsible German citizens were in position to achieve such a goal:

Military Government should not institute or participate in the removal of such [Nazi influenced] books from library shelves nor make any gesture resembling the one-time Nazi act of burning books. Removal of the books in question, or at least from open shelves, should be left to the initiative of local indigenous councils and school supervisors. If the latter fail in this... [Military Government] should accomplish its end by eliminating the indicated personnel on grounds of unreliability rather than move directly on the books themselves.¹²³

Such actions were the logical middle ground between outright domination and complete freedom. In these circumstances, the military expected American MG officers to simultaneously remove the dangers inherent in the Nazi party while maintaining themselves as an example of democracy. Any similarities between the two systems was avoided at all cost, as tainting the democratic process could easily lead the German people astray in the void left by the destruction of Nazism.

This is not to say that the military wanted to install democracy in Germany at any cost. While attempting to foster the democratic process, it realized that historical precedents demonstrated that forceful attempts to reform an entire culture would most

¹²² Daniel J. Mahoney, reproduction of lecture, "German Military Government in Occupied France," delivered at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government), 10, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small.

¹²³ War Department Pamphlet 31-118, "Civil Affairs Guide: German Elementary Schools" (War Department, 22 July 1944), 16.

likely result in resistance if not outright revolution.¹²⁴ Reeducation was necessary, but it needed to be a “patient” process, one conducted with the kindness of an older brother without a “superior or patronizing” tone.¹²⁵ Reeducating Germany through “a campaign of democratic slogans” and “more propaganda of the opposite [non-totalitarian] brand” would simply overwhelm an already weary people.¹²⁶ Germans had to adopt new policies themselves, and no foreign power could force it upon them. Army instructors considered education itself a strictly local domain, one that MG could guide, prod, and occasionally negate but never fully appropriate. The Army envisioned this process as a lengthy one, but one that was necessary if lasting peace was the ultimate goal. As one professor eloquently phrased it to multiple classes:

What chance has a foreigner to teach the basic values of life to a conquered people, who, when he lays his notes on the desk, lays beside it an automatic pistol? Germans and Japanese will have to learn by hard experience that their philosophies and their practices lead to the destruction and death and then teach this great discovery to their people in their own way.¹²⁷

MG believed the process of transforming societal norms would succeed only if a number of broad, multi-faceted appeals to the people found a willing audience. Primary among these was the issue of the economy. The MGD felt that it would have to show Germany that not only was the war a mistake, but so was the entire experience of National Socialism. Instructors and planners believed MG officers should demonstrate this fact through a rapid economic revival. “Economic change,” said the insightful Professor Gabriel, “particularly economic improvement, is the easiest way to affect a

¹²⁴ Ralph H. Gabriel, reproduction of lecture “Military Government and the Civil Population,” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 12 March 1943), 4, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook 1, Small.

¹²⁵ Arnold Wolfers, reproduction of lecture, “Racial, Religious, and Educational Issues,” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 30 April 1943), 6, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 743, Bound Volume, NARA and Andrews, Technique, 3

¹²⁶ Wolfers, Racial, 6.

¹²⁷ Gabriel, Military Government, 6.

change in culture.”¹²⁸ Thus, the immediate mission of MG was putting occupied “towns back on their feet,” as one reporter would describe the mission in Italy.¹²⁹ Under this thinking, MG officers would attempt to portray economic prosperity as a symbol of democracy, attempting to contrast it with the death and destruction wrought by attachment to fascist ideology.

While the latter condition would be relatively simple to ensure in the wake of the catastrophic war, the former aim of economic reconditioning was a more complicated task. Military estimates predicted the state of postwar countries to be quite dire, with German infrastructure destroyed and strife rampant. It would be necessary to take decisive action. Past experiences with military government took over lands where armies fought in showpiece battles or around cities, leaving the vitally important agriculture and light industry of the countryside relatively intact. This was not the case during World War II, where total war targeted civilians and rear areas were wantonly bombed. Such tactics meant that the conflict would only end when “the whole structure crumbles... with hunger and suffering even on the farms.”¹³⁰ In this situation, the best way to keep the peace and prevent widespread civilian unrest was through a return of “economic life to normalcy.”¹³¹ Throughout these instructions there seems to exist an understanding that in order to keep the war won, the Allies must provide a sense of social prosperity and economic security for the German people. This is not just because content people are

¹²⁸ Gabriel, *Military Government*, 5.

¹²⁹ Thomas W. Huntington, “AMGOT – A Symbol for Order,” *The Washington Post* (Washington DC), 15 August 1943, Page B1.

¹³⁰ Douglas Miller, reproduction of lecture “Economic Problems of Military Occupation (Abstract),” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School Military Government, 31 March 1943), 2, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small.

¹³¹ Brandt, 1. Others also discussed this idea. For one example, see Ralph H. Gabriel, reproduction of lecture “Military Government and Economic Problems,” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 11 March 1943), 11, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small.

pacific, but because democracy is most likely to succeed when stomachs are full. It is when society is needy, when children starve, that anarchy and totalitarianism find their greatest strength. Many of the academics within the MGD understood this, as they had seen rumblings of unrest in their own nation in recent years, and they wanted to pass the lesson on to their students.¹³²

Thus, many lecturers took it upon themselves to instill in their students a clear mandate to revive and revitalize the German economy. Instructors illustrated such concepts with myriad examples from history, reaching as far back as the Civil War and as close to home as modern North Africa. Students heard repeatedly and from multiple parties a common refrain that one visiting lecturer made especially clear: “Rehabilitate and make use of local economy whenever possible [original emphasis].”¹³³ American officers would inhabit the top echelons of the control economy and encourage local officials to work within an approved framework for the revitalization of their own country. This effectively empowered the people, so as not to offend or embitter them, and saved administrative effort on behalf of the Army.¹³⁴ This latter aspect of military government was important for its cost saving measures for the Army, as production of foodstuffs and goods reduced the required shipments by Allies to retain a certain standard of living. While this aspect of economic rehabilitation was secondary to the primary goal

¹³² Ralph Gabriel and many of the other scholars associated with the program were surely aware of the academic debate surrounding democracy and its failings that arose during the Depression. It seems reasonable to assume they would have imparted these and other lessons from their studies and experiences to their students. See Purcell for a deeper discussion of the academic back and forth of the period.

¹³³ Morris Rosenthal, reproduction of lecture “Experiences in Military Government: Economic Problems in North Africa (Abstract),” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School Military Government, 31 March 1943), 1, RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small. It is interesting to note that while this lesson specifically referred to actions under the auspices of Civil Affairs, meaning within a friendly territory, little mention was made of the differences between this and Germany. This fits into the larger military training of the period, which to a large extent treated Germany as an essentially liberated territory.

¹³⁴ Brandt, 1-3. Dr. Brandt repeatedly explained that the economy must be restarted, but that food distribution and economic revival must not be viewed as charity by the local peoples. MG officers must allow them to retain their self respect.

of pacifying the population and introducing democracy, it made the program attractive to pragmatic sections of the military (and the government) outside the more indoctrinated CA officers.

Yet MG did not anticipate promoting the revitalization of all industries. The military, like a majority of the world, was wary of the German war machine, lest it start a fourth war in the span of as many generations. Therefore, instructors treated heavy industry somewhat cautiously. The rejuvenation of steel factories, machine production lines, and even chemical processing plants was a taboo subject, especially when discussing European allies, and the Army did its best to steer clear of the topic. While politically sensitive, the Army also justified a delay in the process as inherently pragmatic, as heavy bomb damage would most likely make any attempts at restarting heavy industry a burden on already limited resources. This does not mean that the CAD waffled on restarting Germany industry. Yet despite these concerns, instructors stated that revival of the minimum industry was absolutely necessary to jump-start the economy and return the German people to some kind of self-sufficiency. The commanding general had the duty of “selecting particular industries, localities, and branches of agriculture for priority aid,” but this language made it clear that some revival was expected.¹³⁵ One lecturer went so far as to say that MG officers should immediately revitalize at least the textile industry under their own auspices “as the clothing problem will be pressing.”¹³⁶

The Army designed these policies to pacify the occupied public, thereby allowing for victory and setting the groundwork for democratic government in the future. But the

¹³⁵ Paul Shipman Andrews, reproduction of lecture “Decision to be Considered in Advance, in Liaison,” delivered at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 30 March 1943), RG/6-34, Box 2, Folder 3.

¹³⁶ Douglas Miller, 2.

question of exactly how this democracy would take shape was still a major issue. Political parties represented a problem, as some within the nation's government viewed the Germans as completely incapable of adopting democratic norms in the current generation.¹³⁷ The Nazis came to power using the democratic system of the Weimar Republic, which naysayers of German democracy reminded all who would listen. Yet, historical explanations of the event as recounted by Arnold Wolfers and other professors, some of whom had been in Germany at the time, stressed the particular circumstances of the situation. Nazism was not a direct result of some deep-seated German need for totalitarianism, but an obvious result of the fear, desperation, and upheaval caused by the First World War and the resulting economic crisis.¹³⁸ As professors implied in their readings of this event, had similar circumstances prevailed in the United States, a similar result would not have been out of the question.¹³⁹ Germans were therefore not politically suspect, but politically malleable. Under the proper tutelage, these peoples could easily discover the positive aspects of democracy and adopt its norms as their own.

¹³⁷ Morgenthau among others felt that Germany would always remain centralized, militaristic, and most likely authoritarian. A handful of lecturers, specifically those with experience in the Rhineland, shared such views. Their opinions were in the minority in Charlottesville classrooms. For one example, see James E. Morrisette, reproduction of lecture, "The Administration of Military Law by American Forces During the Occupation of the Rhineland," delivered at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, June 1942), Accession 2001.036, Box 1, US Army Special Operations Command Archives, Fort Bragg, Fayetteville, North Carolina (hereafter referred to as Fort Bragg). Besides his criticisms of German militarism and need for stern, centralized government, Morrisette also claims "During my three years on the Rhine I never met an educated German who, although invariably professing gratitude for our idealistic treatment of his people, was not at the same time in his heart and soul swearing and planning vengeance." Morrisette, 11.

¹³⁸ Wolfers speaks of this fact in a number of his lectures, including Wolfers, reproduction of lecture "Germany's Position in Europe," given at School of Military Government, (Charlottesville, VA: 9 March 1943), RG/6-34, Box 1, Military Government UVA Wartime Folder, Small. One CA Guide actually blamed the attitude of MG authorities occupying the Rhineland at the time for the weakness of the political parties. War Department Pamphlet 31-116, "Civil Affairs Guide: Policy Toward Revival of Old Parties and Establishment of New Parties in Germany" (War Department, 22 July 1944), 3.

¹³⁹ Wolfers, Nazi Philosophy, 1.

To this end, MG sought to remove the Nazi apparatus that had placed a stranglehold on German freedoms. The goal of destroying Nazism was necessary to insure lasting victory “and to bring home to the German people the full defeat of Nazism, but also to clear the path for reconstruction of a democratic Germany, which is a prerequisite for future peace.”¹⁴⁰ While this process of political destruction would be the job of MG, the military recognized that it would be up to the German people to “work out their own salvation.”¹⁴¹ The use of this native German element was the only way to ensure that Allied efforts would completely eradicate Nazism. Since some party members were not ardent Nazis and many Nazi sympathizers were not directly associated with the party, American troops had to rely on those familiar with the political situation to identify true threats. Thus, CA guides and instructors pushed for a certain level of support for anti-fascist groups, going so far as to recommend leniency towards random acts of violence against individuals associated with the party.¹⁴² “Nazism,” as one guide offered, “can in the last analysis be eliminated only through an internal political movement in Germany.”¹⁴³ Taking lenient actions towards spontaneous opposition was just one tool for combating the pervasive threat of Nazism, but one which had the desired effect of encouraging native democratic (or at least anti-fascist) elements.

These forces for change would clearly find their most organized form in political parties, which MG training advised would be particularly useful. Detailed descriptions of the pre-war German political world gave students a broad knowledge of the parties

¹⁴⁰ War Department Pamphlet 31-105, “Civil Affairs Guide: Elimination of Fundamental Nazi Political Laws in Germany” (War Department, 1 July 1944), 1.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴² War Department Pamphlet 31-110, “Civil Affairs Guide: Dissolution of the Nazi Party and Its Affiliated Organizations” (War Department, 29 July 1944), 3 Pamphlet 31-116 offers similar advice, 13.

¹⁴³ WD Pamphlet 31-110, 3.

involved and also which parties might prove themselves useful in filling the holes left by the elimination of the Nazi party.¹⁴⁴ Encouraging the remnants of these organizations was important, as lessons from the past seemed to motivate MG personnel to avoid future mistakes. One CA guide made this point painfully clear:

It is well to recall that one of the reasons for the failure of an enduring peaceful reconstruction of German society after the First World War was the lack of recognition and support on the part of the occupation authorities of the new democratic forces and institutions which had arisen during the revolution.¹⁴⁵

Such a statement shows a clear attitude towards promoting democratic elements within society, as professors considered them the true guarantors of peace.

Of course, while promoting these democratic elements, certain contradictions arose that MG instructors were quick to point out. It surely seemed anti-democratic for many student-officers, familiar with the freedom to gather and speak in the United States, to limit certain parties while allowing others in order to promote democracy. Instructors and planners noted this worry but often dismissed it as a necessary security measure to prevent the return of Nazism – something even the most ardent democrats would accept as a necessary evil.¹⁴⁶ In lectures, for instance, instructors recommended restrictions for enemy populations, but reminded students “that no liberal government can exist where free expression of public opinion is not tolerated.”¹⁴⁷ Considering this fact and the

¹⁴⁴ Wolfers lectures. Pamphlet 31-116 also gives a brief description of the major German parties on pages 5-12.

¹⁴⁵ WD Pamphlet 31-116, 3.

¹⁴⁶ WD Pamphlet 31-116, 13. For a narrative of the academic debate on just this topic in the 1930s, which eventually decided that excessively dogmatic ideologies could not peacefully coexist within the framework of democracy and relativism, see Purcell.

¹⁴⁷ Gabriel, *Civil Population*, 7.

mission of the Army to introduce democracy, students should allow gatherings to voice opinion and “criticize freely” as long as it remained in the realm of “decent language.”¹⁴⁸

More vexing was the problem of communism. Lectures occasionally hinted at the unease with which many viewed Bolshevism, and one CA Guide portrayed it as dangerously revolutionary.¹⁴⁹ While neither of these issues ever approached the level of a major problem, the fact that they repeatedly arise shows a certain concern about a proper understanding of democracy, especially regarding its tenets as expressed in American republicanism. To some extent, this fact demonstrated that even the liberal-minded planners of the CAD still viewed their country as somewhat unique, especially in regards to its wide-ranging and deeply felt liberalism. They did not wish to imply that Germans would never be able to reach the level of freedom experienced in the United States, but that an American definition of freedom “will not be immediately applicable to Germany.”¹⁵⁰ An American-style government was therefore a long-term goal, one that would only succeed through hard work on behalf of the Germans and proper tutelage on the part of their occupiers.

So while, if implemented properly, this program meant a fairly liberal government for occupied Germany, the question still remained: What did this program mean for America? The clearest answer would be a new, more proactive foreign policy for the country, at least according to one of its most vital international agencies. This small section of the War Department – tasked with a much larger mission – had clearly set the

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 7. It is interesting that some MG officers would eventually allow such actions, as long as public criticism was directed at German authorities and not American ones. Ziemke, 179.

¹⁴⁹ Various Lectures at SMG, including Ralph Gabriel, reproduction of lecture, “Purpose, Form, and Authority in Military Government in American Experience” given at the School of Military Government (Charlottesville, VA: School of Military Government, 10 March 1943) RG/6-34, Box 2, Scrapbook, Small and WD Pamphlet 31-116, 8.

¹⁵⁰ WD Pamphlet 31-116, 13.

standard for the future of American foreign policy. This vision still retained many elements of the past, but incorporated them into a livelier and more proactive approach. Inspiring this school of thought was the tradition that democracy was the greatest guarantor of peace. Such thinking had long held sway, especially among those thinkers who believed in what would one day become the democratic peace theory. Many democrats and liberal internationalists still considered Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points the most prescient embodiment of this theory, which promoted native democratic movements throughout the world. The role of the great nations in this vision was not exporting the style of government, but safeguarding the rights of people to choose their proper form of representation, which Wilson and others assumed would arrive in the form of a republic.

This vision found renewed importance as the war again proved the need for such policy. With totalitarianism rampant in the decade, many in America and elsewhere began to question if the propagation of democratic governments was possible. Thus, democratic government acceded to the requests of Hitler, Mussolini, and scores of other dictators. Such actions proved foolhardy when Nazi tanks rolled into Poland and Japanese bombers arrived over Hawai'i. The fault lay not in Hitler or Prussian militarism or the Samurai code, at least not according to the experts within the CAD and increasingly the government. According to these men, the fault lay in totalitarianism, which could provide the arms and resources of a nation to the power of one party, and possibly to the whims of a single man. The Army therefore sought to create a new policy, which would reflect the fact that waging a campaign of peace was now as important as any military campaign. This peace would not arise from military might or even by

guaranteeing people a right to create their own governments. America could only guarantee this peace with the complete annihilation of the specific philosophy itself. As one CA Guide quoted Secretary of State Cordell Hull, “free governments and Nazi and Fascist governments cannot exist together in this world.”¹⁵¹

The military, and the United States itself, could not create a democratic government from scratch. It needed the cooperation of the people. So the military established its concepts of MG to foster this desire for democracy within the people. MG would not be vindictive or vengeful; instead it would attract the peoples of Europe through its generous, yet strict example. It would offer the nations of Europe a tutelage, teaching them to adopt democracy, not just for the benefit of the United States, but for their own benefit as well. The military in this instance was not the tool of destruction, but instead achieving the ends of “Good Samaritan internationalism.”¹⁵² In offering its services to Europe – removing its disgraced governments but offering a hand of friendship and revitalization – the Allied military was acting, as one reporter aptly phrased it, like an “alien Santa Claus in uniform, very severe but at the same time strictly fair and singularly generous.”¹⁵³

This attitude, the military assumed, would be the most profitable for American policy in the long run; a decision it reached while politicians in Washington still stalled and squabbled about what exactly to do. Indeed, as this philosophy developed on the front lines of America’s foreign policy during the period, it does not seem strange to

¹⁵¹ WD Pamphlet, 31-105, 1.

¹⁵² Min of Remarks of Haskell, Actg Dur, CAD 1 April 1943, at MTG Called in WD to Consider Its Attitude Toward the Interdepartmental Comm., OPD files, 230 Civ Employment, sec. 1 in Coles and Weinberg, 29. C.P. Stearns would describe it in an interesting metaphor to student officers, claiming MG had the chance to “bind up wounds of friend and foe alike... restoring to health this old world that has never been so sick. No generation has ever had such a challenge. No group of men has ever had such an opportunity.” Stearns, Present War, 5.

¹⁵³ Callender, AMGOT.

assume it may have informed the thoughts of the decision-makers in Washington. If nothing else, it provided a sorely needed plan of action to a military that could not wait for the bespectacled men of the capital to make up their minds. As troops moved into the heart of Europe, it was clear that the war would not wait for the government in Washington to catch up.

Chapter IV

“What a lecture in Military Government this would have made for Charlottesville” The Implementation of Military Government

While the school clearly had lofty aspirations regarding the foundations of democracy and the benignity of military doctrine, recent scholarship has attacked the effectiveness and implementation of this training. Experts have dismissed the officers of the SMG as incompetents, basing their assumption on the initial comments of President Roosevelt and ignoring his later acceptance of the school. Rebecca Boehling, for example, has made this claim, while simultaneously remarking that even if the officers had been worthwhile, the Army deployed few of them effectively, negating any value they might have developed.¹⁵⁴ Such criticism has grown to the extent that some scholars have even stated that military government actually did much to retard the growth of grassroots democracy in the German polity. While these claims have a germ of truth in them, most are simplifications or exaggerations based on a cursory reading of the evidence.

President Roosevelt eventually accepted the abilities of the trainees for military government, but he continued to work for civilian control of liberated areas. North Africa

¹⁵⁴ Boehling, 34-36.

was the first proving ground for these forces. As soon as the physical fighting ceased in the fall of 1942, a new battle developed over who would represent American forces in the complicated, multinational region that stretched from Morocco to Egypt. President Roosevelt sent Robert D. Murphy, former Counselor of the American Embassy at Vichy, to act as the “President’s personal representative,” advising General Dwight Eisenhower on all matters that were essentially civilian.¹⁵⁵ Despite the presence of the first graduates of Charlottesville in North Africa as military assistants, the President ordered civilian agencies to perform the majority of administrative tasks and relief efforts. Officials from the State Department and “highly qualified representatives of Department of Agriculture, War Shipping Administration, Lend-Lease, Treasury Department, and Board of Economic Warfare” arrived to serve under Murphy.¹⁵⁶ This arrangement between so many departments became extremely confusing. It was exacerbated when Murphy was raised from his position as Eisenhower’s advisor to one where he became “independently responsible to the State Department” regarding the reconstruction and revitalization of the region.¹⁵⁷ With a steady flow of civilian experts and bueracrats flooding into North Africa, many of the SMG graduates were pushed into subservient roles, effectively convincing the War Department that it was unnecessary to deploy officers trained for high level planning.¹⁵⁸ These facts have led many scholars to dismiss the graduates of SMG as mere wasted tax dollars, left to plan mock invasions in Washington or twiddle their thumbs as civilians – “the least satisfying of all situations imaginable.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Msg Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Sep 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 8213, in Coles and Weinberg, 32.

¹⁵⁶ Paraphrase of Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (I), in Coles and Weinberg, 38.

¹⁵⁷ Msg 609, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1492, Coles and Weinberg, 43.

¹⁵⁸ Memo, Col Charles W. Rooth, Asst Civ Admr, AFHQ, for Murphy, Chief CA Admr, AFHQ, 29 Nov 42, CAD files, Husky Plan, in Coles and Weinberg, 45.

¹⁵⁹ Gulkowski, 66.

Yet these authors rarely notice how these initial difficulties led to a reevaluation and reformation of the organization of military government on the ground. With so many institutions sending representatives and contributing to an already muddled chain of authority, conflicts were bound to develop. By early 1943, Eisenhower was growing weary of not only fighting battles with Germans but with civilian administrators in his rear. As one general officer remembered after the war with a slight air of exaggeration, Eisenhower was “disgust[ed] with these 17 civilian agencies roaming around these [liberated and conquered] areas in Africa, causing him more trouble than the Germans.”¹⁶⁰ Exacerbating this problem was confusion within Army ranks as to who exactly should control the functions of military government if the military could somehow wrest control from the civilian sphere. The current operation was largely a cluster of overlapping jurisdictions, the PMG retaining control of training, but having various other staff positions claim control of graduates within the theater.¹⁶¹ To solve this problem and work towards the resolution of the civilian issues that had arisen, the Army moved to create a single center for organization and liaison concerning the governing of occupied areas. Secretary Stimson accomplished this with the creation of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD, eventually designated as staff position G-5) on the first day of March, 1943.¹⁶² The division quickly expanded from a mere advisory and liaison role to

¹⁶⁰ Hilldring, Interview, 37.

¹⁶¹ Technically under the letter of the law, the PMG had no business even being involved with training, which was under the auspices of G-3 (operations and training) staff position. G-1 also made some claim to this position as it had control of personnel. Ziemke, 4-5.

¹⁶² Coles and Weinberg, 68. It is interesting to note that in choosing a general to head the new Division, General Marshall made sure to retain a civilian flavor. Conscious of the battle that the new director would fight as many battles within the army as without, he chose a professional soldier, but one who was from outside the regular outline of Professional soldiers. His choice, Major General John Hilldring, was commissioned out of ROTC at Columbia, had served in the WWI Rhineland occupation, and spent much of his interwar years running a number of Civilian Conservation Corps camps. Sandler, 174. It also seems that Hilldring fit into the larger plan for MG by not doing much, giving his subordinates a wide degree of

take expansive control of civil affairs planning and deployment, leaving only the small MGD of the PMG (which included the SMG and CATS programs) outside of its direct control.¹⁶³

While the Army remained reluctant to challenge the direct authority of the President, the consolidation of military leadership and continuing problems with civilian agencies led to an increased role for the military that would remain until well after hostilities ended. Armed with this new division and a growing corps of trained military governors, officials within the War Department began to agitate for increased control over occupational duties. Chief among these was Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, who by June of 1943 confidently asserted that any State Department officials would be subservient to the authority of the military commander, even requiring all communications with Washington to flow through the War Department.¹⁶⁴ Army complaints and the continued confusion among civilian agencies soon convinced the President to finally abandon his long-held aversion to military rule over civilians, admitting to Secretary of State Hull, “The thought that the occupation [of France, and most likely Germany] when it occurs should be wholly military is one to which I am increasingly inclined.”¹⁶⁵ With this, the President became relatively supportive of

latitude in their actions in the field, possibly because of the influence of his top advisor, SMG trained John Boettiger. Gulkowski, 84.

¹⁶³ While these two planning bodies never actually merged, they shared ideas and regularly traded upper-level personnel. Various documents in Cole and Weinberg, 69-73. Officers within the CAD often referred to the SMG and CATS schools as though they were part of the division. I apologize for the flood of acronyms in that sentence.

¹⁶⁴ Memo, John McCloy to Director of the Budget, 15 January 1943, copy Seen in Marshall Foundation National Archives Project, Item 406, Marshall Library. Also Coles and Weinberg, 109. McCloy is described as having a “showdown” with the other executive departments in a contemporary Army report.

¹⁶⁵ Memo, Hilldring to Secretary of War, 26 November 1943, copy Seen in Marshall Foundation National Archives Project, Item 115A, Marshall Library. It should be noted that Hull had come to this conclusion independently, when State attempts at creating a similar organization had failed.

military government as envisioned by the Army, where the commanding general had authority over both his troops and the civilians they conquered.

This change in heart legitimized the system the CAD had already installed. Starting with the invasion of Italy in the March of 1943, allied armies included MG detachments designed to occupy towns as advancing forces left them in their wake. It was not uncommon to see MG soldiers “sitting on the edge of a town while it was being cleared and going in before the last of the Italians and Germans had left the opposite end.”¹⁶⁶ These small groups comprised only a few men, often only one or two officers with a few enlisted men to assist them in administrative and police duties.¹⁶⁷ Nonetheless they governed over vast regions of Italian countryside and hundreds or thousands of civilians, many lacking the basic amenities of life. Graduates of the SMG, and later the first classes of the CATS, commanded many of these detachments. Navy officer Malcolm MacLean, a graduate of the third class from Charlottesville (April 1943), attested to this fact when he arrived in Italy to compile a report on military government in action. Looking over lists of officers attached to the assault phase, he found “that many of those sent over were former schoolmates at Charlottesville. I ran across a few of them again on my later inspection in Sicily.”¹⁶⁸ Even John Hersey, who wrote the Pulitzer Prize winning novel *A Bell for Adano* about his experiences with military government soldiers, styled his protagonist a graduate of a military government training school (he does not specify

¹⁶⁶ MacLean, memoir, 78.

¹⁶⁷ Citations in MacLean, memoir and Frank McSherry Papers, Sicily and Italy Boxes, MHI.

¹⁶⁸ MacLean, memoir, 34.

which one).¹⁶⁹ By this point in the war, trained civil affairs officers were regularly shipping out to take over detachments in theaters of war.

This model would continue with the invasion of France and Germany. The CAD assigned graduates of the various civil affairs training programs to the European theater in huge numbers, almost 3,700 CATS students alone arriving in the European Theater of Operations (which consisted of military units participating in the invasion of France, the Benelux countries, and Germany).¹⁷⁰ They seem to have made up an overwhelming proportion of the initial 2,500 CA/MG officers selected to handle initial operations in the field.¹⁷¹ These officers divided into small teams of at most 15-25 officers and men, either under the direct authority of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) G-5 or attached to individual army groups.¹⁷² Many of these CA detachments landed just days after D-Day, one arriving on Utah Beach while it was still under “considerable artillery fire and strafing from German planes.”¹⁷³ A handful of CA officers, which included future senator and presidential candidate Strom Thurmond, actually landed with an 82nd airborne glider force the night before D-Day.¹⁷⁴ These CA

¹⁶⁹ John Hersey, *A Bell for Adano*, (United States of America: Random House, 1946; Vintage Books, 1988), 14. The story was a fictionalized version of Major Frank Toscani’s time spent in the small Sicilian port town of Licata. He appears to have been a CATS graduate. Stanley Sadler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: U.S. Special Operations Command), 181.

¹⁷⁰ Report of the General Board United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), “Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations,” Study Number 32, G-5 Section, 15, Accession 2001.036, Box 2, Folder 2, Fort Bragg.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 22, and Kalman Oravetz, phone interview with R Joseph Parrott, 26 March 2008, Charlottesville, Virginia. This is meant as opposed to those officers selected to handle planning, training, and higher administration.

¹⁷² The actual structure of command is somewhat confusing, but the CAD nominally fell under the G-5 section. This was a new staff section that the Army created to handle CA matters in major headquarters, but could also be created in the command structure of individual armies if this was deemed profitable.

¹⁷³ Quoted from John J. Maginnis, *Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin*, ed. Robert A. Hart (United States of America: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971), 6 with information from Maginnis, 2 and Sandler, 187.

¹⁷⁴ Eberhard P. Deutsch, letter extract, no date, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 813, NARA and Sandler, 190. Major Deutsch, an SMG graduate, recounted some of the excitement, and disappointment, of the mission:

detachments would continue to occupy French towns as the war moved towards the German border, staying long enough to ensure a stable situation then moving to the next area. The CAD in Europe would eventually redeploy many of these teams as part of the “carpet plan” for the invasion of Germany. This plan detailed detachments to occupy specific towns and governmental centers: “in theory the MG fabric would be unrolled, as the territory was occupied, like a carpet.”¹⁷⁵ Thus, many of the CA teams transferred from their roles as liaisons in French territory to their new roles as governors in Germany.

It is important to note that not only did these men deploy in Europe, but they seem to have brought with them many of the lessons that they learned in Charlottesville and at the various CATS. While it is difficult to determine exactly what an individual actually retained from the lectures, group work, and study conducted under the auspices of the Army, it seems that many officers looked back on their time with some conscious appreciation of the information they learned. Many men regularly admit this in postwar memoirs and publications, where they often recognize the important practice of “gain[ing] insight into [ethnic groups’] national customs, political, social, and religious activities,” one going so far as to cite this process as a “continual challenge and joy.”¹⁷⁶ Occasionally, graduates of these programs would make more overt mention of the values of the class, as did Lt. Col. Bion Welker in remembering his adventures after German forces captured him.¹⁷⁷ More important, however, are the lessons learned at the school that were not obvious but nonetheless affected the attitudes and actions of these men as

“I came in airborne on D-Day, and for some 48 hours had a lifetime of exciting experiences. No civil affairs officer ever experienced anything like that before, I’m quite certain. Imagine a planned civil affairs operation behind enemy lines! But all I have to show for it now is a couple of broken ribs and a Purple Heart. What a lecture in Military Government this would have made for Charlottesville in its heyday!”

¹⁷⁵ USFET, 91.

¹⁷⁶ Maginnis, *Journal*, 1 and Payne Templeton, unpublished memoir, 6, Payne Templeton Papers, MHI.

¹⁷⁷ Welker, Personal narrative, 1, recounted above.

they became diplomats in uniform to former foes and allies alike. As one man admitted after he arrived in Germany, “The study of Geography, Customs, etc. is very good, though one unconsciously learns.”¹⁷⁸ It is these unconscious lessons that helped shape the actions of men in the field, reflected on by few but present to a wider extent in the benevolent policies implemented during the German occupation.

The attitudes of the School of Military Government and the Civil Affairs Training Programs seem to have made a major impact on the students. These civilians in military uniforms regularly took a noticeably benign approach to the postwar situation and to the defeated populace, especially when compared with the average American of the period. They, for the most part, approached German men and women not as militaristic enemies to be restrained by force, but as a people who had been led astray. Some of these men were paternal, some downright overbearing, but most arrived with the intention of helping the German people find peace through reconstruction, not as conquerors focused on preventing a future war through force.¹⁷⁹ More often than not, their actions demonstrate an understanding and application of many of the more liberal policies taught them, often going beyond military expectations and occasionally beyond the limitations of military orders.

One such example is the handling of education by the MG authorities. Beyond the limited directives espoused by the CAD and issued in various information manuals, there was no policy from on high to guide the actions of officials. Nonetheless, these officers

¹⁷⁸ Letter, EN Humphrey to Colonel LeCrew, 7 December 1944, 2, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 813, NARA.

¹⁷⁹ Attitudes towards Italy were similar, though it should be noted that many people, both within the military and the civilian administrations of the United States, viewed the Italians and Germans in a different light, even before the Italians became nominal allies with the overthrow of Mussolini in 1943. This being said, Italians, especially in the early stages of MG, were still seen very much as the enemy, though they never gained the reputation of atrocity eventually associated with the Germans.

moved quickly to handle what could have been a politically volatile situation. In Bremen, for example, where Bion Welker commanded the E2C2 CA detachment, the reopening of schools in a democratic and wholly German image was a major goal of the MG administration. By the end of 1945, American authorities proudly proclaimed that “out of the mental and physical ruins there is slowly emerging a democratic system of education which was well known in the Free Hanseatic Town of Bremen before 1933.”¹⁸⁰ MG officers across the country accomplished this with swift and principled actions, opening kindergartens before the end of hostilities and elementary schools within months of German surrender.¹⁸¹ In fact, soldiers in the field first proposed the resumption of elementary schooling, which then gained the authorization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington after passing through the appropriate channels during the month of May 1945.¹⁸²

In order to make these schools as much of a reflection of democratic life as possible, American officers had to avoid taking direct control over schooling, as this could color the schools in the eyes of the local populace. More often than not, these men placed nominal control of these schools in the hands of Germans.¹⁸³ This occurred despite the difficulty in finding teachers under harsh SHAEF policies concerning former Nazi party members. Some detachments avoided the issue by conducting their own background checks and approving teachers, many of whom would have otherwise been

¹⁸⁰ “Functional History of Military Government in the Bremen Enclave, Part I, Narrative, October November, and December 1 to 10, 1945,” 43, Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 5, Folder October, November, December 1 to 10, 1945, MHI.

¹⁸¹ The Provost Marshal General’s School, *Training Packet No. 57: U.S. Military Government in Germany: Operations from late March to Mid-July, 1945*, 46, Accession 2002.036, Folder 68, Fort Bragg and Photo, 8 September 1945, Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 5, Folder Appendices 20-31 April 26 to September 30, 1945, MHI and Functional History, Narrative, Part I, October, 45.

¹⁸² Training Packet No. 57, 49 and 111.

¹⁸³ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, October, 45.

ineligible due to past affiliations.¹⁸⁴ While such actions were consistent with MG training, this decision went against the convoluted policies of the upper echelon. Such shortsighted policies resulted in the arrest and jailing of many men and women for membership in the Nazi party despite their having received permission to teach from lower level American officials. MG teams occasionally had to lobby their own commanders to release individuals they considered necessary for the resumption of German education. In Bremen, it took almost a week for the regional detachment to properly resolve just such an issue.¹⁸⁵

This situation highlight the awkward position of many MG officers across Germany: trying to promote democracy while simultaneously eliminating a political party. They did not, however, want to create a new American colony in the center of Europe. To achieve these goals, American MG often adopted a policy of empowering Germans and native practices whenever possible, while retaining a kind of veto power over anything that smacked of National Socialism. SHAEF G-5's handling of the introduction of elementary school textbooks into recently occupied territories is one illustrative example. Unable to create a proper committee of German instructors, they instead avoided both the "taint of Nazi teachings" and the creation of American propaganda by searching for a set of German books used before Hitler came to power. Some entrepreneurial officer eventually found a few remaining books in the Columbia University library, allowing SHAEF to reproduce them "in Germany employing German labor, machinery, and materials."¹⁸⁶ Such a devotion to creating inherently German

¹⁸⁴ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, October, 43-44.

¹⁸⁵ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, October, 49.

¹⁸⁶ Training Packet No. 57, 112.

materials was wasteful in view of simple military necessity, but went a long way in accomplishing the MG goal of recreating an independent and democratic Germany.

Actions were no different on the ground, where MG officers with few resources still relied heavily on German material and personnel in recreating a proper system of education. In a situation drawn almost directly from classes at Charlottesville, Bremen MG officers created a wholly German committee to revise the teachings and texts that had infiltrated the schools under Hitler's rule. There was no American input for this new curriculum, but there was a necessary approval upon its completion.¹⁸⁷ In smaller regions, MG officers rarely had the luxury of being able to completely rewrite curricula, lacking the time, resources, and personnel. Despite this, education was a necessity which they could not sacrifice for the sake of political correctness. One graduate of CATSUP, Captain Earl Crum, resolved this problem by simply removing the propaganda of the Third Reich - what he termed "very excellent Nazi hints... on the Master Race" - from otherwise highly valuable textbooks. Exercising his executive privilege, "the offending pages were ripped out and the books put to use."¹⁸⁸ Such examples show that American forces were not in Germany to force any specific ideals on the people, but merely to prevent the return of a fascist ideology which they believed had perverted the nation.

While this may seem undemocratic, the situation on the ground made this a truly enlightened decision. It would have been easy for American authorities to offer pre-engineered propaganda to create a new generation in the image of its conquerors. Yet such action did not take place, not in Bremen and not elsewhere. As one educator would report a few years later, it was a widespread policy of the MG that new curricula and

¹⁸⁷ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, October, 47-48.

¹⁸⁸ Earle Crum, "Heidelberg University Reopens," draft, Smith-Crum Papers, Box 7, Marshall Library, 5.

democratic ideas of education must be “implemented by the Germans themselves, and that the ideas must be accepted by them willingly rather than under compulsion.”¹⁸⁹ Such pronouncements were not uncommon, and not untrue. One can see this in a quotation from a German educator proudly cited in a report by the Bremen MG, which clearly matched the values of the document’s authors if not the entire detachment:

We finally believe they all [the next generation of teachers] will discover a new path into the future securing the best education of every school comprised by an honest democracy. The stronger the belief is that the Allied Nations and the other countries of the world will rely upon the constructing power of a new Germany the more it will be possible for Germany to find this new way.¹⁹⁰

The role of MG extended beyond the campus of local schools, expanding to encompass youth groups as well. Faced with a situation where a lack of facilities and available resources limited German extracurricular activities, MG had to step in and fill the void. Organized sports, games, and trade programs became popular activities as American soldiers were encouraged to make a direct connection with the German youth. For occupation troops who otherwise did little but physically occupy, the Army considered it “one of their prime duties and responsibilities to assist in this [youth activities] program.”¹⁹¹ This became a combination of simply distracting otherwise delinquent students (and American troops for that matter) and creating a real connection between occupiers and occupied.¹⁹² This developed even as non-fraternization orders were still in effect, undermining the command but strengthening the connection with the

¹⁸⁹ Fremont P. Wirth, Guy Wells, and Norman Frost, “Report from Germany,” *Peabody Journal of Education*, Vol. 26 No. 1 (July, 1948), pp10-18, 11.

¹⁹⁰ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, October, 47.

¹⁹¹ “Functional History of Military Government in the Bremen Enclave, Part I, Narrative, February 1 to March 31, 1946,” 39, Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 3, Folder February 1 to March 31, 1946, MHI. 39.

¹⁹² Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 279.

German populace.¹⁹³ Major John Maginnis, a CATS graduate, was one such example, taking time out from his work in Berlin to distribute candies to children on holidays.¹⁹⁴ Lieutenant General Lucius Clay, deputy military governor in Germany, eventually warmed to such programs and added that he hoped sports and recreational activities could “keep alive in German children a sense of play.”¹⁹⁵

Taking a page out of *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*, these men hoped to reform German society through a new and pure engagement with its youth. Traditionally, youth organizations were the domain of trade unions and governing parties, a highly political atmosphere that American authorities felt could too easily lead back towards fascism. By recruiting American soldiers, MG units felt that they were offering the local youth as neutral and fair-minded a mentor as could be found. It offered young Germans a supervisor, not a leader. The children controlled the activities, with only resources and maybe a helping hand offered by the soldier.¹⁹⁶ This was pure democracy in action:

Under the guidance and supervision of interested Army personnel, the German youth would unconsciously learn to live, play and work democratically... They will only learn what democracy is by actual demonstration, not by having someone tell them what it is... Children will always act the way they see adults acting whom they associate with, and if they associate with American soldiers, they learn their ways of living, playing and working together and thereby actually learn what democracy is.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, February, 47. In Bremen, for example, youth activities began “only one month after capitulation.” This was actually cited by Clay as an inspiration for other cities, again showing the policy-making ability of troops on the ground. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950), 64.

¹⁹⁴ Maginnis, Journal, 324.

¹⁹⁵ Cited in Merritt, 279.

¹⁹⁶ Functional History, Narrative, Part I, February, 42.

¹⁹⁷ Functional History Narrative, Part I, February, 43. Interestingly, it was stressed that American games could be played, but only if there was interest. Any required game could undermine the aim of democratic learning. Functional History, 44.

Democracy was a goal for the future, inculcated in the youth who would one day take the reigns of an independent Germany.

While these actions demonstrate an American commitment to growing democracy in Germany, it also illustrates a more worrying trait of American occupiers that was not taught in Charlottesville. These soldiers suspected all forms of political ideology during this period, not just those on the right. Many authors have pointed out the flaws associated with military attitudes toward civil liberties and especially their actions in retarding political development.¹⁹⁸ While these authors make valid points, it is clear from the previous study of training materials that such policies in the theater actually went against initial CAD recommendations. Officers in conquered territories had to tread the fine line of keeping an often precarious peace while simultaneously fostering political parties that could and to some extent should have challenged foreign rule.¹⁹⁹ This mistrust manifested itself as MG authorities removed fascist government, relying on the help of anti-fascist forces that they never fully trusted. Therefore, MG units considered restrictions on speech and action necessary for keeping military control over the population, despite the fact that many parties insisted on their democratic credentials.²⁰⁰ While such actions aimed at preventing local uprisings, many soldiers were aware of the

¹⁹⁸ Boehling, Gulkowski, and others.

¹⁹⁹ This was especially true in Germany, where the fear of Nazi guerillas, or “Werewolves,” was great. Some soldiers assumed that any gathering could quickly turn into a new militaristic uprising (right or left). A book published in 1946 gives a good idea about the lingering fears: “In the suburbs of Aachen you watch a youngster, perhaps aged six, goose-stepping back and forth by the road every time an Allied truck passes. He thinks he is being cute... You think so too... Until you remember that unless he is taught to stop goose-stepping, your son may be doing close-order drill.” Julian Bach Jr., *America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation* (New York: Random House, 1946), 25.

²⁰⁰ This problem bothered Robert Hill in Italy, who had to balance promotion of democracy with orders. Even more challenging, preventing the censorship that did happen from leading to “riots or public disturbances.” What efforts were made regularly failed. Hill, 38.

hypocrisy of their own policies and offered concessions in occasional cases.²⁰¹ Yet these few reservations rarely overcame the tendency for paranoia, and rights concerning speech, association, and travel were often restricted in the initial phases. This was especially true where large groups were concerned, MG more willing to offer political positions and civil liberties to individuals who were not affiliated with any specific movement than to those that were.²⁰² This, combined with the tendency for MG to hold veto powers as described above, did a great deal to hamper the growth of the organized democratic elements in society.

Nonetheless, the actions were largely ones of military necessity in the aftermath of war, temporary restrictions that slowly gave way to more democratic processes. As governors grew more trusting of the local populace, they began to grant civil liberties to their German charges, increasing over time as a bond of trust formed between the peoples. Bion Welker, for example, encouraged freedom of the press in Bremen by September of 1945.²⁰³ As a newspaperman in civilian life, he felt free speech was the first and most vital step towards a new Germany:

Freedom of expression is the first symbol of a democracy, and a free newspaper is one of the greatest aids in assisting the German people to rebuild their lives on a democratic basis... It lies in the power of the German people to ultimately build a healthy democratic life in Germany and to rejoin the family of nations.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ There is an interesting story related by Earl Ziemke, where a military court fined a civilian for criticizing his local administrator. A review board reversed the decision "on the ground that civilians should be encouraged to comment on public officials." This did not necessarily apply to US soldiers. Ziemke, 179.

²⁰² Training Packet No. 57, 89. One of the few organizations that MG trusted was the church, and there are records of priests remaining as regional leaders even after elections began.

²⁰³ While this was to some extent under the regional MG, this paper most likely had to obtain a license through the Information Control Division, which regulated newspapers to ensure a lack of Nazi content, a certain level of democratic orientation, and prevent one-party control. Merritt, 295-296.

²⁰⁴ Pronouncement, Headquarters, Military Government Detachment E2C2, 18 September 1945, Bion Welker Papers, Box 3, Folder Correspondence and Official Papers, MHI.

Yet despite Welker's liberal devotion to German freedom of expression, he kept wiretaps on German civilian phone lines well into 1946.²⁰⁵ While newspapers in many areas followed a similar path and began publication under the auspices of approved democratic elements, movie theaters and radio stations remained under the control of American authorities, working hard to give Germans an "aggressively neutral" if not wholly sycophantic image of their American occupiers.²⁰⁶ Such a tendency for piecemeal liberalization regarding civil liberties was common in various regions of the U.S. zone, but was viewed as a necessity for maintaining order.²⁰⁷

This tension between continued military security and democratization manifested itself most clearly in the restoration and creation of political parties. The somewhat ambivalent relationship with local parties began in the first stages of occupation, when American forces outlawed all political organizations for reasons of expediency.²⁰⁸ This went against many of the lessons of the SMG and CATS, but was an established policy within the CAD for the sake of simplicity. While MG officers regularly consulted leading individuals, distrusting authorities viewed parties as contentious and prone to authoritarianism – especially as they existed in Germany. Within a few months of V-E Day, MG detachments allowed parties to form, but only after gaining approval from regional commanders.²⁰⁹ This limited the actual freedom of the German people to

²⁰⁵ Various reports in Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 3, Folder: Intelligence Reports, MHI.

²⁰⁶ Frank Howley, *Berlin Command* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1950), 133. In describing American controlled media, which he called a "free voice" in Berlin, Howley terms his attempts at fighting communist propaganda "aggressive neutrality." This meant that American controlled newspapers and radio stations "saw to it that Western, and particularly American, ideas were expressed and expressed forcefully." Earl Ziemke notes that on MG detachment felt it might be useful for completely free radio, allowing occupied peoples to hear propaganda and compare it to their own reality. Ziemke, 191.

²⁰⁷ Merritt, 297-300.

²⁰⁸ Training Packet No. 57, 89.

²⁰⁹ Bach, 234-235. The first parties were approved in August of 1945, though many civilians still questioned the apparent usefulness of voting.

coalesce but was often more than many American officers felt their charges immediately deserved.

While authorities hoped to usher in a more democratic kind of governance, they still suspected their former foes of being “moved by dark plans,” as one German would later describe it.²¹⁰ Even educated and trained CAOs, men who respected Germany’s culture and people, had to overcome this suspicion before they felt comfortable granting a full package of civil rights to their charges. Such an attitude seems excessively paternalistic, but Americans were wary of repeating the swift transition to democracy that caused the problems of the Weimar republic. Having learned that an economically depressed Germany had willfully given up their rights for prosperity once before, the officers of the CAD recognized that postwar conditions were not necessarily conducive to democratic ideals. One reporter recorded the attitude in late 1945:

Once upon a time the Germans were free to write what they wished, film what they wished, broadcast what they wished. Of their own accord, they threw these precious freedoms away and then tried to take them away from everybody else. Military Government does not plan to hand back these freedoms unconditionally unless the Germans first prove that history is not likely to repeat itself.²¹¹

This reflected not only a certain suspicion of German intentions, but also lessons learned in stateside classrooms. While many MG officers clearly wanted to instill some form of democratic process in Germany, most still questioned whether the German people were culturally ready to accept such an open and pliable form of government. They felt, much like Arnold Wolfers and Ralph Gabriel had pointed out to many classes in the states, that their charges might require a long period of acclimatization to the demands and norms of democratic government. This is apparent in the initial steps of

²¹⁰ Letter, Fritz Ernst to Faculty and friends of Heidelberg University. 6 September 1961, 3, Smith-Crum Papers, Box 5, Folder 5, Marshall Library.

²¹¹ Bach, 214.

many MG officers, who usually encouraged elections only within trade unions, local political parties, and similar organizations that did not hold any real political power.²¹² MG only considered such basic procedures when, as one commander put it, the Germans “had shown their ability to function efficiently and according to our concept of the principles of democracy.”²¹³ This was the norm among MG detachments, so it came as a shock to many officers when General Clay announced low-level governmental elections would be held early in 1946, with higher level elections proceeding throughout the year.²¹⁴ Many officers still doubted whether the German people had demonstrated the proper willingness or even ability to accept democratic principles. General Clay’s move did not go against the beliefs of his men on the ground but did dramatically expedite the plan which many of these mid-level officers had assumed would take years to come to fruition.

While the swift decision to hold elections may have surprised American officers, they nonetheless attempted to show the Germans a proper example of democracy in action. Though they retained a predilection for micromanaging and paternalism even after enfranchising the Germans, many regional MG officers allowed specific disfavored parties to contest local elections despite widespread misgivings. Chief among these was the German communist party, which many U.S. officials suspected even before tensions

²¹² While this was a widespread practice, Berlin is an especially interesting case because of the communist presence. John J. Maginnis, unpublished log, 18 December 1945, Box 1, Book 2 Military Government Reports on Berlin, Maginnis Papers, MHI and Howley, 106. Speaking about a referendum held in Berlin concerning the merger of the independent socialist party with the Moscow dominated communist party, Howley described his view of the importance of such small-scale elections: “But I considered it a healthy sigh that a group of individuals, who disagreed with their leadership, should insist on expressing themselves against these leaders and what they considered a wrong policy, doing so on an open and democratic basis. Had the Germans show such independence towards the Nazis, there would have been no World War II.”

²¹³ Howley, 103. It is interesting to note how Col. Howley clearly denotes a conformity with “our” style of democracy.

²¹⁴ Clay, Decision, 88. Even Dr. James K. Pollock, a political science instructor from Michigan and a former instructor at the SMG, felt that the elections might be premature.

with the Soviets flared in mid-1946. MG officials were quite aware of the dangers such actions posed, but nonetheless allowed the communist party to contest elections.²¹⁵

While some officers may have resisted the swift shift to electoral politics, once headquarters made the decision, they had to present a proper example of American style democracy. Allowing a few suspect parties into the political process was only a small step towards a truly representative government, but such actions demonstrated a confidence in the new system and the core elements of a pluralistic spirit. This toleration of seemingly undemocratic parties did not apply to fascist groups, however, which Americans still believed were likely to promote violent disorder within society, if not an outright return to Nazi government. This slow and haphazard movement towards full political democracy was therefore actually no accident, but purposefully implemented by American soldiers who continued to question the readiness of German society for self-rule. While policy from headquarters sped the process, the piecemeal attempts at implementation were largely a result of officers who only slowly abandoned their suspicions that MG training had bred in them since their war began.

While occupation politics became pivotal in the growing international discourse, MG's tendency to independently implement policy is also apparent in its handling of one of the more domestically contentious issues – rebuilding the industrial infrastructure. The American government viewed German industry as a major threat to future peace, as it was the primary means of the country's war-making abilities. Some within government sought to limit – or in some circles destroy – the German economy, not only to retard the war making capabilities of Germany, but also to strike the psychological blow at German

²¹⁵ Ziemke, 365 and Howley, 133. The communist party in Berlin was allowed to contest elections, even though former Nazis were allowed into its ranks.

pride that would finally convince them of their own defeat. Representing the most dramatic of this scattered coalition was Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, who had early on become suspicious of the SMG. His plan, which gained some modicum of acceptance at the Quebec conference in September of 1945, called for the reduction of Germany to an essentially “pastoral” economy. While this vengeful scheme was quickly sidelined, the furor around the issue and President Roosevelt’s own personal leanings resulted in the creation of the first high-level Army policy on the issue of postwar Germany, JCS 1067, which incorporated many of Morgenthau’s proposals in only slightly watered down form. While this document would go through a number of variations, it technically continued to promote the ideas of a harsh peace and a slow revitalization of Germany well into 1947. Such actions clearly went against the ideas espoused by the CAD, but have continually been cited as proof that the Army was either indifferent to policy or agreeable to the Treasury’s harsh tactics. As John Lewis Gaddis claims, the War Department’s passage of this document was “a means of avoiding the involvement with civil affairs which the military government planners had long dreaded.”²¹⁶

This “dread” that supposedly gripped the military was not as all-encompassing as previous scholars have assumed. The vindictiveness of the Morgenthau Plan in many ways evolved from anger at the “softness” of proposed Army policy, first established by the SHAEF approved *Basic Handbook for Military Government of Germany*.²¹⁷ This, along with the numerous Civil Affairs Guides, appeared in the summer of 1944 and advocated a relatively progressive administration of Germany through the

²¹⁶ Gaddis, 123. For a more detailed discussion of the Morgenthau plan and JCS 1067, see Gaddis 117-125 and Ziemke, 98-106.

²¹⁷ Gaddis, 116-117.

implementation of social, political, and economic recovery measures. Produced by the SHAEF country unit, which included numerous SMG and CATS graduates, these policies complemented the larger direction of MG training offered since 1942.²¹⁸ This plan called for a relatively rapid rejuvenation of German industry, so the country could once again stand on its own. While President Roosevelt criticized the handbook and called for its removal, it nonetheless became unofficial policy in the American occupied zone, arriving among CA detachments as the new “bible” for dealing with Germany.²¹⁹ Such facts make the passage of JCS 1067 all the more confusing, but Hilldring and others believed Undersecretary McCloy allowed it to pass merely to have some document to point to as official Washington policy.²²⁰ Considering the secret nature of JCS 1067, its unpopularity in official circles, and the prevalence of more public CAD material, it seems logical that actions on the ground would more closely resemble the benevolent nature espoused by the new “bible” than the more contentious Washington document.

Given these circumstances, MG units arriving in Germany were not necessarily timid about restarting industry. In October of 1944, in a time when the Morgenthau plan still called for mines to be flooded, the CAOs in the recently conquered town of Baesweiler were already restarting mining operations outside the city – under local

²¹⁸ Studying the list of officers apparently assigned to this unit, many have the rank most closely associated with SMG/CATS graduates. Gaddis also mentions their civilian background, which would have meant in almost all cases (especially during this period of early 1944) that they would have gone through training. Furthermore, a similar duty roster about the same time shows the heavy use of SMG/CATS graduates in “key staff assignments.” Gaddis 116 and Memo, Hilldring to PMG, 7 January 1944 and attachment, Frank McSherry Papers, Box 39 Personnel, MHI and SHAEF Special Order 1, 25 February 1944, Frank McSherry Papers, Box 39 Personnel, MHI. The ideas of Arnold Wolfers were clearly on the minds of planners when they tried to get him to join the country unit. Letter, Edgar Lewis and Oravetz Interview.

²¹⁹ Sandler, 202. The major result of Washington’s criticism was a small insert attached to the front of each copy, posting a few major points as proposed by the President. Ziemke, 88.

²²⁰ Hilldring, interview, 40 and 49-51. Supposedly, McCloy, who would later be considered a great friend of Germany, wrote JCS 1067 “at the end of his patience,” simply to get something to Eisenhower before he entered Germany. While admitting that the document was therefore a War Department product, Hilldring adds “but it wasn’t because anyone in the War Department, including Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall, thought that this was the way to do it. Hilldring, 40.

administration.²²¹ While such action was meant to help fuel the war effort, American authorities did turn some of the coal and other materials over to German citizens. Similar actions seem to have been widespread enough that by the beginning of 1946, coal production exceeded German need and the product supplemented Allied stores.²²² Industries not under operation often owed this as much to excessive damage as anything else, though MG detachments often shut down all factories when they first entered a town. In early 1945, MG units were already assessing the value and possibilities of restarting certain industries.²²³ Light industries, especially those producing foodstuffs, agricultural goods, and items that could be used by the advancing Allies (tires, coal, and bandages), were allowed to resume production during the combat period.²²⁴ This of course did not apply to specific heavy industries, which were quickly adaptable to producing war materiel. No matter how important such industries may have been to the economy, MG quickly and efficiently shut all of these down.²²⁵

Nonetheless, as the war came to an end, MG slowly revitalized specific areas of production that held importance to the people of Germany. This began mainly to meet the essential needs of the local population during the initial months of occupation, but led to productions of items as diverse as “shoes, clothing, soap, trucks, tires and tubes, batteries, and other accessories for motor transport, building materials, medical supplies, essential household goods and paper.”²²⁶ While this was just a tiny sampling of prewar

²²¹ Paul R. Sweet, Report, “Baesweiler, A German Mining Town under M.G.,” 20 February 1945, Frank McSherry Papers, Box 50 Germany 1944-45, MHI.

²²² Maginnis, 333 and Bach, 123.

²²³ Training Packet No. 57, 103 and an example, Report, “The Small Business of Alsdorf,” 21 February 1945, Frank McSherry Papers, Box 50 Germany 1944-45, MHI.

²²⁴ Training Packet No. 57, 36.

²²⁵ Training Packet No. 57, 104.

²²⁶ Training Packet No. 57, 103 and the specific example of Daimler-Benz making light trucks in Bach, 117-119.

manufacturing, it was nonetheless a start when policy still called for a harsh handling of the German economy. This expanded as the months wore on, with armies increasingly relying on German produced items and American authorities even making plans for exports of goods.²²⁷ This was especially noteworthy as this period was a time of great unrest, when many industries could still be victim to Allied demands. The commitment of some American officials to restarting native German industry often conflicted with the policies of neighboring powers, especially as the French and Russians often refused to return “liberated” machinery and continued to demand reparations well after US authorities had curbed that practice.²²⁸

Yet these examples do not portray a completely homogenous situation across Germany. Numerous policies and events complicated not only orders but also attitudes within CA detachments that were important for the creation and implementation of rehabilitative processes on the ground. While a majority of CAOs eventually adopted a benevolent if not outright helpful attitude towards their German charges, there were still a large number who harbored negative views and reflected them in actions. This attitude seems to have developed not as much from bitterness about actual fighting, which many CA soldiers only experienced tangentially, but animosity developed due to German responsibility for prolonging the war and the growing list of atrocities attributable to the Third Reich. Official policies and outlooks often complicated this fact, with directives varying from downright vengeful to vaguely conscientious, depending on the individual section and time period.

²²⁷ Training Packet No. 57, 104.

²²⁸ Maginnis, 300-301. Ziemke cites similar examples.

Some of these conflicting attitudes were due to developments within the war itself. In the Aachen region, which came under U.S. control in the initial phases of the advance into Germany, American MG was downright friendly and enthusiastic in its efforts to reconstruct German society. The bond that developed between the American officers and their German intermediaries actually resulted in a directive from the 12th Army Group allowing MG detachments to evacuate any local officials in case of a German counteroffensive.²²⁹ When this offensive did come during the Battle of the Bulge, the ramifications were somewhat different than expected. Only a few MG detachments had to evacuate (one being captured in the process and another fighting its way through German lines with retreating troops), but the prolonging of a war that had seemed almost finished hardened the resolve of many in the military, even within the CAD.²³⁰ Citizens at home and soldiers in the field had made assumptions that the war might be over by Christmas, but a winter of foxholes and fighting convinced people on both sides of the Atlantic that the stubbornly militaristic German war machine could only be reformed with the proverbial stick.

This outlook gained widespread popularity in part due to the increasingly vivid encounters with the worst of Nazi atrocities. Many who had previously viewed the Germans with magnanimity and pity now saw them as evil and inhuman. Officials within the CAD even published an illustrated booklet offering detailed narratives of some of the atrocities, though it is somewhat unclear who within the division created the work or how wide was its distribution. Looking mainly at soldiers' acts against civilians in France, the booklet listed a total of 14 individual incidents. Sensational descriptions of the violence

²²⁹ Ziemke, 157.

²³⁰ Ibid, 154 and 157.

accompanied sketches with captions like “Murder ‘just for fun’”, including the following passage concerning the survivors of a town in the path of the German retreat:²³¹

Some of the inhabitants had survived the shelling and all these found by the charging Nazis were shot...Twenty five of the 67 killed were children between the ages of 10 months and 18 years... The 10 months old child was decapitated by a bayonet thrust.²³²

While the Army claimed it aimed this propaganda at the Nazis as opposed to the German population itself, advancing soldiers could be excused for blurring this line in their minds.²³³ This was especially true when the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps became public knowledge in the latter half of 1944. While training had attempted to prepare its officers for these circumstances, especially in regards to the treatment of Jews, it fell far short of the depravity of the Nazi regime.²³⁴ These revelations gave rise to a growing list of pronouncements that repeatedly highlighted the guilt of the Germans, rarely bothering to differentiate between combatants, politicians, or citizens.²³⁵

Widespread calls for German punishment, circulating officially and present in the attitudes of many officers within the regular Army, surely had some effect on CA soldiers in the field.

An illustration of this change in attitude is the personal journey of one young man who went through the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which was a kind of

²³¹ Detachment A1A1, ECAD, “Know Your Enemy,” 14, Accession 2001.036, Box 1, Folder 17, Fort Bragg.

²³² *Ibid.*, 9.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 23.

²³⁴ One CA Guide, for example, discussed briefly the large body of law that had slowly disenfranchised the Jews of Europe. In a section titled the “The Disappearance of the Jews in Germany,” the CAD estimated that approximately 150,000 German Jews had died to that point (July 1944) from starvation, suicide, complications of deportation, and natural death and that 75,000 might still be housed in concentration camps. The true figures were far more dramatic and included Jews from many of the conquered nations.

²³⁵ Eisenhower had a publicly professed dislike for Germans, but this paled in comparison to the reaction created by the publicity surrounding the Morgenthau plan, which some said at the time actually encouraged Germans to fight harder. Ziemke, 106-108.

CATS for enlisted soldiers aimed mainly at producing capable translators. Hans Wilfred Anders received similar training to those officers with which he would eventually serve, including courses on history and psychology, so it was natural that he would adopt the attitude and outlook that CA training most often promulgated, especially regarding German culpability for the war. During his training period, he wrote to his mother (who was Austrian born):

...fellows in the Area and Language [ASTP] don't hold the German people responsible for everything that has happened in Germany. It is true that the German people were largely responsible for Hitler's popularity in the first place... On the other hand we must remember that the German people were in the midst of an economic depression, which brought about a political crisis too, indirectly... The German people were desperate—they would follow anyone who assured them food and money.²³⁶

Such logic led Anders to adopt a friendly attitude toward Germany and focus on the positive aspects of occupation: “It isn't punishment that we must think about, it is the educational that must be stressed.”²³⁷ His feelings were so strong that a reader of his letters can almost sense his tangible excitement at having the opportunity to reconstruct Europe – what he referred to in boot camp as “something constructive to look forward to.”²³⁸ Considering the training received by these soldiers and the officers of the CAD, it seems likely that this attitude was by no means an anomaly, and very well may have represented the norm within the division, at least during the initial stages.

Yet his excitement for the coming years and his view of the German people changed at some point. While relatively tolerant with a majority of the German citizens with whom he interacted, there are occasional letters where one can see a slight change in

²³⁶ Letter, Hans Wilfred Anders to Anna Josephine Anders, 26 October 1943, 1, Hans Wilfred Anders Papers, Folder October 1943, MHI.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 10 June 1943, 3 Hans Wilfred Anders Papers, Folder June 1943, MHI.

Anders' attitude. To some extent, he seems to have accepted some of the harsh views proposed by the more vindictive men in the theater, where Germans were not victims, but willing Nazi collaborators. While considering what he judged a legitimate travel request, the simmering tensions he held came to the fore:

After she related her story...I just sat there kind of thinking the whole thing over. Apparently, I gave her the impression that she wouldn't get one. So, she unhesitatingly added, "Oh, I make a plea on your sense of human understanding" (*menschliche Verstandnis*). God! When she said this I blew up—I told her she had a hell of a lot of nerve to even mention those words, after what misery the Germans had brought upon the world.²³⁹

Similar outbursts would characterize his interactions throughout the rest of the year, but these were often limited to specific instances concerning Nazi collaborators or Germans who felt entitled to specific requests.²⁴⁰

Such an attitude was not wholly unusual, though it often manifested itself only under certain circumstances. More often than not, men who sought vengeance for the crimes of war manifested their hatred most firmly towards Nazi party members and sympathizers. While many detachments did only a high level cleaning of the National Socialist ranks, other officers took an almost perverse pride in their abilities to denazify huge swaths of society.²⁴¹ Frank Howley, for instance, a CATS graduate and the officer in charge of the American sector in Berlin, was noted for his humanitarianism towards German civilians and his tendency to ignore regular Army orders despite his highly public office.²⁴² Nonetheless, not only did his detachment claim responsibility for publishing the above document on Nazi atrocities, but he would later brag that under his

²³⁹ Ibid, 16 July 1945, 2 Hans Wilfred Anders Papers, Folder March – December 1945, MHI.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 25 July 1945 among others.

²⁴¹ Training Packet No. 57, 92. In the early stages of postwar administration, one survey showed that only 20 of 216 claimed completing the process of denazification, and many others had only removed the most repugnant officials.

²⁴² Maginnis, 293-294; Ziemke, 159; Clay, Decision, 32.

leadership “We have even removed the head of Public Health and 21 eminent [Nazi] surgeons at a time when doctors are desperately needed.”²⁴³ Even when considering the past crimes of the German people, such a cold statement is surprising. It did, however, represent a commitment to purification and punishment that, while never approaching a truly widespread culture among CA detachments, was not unusual in postwar Germany.

As has been shown, confusing and often contradictory attitudes within the military were responsible for much of this heterogeneity within the ranks, but this problem was not as challenging as the contradictions in orders coming pell-mell from above. The obvious example is the notorious JCS 1067, which directly conflicted with the much more public and more prominent CA guides for Germany. Additional confusion came from the public pronouncements and orders flowing down the line from commanders like Eisenhower, who more often than not were solely concerned with the military aspect of conquest to the detriment of MG operations. His oft-noted disinterest in such matters must have created confusion, both within his inner circle of CA advisors and within the ranks themselves.²⁴⁴ Given the fact that similar-minded officers to Eisenhower – career military men who were more familiar with a battle map than a street grid – were the nominal military governors of large areas added to such confusion.²⁴⁵ The somewhat nonsensical decrees that emanated from these commanders often made implementing MG

²⁴³ Office of Military Government, U.S. Berlin District, “Six Months Report: 4 July 1945- 3 January 1946,” 9, John J. Maginnis Papers, Box 1, Book 1, MHI.

²⁴⁴ Gulkowski, 150-151 and Gaddis, 102-103 among others.

²⁴⁵ This began with career officer General Frank McSherry, who essentially ran military government concerns in Italy, France and into Germany. It would continue when Generals Eisenhower and then Joseph McNarney became the Military Governors of Germany, with lower ranking generals often taking nominal control of major regions. Amongst these was George Patton, who drew fire for his publicly liberal stance towards Nazis. Rarely respected by the military establishment and facing an entrenched bias towards new units, trained MG officers were rarely promoted above the rank of Colonel. Nonetheless, it was not unusual for military commanders, rarely interested in MG, to delegate the actual duties of their office to better trained or more willing subordinates. Gulkowski, 150-161.

all the more difficult. Chief amongst these were orders like the ban on fraternization between Americans and Germans. Meant to curb relations between soldiers and the local women, it did more to expand the gap between occupiers and the occupied than any other action. It also confused and frustrated well-intentioned MG officers, who now wondered where to draw the line in their everyday interactions with the locals.²⁴⁶ Testifying to this fact is the case of Colonel John Maginnis, who questioned the policy after refusing the handshake of a polite German storeowner: “I did not take it [the proprietor’s hand], and it bothered me that I did not. Had I given him a brief handshake would I have been fraternizing?”²⁴⁷ This and other issues like denazification became thorns in the sides of CA officers, who felt these orders often directly interfered with their abilities to carry out their duties.

Additionally, Washington politicians, military planners, and the majority of citizens at home demanded the swift demobilization of the Army after the war, which often included those men with the most civil affairs experience. The tradition of the citizen soldier included a quick demobilization at the end of most wars, and World War II would be no different. This process actually began before the war was over, when the Army announced just after VE-Day that all men 42 years of age and older could be discharged with the proper application.²⁴⁸ This clearly included many of the men of MG, who had often begun their schooling in the states above the age of 40 two or three years

²⁴⁶ The drawbacks of this order had been noted by many, including General Clay who eventually struck down the order altogether and supported relations between the peoples. Gulkowski, 181.

²⁴⁷ Maginnis, 249. Compare this with the relative ease with which MG officers conversed with the populace in Italy. Social functions were not out of the question, and one officer even spent his time “discuss[ing] ‘Latifundism’ over dinner table with the owner of a 20,000 acre barony.” Letter, Captain Gardiner Bump to Folks at Yale, Easter, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 813, NARA. For examples of relations with Italians, letters in RG 389 Entry 442, Box 813 and Hersey.

²⁴⁸ “To Release Older Men,” *CASALOG* (Presidio of Monterey, California), 9 May 1945, 1, Accession 2001.036, Box 2, Folder 12, Fort Bragg.

prior. This began the flood of soldiers back home.²⁴⁹ These men were usually those with the highest points, a complicated Army system that took into account training, time spent in the theater, and various other individual considerations – a process that meant many of the trained and experienced men of MG were eligible to return home.

Yet despite this, MG officers were slower to leave the continent than is obvious. As late as January 1946, SMG or CATS graduates led a majority of MG detachments in various city centers.²⁵⁰ Many of these men were not young, so the fact that they remained must have been some combination of personal willingness and military necessity. Perhaps they were too involved in their own work to bother with the proper paperwork. Either way, regular shipments of officers home would diminish the final numbers, but it by no means decapitated the MG leadership. Many of those men who did remain often moved to more senior positions and occasionally were “civilianized,” though this happened in only a handful of cases.²⁵¹ Nonetheless, the trials of war and the policies of the military resulted in a trend of needed officers leaving in greater and greater numbers as the months progressed. This became especially noticeable as the occupation continued to demand American officers more than a year after hostilities ended. By the summer of 1946, Frank Howley, who was still going strong in Berlin, commented to a former MG colleague that “All the old gang is gone.”²⁵² Military Government, while still holding on to some excellent individuals, saw many of its best trained and most experienced officers allowed to return home before the final mission succeeded.

²⁴⁹ “MGR High Pointers Begin ‘Sentimental Journey’ Home,” *The Bavarian*, 13 September 1945 (Augsburg, Germany), 1, Accession 2002.036, Box 1, Folder 49, Fort Bragg.

²⁵⁰ Review of various MG detachment reports in Accession 2002.036, Box 2, Folders 3-5, Fort Bragg.

²⁵¹ Even in mid-1947, John Maginnis recognized a few of the officers from his time in Berlin, though he commented that they “looked a little strange in civilian dress.” Letter, Maginnis to Howley, 27 March 1947, John J. Maginnis Papers, Box 2, Folder 1, MHI.

²⁵² Letter, Frank Howley to John Maginnis, 5 May 1946, John J. Maginnis Papers, Box 2, Folder 1, MHI.

These problems were parts of a larger cultural issue. A handful of officers, mainly those in the CAD and a few in Washington, understood the future of international affairs and “the new mission the Army had.”²⁵³ Warfare had become so destructive, that any future conflict could mean calamity from day one. It was no longer a matter of defending territory from aggression, but of preventing aggression from occurring altogether. CA/MG did battle in this new arena, for what a later generation would call the hearts and minds of the world. Warfare in this new arena did not involve tanks or shells, but foodstuffs and clothing. This battle only began when the physical firing ceased. The average commander was slow to realize the importance of this new strategy. George Patton typified the attitude of many old soldiers when he responded to the question of how many MG officers he needed for Sicily with “not a God-damn one of those civilian sissies.”²⁵⁴ Such attitudes made performing MG duties difficult and would persist in some quarters throughout the war, most evident in the eventual removal of a Civil Affairs component from the staffs of army groups within a short period after hostilities ended.²⁵⁵

Attitudes were similar within the ranks themselves. Many of these men did not realize the full extent of their mission. If they did, they simply did not care. Just a few months after V-E Day, one reporter described an MG staff in Bremen as having “its combined mind concentrated on getting home.”²⁵⁶ These men had enlisted as part of a patriotic duty, or even as a kind of adventure, and by 1945 they were tired of the ordeal.

²⁵³ “History: School for Government of Occupied Areas,” unpublished history (November 1946), 1, RG 389 Entry 442, Box 763, NARA.

²⁵⁴ MacLean, memoir, 33.

²⁵⁵ The SMG had closed in early 1946. Realizing Training would need to continue, the School for Government of Occupied Areas opened at Carlisle Barracks, PA. This itself would close after just a few months to the “surprise and shock” of its administrators and students, who had just prepared to train five more class. “History: School for Government of Occupied Areas,” 17. The CAD would share a similar fate just a short while after that.

²⁵⁶ Frank E. Mason, North American Newspaper Alliance, no date, Bion C. Welker Papers, Box 3, Folder News Articles, MHI.

Less conscientious men than Frank Howley had already taken a similar course of action when he jokingly complained to John Maginnis that “I am personally very anxious to get back to the States and start making money.”²⁵⁷ Men like Howley would remain in Europe and do some of their finest work after such complaints, but their rare sacrifices show that not all officers fully grasped the lasting mission with which they were involved.²⁵⁸ Only a few understood that the military mission in postwar Europe had changed drastically from that for which they had enlisted.

CAD had foreseen the problems of the coming conflict, problems which were fairly new to the realm of warfare. The destruction, carnage, and human loss that had taken place were incomparable to even that most horrible of wars a generation before. Yet the CAD was merely a part of the military. While it guided American policy on the ground in Germany, demanding a more active and permanent approach regarding American foreign policy in Europe, it could not set the final tone. For this, Washington was responsible. What it did do was demonstrate the necessity and benefits of a new kind of warfare, a warfare that did not necessarily involve bullets. The government could not create appropriate forces for this new mission as it went along, because its job was inherently multifaceted – too complicated to be left to the chance and improvisation. The resulting confusion could easily lead to faulty policy, poor administration, and failure. The CAD demonstrated that men in uniform could not return home as soon as the firing stopped, but now were necessary in times of quiet as well as tumult. It began the first battle in this new peacetime war, and in 1946 it showed Washington that this battle was necessary to safeguard the future of American democracy.

²⁵⁷ Letter, Howley to Maginnis, 5 May 1946, John J. Maginnis Papers, Box 2, Folder 1, MHI.

²⁵⁸ Both Frank Howley and Earl Crum, who made similar complaints, would remain for almost a full year after they first started writing about the return home.

**“The responsibility of great states is to serve and not to dominate the world”
Conclusion**

The importance of the men of the CAD and their beliefs is apparent when one considers the situation on the ground in the final days of the European war. Lacking guidance from above, MG detachments often had to formulate policy within their own area as a matter of necessity. Even within the military itself, the hierarchy of the CAD had little influence over its detachments until after the victory, when the advance finally ended and the Army could implement a formal communication structure.²⁵⁹ Until this point, detachments had almost complete autonomy and the CAD expected them to deal with the situation as best they could.²⁶⁰ Years later, one soldier summarized his experiences during the period: “Plans were made, unmade, remade. But somehow the deal went off.”²⁶¹ The lessons taught on the home front combined with the inherent abilities of the men selected for the job were the only constant factors in initial steps towards postwar reconstruction. This resulted in a policy that rarely reflected official doctrine as embodied in the still secret JCS 1067 or even the later Potsdam agreements.

Considering the situation, it is likely that such actions may very well have shaped wider military policy at this point. As has been shown above, initial actions often went

²⁵⁹ The extent of this independence had clearly ruffled feathers among the old-school military commanders. Even after victory John Hilldring noted that “the G-5 [CA] boys have a tendency” to set up “outside military channels. Whatever the theoretical justification, in practice the military government officer (a lt. col.) sitting in the same town as a division commander (maj. gen.) is independent, God Help the lt. col. and your military government.” Quoted in Ziemke, 273.

²⁶⁰ Oravetz interview, also MacLean, memoir, 90. Based on his observations in the theater, Malcolm MacLean recommended selection of officers “of great self-reliance and common sense” to be given “carte blanche within a few general directives to carry on all necessary civil affairs action.”

²⁶¹ Templeton, 93.

far beyond the restrictive confines of military necessity and occasionally forced the higher echelons to craft new policy. Into this situation came Lucius Clay, a regular Army officer who had spent most of his time working in various home-front posts during the war. Unfamiliar with the situation in Germany when he arrived in March of 1945, it is reasonable to assume that Clay relied heavily on his MG advisors and policy that already existed on the ground. Before leaving for Europe, he had spent a few days in intense discussion with G-5 General Hilldring on issues in Germany.²⁶² Upon taking up his position, he found himself surrounded by graduates and instructors associated with the various MG training schools. Former SMG director Cornelius Wickersham was essentially his predecessor in the role of deputy military governor, having been responsible for much of the planning and creation of the staff that Clay would inherit.²⁶³ Men like Frank Howley and Bion Welker still occupied many of the highest regional offices and planning positions, continually applying the culture of the CAD and what Clay would describe as “the humanitarian touch of America to the stern task of occupation” well after V-E Day.²⁶⁴ Even some civilian advisors had connections with the CAD, initially associating themselves with the armed forces through stints as instructors in the various schools. Especially notable on this list is a pair of political advisors – SMG instructor Dr. James K. Pollack and former director of the Harvard CATS Carl

²⁶² Lucius D. Clay, interview with R. Joe Rogers, transcript, Tape Three, New York, 24 January 1973, 3, Lucius Clay Papers, MHI and Hilldring, interview, 47.

²⁶³ Ziemke, 222-224. Clay, Decision, 8. While much of the planning of the Group Control Council, which preceded the office of deputy military governor, was never implemented, the ideas developed and the staff recruited would continue to inform thinking in the theater. Wickersham would remain in Europe for a short period of time after Clay arrived, though it is unclear how much of a relationship the men had.

²⁶⁴ This phrase was specifically applied to the actions of Frank Howley. The full quotation shows the affection Clay must have felt for the man: “I had only to think back to the successful effort he had made, working day and night, to bring order out of chaos, to relieve human suffering beyond reason, and to bring the humanitarian touch of America to the stern task of occupation. Then it would seem to me that he had well earned the commendation not only of Americans but of his fellow men.” Clay, Decision, 32.

Friedrich.²⁶⁵ Looking at the list of men that surrounded Clay on his arrival in Europe, he had excessive opportunities to familiarize himself with the CA mindset.

Clay demonstrated his agreement with such values in his constant bending of directives, especially his somewhat lax view towards enforcing JCS 1067. Historians have long noted his suspicion of the document, which he tended to actively rework in order to accomplish the necessities of MG on the ground. “In a realistic sense,” he recalled, the harsh treatment demanded by the document “was never really put into effect.”²⁶⁶ Reports also tended to bubble up from field operations, recommending the adoption of more flexible and benevolent actions in Germany. While Clay would claim that these did not represent official military policy, his actions clearly show that he had some sympathies for the constructive attitudes that they espoused, especially regarding the economy.²⁶⁷ This was particularly important as Washington continued to vacillate under the unsure leadership of Harry Truman, who had been isolated from much of Roosevelt’s postwar decision making (or lack thereof). Actions like the reparations halt of May 1946 (though this had stopped in certain areas even earlier) and the first attempts at regional unification led in a direction very different from established policy. During the immediate postwar period when implementation of JCS 1067 for “even a brief period of time seemed likely to undermine the [War Department’s] long range objectives” in Germany, the somewhat insubordinate actions of the military kept the German ship from

²⁶⁵ Clay, interview, 8.

²⁶⁶ Clay, interview, 4. Compare this with John Hilldring’s comment about implementation of the directive by MG officers: “when JCS 1067 finally reached them, it was at considerable variation and considerable variance from what they thought the American policy in Germany should be and when they went to work inside Germany, what they really did was somewhere in between...” Such actions were largely condoned by the higher officers, which soon led to a Senatorial investigation on the topic. Hilldring, interview, 45.

²⁶⁷ Gimbel, 20-25.

sinking.²⁶⁸ Thus when MG found itself reworking many of the policies emanating from across the Atlantic, especially on economic issues like reparation, it was demonstrating to Washington the best path for future international relations.

The attention paid to these developments by the civilian establishment only increased as time went on. The new Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, was especially receptive to such ideas. As Clay's superior during the war, he had developed a close bond with the future military governor of Germany and was willing to entertain ideas emanating from overseas. He realized the importance of the military's mission and accepted it as one that only the armed forces could properly achieve, describing the Army as the "operating department" to the State Department's policy centered role.²⁶⁹ From such statements made before authoritative bodies like the Truman Committee of the Senate, Byrnes indicated that he felt the Army had a role to play – not just in war, but in peacetime as well.

The importance of this connection between Byrnes and the military was essential for his September of 1946 speech in Stuttgart, where he reversed the official American policy of a harsh retribution on Germany. There he reiterated America's intention to demilitarize and denazify Germany, but also struck a more conciliatory note regarding German self-government and the economy. He, in his most elegant words, offered America's assistance "to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world."²⁷⁰ This had come after months of talks brought Clay and "those of us who were responsible for military

²⁶⁸ Quoted from Gaddis, 124.

²⁶⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Investigation of Military Government," 79th Congress, 1st Session, 13 November 1946, Senate Unpublished Hearing, CIS-NO: 79 SSt-T.37, 24-25.

²⁷⁰ Quoted in Clay, Decision, 81.

government” into contact with Byrnes, Truman, and men like Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton.²⁷¹ John Hilldring, who moved from G-5 to the State Department earlier in the year, remembered the speech as “something that the soldiers sold him on.”²⁷²

While some historians have claimed that this new policy was the product of increasing U.S.-Soviet tensions, this shift in thinking existed before such issues rose to the forefront of international policy.²⁷³ Far from being a complete about-face, this speech brought official national policy closer to the constructive approach that many soldier-governors had already attempted to implement on the ground. Clay recognized this fact, stating in his memoirs that the CAD inspired *Basic Handbook for Military Government of Germany*, the unofficial “bible” earlier rejected by Roosevelt, “deviated little from the American policy which was to develop for Germany and to be proclaimed first by Secretary of State Byrnes in his Stuttgart speech.”²⁷⁴

These new policies first implemented by the military were in many ways archetypes for attitudes that would guide American foreign policy in the first decades of the Cold War. Soviet pressure or not, this was first and foremost an active approach towards the world, engaging with other nations for the mutual benefit of all peoples. As espoused under the specific circumstances of occupation, democratization, by cajoling if necessary, was the great goal of American force. This was the only way to fight totalitarianism – a battle that would continue with the onset of the Cold War.

²⁷¹ Ibid, 43.

²⁷² Hilldring interview, 52.

²⁷³ Hilldring stated quite clearly that this change in opinion happened well before the U.S.-Soviet split completely solidified, owing more to a fear of an “economic morass in central Europe” than anything else. Ibid, 51.

²⁷⁴ Clay, Decision, 8.

The attachment to isolationism had disappeared. While many in 1943 still feared that an internationally active United States would somehow poison its own native democracy, just a few years later such criticism had faded. The fight against totalitarianism proved to many that democracy was only safe under the auspices of an active, if beneficent, foreign policy. Only through the spread of democracy across the globe could the home-grown American variety ultimately prosper. The victorious war against fascism had apparently proved this formula, and this logic soon developed to encompass the Soviet Union, as its totalitarian tendencies became more and more apparent in its actions in Eastern Europe.

The best way to fight such a war for the very culture of disparate nations was not with guns, but with the tools of the civilian world. The military had realized this in its attempts to forestall the impending disaster of JCS 1067, and it had espoused just such policy for three years prior. While more research is necessary to document how such thinking affected national decision-making (or whether it merely forestalled the occurrence of a much greater disaster than had already struck Europe), MG practitioners had repeatedly shown their intentions to create a new and dynamic German nation.

The ideas of multilateral cooperation, international economic prosperity, and political rejuvenation of occupied nations had first been recommended in the classrooms of the University of Virginia, Yale, Wisconsin, and others, but they became reality in the actions of the Marshall Plan and the great recuperative strategies of the early Cold War United States. While Harry Truman may never have sat in a CATS classroom or discussed economic recovery with one of its graduates, it is reasonable to say that many of the President's most lasting initiatives complemented the culture created under the

CAD. President Truman was not thinking of the actions of General Clay and the troops on the ground when he addressed Congress in 1945, but many of the officers in Europe would have concurred with his statement that “The responsibility of great states is to serve and not to dominate the world.”²⁷⁵ With this first statement and the many that would follow over the next years, Truman signaled to the world that the United States would remain an active member of the world community and that its military was now at the forefront of its foreign policy.

For the first time in American history, the military had reached beyond its role as a largely defensive force and established itself as a major peacetime actor. While the public demanded demobilization, the government tempered this process somewhat by the retention of a peacetime selective service, leaving over 1.5 million men still in uniform in 1947.²⁷⁶ During this period, the military also renewed MG training, which it realized was essential for its new international mission. Its education on democratic institutions and culture no longer questioned the effectiveness or durability of democracy but recognized the major importance of this political system as a weapon in the new world order.²⁷⁷ Unable to completely withdraw from Germany due to a mixture of self-imposed duty and a changing international situation, the military became a major actor in long-term policy planning.

²⁷⁵ Harry Truman, Address Before Joint Session of Congress, 16 April 1945, available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ww2/stofunio.htm>, accessed 12 April 2008.

²⁷⁶ Gerhardt, 56-57. This was the number of military officers sanctioned by Congress for the year – 1 million alone for the Army. Such a large number over two years after fighting ended would have shocked many from a previous generation, but was actually considered necessary (and was below the number the Truman administration claimed it required) by the politicians of the time. While it seems this number was still being whittled down, events of 1948 would completely reverse this policy. It is unclear where exactly the Congress would have left the military without these events, but the facts of the period point to a more active and sizeable military than had been present in the past.

²⁷⁷ The Provost Marshall General’s School, *MG Training Packet No. 5: Principles of Government*. Accession 2002.036, Box 2, Folder 13, Fort Bragg.

While such an idea had frightened Americans only a few years prior, the experience of MG in Germany and the changing international situation reformed the image of the military. While many could have easily blamed the somewhat incoherent policies of the postwar period on the incompetence of the indecisive armed forces, books and articles repeatedly highlighted the work ethic, honesty, and good intentions of the men in uniform, who were now performing an inherently civilian job.²⁷⁸ Public opinion pages, while rarely unanimous in support of any institution, tended to aim criticism not at the military, which had been the favored target into 1943, but at the federal administration.²⁷⁹ In breaking away from its traditions and embracing new and diverse missions, the Army had proved itself a capable and trustworthy tool of American democratic government. No longer did the public look at the military with fear or suspicion, but tended to regard it with more grateful eyes.

With new actors and a new mission, America would enter the stage of a dynamic and changing postwar world. Revolutionary challenges existed in the threat of nuclear arms and the improvement in air technology. The enemy was no longer a single nation, but an ideology that thrived on strife and starvation. Traditional ideas of international relations were cast aside in favor of a more active approach, which combined the long-held traditions of American diplomacy with an increasingly powerful military establishment. These ideas and transitions had their first rehearsals among the men of military government. These officers were the first to establish the roots of the new

²⁷⁸ Bach. Reporting from Germany after the war, the sharp-tongued, often dramatic Julian Bach had largely good things to say about the MG officers in Europe.

²⁷⁹ For a few examples, see William A. Lord, "Administration is Blamed" letter, (Newark, NJ; 5 April 1946), in "Letters to the Times," *The New York Times*(New York), 11 April 1946, 24 and Marquis Childs, *Washington Calling*, "Danger Signals from Germany," *The Washington Post* (Washington DC), 16 November 1945, 6.

American internationalism, and some of the first military men to break out of the long-held restrictions placed on the American armed forces by its own populace. Military government, in essence, was the first step down the long and often perilous road that has led America to its current place as world leader and international guarantor of democratic principles.

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